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ITALY  AND  THE  WAR 


ITALY  AND  THE  WAR 


BY 
JACQUES   BAINVILLE 


TRANSLATED   BY 

BERNARD   MIALL 


NEW  YORK:   GEORGE   H.  DORAN  COMPANY 
LONDON:    HODDER  &  STOUGHTON 


^v 


Priiite4  i»  Great  Britain  by  Hatell,  Watson  &  Viney,  W. 
l^ndon  and  Aylesb'^ry. 


TO 

MADAME  DE  COUDEKERQUE-LAMBRECHT 

RESPECTFUL    HOMAGE 


J.B. 


367464 


PREFACE 


War  reveals  the  nations  as  they  are.  It  shows 
where  they  are  strong  ;  it  pardons  none  of  their 
weaknesses.  It  sheds  a  harsh  light  upon  their 
national  characteristics,  their  institutions  and 
governments.  The  European  struggle,  by  bring- 
ing the  great  Powers  into  mutual  conflict,  and 
by  forcing  even  the  smaller  nations  to  take  up  a 
position  or  to  choose  a  side,  will  at  least  have 
served  to  increase  our  knowledge  of  the  human 
species.  The  present  war  provides  us  with  the 
elements  of  a  prodigious  survey  of  experimental 
psychology  and  politics.  Observations  made  of 
this  or  that  country  under  such  circumstances  as 
the  present  are  likely  to  lead  to  a  much  better 
knowledge  of  the  absolute  reaHty  of  things. 

In  the  case  of  Italy  I  believe  we  shall  never 
have  a  better  occasion  of  getting  to  know  her. 
And  at  present,  to  tell  the  truth,  we  know  very 
little  of  her. 

The  old  misunderstandings  with  France  have 
vanished.  Since  the  rupture  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
the  two  countries  have  lived  in  an  atmosphere  of 
unalloyed  and  unsuspicious  sympathy.  And  the 
Italians,  when  they  broke  the  Alliance,  were  not 
playing  a  part.  Their  action  revealed  the  depths 
oi  the  Italian  heart.     In  deciding  to  intervene  in 


10.  PREFACE 

'th^'w'ar,  and  on  the  same  side  as  ourselves,  they 
were  careful  to  announce  that  the  national  in- 
terest of  Italy  was  their  guide,  and  the  *'  sacred 
egoism  "  of  patriotism  their  point  of  departure. 
This  famous  phrase  was  uttered  by  Signor 
Salandra,  the  leader  of  one  of  the  most  broad- 
minded  and  honest  Governments  that  Italy  has 
ever  known.  It  is  the  solid  foundation  of  Italian 
politics,  and  the  best  of  guarantees  for  the 
harmony  of  the  Allies.  Every  day  that  has  passed 
since  Italy  declared  war  upon  Austria  has  resulted 
in  a  more  intimate  collaboration  with  the  Powers 
of  the  Entente.  This  result  could  not  have  been 
so  certainly  foretold  if  Italy  had  entered  the  war 
merely  in  obedience  to  racial  affinities,  or  an 
enthusiastic  but  unreliable  movement  of  disin- 
terested altruism. 

We  are  informed  that  in  May  191 5  an  Italian 
statesman,  who  was  hostile  to  intervention, 
flattered  himself  that  before  three  months  had 
elapsed  Italy  would  be  disillusioned  and  weary 
of  the  war,  and  would  again  appeal  to  him  to 
save  her  from  the  consequences  of  the  "  false 
step  "  which  nationalism  had  induced  her  to  take. 

The  Italians  have  already  been  fighting  for 
a  much  longer  period  than  three  months,  and 
they  are  neither  weary  nor  disillusioned.  Those 
who,  whether  at  home  or  abroad,  had  believed 
Italy  capable  of  so  promptly  renouncing  her 
undertaking  made  a  bad  miscalculation  as  to  her 
material  and  moral  resources.  The  power  of 
resistance  which  Italy  is  displaying  is  a  pheno- 
menon which  proves  better  than  aught  else  how 
the  Italian  nation  has  grown  and  developed  during 
these  early  years  of  the  twentieth  century. 


PREFACE  II 

The  Italians  are  suffering  under  no  illusions  as 
to  the  nature  of  the  war  upon  which  they  have 
voluntarily  embarked.  Appreciating,  judiciously 
and  positively,  the  general  situation,  and  the  forces 
at  work,  they  will  have  formed  no  false  estimate 
of  the  duration  of  the  struggle,  nor  of  its  diffi- 
culty. In  this  connection  we  were  able  to  collect, 
on  the  spot,  the  clearest  evidence  of  their  clair- 
voyance and  resolution.  Time,  since  then,  has 
not  stood  still ;  it  has  proved  that  the  will  of 
Italy,  as  it  asserted  itself  in  Rome  during  the 
critical  days  of  May,  has  become  a  desperate 
resolve.  It  is  a  foolish  prejudice,  which  must  now 
be  abandoned,  that  the  predominant  characteris- 
tics of  the  Latins  are  frivolity  and  inconstancy. 
Without  speaking  of  ancient  Rome,  did  not  the 
Italy  of  the  nineteenth  century,  in  her  struggles 
for  unity  and  independence,  display  a  persever- 
ance bordering  upon  obstinacy  ?  The  Italy  that 
realised  herself  in  191 5  was  the  same  Italy. 

A  broad  view  of  the  general  situation  enables 
us  to  estimate  the  great  service  which  the  Italians, 
merely  from  the  military  point  of  view,  are  render- 
ing to  the  cause  of  the  Allies  by  immobilising,  on 
the  Isonzo  and  the  Julian  Alps,  many  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  Austro-German  troops.  To  recog- 
nise "  the  efficacy  of  Italian  co-operation,"  as 
M.  Briand  has  lately  done,  in  a  conversation  pub- 
lished by  a  Roman  newspaper,  is  therefore  to 
recognise,  to  do  justice  to,  an  indubitable  truth. 

But  equity  calls  for  more  than  this.  We  must 
never  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the  Italian  people 
entered  the  war  by  its  own  will,  imposing  that 
will  upon  the  neutral  elements  of  the  nation, 
elements  both  powerful  and  numerous.     When- 


12  PREFACE 

ever  the  complaint  is  made  that  Italy  does  not  do 
this  or  that,  simple  as  the  matter  may  appear  from 
a  distance,  we  must  remember  that  every  step 
forward,  every  extension  of  the  conflict,  implies 
discussion,  a  struggle,  and  resistance  to  be  over- 
come. In  Florence,  this  very  summer,^  on  the 
wall  of  the  Uffizi  we  saw  "  Down  with  the  War  !  " 
inscribed  in  great  red  letters ;  they  could  be  read 
from  the  farther  side  of  the  Piazza  della  Signoria. 
And  a  little  farther  on,  upon  another  wall,  we 
found  other  graffiti  in  favour  of  intervention. 
Well ! — these  two  tendencies — like  those  of  the 
Guelfs  and  the  Ghibellines — are  active  still ;  but 
the  neutralist  movement  is  in  general  dominated 
by  the  other,  which  is  directed  by  the  best  and 
strongest  elements  of  the  country,  and  has  rallied 
all  the  elites. 

The  recent  declarations  of  Baron  Sonnino, 
which  corroborated  those  of  Signor  Orlando,  his 
colleague,  and  the  definite,  official  adhesion  of 
Italy  to  the  Pact  of  London — these  are  events 
which  have  occurred  since  this  book  was  written, 
and  which  justify  its  forecasts.  Once  having 
entered  the  war,  it  was  clear  that  Italy  had  to  ^'  go 
through  with  it  "  ;  had  to  accept  the  ultimate 
consequences  of  the  decision  which  she  took  when 
she  broke  with  the  Triple  Alliance  ;  otherwise  her 
policy  would  have  been  merely  puerile.  And  the 
Italians  are  no  children.  They  have  even  proved, 
by  their  far-sightedness  in  Eastern  affairs,  that 
they  are,  in  experience  and  political  maturity, 
far  in  advance  of  some  of  their  associates. 

We  have  endeavoured,  in  this  book,  to  show 
Italy  as  the  war  has  revealed  her,  We  have  also 
I  1915, 


PREFACE  13 

sought  to  present  the  profounder  motives  of  her 
intervention ;  motives  v^hich  rule  her  poHtical 
future.  The  ItaHan  State  is  one  of  the  most 
original  and  one  of  the  most  vigorous  elements 
of  modern  Europe,  and  one  of  the  richest  in  future 
promise.  The  v^ar  came  at  one  of  the  most 
favourable  moments  of  its  grovi^th  and  evolution. 
Italy  v^as  able  to  seize  upon  this  moment,  and 
to-morrow,  we  believe,  she  will  count  in  the 
world  for  more  than  she  counted  yesterday. 

This  is  a  fact  which  we  ought  to  realise  ;  and 
also,  how  it  came  about.  This  book  expresses 
our  admiration  for  the  progress  of  Italy,  and  for 
the  realism  of  her  politics.  We  foresee  for  her 
in  the  future  successes  at  least  equal  to  those  she 
has  won  in  the  past.  Whosoever  may  feel  inclined 
to  take  umbrage  for  this  reason  will  do  better 
to  learn,  by  this  example,  something  of  the 
conditions  under  which  a  State  may  uplift  itself, 
and  a  people  increase  its  stature. 

December  191 5. 


CONTENTS 

Preface  ......      pp.  9-13 

CHAPTER  I 
Italian  Opinions  and  Intentions 

A  saying  of  Massimo  d'  Azeglio's — ^The  "  comet  "  of  Franco- 
Italian  friendship — Europe  in  arms — Italy  is  no  longer 
a  "  geographical  expression  " — ^The  "  risorgimento  of  the 
Risorgimento  " — Development  of  the  national  conscious- 
ness— ^The  might  of  historic  memories  in  Italy — Poetry 
and  action — Political  traditions  and  the  war — ^The  deeper 
motives  of  the  Italian  intervention — Insufficiency  of  all 
partial  explanations — "  For  the  greater  destinies  of  Italy  " 
— What  the  Giolittian  "  neutralists "  failed  to  realise. 

pp.  19^41 

CHAPTER  II 

The  Adaptations  of  the  House  of  Savoy 

The  Revolution  in  the  Italian  past — A  saying  of  George  Sand's 
— ^A  dynasty  of  adapters  and  realisers — ^The  advice  of 
Joseph  de  Maistre — The  spiritual  drama  of  Carlo  Alberto 
15 


i6  CONTENTS 

— ^The  rallying  of  the  patriotic  Democrats — The  evolution 
of  a  subversive  monarchy — ^The  Italian  Iphigcnia — 
Neither  reaction  nor  revolution — After  unification,  pacifica- 
tion and  union pp.  42-70 


CHAPTER  III 
The  Nationalist  Tradition 

Independence  and  *'  Liberty  " — ^The  period  of  conflict  and  its 
sacrifices — How  a  nation  is  born — ^The  union  of  classes — 
The  Princess  Belgiojoso — The  Chevalier  Nigra — ^The  work 
of  the  people — ^The  hunchback  of  Brescia — Irredentism — ■ 
Guglielmo  Oberdank — ^The  primordial  importance  of 
literature — From  Gioberti  to  d'  Annunzio — Italian  poetry 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  or  Nationalist  lyricism — 
Leopardi,  the  false  pessimist — Carducci,  the  national  poet 
of  the  Third  Italy — The  Fourth  Italy  and  Gabriele 
d' Annunzio       ......    pp.  71-98 


CHAPTER  IV 
Italy  is  no  longer  the  Country  of  the  Dead 

The  scorn  of  the  nineteenth  century — Literary  witchcraft — 
Italy  wishes  to  "  live  her  life  " — From  beyond  the  tombs 
—The  forerunners— The  intuition  of  Proudhon— First 
outlines  of  an  Italian  Imperialism — ^The  dream  of  Victor 
Emmanuel  II — Don  Amadeo — Italian  dynamism — ^The 
conservative  nations  and  the  progressive  nations — The 
tendency  of  ideas  before  the  war — "  Futurism "  and 
Nietzscheism — The  new  Nationalist  party — The  cathedral 
of  Reims — The  Italian  spirit  and  the  war      ,     pp.  9^125 


CONTENTS  17 

CHAPTER  V 

The  Quirinal  and  the  Vatican 

The  two  Queens — ^The  Duchessa  d'  Aosta — A  significant  be- 
trothal— A  "  King  Deadweight  " — Victor  Emmanuel  III 
and  the  Republicans — Universal  suffrage — ^The  crisis  of 
the  Masonic  idea — ^The  Italian  monarchy  and  the  Papacy 
— Coexistence  of  the  two  Powers — ^The  Latapie  incident 
— Germany  and  the  Holy  See — An  ingenuous  symbol — A 
prophecy  concerning  the  Italian  Empire — The  expiring 
Revolution pp.  126-157 


CHAPTER  VI 

From  the  Triple  Alliance  to  the  Quadruple 

Entente 

A  saying  of  Thiers' — A  false  conception  of  Italian  "  gratitude  " 
— ^The  origins  of  the  triple  pact — Italy  between  France 
and  Austria — Sentiment  and  reason — ^The  policy  of  Crispi : 
modification  of  the  system — Italy  and  England  :  maritime 
assurance — ^The  "turns  round  the  ballroom" — ^The 
"  penetration  of  alliances " — ^Tlie  Franco-Italian  rapproche- 
ment— Renewed  tension,  and  a  fresh  obstacle — Italy's 
Mediterranean  policy — ^Vain  attempts  of  Germany — ^The 
question  of  the  Twelve  Islands — Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the 
Marquis  di  San  Giuliano — ^What  happened  in  April  1914 — 
A  reason  for  confidence — Neutrality  or  intervention  ? 

pp.  158-182 


i8  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VII 
The  Historic  Month  in  Italy 

The  aspect  of  Rome  after  the  great  days  of  May — ^A  drama  of 
the  national  conscience — ^The  protagonists  of  intervention 
— Baron  Sonnino  and  Article  VII — From  Count  Berchtold 
to  Baron  Burian — A  great  statesman  who  is  a  great  and 
honest  man  :  Signor  Salandra — ^A  diplomatic  "  sixteen- 
inch  shell "  :  the  Biilow  mission — ^A  return  from  the 
Parliamentary  Elba  :  Signor  Giolitti — "  Down  with  the 
parecchio  !  " — Gabriele  d'  Annunzio  takes  the  field — ^Poet 
versus  Parliamentarian — Rome  in  an  uproar — ^The  appeal 
to  the  King — ^The  liberty  of  the  Crown — ^The  victory  of 
Italian  Nationalism         ....       pp.  183-234 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Future 

Italy's  objectives — ^The  "  sacred  egoism  " — Italian  realism  and 
the  principle  of  nationalities — Italy  and  Germany :  why 
they  both  expected  a  declaration  of  war — ^Hypotheses  con- 
cerning the  part  of  Italy  in  a  future  Congress — ^The  Austrian 
*'  cushion  " — Threats  of  Pangermanism — "  The  war  which 
is  to  establish  Central  Europe  " — ^The  future  policy  of 
Italy  in  the  Balkans  and  the  East — ^The  future  of  the 
Franco-Italian  relations — Reasons  for  believing  in  a  durable 
/«^^«/^  and  a  lasting  friendship  .         ,         ,        pp.  235-262 

Index    ,         ,         .         .         .         .         .pp.  263-267 


ERRATA 


P-  54>  5^^  line  from  bottom,  for  unc/es  read  cousins. 

p.  69,  nth  line,  for  conservator  read  conservative. 

P-  75»  3rd  line  from  bottom,  p.  76,  ist  line,  for  Trivulce  read  Trivuhio. 

p.  105,  7th  line  from  bottom,  for  On  leaving  Spain  read  On  leaving 


for  Spain, 


from  Turin  to  his  French  friends  :  '*  You  should 
see  how  your  soldiers  are  received  !  Yesterday 
two  squadrons  of  lancers  went  by  beneath  my 
windows,  in  the  midst  of  a  crowd  which  could  no 
longer  find  means  of  expressing  its  delight,  and 
nearly  all  the  officers  were  wearing  great  bunches 
of  flowers,  which  the  ladies  had  thrown  them 
from  the  balconies.  It  is  the  honeymoon  at  its 
full,  and  I  hope  it  will  be  a  honey-comet  (excuse 

19 


i8  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  VII 

The  Historic  Month  in  Italy 

The  aspect  of  Rome  after  the  great  days  of  May — A  drama  of 
the  national  conscience — ^The  protaeonists  of  intprv«='ntinn 


"  cushion  " — ^Threats  of  Pangermanism — "  The  war  which 
is  to  establish  Central  Europe  " — ^The  future  policy  of 
Italy  in  the  Balkans  and  the  East — ^The  future  of  the 
Franco-Italian  relations — Reasons  for  believing  in  a  durable 
/»/^«/^  and  a  lasting  friendship  .         ,         ,        pp.  235-262 

Index pp.  263-267 


ITALY  AND  THE  WAR 


CHAPTER  I 

ITALIAN    OPINIONS    AND    INTENTIONS 

A  saying  of  Massimo  d'  Azeglio's — ^The  *'  comet  "  of  Franco- 
Italian  friendship — Europe  in  arms — Italy  is  no  longer 
a  "  geographical  expression  " — ^The  "  risorgimento  of  the 
Risorgimento  " — Development  of  the  national  conscious- 
ness— The  might  of  historic  memories  in  Italy — Poetry 
and  action — Political  traditions  and  the  war — ^The  deeper 
motives  of  the  Italian  intervention — Insufficiency  of  all 
partial  explanations — "  For  the  greater  destinies  of  Italy  " 
— ^What  the  Giolittian  "  neutralists "  failed  to  realise. 

In  the  month  of  May  1859,  shortly  before  the 
battles  of  Magenta  and  Solferino,  an  Italian 
patriot,  one  of  those  who  had  done  most  for  the 
independence  of  Italy,  Massimo  d'  Azeglio,  wrote 
from  Turin  to  his  French  friends  :  "  You  should 
see  how  your  soldiers  are  received  !  Yesterday 
two  squadrons  of  lancers  went  by  beneath  my 
windows,  in  the  midst  of  a  crowd  which  could  no 
longer  find  means  of  expressing  its  delight,  and 
nearly  all  the  officers  were  wearing  great  bunches 
of  flowers,  which  the  ladies  had  thrown  them 
from  the  balconies.  It  is  the  honeymoon  at  its 
full,  and  I  hope  it  will  be  a  honey-comet  (excuse 

19 


20  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

the  neologism  !),  and,  what  is  more,  one  of  those 
that  return  every  hundred  years !  " 

This  curious  expression  erred  only  on  the  side 
of  moderation  and  extreme  prudence.  Not  in 
a  century,  as  Azeglio  thought,  but  in  less  than 
sixty  years,  will  the  "  comet  "  of  Franco-Italian 
friendship  have  accomplished  its  revolution. 

During  the  journey  from  Paris  to  Milan  we 
mused  for  a  long  time  on  this  species  of  prophecy. 
How  favourable  to  meditation,  by  the  way,  is 
this  journey  !  Not  recking  that  we  should,  by 
passing  through  Switzerland,  double  the  forma- 
lities of  the  passport  and  the  customs  inspection, 
particularly  strict  and  minute  in  these  troublous 
times,  we  had  taken  the  "  short-cut  "  by  way  of 
Frasne-Vallerbe,  a  work  of  peace  which  had  just 
been  inaugurated  in  the  midst  of  war.  The 
"  short-cut  "  was  destined  to  lengthen  our  voyage 
to  a  remarkable  degree,  but  we  had  no  reason 
to  regret  this.  On  leaving  a  France  in  arms,  a 
France  in  which  the  enemy  was  still  encamped, 
all  of  whose  male  population  was  with  the  colours, 
down  to  the  reservists  of  the  old  territorial 
classes,  with  grey  hairs  and  bushy  beards,  who 
were  patiently  guarding  the  railway-track — on 
leaving  this  France,  a  France  in  campaigning 
kit  and  all  the  accoutrements  of  war,  what  did 
we  find  ?  A  Switzerland  which,  in  the  Latin 
portion,  was  thrilled  by  the  same  passions  and 
the  same  hopes  as  we  ourselves,  and  which,  in 
her  Germanic  portion,  was  equally  ready  to  defend 
her  frontiers,  determined  that  she  would  not 
suffer  the  fate  of  Belgium  ;  whose  mountaineers 
had  been  in  arms  for  nearly  a  year,  in  order  to 
safeguard  their  independence.     And  when,  having 


OPINIONS   AND    INTENTIONS      21 

crossed  the  Simplon,  we  entered  Italy,  our  eyes 
again  encountered  the  same  military  spectacle, 
but  here  something  was  added  :  the  activity, 
the  stir,  and  the  lively  bustle  of  the  first  weeks 
of  warfare,  which  we  had  witnessed  in  France  at 
the  opening  of  hostilities. 

Lastly,  whether  in  P'rance,  in  Switzerland, 
or  in  Italy,  on  the  faces  of  these  mobilised  citizens, 
men  confronted  by  their  harsh  military  duty, 
we  beheld  no  resignation,  but  resolute  glances 
and  entire  acceptation.  What  a  vision  it  was ! 
— fleeting,  to  be  sure,  and  incomplete,  yet 
suggestive  and  exact  as  a  photographic  document 
— this  vision  of  the  Europe  of  1915,  and  of  the 
tasks,  heavy  and  fearful,  which  the  existence  of 
a  mighty  Germany  has  imposed  upon  all  the 
European  peoples ! 

While  the  train  was  rolling  across  the  plain 
of  Lombardy,  without  a  stop,  with  a  clockwork 
punctuality  of  which  the  Italians  might  well  be 
proud  in  the  midst  of  such  circumstances ;  while 
we  were  drawing  near  to  the  historic  sites  of 
Magenta  and  Solferino,  we  listened  to  the 
conversation  of  our  fellow-travellers,  who  were 
all  in  favour  of  Italian  intervention,  approving 
warmly  of  the  decision  of  King  Victor-Emmanuel 
and  Signor  Salandra.  And  then  there  recurred 
to  our  mind  a  striking  impression  which  had 
remained  with  us  from  the  great  decisive  days  of 
the  international  crisis  of  1914,  from  which  the 
war  emerged.  Living,  in  Paris,  near  the  Italian 
Embassy,  we  had  seen,  at  the  end  of  July,  the 
Rue  de  Crenelle  filled  with  Italians  resident  in 
the  city,  who  had  come  some  to  ask  for  informa- 
tion, some  to  obtain  certificates,  some  to  apply 


22  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

for  passports.  On  the  faces  of  these  poor  folk 
might  be  read  the  same  uneasiness,  the  same 
anguish.  They  were  going  to  war,  that  was 
certain.  Germany  and  Austria  were  revealing 
their  design,  pursuing  their  ideal  of  aggression. 
And  was  not  Italy  their  ally  and  associate  ?  Was 
there  not  the  Triple  Alliance  ?  .  .  .  What  ? 
They  would  have  to  fight  against  France — friendly, 
hospitable  France  ?  The  thought  made  for 
gloomy  faces.  One  felt  that  their  hearts  rebelled 
against  it.  But  no  later  than  the  3rd  of  August, 
interpreting  and  appeasing  the  Italian  conscience, 
the  Government  of  Victor-Emmanuel  III  declared 
its  full  and  entire  neutrality,  leaving  to  Germany 
and  Austria  the  responsibility  for  their  provoca- 
tive attitude.  And  then  you  might  have  seen 
the  Italians  in  Paris  lifting  their  heads  once 
more ;  you  might  have  seen  them  displaying, 
with  pride  and  gladness,  on  their  sleeves,  in  their 
buttonholes,  on  their  hats,  the  Red,  White,  and 
Green  which  should  never  be  the  foe  of  the 
Blue,  White,  and  Red. 

Those  Italian  artillerymen  were  actuated  by 
the  same  feeling  who,  at  that  very  moment,  on 
the  Alpine  frontier,  were  changing  the  direction 
of  their  guns,  no  longer  willing  that  their  mouths 
should  be  turned  toward  France  :  as  a  token 
that  the  French  might  be  at  ease,  might  devote 
themselves  wholly,  without  anxiety  as  to  their 
south-eastern  frontier,  to  repulsing  the  invader. 
And  this  attitude,  loyally  assumed  and  faithfully 
observed  by  Italy  from  the  first  day  of  the  con- 
flict, from  the  declaration  of  hostilities — was  it 
not  the  attitude  of  Italy  even  before  this  date  ? 
Did  it  not  set  her  feet  upon  the  path  which  was 


OPINIONS   AND   INTENTIONS      23 

to  lead  her  to  intervene  on  the  side  of  France  ? 
The  fortunate  event,  the  favourable  issue,  occurred 
at  the  due  momen^,  v^hen  it  v^as  needed,  v^hen  it 
could  supervene  with  the  most  complete  effect. 
It  was,  above  all,  a  great  happiness  for  those 
who,  being  friends  and  admirers  of  intellectual, 
artistic,  and  literary  Italy,  had  so  long  dreaded 
to  see  the  scandal  of  Italy  in  arms  against  France, 
in  conformity  with  the  treacherous  programme 
of  Bismarck.  When,  in  the  summer  of  191 5,  we 
found  an  Italy  associated  with  our  cause  and  our 
arms,  we  were  conscious  of  one  of  the  keenest 
pleasures  we  have  experienced  since  this  war 
began.  What  a  satisfaction,  what  a  consolation, 
to  reflect  that  the  blood  of  the  French  heroes 
which  was  shed  of  old  for  the  liberation  of  Italy 
was  shed  no  less  for  France  ;  that  the  sacrifice 
was  not  in  vain,  since  it  was  in  part  responsible 
for  the  advent  of  this  hour ;  since  by  its  virtue 
the  old  alliance,  which  men  feared  to  see  fall 
into  oblivion,  had  been  renewed. 

Of  course — and  we  must  not  forget  this— we 
are  no  longer  in  the  year  1859.  We  are  no 
longer  in  the  times  when  Swinburne  called  Italy 
"  the  care  of  the  world."  We  are  no  longer  in 
the  times  when  Lamartine  had  but  lately 
declared  :  "  To  liberate  Italy  would  be  enough 
to  make  a  people  glorious."  These  are  no  longer 
the  times  when  Napoleon  III  cast  the  sword  of 
France  in  the  European  balance — in  favour  of 
United  Italy;  and  the  collaboration  of  to-day 
bears  only  a  distant  resemblance  to  the  old 
collaboration  between  the  Second  Empire  and 
Piedmont.  Situations,  events,  states  of  mind — 
these  no  longer  coincide,  point  by  point.     The 


24  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

comet  predicted  by  Massimo  d'  Azeglio  is  gleam- 
ing above  a  world  transformed — a  world  over 
which  time  has  passed.  Still,  we  hasten  to  admit 
that  this  comet,  on  its  return,  must  have  recog- 
nised many  things — many  relics  of  other  times, 
which  all  those  for  whom  history  speaks  a  living 
tongue  will  have  saluted,  with  overflowing  hearts, 
upon  setting  foot  on  Italian  soil  in  the  midst  of 

these  great  events. 

.  <  •  •  • 

It  would  be  a  great  error  to  represent  the 
Italy  of  1 91 5,  an  Italy  enlarged  and  fortified, 
the  greater  Italy,  a  mighty  entity,  which  has 
freely  formed  its  decision  in  the  face  of  the 
European  conflict,  as  having  the  countenance 
and  the  features  of  the  Italy  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  Italy  which  had  yet  to  conquer  her 
independence,  to  overcome  the  obstacles  which 
opposed  her  existence  as  a  nation.  Then  Italy 
was  in  the  outer  darkness. 

Was  she  capable  of  life  ?  Men  thought  it 
so  doubtful  that  Metternich,  her  deadliest  enemy, 
was  able  to  flatter  himself  that  he  had  for  all 
time  defined  her  as  a  "  geographical  expression." 

But  we  must  not  forget  this  :  that  something, 
and  something  strong  and  enduring,  has  survived 
from  the  heroic  age,  from  that  period  of  suffering 
from  which  the  political  rebirth  was  dated,  the 
resurrection — Risorgimento — of  the  Italian  people ; 
it  is  the  moral  element,  the  idealism  and  the 
poetry  of  that  period.  We  were  impelled  one 
day  in  Milan  to  remark  before  a  few  hearers  who 
willingly  forgave  the  play  of  words  :  "It  seems 
that  we  are  here  witnessing  the  risorgimento  del 
Risorgimento.^^     For   there   was   indeed,   in   the 


OPINIONS   AND    INTENTIONS      25 

Italy  of  191 5,  a  real  resurrection  of  those  feelings 
by  virtue  of  which  the  Italy  of  the  nineteenth 
century  arose  from  her  tomb.  To  realise  what 
was  passing,  during  the  great  European  crisis, 
in  the  minds  of  Italian  citizens,  we  must  obtain 
an  accurate  idea  of  the  various  elements  which 
came  into  play.  Among  these  elements,  historical 
tradition  and  the  poetical  inspiration  of  the 
Risorgimento  were  not  the  least,  and  if  we  were 
to  ignore  these  we  should  form  an  erroneous 
estimate  as  to  the  general  causes  of  the  war,  and 
also  as  to  the  mental  state  and  mental  tendencies 
of  the  Italian  people. 

Rare  indeed  in  France,  save  perhaps  among 
a  few  of  the  elect,  the  historical  sense  is  in  Italy 
an  inspiring  motive.  And  we  must  not  suppose 
that  this  is  true  of  Lombardy  only,  and  Venetia, 
where  the  meaning  of  oppression  has  obviously 
remained  more  vivid  and  is  still  a  thing  of  yester- 
day. More  than  one  Milanese  was  born  under 
foreign  rule.  More  than  one  heard  the  cry  : 
"  Away  with  the  Barbarians  !  "  long  before  the 
war  of  1 9 14  had  spontaneously  recalled  to  life, 
in  Belgium,  in  France,  and  all  over  Europe,  the 
accusation  of  barbarism  brought  against  the 
Germans.  In  Milan  the  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence is  evoked  at  every  step,  almost  by 
every  stone  ;  the  very  names  of  the  streets  (as 
that  of  the  Via  Mac-Mahon)  recall  the  past. 
More  than  one  Milanese  has  asked  me  :  "  How 
could  I  fail  to  be  in  favour  of  intervention,  when 
my  father  fought  beside  your  soldiers  in  1859  ?  " 

Yes ;  memory  may  be  more  potent  here  than 
elsewhere,  but  it  has  never,  in  Italy,  been  absent 
from  the  minds  of  any  :    Signor  Salandra,  for 


26  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

example  (one  cannot  cite  a  better),  is  neither 
Lombard  nor  Venetian  ;  he  hails  from  Bari,  in 
Apulia.  All,  in  short,  have  been  affected  by- 
historical  suggestion.  It  has  even  seemed  as 
though  there  WQie  those  among  the  adversaries 
of  intervention  themselves  w^ho  could  not  refrain 
from  recalling  the  years  of  Piedmont's  grov^th 
and  conflict,  years  full  of  bitterness  and  perplexity. 
And  these  had  feared — quite  wrongly — lest  v^ar 
with  Germany  and  Austria  should  compromise 
the  magnificent  results — which  half  a  century 
ago  had  seemed  too  much  to  hope  for  to  Italians 
of  little  faith — which  the  Italy  of  our  days  has 
achieved. 

The  Italian  has  a  long  memory.  He  knows  his 
history.  His  own  national  history  is  to  him 
a  sacred  thing,  and  he  continually  derives  from 
it  motives  of  action.  Thus  it  was  that  the 
enthusiasm  with  which  Italy  welcomed  the 
expedition  to  Tripoli  went  hand  in  hand  with 
the  festivals  which  celebrated  the  jubilee  of  the 
Risorgimento.  Italy  owes  her  conquest  of  Tripoli 
to  the  evocation  of  memories  which  exalt  the 
Italian  mind.  Let  us  carefully  remember  this 
Italian  characteristic  :  it  will  explain  more  than 
one  phenomenon  of  political  life  which  is  puzzling 
at  the  first  encounter.  As  for  us,  we  have  always 
regarded  those  peoples  which  do  not  attempt  to 
conceal  their  frivolity  and  ignorance  by  an  affected 
disdain  of  the  past  as  worthy  of  admiration,  and 
even  of  envy. 

Like  the  French,  the  Italians  willingly  discuss, 
with  entire  candour  and  freedom,  those  events 
which  have,  in  the  course  of  years,  marked  the 
relations  between  French  and  Italy.     They  do 


OPINIONS   AND   INTENTIONS      27 

not  hesitate — and  in  this  they  are  right — to 
evoke  the  bad  moments  as  well  as  the  good  ;  they 
hold  that  silence,  in  this  connection,  conciliates 
no  one,  but  merely  nourishes  ill-feeling.  It  is 
significant  that  they  do  not  hesitate  to  go  back 
beyond  the  incidents  of  the  Carthage  and  the 
Manouba,  and  the  affair  of  Aigues-Mortes.  One 
day,  as  I  was  standing  before  the  statue  of 
Napoleon  III  which  may  be  seen  in  the  court- 
yard of  the  palace  of  the  ancient  Senate  in 
Milan,  a  prominent  citizen  of  the  Lombard 
capital  made  the  following  curious  remark : 
"  Napoleon  III.  .  .  .  We  shall  always  be  grateful 
to  him  for  Solferino.  But  we  have  not  forgiven 
him  for  Villafranca."  Well !  If  one  wishes  to 
avoid  misunderstandings,  when  conversing  with 
Italians,  if  one  wishes  one's  conversation  to  be 
profitable,  one  must  always  remember  that 
Solferino,  no  less  than  Villafranca,  is  always 
present  to  the  lucid  Italian  mind.  They  are 
events  of  more  than  fifty  years  ago.  But  that 
matters  little.  Solferino  remains,  for  the  Italians, 
the  name  of  the  victory  which  made  every  hope 
possible  ;  Villafranca  stands  for  the  sudden  check 
and  the  bitter  disappointment.  And  they  are 
still  keenly  sensible  of  these  contradictory  im- 
pressions, as  the  contemporaries  of  these  events 
were  conscious  of  them.  They  are  still  thrilled 
by  the  passions  of  their  ancestors. 

This  is  one  of  the  essential  characteristics  of 
the  Italian  mind,  of  the  Italian  sensibility,  which 
are  attentive  to  the  voice  of  history.  The 
Germans,  who  know  the  Italians,  have  not  failed 
to  cultivate  this  peculiarity.  We  have  been 
told   that   during   the  weeks  when  Prince  von 


28  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Biilow  was  desperately  negotiating  and  intriguing 
in  Rome,  German  agents,  Wilhelm  IPs  commer- 
cial travellers,  were  giving  lectures  on  modern 
history  to  the  villagers  in  the  taverns  (in  the 
osterie  of  Tuscany  more  especially),  hoping  to 
prove  to  them  that  it  was  in  the  interest  of  Italy 
to  range  herself  on  the  Austro-German  side. 
The  attempt,  however,  was  made  in  vain ;  it 
was  swamped,  with  all  the  rest,  by  the  great 
flood  of  feeling  which  was  sweeping  across  Italy. 
But  for  some  little  time,  in  the  market-places  of 
the  Tuscan  villages,  you  might  have  heard  the 
rustics  discussing  Italian  history,  and,  with  the 
erudition    of    a   German    textbook,   supporting 

the  cause  of  the  Ghibellines ! 

•  •  •  •  • 

Italy  went  to  war — to  "  her  "  war,  as  she  said — 
with  deliberate  significance  and  a  just  pride ; 
animated  by  a  passion  and  enthusiasm  several  of 
whose  elements  will  be  found  lacking  in  the 
feelings  which  determined  the  course  of  the  other 
nations  which  are  to-day  united  against  the 
Central  Empires.  It  is  true,  in  particular,  that 
a  writer  played  an  important  part  in  determining 
the  decision  of  Italy :  Gabriele  d'  Annunzio 
continued  the  incantations  of  all  the  great  Italian 
poets  by  whom  the  lyric  moments  of  last  May  were 
brought  to  completion,  and  the  war  was  acclaimed 
by  the  Roman  people. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  in  this  land  of 
noble  speech  and  rhythm,  where  the  music  of 
verse  is  appreciated  as  highly  as  in  the  country 
of  the  Felibres,  all  the  poetry  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  more  particularly  the  noblest  and 
the  most  beautiful,  has  been,  in  spirit,  Nationalist. 


OPINIONS   AND   INTENTIONS      29 

The  Italians  are  fortunate  in  that  their  greatest 
poets  have  always  expressed  the  aspirations  of 
their  country.  Everywhere  in  Italy  since  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  a  collection  of  patriotic 
verse  has  been  offered  for  sale  ;  an  anthology, 
printed  on  inferior  paper  ;  and  in  this  popular 
anthology  figure  the  noblest  and  proudest  names 
of  the  Italian  Parnassus.  Happy  country,  where 
the  difficult  and  scholarly  verse  of  a  Leopardi 
or  a  Carducci  is  sold  in  the  street  for  a  halfpenny, 
and  is  carried  in  the  soldier's  knapsack !  It 
should  be  remembered  that  the  Saluto  italico 
of  Carducci  has  since  the  end  of  May  been 
recited  almost  nightly  in  the  theatres  of  the 
populace,  if  we  are  to  realise  the  nature  and  the 
quality  of  the  movement  which  has  brought 
Italy  into  the  conflict. 

Stendhal  somewhere  remarks  that  in  Italy 
"  the  vulgar  are  the  few."  The  remark  is  still 
true,  and  I  remember  that  a  similar  observation 
was  made  years  ago  by  General  de  Charette. 
For  although  he  had  fought  in  the  ranks  of  the 
Papal  Army,  and  against  the  unity  of  Italy,  he 
adored  the  Italian  spirit,  and  he  always  remem- 
bered with  pride  that  he  was  once  a  pup  1  in 
the  Royal  Military  Academy  of  Turin.  I  think 
I  may  venture  to  say  that  General  de  Charette 
had  never  read  Stendhal,  although  his  memoirs 
often  remind  one  of  the  anecdotes  in  the  Chart- 
reuse de  Par  me.  But  this  similarity  of  opinion, 
as  regards  the  tendency  of  the  Italian  mind  to 
adhere  to  what  is  high  and  noble,  coming  from 
men  so  different  as  Henri  Beyle  and  the  leader  of 
the  Papal  Zouaves,  has  always  struck  me  as 
worthy  of  attention. 


30  ITALY  AND   THE  WAR 

It  is  very  flattering  to  the  nature  and  the 
quality  of  the  Italian  mind,  for  Stendhal  and 
Charette,  each  in  his  own  way,  were  good  judges 
of  men.  They  would  both  have  recognised  Italy, 
and  one  of  the  dominant  faculties  of  the  Italian 
character,  in  the  events  of  last  year.  They 
would  have  said  that  the  inspiration  of  the  war 
of  1 91 5,  propagated  by  the  lyre,  was  such  as  it 
should  have  been  in  a  country  whose  greatest 
patriotic  society  bears  the  name  of  Dante  Alighieri. 

However,  we  must  not  suppose  that  the  fore- 
going remarks  have  exhausted  the  analysis  of  the 
sentiments  of  the  Italian  nation.  One  there 
was  above  all — and  again,  of  the  moral  order — 
which  was  to  the  fore  in  everything  and  was 
all- decisive.  This  was  the  sentiment  of  the 
nation's  honour,  so  potent  in  modern  Italy,  who 
has  by  no  means  forgotten  the  rule  of  the  tedesco^ 
which  has  made  her  extremely  susceptible  on 
this  point.  Now  this  sense  of  honour  was  seriously 
exacerbated  by  the  intrigues  of  Prince  von  Biilow, 
and  was  even  more  seriously  offended  by  the 
connivance  of  certain  Parliamentarians  with  the 
foreigner.  Whoso  fails  to  realise  this  fact  will 
fail  to  understand  the  force  of  the  current  which 
was  sweeping  Italy  onward  in  the  month  of  May 
191 5.  This,  however,  is  a  subject  of  such  import- 
ance, involving  so  many  diverse  considerations, 
that  we  shall  have  to  deal  with  it  at  leisure  and 
in  a  special  chapter. 

But  the  hints  we  have  just  given  will  perhaps 
be  sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  necessary  falsity 
of  any  one-sided  explanation  of  the  new  Ris- 
orgimento  and  the  rupture  between  Italy  and  her 
ancient  Allies.     Especially  should  we  reject,  as 


OPINIONS   AND   INTENTIONS      31 

unduly  simplified  and  suspiciously  complete, 
the  explanation  that  all  was  due  to  Freemasonry 
and  the  traditions  of  the  democratic  and  revolu- 
tionary spirit.  Doubtless  these  forces  do  exist, 
these  traditions  do  survive,  and  play  their  part 
in  the  public  life  of  modern  Italy.  But  they 
are  far  from  being  the  only  forces  at  work  therein, 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  ideas,  as  we  shall 
have  occasion  to  show  farther  on. 

Yet  it  is  upon  this  explanation  that  the  German 
newspapers  have  seized.  This  is  the  explanation 
to  which  they  have  given  currency  ;  which  they 
loudly  proclaim,  with  hypocritical  reprobation. 
Atheistical  Italy  !  Italy  the  jailer  of  the  Papacy  I 
As  though  before  191 4  Wilhelm  II  had  ever 
dreamed  of  being  offended  with  Italy  1  Yet 
to-day,  in  order  to  win  the  sympathies  of  the 
Catholics  for  his  cause,  he  is  posing  as  the 
champion  of  the  Church  and  the  protector  of 
the  Holy  See.  But  the  German  Press  excels  in 
blowing  hot  and  cold,  and  does  not  even  trouble 
to  find  out  whether  neutrals  are  conscious  of  its 
contradictions  when  it  represents  Germany  now 
as  the  champion  of  Liberalism  against  the  Russian 
autocracy  and  now  as  the  champion  of  law  and 
order  against  the  French  democracy.  More- 
over, the  Prussia  of  the  Kulturkampf,  which  to- 
day affects  to  be  so  zealous  for  the  Papacy  and 
the  Church,  in  1866  befriended  young  Italy 
against  Austria,  although  Italy  was  really  animated 
by  a  spirit  of  revolution  !  Imperial  Germany, 
again,  has  for  thirty-two  years  been  the  ally  of 
the  Italian  monarchy,  yet  has  never  made  any 
remark  as  to  its  domestic  politics,  even  when 
the    question    of    religion  was    concerned.     In 


32  ITALY  AND   THE   WAR 

France,  as  abroad,  if  one  followed  the  Germanic 
Press  along  such  a  path  as  this,  one  would  be 
submitting  to  capture  by  the  clumsiest  of  Teutonic 
manoeuvres. 

We   may   suppose — may  we   not  ? — that   the 
Italians    know    themselves.     Now    the    Conser- 
vatives and  the  Moderates,  in  Italy,  absolutely 
refuse  to  admit  that  the  movement  in  favour  of 
intervention  can  be  explained  by  the  influence 
of  Freemasonry,  and  by  that  alone.    In  Lombardy 
notably  the  Catholics  are  demanding  their  share 
in  the  national  war,  and  their  attitude  and  their 
actions  speak  for  them.     Consider,  for  example, 
the  magnificent  campaign  of  the  Corriere  delta 
Sera,  which  has  become  the  most  widely  read 
newspaper   in   Northern   Italy,   and   which   has 
been  fully  as  eager  and  resolute  in  its  appeal  for 
intervention  as  any  of  its  Radical  contemporaries. 
Consider  too   the   welcome   which   the  deputy 
Meda,  who  was  then  a  "  neutralist,"  received, 
on  a  certain  day,  from  his  friends  and  his  Catholic 
electors.     Consider,  lastly,  the  enthusiastic  parti- 
cipation of  the  Lombard  aristocracy  in  the  war. 
Not  that  the  aristocracy  of  the  other   Italian 
provinces  bore  itself  otherwise ;    not  that  any 
distinction  can  be  made.     But  in  Lombardy  it 
was    truly   a   whole   chivalry   that   rose.     Some 
friends  were  anxious  to  provide  me  with  a  list 
of  names.     The  whole  of  Milan  society  was  on 
this  list ;    if  there  were  exceptions  they  were 
extremely  few,  and  only  necessity  was  responsible 
for  them.     Ofiicers  or  volunteers,  there  is  not 
one  good  Lombard  family  that  has  not  its  repre- 
sentatives in  the  armies.     Here  are  the  Princes 
of  Castelbarco-Albani,  the  Conti  di  Castelbarco- 


OPINIONS   AND   INTENTIONS      33 

Visconti,  Prince  Gonzaga  di  Venevato,  the  Duca 
di  Visconti  and  his  brotliers,  the  Conti  Visconti 
di  Modrone,  the  Duca  Scotti  and  his  brothers, 
the  Conti  Gallarati  Scotti,  Prince  Trivulzio,  the 
Conti  Cornaggia,  the  Conte  Catena,  the  Conte 
Taverna,  the  Conte  Borromeo-Aresi,  who  owns 
the  beautiful  palace,  unique  upon  the  face  of 
the  earth,  of  the  Borromean  Isles  in  Lago 
Maggiore ;  the  Conti  Borromeo  d'  Adda,  the 
Conti  Paravicini,  the  Conte  Cicogna,  the  Grippi, 
the  Marchesi  Clerici  and  Crivelli,  the  Marchesi 
Corti  and  his  sons,  the  Conte  di  Negroni  and  his 
sons,  the  families  of  the  Conti  Belgiojoso,  who 
bear  a  name  illustrious  in  the  history  of  the 
rinnovamento  ;  the  Conti  Dal  Verme,  the  Calvi, 
the  Brivii,  the  Durini  .  .  .  and  others  and  others 
and  again  others ;  names  which  form,  as  it  were, 
the  armorial  of  a  Crusade. 

And  those  who  showed  me  these  eloquent  lists 
added  these  words  : 

"  There  are  families  here  which  used  to  be 
considered  Austrophile.  They  are  with  the 
armies,  like  the  rest.  Even  in  1859  there 
was  not  such  a  blaze,  nor  such  unity,  in  our 
Lombardy  !  " 

This  is  a  fact  to  be  remembered.  It  indicates 
the  moral  elevation  of  Italy  at  war.  It  gives  the 
keynote  of  this  mighty  enterprise,  so  quick  with 
consequences  to  come,  upon  which  the  Italian 
people  has  voluntarily  embarked.  But,  as  the 
Milanese  themselves  would  be  the  first  to  admit, 
it  was  in  Rome  that  all  was  decided.  It  was 
in  Rome  that  the  movement  in  favour  of  inter- 
vention was  most  effective.  It  was  in  Rome 
that  opinion  had  to  be  consulted,  during  those 


34  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

historic  days  which  gave  birth  to  the  Italian 
war. 

The  first  time  I  met  Gabriele  d'  Annunzio — 
it  was,  as  he  himself  has  since  reminded  me,  at 
the  Villa  Borghese,  under  the  burning  Roman 
sun — I  remarked  to  the  poet,  after  recalling  those 
wonderful  evenings  in  May,  when  the  Roman 
people,  speaking  with  his  voice,  had  demanded  and 
acclaimed  the  war  : 

"  In  1848  you  would  have  been  Lamartine. 
But,  more  fortunate  than  he,  there  was  no  need 
for  you  to  cause  a  revolution." 

It  is  important  that  the  reader  should  realise 
the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  popular  and 
national  movement  which  determined  the  inter- 
vention of  Italy.  In  France,  on  the  whole, 
these  events  were  not  very  clearly  understood. 
The  internal  convulsion  which  Italy  underwent 
before  taking  part  in  the  European  war  has 
remained  obscure.  Farther  on  we  shall  sketch 
the  history  of  this  crisis,  and  it  will  be  seen  that 
it  constitutes  one  of  the  most  striking  phenomena 
of  the  political  life  of  contemporary  Europe. 

Among  the  States  at  present  at  war  in  Europe, 
some  have  obeyed  an  idea  of  aggression  ;  others, 
in  the  face  of  this  attack,  have  assumed  an  attitude 
of  conservation  and  self-defence ;  Italy  has 
taken  part  in  the  conflict  from  motives  peculiar 
to  herself.  She  has  done  so  voluntarily,  in  perfect 
liberty,  although  offered  compensation  if  she 
would  remain  a  neutral.  Something  more  power- 
ful than  love  of  peace,  more  persuasive  than  the 
sense  of  immediate  gains  and  advantages,  to  be 
enjoyed  without  effort,  impelled  the  Italian 
people  to  intervene.     It  was  the  feeling  that  a 


OPINIONS   AND   INTENTIONS      35 

solemn  hour  was  striking  for  all  the  nations,  and 
that  the  nation  which  should  allow  this  historic 
moment  to  pass  without  proving  the  might 
of  its  arms  would  suffer  an  irreparable  diminish- 
ment.  Moreover,  a  sort  of  vital  instinct  warned 
Italy  that  these  great  European  events  were 
occurring  at  the  moment  when  she  herself  was 
entering  upon  a  period  of  growth  and  develop- 
ment, a  new  phase  of  her  history,  after  surmount- 
ing the  difficult  years  of  her  unification.  From 
every  point  of  view  the  year  191 5  marked  a  great 
date  in  the  development  of  Italian  nationality, 
the  beginning  of  what  has  sometimes  been  called 
the  "  Fourth  Italy."  And  this  the  people  of 
Italy  felt ;  this  they  understood.  Few  peoples 
are  better  endowed  than  the  Italians  in  the  matter 
of  the  spontaneous  realisation  of  the  great 
necessities  of  politics.  The  demonstrations  of 
May  191 5  expressed  the  profound  intuition  of 
the  Italian  people.  According  to  the  decision 
which  it  was  about  to  take,  a  door  leading  to  the 
future  was  about  to  open  or  to  close. 

It  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  attribute  the 
war  merely  to  the  passion  of  "  Irredentism." 
No  doubt  the  Italian  nationalist  wants  the 
Trentino  and  Trieste.  He  wants  them  badly. 
I  have  seen,  wearing  the  Italian  uniform,  many 
sons  of  the  terre  irredente — the  unredeemed 
lands — who  had  just  fled  from  Austria  to  fight 
her  ;  and  the  other  day  forty- two  of  them  begged 
permission  to  make  an  assault  upon  an  enemy 
position,  an  assault  from  which  not  one  returned. 
It  is  always  curiously  potent,  this  feeling  of 
nostalgia  which  Italy  cherishes  for  the  Urre 
irredentey  the  feeling  to  which  Giosue  Carducci 


36  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

gave  the  wings  of  poetry  in  his  famous  Saluto 
Italico  : 

"  '  When  ?  '  the  old  men  sadly  repeat  to  them- 
selves, who  one  day,  when  their  hair  was  black, 
bade  thee,  Trentino,  farewell. 

"  '  When  ? '  say  the  young  men,  thrilling  with 
passion,  who  yesterday,  from  San  Giusto,  still 
beheld  the  blue-green  Adriatic  sparkling." 

This  "  when  ?  "  receives  its  reply  at  length, 
and  the  prayer  of  so  many  Italian  patriots,  who 
have  vanished,  like  Carducci,  without  having 
seen  the  deliverance  of  their  brothers,  is  about  to 
be  granted.  But  this  is  only  a  portion  of  the  great 
programme  which  Italy  has  set  herself,  and  which, 
she  is  conscious,  responds  to  her  increased  energies, 
her  development,  and  the  progress  of  all  kinds 
which  she  has  of  late  years  realised.  If  Italy 
desired  the  war  for  the  sake  of  Trieste  and  the 
Trentino,  it  was  not  for  their  sakes  only.  She 
desired  even  more  to  solve  the  problem  of  the 
Adriatic,  for  every  one  in  the  Peninsula  knows 
that  Italy  has  the  worse  share  of  the  shores  of 
that  sea,  and  that  Austria-Hungary,  from  her 
safe  Dalmatian  harbours  and  her  islands,  with 
their  formidable  winding  channels,  continually 
threatens  and  overlooks  her. 

But  the  problem  of  the  Adriatic,  the  "  most 
bitter  Adriatic,"  as  Gabriele  d'  Annunzio  calls  it 
— bitter  indeed  to  the  Italian  heart — the  problem 
of  the  Adriatic  does  not  explain  everything,  any 
more  than  the  passion  of  irredentism. 

•  •  •  •  • 

Since  the  guns  have  been  thundering  on  the 


OPINIONS    AND    INTENTIONS      37 

Isonzo  and  the  Julian  Alps — since  the  fourth 
war  against  Austria  has  commenced — very  many 
officers  and  soldiers  from  all  parts  and  provinces 
of  the  Peninsula  have  already  fallen.  The 
epitaph  preferred  by  the  families  of  these  heroes 
— the  ordinary  formula  of  the  announcement  in 
the  press  or  by  letter — is  extremely  significant : 
"  Died  fighting  for  the  greater  destinies  of  Italy 
— 'per  i  maggiori  destini  cf  Italia.''^  Thus  the 
memory  of  the  soldiers  who  have  fallen  on  the 
field  of  honour  is  associated  with  the  idea  of  the 
nation's  future.  And  this  ideal,  for  which  they 
gave  their  lives,  was  indeed  the  great  incentive, 
the  active,  determining  motive,  which  was  respon- 
sible for  Italy's  decision. 

Not  because  of  Trieste  and  the  Trentino,  nor 
the  Adriatic  problem,  but  in  view  of  a  more 
general  interest,  which  none  the  less  embraces 
these,  did  Italy  desire  ''  her  "  war.  She  wanted 
a  war  of  her  own,  a  personal  war,  a  national  war, 
which  is,  however,  the  same  war  as  that  the 
Allies  are  fighting,  because  she  felt  in  every  fibre, 
felt  in  her  vital  centres,  that  the  victory  of 
Austria-Hungary  would  for  her  be  the  signal  for 
her  downfall  and  a  fresh  servitude.  The  Italian 
people  understood  with  extraordinary  lucidity 
that  the  Triple  Alliance  had  never  been  any- 
thing more,  either  to  Italy  or  to  her  Germanic 
associates,  than  a  provisional  combination,  which 
involved  no  loyalty  on  the  part  of  her  partners  of 
Vienna  and  Berlin ;  something  after  the  fashion 
of  a  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  wolf,  the  goat, 
and  the  cabbage,  a  solution  according  to  which 
the  Prussian  wolf  proposed  to  allow  the  Austrian 
goat,   when    occasion   should   present   itself,    to 


38  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

fatten  herself  upon  the  Italian  cabbage,  in  order 
that  the  wolf  might  finally  devour  her  with  greater 
satisfaction.  The  Italians  felt  no  scruples  as  to 
denouncing  a  convention  dictated  by  the  purest 
opportunism.  They  refused  to  allow  themselves 
to  be  seduced  by  the  supreme  temptations  of 
Prince  von  Biilow,  who  offered  them  not  merely 
meagre  and  eventual  compensations  at  the  ex- 
pense of  Austria,  but  also  held  out  Tunisia,  Malta, 
and  Egypt  even  as  their  easy  prey.  The  greatest 
proof  that  the  Italian  people  has  ever  given  of 
its  political  good  sense,  which  is  extremely 
shrewd,  is  that  it  refused  this  deal ;  that  it 
preferred  to  owe  whatever  it  might  take  to 
its  own  efforts  ;  to  conquest  ;  that  it  preferred 
to  assert  its  right  to  '*  greater  destinies,"  to  a 
greater  place  in  the  world,  by  giving  proof 
of  its  strength  and  revealing  the  colour  of  its 
blood. 

And  here,  precisely  here,  resided  the  mis- 
understanding which  broke  out  into  public 
demonstrations  in  the  May  of  191 5  ;  a  misunder- 
standing between  two  generations,  between  two 
states  of  mind.  The  violence  of  the  "  inter- 
ventionists "  against  Signor  Giolitti  and  the 
"  neutralists  "  was  extreme.  If  we  regard  matters 
carefully,  with  the  impartiality  of  histor}/,  we 
shall  no  doubt  recognise  that  Signor  Giolitti,  in 
supporting  the  thesis  of  the  farecchio,  of  com- 
pensation, of  the  equivalent — of  "  something," 
in  short,  which  Italy  could  and  should  acquire 
without  sacrifice — ^was  actuated  by  another  con- 
ception, another  instinct  than  those  which  were 
actuating  the  Italian  people.  I  was  told  that 
Signor  Giolitti,  so  long  the  Grand  Master  of  the 


OPINIONS   AND   INTENTIONS      39 

administrative  life  of  Italy,  as  he  had  also  been 
its  Parliamentary  dictator,  was  never  in  his  life 
so  amazed  as  when  he  saw  the  staff  of  the  Minis- 
tries, almost  wholly  appointed  by  himself,  demon- 
strating in  favour  of  war — that  is,  in  opposition 
to  his  own  influence.  The  conflict,  accordingly, 
was  truly  serious,  because  it  was  a  conflict  between 
two  ideas,  two  methods  ;  because  it  revealed 
the  fact  that  Signor  Giolitti  and  his  supporters 
were  below  the  level  of  the  people's  will  to  live, 
were  behind  the  passing  hour.  Their  ideas, 
though  economic  and  prudent,  were  in  violent 
contrast  to  the  need  of  development  experienced 
by  the  nation.  They  assuredly  esteemed  them- 
selves the  best  and  wisest  and  most  realistic  of 
the  Italians.  And  a  great  cry  arose  from  the 
people,  declaring  that  their  prudence  was  sense- 
less, for  it  sought  to  restrain  one  of  those  national 
impulses  toward  wider  destinies  which  may  be 
compared  to  an  irresistible  vocation  in  the 
individual. 

Those  days  of  May  were  more  fraught  with 
future  consequences  than  any  through  which 
Italy  had  passed  since  the  fiery  period  of  her 
enfranchisement.  Their  history  is  as  yet  little 
known.  Jean  Carrere,  in  his  lucid  letters  to  the 
Paris  Temps,  was  almost  alone  in  giving,  day  by 
day,  a  precise  account  of  the  events  of  which  Rome 
was  the  theatre.  We  shall  now  endeavour  to 
tell  the  story  of  these  days,  or  at  least  to  give 
an  outline  of  them,  for  they  constitute  one  of 
the  most  striking  episodes  connected  with  the 
great  European  war. 

Now  here  is  a  point  which  it  is  important  to 
elucidate  without  delay. 


40  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

These  unforgettable  days  in  Rome,  which  the 
superficial  spectator  would  have  been  tempted 
to  describe  as  days  of  rioting,  were  above  all  an 
appeal  to  the  King.  It  was  to  the  successor  of 
the  creators  of  Italian  unity  that  the  people 
turned.  They  demanded  that  he  should  speak 
with  the  voice  of  the  nation  ;  a  decisive  voice 
against  which  there  should  be  no  appeal,  before 
which  the  last  opposition  would  give  way.  .  .  . 
And  the  King  spoke,  recalling  Salandra  to  power, 
declaring  war  upon  the  24th  of  May  :  a  great 
day,  in  the  records  of  Italy  and  the  House  of 
Savoy,  both  of  which  set  forth,  together  and 
once  again,  toward  an  ampler  future. 

On  this  point  all  actors  and  all  observers  are 
unanimous  :  it  was  no  revolutionary  or  Car- 
bonarist  movement  of  the  old  style  which  pushed 
Italy  into  the  war.  The  democratic  elements, 
by  a  mighty  synthesis,  were  united,  in  the  national 
movement,  with  the  remaining  elements  of  the 
nation.  But  the  national  character  carried  all 
before  it  ;  the  word  of  the  king  dominated  every- 
thing. Even  from  the  Trastevere,  traditionally 
anticlerical,  not  a  word  or  a  stone  was  aimed  at 
the  Vatican  ;  a  phenomenon  which  impressed 
all  observers.  Later  on  Barzilai,  a  republican, 
rallied  to  the  monarchy.  This  is  the  truth  about 
the  movement  of  May  191 5,  which  marked  a 
renewal  of  Italy's  historic  patriotism,  a  renewal 
implying  the  subordination  of  the  old  revolu- 
tionary element  to  the  national  spirit. 

This  is  why  I  was  able  to  remark  to  Gabriele 
d'  Annunzio,  who  did  not  contradict  me,  that 
in  being  the  poet  of  these  days  of  May  he  was 
happier  than  Lamartine,  for  he  caused  no  revolu- 


OPINIONS    AND    INTENTIONS      41 

tion.  But  a  rapid  glance  at  the  most  recent 
period  of  Italian  history  will  suffice  to  convince 
us  that  a  national  movement  like  that  of  May 
191 5  could  not  be  in  the  slightest  danger  of  follow- 
ing a  revolutionary  path. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    ADAPTATIONS     OF    THE    HOUSE    OF    SAVOY 

The  Revolution  in  the  Italian  past — A  saying  of  George  Sand's 
— A  dynasty  of  adapters  and  realisers — ^The  advice  of 
Joseph  de  Maistre — ^The  spiritual  drama  of  Carlo  Alberto 
— ^The  rallying  of  the  patriotic  Democrats — ^The  evolution 
of  a  subversive  monarchy — ^The  Italian  Iphigenia — 
Neither  reaction  nor  revolution — ^After  unification,  pacifica- 
tion and  union. 

During  the  winter  of  191 5  a  Frenchman  toured 
through  the  cities  of  Northern  Italy,  where  he 
delivered  eloquent  lectures  in  honour  of  the 
Allies.  And  as  he  neglected  no  argument  which 
might  be  capable  of  determining  the  interven- 
tion of  Italy  on  the  side  of  the  French  Republic, 
the  orator  evoked  the  memories  of  the  past,  the 
solidarity  of  the  revolutionary  movements  of 
the  nineteenth  century  in  France  and  Italy,  and 
the  ancient  fraternity  existing  between  the 
French  democracy  and  the  Italian.  Now  it  was 
noticed  that  his  public — Piedmontese  and  Lom- 
bard— was,  as  a  general  thing,  by  no  means 
sensible  to  such  appeals,  responding  but  poorly 
to  the  fiery  conviction  with  which  they  were 
delivered.  Finally  our  compatriot — an  open- 
minded  and  scholarly  speaker  on  whom  the  lesson 
cannot  have  been  wasted — was  enlightened  as 
to  the  cause  of  his  perplexity.     By  the  aid  of  a 

42 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  43 

familiar  and  proverbial  expression  one  of  his 
auditors  made  him  understand  the  reason  why 
certain  passages  of  his  lectures  did  not  receive 
the  response  he  had  looked  for. 

"  Take  care  !  "  someone  told  him  ;  "  to  speak 
of  revolution  in  Italy  is  rather  like  speaking  of 
the  cord  in  the  house  of  a  man  who  has  been 
hanged  !  " 

Thoroughly  to  understand  contemporary  Italy, 
and  to  avoid  misconceptions  as  to  the  Italy  of 
to-morrow,  we  must,  in  short,  realise  the  nature 
of  the  modern  Italian  State,  its  origins,  the 
complexity  of  the  elements  and  ideas  which 
presided  over  its  formation,  and  lastly,  the 
remarkable  evolution  which  it  has  accomplished 
in  the  course  of  half  a  century's  existence. 

By  way  of  introduction  to  a  little  book  of 
Mazzini's,  Republic  or  Royalty  in  Italy ^  one  of  the 
Gospels  of  the  Italian  Risorgimento,  George  Sand, 
at  the  height  of  her  democratic  fervour  (it  was 
in  1880)  wrote  the  following  lines.  It  is  curious 
indeed  to  read  them  at  the  present  moment. 

"  Italy,"  she  said,  '*  will  never  succeed  in 
winning  her  freedom  by  means  of  princes.  She 
must  rally  round  the  republican  principle,  which 
is  her  safety-anchor  ;  for  independently  of  the 
prodigies  of  courage  and  enthusiasm  which  only 
a  new  faith  can  engender,  this  nation  cannot  lag 
behind  that  European  movement  which  is  in- 
evitably drawing  the  democracy  toward  the 
Republic." 

George  Sand  was  expressing  a  belief  which 
was  then  general ;    it  was  the  profoundest  tenet 


44  ITALY   AND    THE   WAR 

of  the  men  of  1848,  her  friends  and  confidants. 
Did  not  Michelet,  about  this  time,  prophesy 
that  when  German  unity  and  Italian  unity  were 
an  accomplished  fact,  Europe  would  at  last  enjoy 
peace  and  fraternity,  based  upon  a  system  of 
universal  democracy  ?  It  was  then  hoped  that 
the  "  unitarian "  movement  in  Germany  and 
Italy  was  the  precursor  of  a  great  European 
Republic.  It  was  argued  that  once  these  national 
aspirations  were  satisfied,  once  a  few  thrones  were 
overturned,  once  a  few  great  peoples  had  united 
according  to  their  affinities  and  aspirations,  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States  of  Europe 
would  be  only  a  matter  of  a  few  years.  In  this 
respect  Michelet  and  George  Sand,  with  almost 
all  their  contemporaries,  were  gravely  mistaken. 
It  was  not  the  German  Liberals  of  the  Frankfort 
Parliament  who  created  German  unity  ;  it  was 
Bismarck,  Moltke,  and  the  Hohenzollerns.  United 
Italy  was  the  work  not  of  republicans  like  Manin 
or  Mazzini,  but  of  Cavour  and  the  princes  of  the 
House  of  Savoy.  We  must  admit,  however,  that 
in  the  days  of  George  Sand  and  Michelet  it  was 
pardonable  to  be  thus  mistaken  ;  the  delusion 
was  to  a  certain  extent  excusable. 

Who  were,  in  truth,  in  Italy  as  in  Germany, 
the  first  partisans  of  national  unity  ?  Liberals, 
Democrats,  Jacobins  even,  who  represented  the 
traditions  of  the  French  Revolution  ;  who  were 
inspired  by  the  spirit  of  the  Declaration  of  the 
Rights  of  Man  ;  who  proposed,  as  did  the  French 
Jacobins  and  Liberals,  the  abolition  of  the  treaties 
of  1815.  The  Revolution  of  1848 — a  revolution 
not  only  French,  like  that  of  1789,  but  European 
rather — marked  an  awakening  of  the  nationalities, 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  45 

a  considerable  step  forward.  In  Italy  the  national 
and  unifying  movement  was  all  the  more  nearly 
confounded  with  the  democratic  movement  in 
that  there  was  a  question  of  liberating  Italian 
soil  from  the  sovereignty  of  the  Holy  See  and  the 
rule  of  Austria — that  is,  from  the  two  Powers 
which  in  the  highest  degree  represented  absolut- 
ism and  reaction. 

Now  in  Piedmont  there  reigned  a  very  ancient 
dynasty,  one  of  the  oldest  sovereign  families  in 
Europe,  whose  origins  were  lost  in  the  night  of 
the  legendary  period,  before  even  Hubert  of  the 
White  Hands,  one  of  the  founders  of  the  house. 
In  the  course  of  a  very  long  history,  full  of 
vicissitudes,  through  which  they  succeeded  in 
maintaining  their  independence  amid  powerful 
neighbours,  the  Dukes  of  Savoy  had  finally  trans- 
ferred the  seat  of  their  government  from 
Chambery  to  Turin  :  a  first  step  on  the  road 
to  Florence,  and  thence  to  Rome.  The  first 
heads  of  the  house  had  their  sepulchre  in  the 
little  Savoyard  abbey  of  Hautecombe.  Their 
heirs  rest  in  the  Roman  Pantheon.  Who  would 
have  prophesied  this  even  a  hundred  years  ago  ? 

Their  capacity  for  adapting  themselves  to 
novel  conditions  of  political  existence,  for 
enduring,  and  even  increasing,  amid  the  vicissi- 
tudes of  the  ages,  had  always  been  remarkable. 
This  aptitude  was  in  the  nineteenth  century  to 
find  an  extraordinary  opportunity  of  fulfilment. 
The  tendency  of  the  Dukes  of  Savoy  to  become 
Italianised  had  been  for  some  time  perceptible. 
But  their  monarchy  was  none  the  less  a  traditional 
monarchy,  exactly  like  that  of  the  Bourbons  of 
France   or   that   of   the   Habsburgs   of  Austria. 


46  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Nevertheless  it  was  this  ancient  dynasty  which, 
with  the  audacity  of  youth,  was  to  plunge  itself 
into  the  Risorgtmento,  to  place  itself  at  the  head 
of  the  Italian  nationalist  movement,  a  movement 
w^hose  origin  was  democratic  and  revolutionary, 
while  its  aspirations  were  republican. 

It  may  readily  be  imagined  that  such  a  dynasty, 
to  have  achieved  such  a  position,  must  have 
undertaken  great  responsibilities  and  overcome 
violent  repulsions.  A  cross  figures  on  the  coat- 
of-arms  of  the  House  ;  and  this  cross,  the  Cross 
of  Savoy,  was  one  day  raised  against  the  Papacy, 
thus  fulfilling  the  passage — extremely  obscure, 
one  must  admit — in  the  famous  prophecy  of  St. 
Malachi — crux  de  cruce — ^which  refers  to  the 
pontificate  of  Pius  IX.  To  tread  such  a  path, 
bordered  by  so  many  precipices,  the  House  of 
Savoy  was  forced  to  display  a  great  deal  of  supple- 
ness and  a  sure  eye  for  realities.  Intuition  of  the 
future  was  required  of  it.  From  generation  to 
generation  it  has  displayed  these  gifts.  One 
recalls,  upon  reading  its  history,  that  French 
minister  who  one  day  defined  both  himself  and 
his  policy  by  a  famous  phrase,  to  the  effect  that 
he  was  **  a  man  of  realisations."  One  might 
equally  well  say  of  the  House  of  Savoy  that  it  has 
been  a  dynasty  of  realisers. 

Towards  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century 
these  princes  felt  that  their  destinies  were  either 
about  to  close  for  ever,  or,  on  the  contrary,  to 
open  upon  an  ampler  phase.  They  understood 
that  their  house,  reigning  over  Piedmont,  and 
affected,  through  Piedmont,  by  all  that  might 
happen  in  Italy,  might  well  be  overpowered  and 
overthrown  by  the  Italian  nationalist  movement 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  47 

— unless  it  were  to  place  itself  at  the  head  of  that 
movement.  On  the  other  hand,  although  the 
nationalist  movement  was  powerful  as  a  state  of 
mind,  its  resources  were  small.  Reduced  to 
itself,  led  by  a  few  republican  agitators,  it  was 
in  danger  of  meeting  with  a  check  unless  it  could 
find  some  organised  force  which  would  lend  it 
support.  This  force  was  to  be  Piedmont  and 
its  princes.  Thus  the  same  hope,  the  same 
fear,  and  the  same  calculation  were  about  to 
ally  these  two  differing  elements — kings  by 
Divine  right  and  democrats,  traditional  sovereigns 
and  red-shirted  insurgents,  who  had  come  to  an 
agreement  upon  a  formula  of  national  interest 
and   Italian  interest. 

Modern  Italy  was  to  be  born  of  this  marriage 
— the  marriage  of  a  royal  family  and  the  Revolu- 
tion— and  for  a  long  time  she  was  to  be  conscious 
of  this  conflicting  heredity.  For  a  long  time 
men  asked  themselves  which  of  the  two  partners 
would  devour  the  other.  To-day  the  question 
puzzles  no  one  ;  the  monarchical  element  has 
finally  prevailed,  by  effecting  a  masterly  synthesis, 
a  skilful  conciliation.  The  princes  of  the  House 
of  Savoy  enjoyed  at  the  critical  moment  the 
immense  advantage,  the  immense  superiority,  of 
doubting  neither  themselves  nor  their  future. 
At  a  time  when  the  majority  of  kings  no  longer 
had  much  faith  in  monarchy,  they  had  full 
confidence  in  it.  Metternich  said  pityingly  of 
those  sovereigns  who  allowed  themselves  to  be 
dethroned  without  resistance,  after  standing  in 
a  spirit  of  fatalism  before  the  barricades  :  "  I 
am  so  accustomed  to  find  kings  regarding  them- 
selves as  an  abuse  that  I  shall  no  longer  be  surprised 


48  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

if  one  day  I  find  one  begging  for  employment 
as  parish  scavenger."  Instead  of  abdicating 
before  the  revolutionaries,  the  princes  of  Savoy 
conceived  the  audacious  idea  of  placing  them- 
selves at  their  head.  Such  v^as  the  great  and 
lasting  originality  of  their  policy. 

It  is  a  strange  thing  :  it  v^as  the  most  cele- 
brated of  the  philosophers  of  the  counter-revolu- 
tionary doctrine,  Joseph  de  Maistre  himself,  v^ho 
advised  them  to  adopt  this  venturesome  policy. 
A  diplomatist  in  the  service  of  the  Kings  of  Sar- 
dinia, the  author  of  Le  Pape,  showed  his  masters 
the  path  v^hich  was  to  lead  them  to  the  breach 
in  the  Porta  Pia,  to  the  entry  into  pontifical 
Rome,  and  to  sacrilege.  Joseph  de  Maistre  was 
the  first  to  suggest  to  the  House  of  Savoy  that 
the  best  part  it  could  play  was  to  ally  itself  with 
the  young  Liberal  forces  which  were  springing 
up  in  Italy,  the  better  to  subordinate  them  after- 
wards. Again,  he  told  them  that  it  was  essential 
to  march  boldly  against  Austria.  Now  to  march 
against  Austria  was  to  march  against  the  Holy 
Alliance,  against  the  European  conservative  party, 
on  the  side  of  the  new  spirit  of  Italy.  However, 
you  may  find  in  a  score  of  passages  in  the  Lettres 
diflomatiques  of  Joseph  de  Maistre  the  audacious 
formulae  which  the  Piedmontese  monarchy  was 
to  apply.  It  was  Joseph  de  Maistre  and  another 
who  forged  these  maxims  for  the  future  kings  of 
Italy  : 

''  The  diameter  of  Piedmont  is  not  in 
proportion  to  the  greatness  and  the  nobility  of 
the  House  of  Savoy.  ...  So  long  as  I  can  still 
breathe  I  shall  repeat  that  Austria  is  His  Majesty's 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  49 

natural  and  eternal  enemy.  .  .  .  Beware  of  the 
Italian  spirit  ;  it  is  born  of  the  Revolution  and 
will  presently  play  its  part  in  a  great  tragedy.  .  .  . 
Let  the  king  make  himself  the  leader  of  the 
Italians  ;  in  every  civil  and  military  employment 
let  him  employ  revolutionaries  indifferently. 
This  is  essential,  vital,  capital.  .  .  .  This  is  my 
last  word  :  if  we  remain  or  become  an  obstacle  : 
requiem  aeternamP 

Such  words  and  such  warnings  must  have 
echoed  profoundly  in  the  mind  of  Carlo  Alberto 
and  Victor  Emmanuel  :  must  have  urged  them 
onward,  and,  at  the  same  time,  must  have  seemed 
to  authorise  them,  in  their  own  minds,  to  under- 
take their  Italian  enterprise.  For  to  travel  from 
Chambery  and  Hautecombe  to  the  Quirinal  the 
House  of  Savoy  had  to  travel  not  only  through 
space,  but  in  the  domain  of  thought  and  feeling. 
For  an  ancient  and  God-fearing  dynasty  to  pass 
from  its  old-style  traditions  to  an  alliance  with 
the  party  of  the  Revolution,  to  join  hands  with 
Garibaldi,  to  take  part  in  dispossessing  the  Pope, 
to  face  excommunication,  it  must  have  been 
necessary  to  overcome  many  prejudices  and 
repugnances.  The  nineteenth  century  has  seen 
other  examples  of  monarchies  which  have  suc- 
ceeded in  evolving  and  in  becoming  pliant,  instead 
of  resisting  and  breaking  ;  which  have  had  the 
wisdom  to  await  the  moment  when  their  prestige 
should  revive,  with  the  need  of  order  and 
authority.  But  amid  examples  of  development 
that  of  the  House  of  Savoy  was  the  most  com- 
plete; so  complete  that  it  was  long  the  scandal 
of  the  whole  party  of  European  conservatism, 
so    that   this    highly  legitimate    monarchy    was 


50  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

upheld  to  the  execration  of  legitimists  of  every 
country. 

Much  suffering  had  to  be  undergone  before 
a  member  of  the  House  of  Savoy,  considering  the 
past  history  of  his  house,  could  one  day  tell  him- 
self :  "  All  is  accomplished  !  "  On  Carlo  Alberto, 
a  man  of  self-tormented  mind,  highly  romantic, 
w^ith  a  heart  of  extreme  sensitiveness,  w^as  to  fall 
the  v^hole  weight  of  a  crisis  that  involved  not 
merely  a  family,  but  a  whole  people.  It  was  an 
internal  crisis  in  the  first  place  ;  then  it  was 
European.  It  was  a  moral,  a  psychological  crisis, 
before  it  became  political. 

Carlo  Alberto,  at  the  outset  of  his  life,  had 
been  far  removed  from  the  throne.  It  was 
believed  that  he  would  never  reign.  He  had 
himself  believed  this,  and  would  readily  have 
resigned  himself  to  whatever  destiny.  Carlo 
Alberto  was  he  whom  fate  had  elected  for  the 
difficult  decision  which  was  to  force  itself  upon 
his  race  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
On  him  fell  the  responsibility  of  a  grave  deter- 
mination, a  weighty  choice.  A  dynasty  which 
had  seen  more  than  eight  hundred  years  had  to 
enter  upon  paths  which  were  new  and  strangely 
perilous.  The  doubts,  the  hesitations,  the  suffer- 
ings, even  the  remorse  of  Carlo  Alberto  were 
thereby  all  the  more  cruel ;  the  break  with  the 
past  was  the  more  excruciating,  in  that  a  whole 
family,  nay,  a  whole  race,  was  perforce  to  share 
them.  It  was  a  drama  of  the  conscience,  if  you 
will,  but  of  the  collective  conscience.  It  is  this 
that  increases  its  tragedy  and  its  grandeur. 

Carlo  Alberto,  pious  among  the  kings  of  his 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  51 

time  and  of  all  times,  an  ascetic  on  the  throne, 
as  firmly  attached  to  the  Catholic  religion  as  to 
the  order  of  Europe,  was  nevertheless  the  prince 
who  inaugurated  a  revolutionary  policy,  and  who, 
not  fearing  to  ally  himself  with  the  patriots  of 
all  Italy,  was  to  create  that  scandal  which  he 
undoubtedly  foresaw,  and  which  was  the  torment 
of  his  life  :  the  Cross  of  Savoy  upraised  against 
the  Holy  See.  From  the  moment  when  he 
succeeded  Carlo  Felice,  to  his  death,  at  Oporto, 
after  the  defeat  of  Novara  and  his  abdication,  the 
father  of  the  first  King  of  Italy  showed  that 
enigmatical  and  melancholy  countenance  which 
caused  him  to  be  nicknamed  "  The  Sphinx." 
It  was  Victor  Emmanuel  II  who  revealed  the 
secret ;  it  was  Cavour  who  gave  the  key  to  the 
enigma,  by  continuing  and  completing  the  policy 
of  which  Carlo  Alberto,  full  of  scruples  and 
repugnances,  and  faltering  at  times,  had  begun 
to  trace  the  plan. 

For  Carlo  Alberto,  the  king  of  the  Holy 
Alliance,  to  transform  himself  into  the  king  of 
the  Revolution,  he  must  have  had  a  very  clear 
and  very  powerful  vision  of  his  Italian  mission, 
and  of  his  duty  toward  his  house  and  his  people. 
It  was  to  Metternich  that  he  owed  his  crown. 
And  in  exchange  for  the  recognition  of  his  rights, 
which  were  supported  by  Austria  against  his  own 
uncles,  he  had  been  forced  secretly  to  promise 
always  to  maintain  the  old  absolutist  monarchy 
in  Piedmont.  It  would  seem  as  though  the 
liberal  youth  of  Turin,  which  as  early  as  1821 
had  risen  and  acclaimed  Carlo  Alberto,  must 
have  compromised  him  against  his  will.  For 
we   see  him  fighting  in   Spain  for   Ferdinand, 


52  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

against  the  Constitutionals,  and  obtaining,  but 
too  late,  permission  from  Carlo  Felice  to  go  to 
Paris,  to  defend  Charles  X  during  the  days  of 
the  July  Revolution.  Lastly,  himself  a  king, 
he  vigorously  suppressed  the  Piedmontese  insur- 
rection. In  1820,  half  a  century  before  his  own 
son  had  made  Rome  his  capital,  Carlo  Alberto 
was  writing  : 

"  The  goods  of  which  the  Church  is  despoiled 
bring  misfortune  to  those  that  acquire  them. 
Thus,  when  a  very  great  crime  is  committed 
God  not  only  punishes  its  author  here  below,  but 
even  makes  him  the  object  of  terrible  lessons  to 
society." 

What  a  gulf — and  what  a  conflict — between 
these  ideas,  which  were  the  traditional  ideas  of 
the  House  of  Savoy,  and  the  ideas  which  were 
to  make  the  Sardinian  monarchy  the  instrument 
of  Italian  unity,  and  were  to  extend  it  from  the 
limits  of  Piedmont  to  the  ends  of  the  Peninsula  ! 

Carlo  Alberto  was  for  a  long  time — was  always 
— to  endeavour  to  reconcile  the  traditions  of  his 
race  with  its  Italian  mission,  with  the  necessity 
forced  upon  his  kingly  function  to  establish  the 
new,  great  country  on  the  solid  foundation  of 
his  dynasty.  When  he  despaired  of  effecting 
this  reconciliation  it  was  for  Italy  that  he  finally 
decided.  But  he  died  of  this  great  renunciation 
of  his  personal  feelings.  From  that  moment 
we  see  him  failing,  growing  emaciated ;  and 
finding  that  death  did  not  come  to  him  soon 
enough,  risking  it  in  battle  and  riot.  He  was 
heard  to  say :    "  I   shall  march  until  a   bullet 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  53 

enables  me  joyfully  to  end  a  life  of  vicissitudes 
which  was  wholly  consecrated  and  sacrificed  to 
my  country."  Around  him — a  sacrifice  almost 
equally  painful — his  chivalry,  the  Sonnaz,  Costas, 
and  Robilants,  the  flower  of  the  Savoyard  nobility, 
shed  their  blood  out  of  traditional  fidelity  to  the 
king,  for  a  cause  which  was  not  theirs  and  which 
revolted  their  personal  feelings.  M.  de  Beaure- 
gard relates  that  after  the  interview  between 
Carlo  Alberto  and  Garibaldi  the  old  and  faithful 
Sonnaz  murmured  :  "  This  is  the  end  of  us." 
It  was  indeed  an  end  of  all  that  the  most  ancient 
House  of  Savoy  had  represented  in  the  past. 
But  how  much  greater  was  all  that  which  it  was 
to  represent  in  the  future  !  What  a  future  was 
unfolding  before  it  ! 

Joseph  de  Maistre  has  written  :  "  The  mon- 
archy participates  in  the  formation  of  a  nation 
after  the  manner  of  the  kernel  which  forms 
in  the  heart  of  a  fruit."  The  Italians  are  agreed 
in  recognising  this  truth  ;  without  the  House 
of  Savoy  there  would  have  been  no  Italy. 

Here  the  mind  cannot  refrain  from  lingering, 
from  musing,  from  reconstructing  history.  The 
French  Revolution,  whose  ideas  and  results  were 
to  arouse  the  nationalism  of  Italy,  as  of  Germany, 
was  at  the  same  time  to  hold  at  its  mercy  the 
two  dynasties  which  actually  created  Italy  and 
Germany  :  called  them  out  of  chaos,  kneaded 
them  into  shape.  The  Revolution  and  Napoleon 
I,  its  heir  and  successor,  all  but  annihilated 
Piedmont  and  Prussia,  Hohenzollern  and  Carig- 
nan.  At  the  moment  when  the  future  Wilhelm  I, 
he  who  was  to  be  crowned  as  Emperor  at  Versailles, 
was  flying  from  Berlin  under  the  falling  snow — 


54  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

it  was  after  Jena — taking  refuge  with  the  Prussian 
Court  in  the  wretched  and  precarious  retreat 
provided  by  Memel — at  this  moment  another 
child,  the  future  Carlo  Alberto,  dispossessed  of 
his  rights,  which  his  father  had  renounced  for 
the  sake  of  a  pension  which  was,  by  the  way, 
unpaid,  was  shivering  with  cold  on  the  seat  of 
the  carriage  to  which  he  was  derisively  relegated 
by  M.  de  Montleart,  the  second-hand  husband 
of  the  Princess  de  Carignan,  a  woman  forgetful 
of  her  royal  blood.  The  French  Revolution, 
victorious,  was  reigning  in  Berlin  as  in  Turin. 
It  had  abolished  the  independence,  the  hope, 
almost  the  life  of  the  two  States.  Yet  the  royal 
families  in  which  these  States  were  incarnated 
still  survived.  And  thanks  to  the  two  little  boys 
of  1806,  Prussia  and  Piedmont  were  to  live  again, 
and  to  enjoy  a  dazzling  revenge  for  the  Napoleonic 
victories. 

Fate  was  implacable  to  Carlo  Alberto.  Fate, 
and  the  divination  of  a  man.  Metternich,  who 
foresaw  perhaps  not  all  things,  as  he  boasted,  but 
certainly  many  things,  seemed  to  have  foreseen, 
as  the  far-sighted  enemy  of  Italian  unity,  the 
destiny  of  Carlo  Alberto,  who  had  no  worse 
enemy,  until  the  day  when  the  skilful  statesman 
judged  it  more  expedient  to  chain  him  by  a 
promise.  For  a  long  time  the  Carignans  were 
erased  from  the  royal  Almanack  of  Sardinia. 
For  a  long  time  Carlo  Alberto  had  to  suffer  the 
hatred  and  suspicion  of  his  uncles  before  he 
succeeded  them.  But  was  not  his  motto  "  I 
await  my  star  "  ?  His  destiny  was  to  overcome 
all  obstacles. 

The  history  of  the  Italian  revolutions  of  the 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  55 

nineteenth  century  is  long,  confused,  and  even 
yet  obscured  by  passion  and  by  rivalry.  One 
great  fact  dominates  them  and  explains  their 
final  success  :  there  was  in  Piedmont  an  ancient 
dynasty,  firmly  founded,  which  formed,  in  the 
midst  of  all  upheavals,  an  element  of  continuity 
and  strength.  One  by  one  all  the  Italian  patriots, 
despite  errors  and  illusions  and  failures,  came  to 
recognise  that  the  salvation  of  their  ideals  resided 
in  an  alliance  with  the  House  of  Savoy.  Willingly 
or  perforce — being  constrained  by  evidence  and 
necessity — they  had  to  admit,  each  in  his  turn, 
that  Italy  could  not  assume  a  shape  and  a  con- 
sciousness save  by  virtue  of  the  most  vigorous 
and  also  the  most  ambitious  of  her  dynasties,  and 
the  only  one  of  them  which  had  a  sense  of  Italian 
patriotism.  To  this  nationalism  Carlo  Alberto 
sacrificed  his  faith  and  his  traditions,  as  Mazzini 
and  Manin  sacrificed  their  democratic  ideal. 
On  one  point,  however,  he  was  immovable  : 
namely,  in  anything  that  threatened  his  authority. 
When  he  refused  a  constitution  to  his  people 
Carlo  Alberto  deplored  the  fact,  as  he  one  day 
told  Roberto  d'  AzegHo,  that  he  was  misunder- 
stood. He  considered  that  a  constitution  would 
have  enfeebled  the  monarchy,  and  to  enfeeble 
the  monarchy  in  Piedmont  would  have  been  to 
hazard  the  future  chances  of  the  ItaUan  party. 
What  a  drama  was  played  when  Mazzini,  Manin, 
or  Garibaldi  went  to  the  king,  and  he  stifled  his 
old  repugnances  in  order  to  welcome  the  revolu- 
tionary leaders,  and  to  negotiate  with  them  and 
come  to  an  understanding  with  them  in  cool 
blood  !  The  goodwill  reciprocally  evidenced  by 
the  pious  monarch  and  the  republican  agitators. 


56  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

united  by  the  nationalist  ideal,  was  not  to  be 
rewarded  until  a  later  date.  At  that  time  what 
nobility  of  mind  was  demanded,  what  sacrifice  ! 
Mazzini  announced  the  entire  political  develop- 
ment of  the  new  Italy  when  he  declared,  as  a 
true  precursor  : 

''  Despite  all  the  aversion  which  I  felt  for  Carlo 
Alberto,  despite  all  the  democratic  aspirations 
which  were  seething  in  my  heart,  if  I  felt  that 
Carlo  Alberto  were  sufficiently  ambitious  to 
estabhsh  Italian  unity  I  would  cry  Amen  I  " 

After  Mazzini  it  was  Garibaldi's  turn  to  say, 
as  he  landed  at  Naples  :  *'  I  have  never  been 
a  supporter  of  kings.  But  since  Carlo  Alberto 
has  made  himself  the  champion  of  the  people's 
cause,  my  duty  is  to  offer  him  my  sword." 

And  it  was  Manin  himself  who  was  to  complete 
their  action,  and  perhaps  their  thought  also, 
when  he  said,  in  1856,  preferring  Italy  to  the 
Republic  : 

'^  I  accept  the  monarchy  of  Savoy  provided  it 
aids  loyally  and  effectually  in  the  creation  of 
Italy.  The  Piedmontese  monarchy,  in  order  to 
be  faithful  to  its  mission,  must  always  keep  before 
its  eyes  the  final  aim  :  the  independence  and 
unification  of  Italy.  It  must  profit  by  every 
occasion  which  may  permit  it  to  take  a  step  for- 
ward on  the  path  leading  to  this  goal.  ...  It 
must  remain  the  kernel,  the  centre  of  attraction 
of  the  Italian  nationality." 

Thus   did  patriotism  place  in  the  mouth  of 
Manin  the  very  words  of  Joseph  de  Maistre. 
The  Italian  patriots  of  the  nineteenth  century 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  57 

eventually  without  exception  understood  that 
their  nationalism  must,  to  succeed,  become 
royalist,  as  Nino  Bixio  had  said,  and  that  their 
sole  resource  was  represented  by  a  monarchy 
capable  of  federating  the  Italian  populations,  so 
diverse,  and  separated  by  so  many  habits  and 
interests  and  memories.  In  this  respect  the 
Italian  democrats  displayed  a  political  intelligence 
infinitely  superior  to  that  of  the  Prussian  Liberals, 
who  needed  the  double  victory  of  1866  and  1870, 
and  the  justification  which  the  policy  of  Bismarck 
received  thereby,  in  order  to  rally  to  the  Iron 
Chancellor  and  cease  their  opposition — an  opposi- 
tion profoundly  absurd,  since  they  desired  the 
unity  of  Germany  without  admitting  the  means, 
which  were  those  which  Bismarck  provided.  In 
this  contrast  we  may  see  the  eternal  superiority 
of  the  political  spirit  of  the  Italians. 

The  best,  most  ardent,  and  most  far-sighted 
of  the  men  of  the  Risorgimento  all  ended,  sooner 
or  later,  by  fighting  at  once  for  Italy  and  for 
the  House  of  Savoy.  Massimo  d'  Azeglio  was  one 
of  the  agents  of  this  propaganda,  one  of  these 
apostles.  He  toured  the  peninsula  indefatigably, 
delivering  to  all  the  patriots  whom  he  encountered 
on  the  way  a  sort  of  Socratic  discourse,  conceived 
more  or  less  in  the  following  words  : 

"  After  all,  what  do  you  want  ?  To  be 
delivered  from  the  Germans  ?  To  escape  from 
the  clerical  oligarchy  ?  These  gentry  won't  go 
of  themselves,  will  they  ?  They  will  have  to  be 
driven  out.  And  in  order  to  force  people  to 
clear  out  we  must  ourselves  possess  force.  Now 
have  you  this  force  ?  No,  you  know  you  have 
not.     And  who  in  Italy  is  strong  ?     Piedmont. 


58  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

I  see  in  your  face  that  you  do  not  like  Piedmont, 
and  no  doubt  you  like  her  king  even  less.  You 
say  that  one  cannot  hope  for  anything  from  Carlo 
Alberto  ?  If  you  do  not  wish  to  hope  for  any- 
thing from  him,  do  not ;  but  do  not  set  your 
trust  in  anyone  else.  I  tell  you,  and  I  will  repeat 
it  :  resign  yourself  to  hope  for  Carlo  Alberto's 
help,  or  hope  for  nothing  at  all." 


This  fusion  of  the  democratic  elements  of  Italy 
and  the  monarchy  was  to  continue  until  our  days  : 
was  to  be  the  law  of  Italy's  political  life.  The 
war  of  1 91 5  has  once  more  seen  the  Barzilai  and 
the  Bissolati  rally  to  the  House  of  Savoy,  as 
did  their  great  forbears  of  the  Risorgimento  ; 
as  did  Crispi  himself.  Signor  Marcora,  the 
President  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  to  whom 
Victor  Emmanuel  III,  during  the  crisis  of  May 
1 91 5,  offered  the  task  of  constituting  the 
Ministry,  was  also  one  of  those  converted  Re- 
publicans who  for  the  last  fifty  years  have  always 
been  represented  in  the  councils  of  the  Italian 
monarchy. 

Thus  necessity  and  patriotism  summoned  the 
Republicans  to  sacrifice  their  preferences,  to 
gather,  one  by  one,  about  the  throne,  mounting 
guard  before  it,  the  symbol  and  guarantee  of  the 
national  unity  so  hardly  achieved.  To  all  minds 
ripened  by  experience,  royalty  appeared  as  one 
of  their  country's  needs.  "  The  monarchy  unites 
us  ;  the  republic  would  divide  us,"  said  Crispi. 
And  the  danger  of  division  was  all  the  more 
serious  because  the  Republic,  in  Italy,  could 
never  be  otherwise  than  federal.     And  federalism, 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  59 

on  the  morrow  of  unification,  would  have  meant 
fresh  dislocation. 

Herein  resided  the  great  strength  of  the  House 
of  Savoy,  during  those  years  when — the  example 
of  France  aiding  its  decline — the  monarchical 
ideal  was  falling  into  decadence.  Democrats 
like  Mazzini,  who  had  enounced  the  ideal  of 
Italian  unity,  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  had  begun  by  devising  the  scheme  which 
seduced  George  Sand  : 

"  There  are  in  Italy,  including  the  Pope  and  the 
Emperor  of  Austria,  seven  kings  or  dukes  (Pied- 
mont, Naples,  Parma,  Modena,  Tuscany).  Let 
us  make  use  of  one  of  these — Victor  Emmanuel — 
to  overthrow  the  other  six.  This  once  accom- 
plished, it  will  be  easy  to  overthrow  the 
seventh  ..." 

'^  An  error,"  so  Proudhon  warned  them  ;  and 
where  Italian  affairs  were  concerned  he  was  often 
a  good  prophet. 

"  In  the  State  which  he  founds  Victor  Emma- 
nuel will  be  a  national  king,  a  popular  king,  and 
his  monarchy  will  continue  as  a  centre  of  attraction 
for  all  Italians.  ..." 

This  view  of  Proudhon's  was  so  correct  that  to 
all  appearances  it  was  also  that  which  served  as 
a  guide  to  the  House  of  Savoy. 

Succeeding  to  Carlo  Alberto,  Victor  Emmanuel 
had  learned  a  lesson  from  the  trials  which  his 
father  had  undergone.  With  him  the  House  of 
Savoy  gave  itself  boldly  to  the  prevailing  winds ; 
Liberalism  and  Nationalities — this  was  its  motto. 
And  the  Piedmontese  monarchy,  a  highly  legitim- 
ate monarchy,  was  seen  to  attack  and  to  dethrone 


6o  ITALY   AND   THE    WAR 

monarchies  no  less  legitimate  than  itself.  In 
Germany,  to  establish  unity,  the  kings  of  Prussia 
did  little  more  than  suppress  one  other  king — 
the  King  of  Hanover,  with  the  Elector  of  Hesse 
and  the  Duke  of  Nassau.  The  House  of  Savoy 
had  to  shatter  many  more  crov^ns.  It  had  to 
attack  the  Triple  Crown  itself,  and  for  this  work 
of  revolution — not  Italian  merely,  but  European 
— it  had  to  accept  the  help  of  avowed  revolu- 
tionists. 

This  complicity — which,  however,  was  con- 
fessed, was  displayed  in  the  face  of  day — was 
for  a  long  time  to  earn  the  opprobrium  of  the 
conservatives.  These,  in  general,  were  mistaken 
as  gravely  as  the  Republicans  as  to  the  future  of 
the  Italian  monarchy,  and  mistaken  in  the  same 
fashion.  They  predicted  that  Victor  Emmanuel 
or  his  descendants,  having  appealed  to  the  Revolu- 
tion, would  perish  by  the  Revolution.  What 
they  did  not  foresee  was  that  the  House  of  Savoy, 
being  more  skilful,  more  supple,  more  far-sighted 
than  other  dynasties,  would  succeed  in  appeasing 
the  monster. 

The  difficulty,  for  Victor  Emmanuel,  was  to 
establish  in  Italy  a  subversive  monarchy  founded 
on  the  ruin  of  the  temporal  power  of  the  Popes, 
and  on  the  debris  of  other  thrones,  which  should 
nevertheless  remain  a  monarchy,  retaining  its 
character  and  its  authority.  The  first  condition 
of  success  in  so  delicate  an  undertaking  was 
perfectly  fulfilled  by  the  first  King  of  Italy. 
This  was  to  stifle,  in  his  Savoyard  heart,  the 
prejudices  and  the  scruples  of  his  race  ;  all  those 
elements  in  the  traditions  of  his  house  which 
were  merely  sentimental.     And  Victor  Emmanuel 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  6i 

n  was  the  man  for  this  task.  With  his  minister 
Cavour  he  was  an  example  of  what  audacious 
things  may  be  accomplished  in  this  world  by 
minds  born  for  politics,  able  to  shape  themselves 
according  to  their  political  interest.  Certain 
phrases,  which  are  still  famous,  and  for  which 
they  have  been  much  reproached,  such  as  "  Do 
it,  but  do  it  quickly,"  used  to  shock  the  con- 
servative and  legitimist  Europe  of  fifty  years  ago. 
However,  Victor  Emmanuel  was  founding  a  new 
legitimism  for  the  future. 

He  founded  it  on  the  Italian  sense  of  nationality, 
a  powerful  sentiment,  by  which  he  was  wholly 
penetrated.  People  were  wrong  to  deny  his 
sensibility  ;  or  rather,  they  made  the  mistake  of 
misunderstanding  it.  His  feelings  were  nationa- 
list ;  they  went  out  to  an  oppressed  Italy,  a 
martyred,  suffering  Italy.  When,  to  the  great 
consternation  of  European  diplomacy,  he  asserted 
his  intention  of  responding  to  the  Italian  people's 
*'  cry  of  suffering,"  a  cry  which  rent  his  heart, 
Victor  Emmanuel  revealed  the  fact  that  he  yearned 
over  the  Italian  nationality  with  the  bowels  of  a 
father. 

The  kings  of  Italy  have  continued  in  this  new 
tradition.  But  beside  them,  in  their  own  palaces 
— and — who  shall  say  ? — unknown,  perhaps,  in 
the  depths  of  their  beings — the  old  tradition 
persisted,  and  at  moments  burst  into  flame. 
This  dualism,  which  made  a  martyr  of  Carlo 
Alberto,  was  to  find  other  victims  among  his 
descendants. 

Like  a  symbol  of  the  moral  history  of  his  race, 
of  the  mental  drama  of  her  family,  was  that 
strange    and    unhappy    Princess    Clotilde,    who 


62  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

drifted  through  the  triumphs  of  the  House  of 
Savoy,  head  of  one  of  the  most  modern  States 
of  Europe,  Hke  a  figure  stepped  forth  from  some 
stained-glass  window  of  Hautecombe. 

Fate  willed  it  that  Princess  Clotilde  should 
leave  this  world  in  the  very  year  when  Italy  was 
celebrating  the  jubilee  of  her  political  resurrec- 
tion, some  days  after  the  inauguration  of  the 
monument  which,  hard  by  the  Rome  of  anti- 
quity, and  facing  the  Rome  of  the  Popes,  glorifies 
Victor  Emmanuel  II  and  the  unity  of  Italy. 
Princess  Clotilde  died  during  the  celebrations  of 
that  United  Italy  to  which  her  woman's  life  had 
been  sacrificed. 

More  than  one  Frenchman,  more  than  one 
Frenchwoman  still  surviving  will  remember  that 
February  day  of  1859  when  the  little  Princess 
made  her  entry  into  Paris.  These  observers 
cannot  have  forgotten  the  sadness  painted  on  the 
features  of  this  child  of  sixteen  years.  They  will 
remember  her  bizarre  head-dress,  a  capote  in  the 
fashion  of  the  period,  far  too  severe  for  her  age. 
Paris,  however,  welcomed  her  with  enthusiasm  ; 
for  Paris  was  then  at  the  most  impassioned  height 
of  her  infatuation  for  the  Italian  cause.  The 
marriage  of  the  daughter  of  Victor  Emmanuel  II 
with  Prince  Napoleon,  twenty  years  her  senior, 
was  a  marriage  of  political  convenience.  This 
union  sealed  the  alliance  concluded  between  the 
Empire  and  the  House  of  Savoy.  Princess 
Clotilde  had  been  married  at  Plombieres  by 
Cavour.  She  was,  as  it  were,  the  hostage  of 
Italian  unity.  And  the  most  sorrowful  part  of 
her  destiny  was  that  she,  who  had  remained  faith- 
ful to  the   traditions    of   Savoy,  she,  the  pious 


THE   HOUSE   OF   SAVOY  63 

daughter  of  the  Church,  the  god-child  of  Pio 
Nono,  was  to  suffer  from  the  poHtical  successes 
to  which  her  marriage  had  contributed,  and  which 
were  to  lead  her  father  to  Rome,  to  the  Palace 
of  the  Quirinal,  the  residence  of  the  Papacy. 

It  is  said  that  Victor  Emmanuel,  rough  though 
his  outer  husk  might  be,  could  not  refrain  from 
weeping  when,  after  long  hesitations,  his  daughter 
at  length  accepted  the  husband  for  whom  politics 
had  destined  her.  Victor  Emmanuel  realised 
the  extent  of  the  sacrifice  which  he  was  requiring 
of  his  daughter.  But  he  did  not  insist  upon  this 
sacrifice.  The  little  Princess  consented  freely 
to  the  project  concluded  between  Napoleon  HI 
and  her  father's  minister.  Princess  Clotilde  was 
as  it  were  another  Iphigenia.  It  was  one  of  the 
most  affecting  dramas  presented  by  the  royal 
lives  of  the  last  century. 

It  is  said  that  on  reaching  the  Palais-Royal, 
which  was  then  Prince  Napoleon's  residence,  the 
young  Princess  begged  her  husband  that  he  would 
allow  her  to  have  a  supply  of  holy  water  at  her 
disposal,  as  had  been  her  custom  in  Piedmont. 

"  Holy  water  ?  Let  them  send  to  the  grocer's 
to  see  if  there  is  any  left,"  replied  the  Prince,  a 
notorious  atheist,  a  figure  at  the  famous  Ash- 
Wednesday  dinners,  who  doubtless  counted  on 
inducing  the  young  woman  to  abandon  her  pious 
practices. 

The  obstinate  gentleness  of  the  Princess  Clotilde 
won  the  day.  Nothing  disturbed  her  beliefs ; 
nothing  modified  her  manner  of  life.  She  com- 
pelled the  admiration  of  the  hard,  violent  man 
whom  politics  had  given  her  as  husband.  Every- 
where  she    made   herself   loved    and   respected. 


64  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Napoleon  III,  always  anxious  to  legitimise  him- 
self, had  desired  this  marriage,  apart  from  his 
diplomatic  ends,  as  a  means  of  giving  greater 
brilliance  to  the  Tuileries,  by  introducing  to  the 
Palace  a  princess  of  the  blood  royal.  The 
Austrian  Ambassador  had  impertinently  remarked 
that  his  Court  was  ''  lacking  in  aristocracy,"  but 
he  knew  it  without  that.  Princess  Clotilde,  the 
daughter  of  a  King  of  Sardinia  and  an  Arch- 
duchess of  Austria,  was,  according  to  the  Em- 
peror's ideas,  to  put  an  end  to  the  sulky  behaviour 
of  foreign  Courts.  Princess  Clotilde  was  not 
unaware  of  this  fact.  And  we  know  the  reply, 
so  surprising  on  the  lips  of  a  girl  of  sixteen, 
which  she  addressed  to  the  Empress  Eugenie. 
The  Empress  had  wished  to  advise  the  young 
wife  as  to  her  deportment,  mistaking  her  melan- 
choly and  reserve  for  timidity  and  embarrass- 
ment. To  her  remarks,  the  Princess  simply 
responded  :  "  You  forget,  madame,  I  was  born 
at  Court." 

The  Empire  fell.  Victor  Emmanuel  entered 
Rome.  Here  were  fresh  occasions  of  suffering 
for  Princess  Clotilde.  For  her  life  she  would  not 
recognise  the  accomplished  fact,  the  policy  with 
which  the  House  of  Savoy  was  associated.  This 
is  why  she  ended  her  days  in  the  Piedmontese 
chateau  of  Moncalieri.  There  she  led  a  life  of 
privation,  recollection,  and  charity.  Daughter, 
sister,  or  aunt  of  the  kings  of  Italy,  she  refused 
to  associate  herself  with  their  triumph,  although 
she  had  made  herself  its  voluntary  servant. 
Rome  the  capital  saw  nothing  of  her  ;  she  would 
have  feared  to  sanction,  by  her  presence,  the 
events    of    1870.     When    Prince    Napoleon    lay 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  65 

dying  in  an  hotel  near  the  Piazza  del  Popolo, 

Clotilde   pushed  her   scruples   to   the   point   of 

asking  Leo  XHI  for  permission  to  enter  Rome. 

In  1878,  at  the  news  that  her  father  was  about 

to  die,  she  decided  to  visit  the  Quirinal.     Then, 

learning  on  the  way  that  Victor  Emmanuel  was 

dead,  she  returned  to  Moncalieri. 

Thus  Princess  Clotilde,  sacrificed  to  the  future 

of  the  House  of  Savoy,  was  its  martyr.     As  for 

the  new  Italy,  she  not  ungratefully  remembers 

the  young  girl  of  royal  race  who  long  ago  devoted 

herself  to  her  cause,  and  whose  figure  will  live  in 

Italian  history  as  the  symbol  of  the  reconciliation 

and  alliance  of  two  contrary  traditions.     This 

gentle  phantom,  amid  the  sterner  faces  of  the 

founders  of  United  Italy,  succeeded  in  exorcising 

the  Revolution. 

*  •  •  •  • 

If  there  is  a  country  and  a  government  for 
which  the  well-known  formula  "  neither  reaction 
nor  revolution  "  has  a  meaning,  that  country  is 
Italy  and  that  government  the  Italian  monarchy. 
The  Italian  State  was  created  in  spite  of  the 
powers  of  the  past,  by  making  use  of  the  extremest 
elements  of  democracy ;  it  was  important  that 
it  should  make  sure,  in  the  course  of  its  future 
destinies,  that  these  powers  should  not  take  their 
revenge,  nor  these  elements  rule  it.  It  was 
necessary,  on  the  contrary,  that  it  should  absorb 
them  both.  And  this  the  Italian  monarchy 
succeeded  in  doing  ;   slowly,  but  surely. 

It  found,  among  others,  one  minister  who 
illustrated  this  policy  in  a  vigorous  and  original 
fashion.  This  was  the  Marchese  di  Rudini. 
A  great  noble,  a  great  landowner,  a  man  of 

S 


66  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

traditions  and  principles,  a  "  man  of  the  past  " 
in  many  respects,  Di  Rudini,  by  rallying  to  the 
House  of  Savoy,  perhaps  made  a  sacrifice  no  less 
than  that  made  by  the  republican  patriots  of  his 
time  ;  like  them,  he  subordinated  his  personal 
inclinations  to  the  interest  of  his  country.  Once 
it  had  passed  through  the  period  of  birth,  he 
was  one  of  those  who  kept  in  mind  the  desirability 
of  causing  the  revolutionary  beginnings  of  the 
new  monarchy  to  be  forgotten,  and  of  reconciling 
it  by  degrees  with  the  conservative  elements. 
This  was  the  work  to  which  he  desired  to  devote 
himself  when  in  1895  he  was  called  in  to  repair 
the  errors  of  Crispi. 

But  the  Marchese  di  Rudini  was  obsessed  by 
one  anxiety  :  he  trembled  continually  for  the 
unity  of  Italy,  a  unity  conquered  at  the  cost  of 
such  labour,  and  which  never  would  have  been 
achieved  but  for  a  conjunction  of  circumstances 
of  which  some,  like  the  support  of  France,  were 
really  unhoped-for.  He  therefore  watched  un- 
restingly  over  those  elements  of  division  which 
might,  in  the  young  Italy,  survive  the  work  of 
unification.  On  the  Right  and  on  the  Left,  in 
the  north  and  in  the  south,  everywhere  he  saw 
the  enemies  of  unity.  He  was  only  the  more 
firmly  attached  to  the  dynasty,  without  which 
the  ruin  of  the  national  work,  the  decomposition 
of  the  peninsula,  appeared  to  him  inevitable. 

Twice,  in  fact,  Di  Rudini  had  to  struggle  against 
insurrections  in  which  he  saw  the  danger  of 
separatism,  and  the  confirmation  of  the  anxieties 
with  which  the  fragility  of  United  Italy  had 
inspired  him.  These  two  risings  were  very 
dissimilar.     However,  he  suppressed  them  with 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  G'j 

equal  vigour.  In  1866,  when  still  quite  a  young 
man,  he  had  been  forced,  as  Syndic  of  Palermo, 
to  put  down  an  insurrection  organised  by  the 
supporters  of  the  Bourbon  monarchy.  He  then 
showed  himself  implacable,  as  he  was  thirty 
years  later,  when  rioting  broke  out  in  Milan 
which  suddenly  assumed  a  serious  character. 
This  seditious  movement  Di  Rudini  denounced 
as  political  and  not  as  social,  as  inimical  to  the 
monarchy  and  the  national  unity,  not  to  society. 
He  accused  "  anarchism,  black  and  red,"  of 
plotting  against  the  State  and  the  country,  and, 
while  he  suppressed  both  Radical  and  Catholic 
newspapers,  he  caused  a  Socialist  like  Turati  to 
be  condemned  by  his  courts-martial,  and  a  priest 
like  the  Abato  Albertario. 

Reaction  and  revolution  :  the  monarchy  has 
succeeded  in  steering  between  these  two  reefs. 
The  occasions  on  which  severity  has  been  necessary 
have  been  rare.  With  their  characteristic  supple- 
ness, the  members  of  the  House  of  Savoy  have 
succeeded  in  retaining  the  old  fidelity  of  the  Pied- 
montese  loyalists  and  in  welcoming  the  repre- 
sentatives of  all  Italy,  so  different  as  to  manners 
and  feelings  and  opinions,  whom  they  have  united 
"  under  their  sceptre,"  to  use  a  time-honoured 
expression,  which  in  this  case  is  true  enough. 
Prophets  of  evil  augury  were  not  lacking  to  predict 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  get  elements  so 
diverse  to  march  in  step,  or  to  harmonise  all  the 
Italian  contradictions.  The  Savoyard  monarchy 
gave  the  lie  to  all  these  prophecies.  It  was  able 
to  induce  the  north  of  Italy,  so  pervaded  by  Gallic 
influence,  and  southern  Italy,  which  was  almost 
African,  to  live  together  on  friendly  terms.     It 


68  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

continued  to  welcome  the  adhesion  of  the  advanced 
democrats,  and  it  was  careful  not  to  reject  or 
regard  with  suspicion  the  ancient  aristocracy 
which  had  served  the  Bourbons  of  Naples.  It 
has  been  truly  national,  truly  superior  to  the 
spirit  of  party.  It  has  profited  by  the  experience 
which  was  only  too  lacking  in  the  first  Parlia- 
mentary and  Constitutional  kings  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  ;  it  has  compromised  itself  with 
no  group,  and  has  not  preferred  one  before 
another.  Perhaps  if  we  could  probe  the  men- 
tality of  the  kings  of  Italy  we  should  find,  at  the 
back  of  their  minds,  the  idea  that  one  party  is  as 
good  as  another,  that  all  are  composed  of  men 
who  are  no  worse  than  their  fellows,  who  are 
all  equally  capable  of  being  employed  for  the 
good  of  their  country.  When,  in  1876,  the 
exhausted  Right  was  forced  to  relinquish  power 
in  favour  of  the  Left,  Victor  Emmanuel  II  was 
able  to  welcome  Depretis  and  Crispi  without  an 
effort.  He  did  not  suppose — and  he  was  right 
— that  his  throne  was  in  danger.  He  regarded 
radicalism  and  democracy  as  fashions,  liable  to 
change,  but  which  it  would  have  been  imprudent 
to  oppose  when  they  were  at  the  height  of  their 
vogue.  The  members  of  the  House  of  Savoy 
have  not  made  the  mistake  of  insisting  upon 
retaining  their  Polignacs  or  their  Guizots.  Victor 
Emmanuel,  for  example,  did  not  dream  of  retain- 
ing his  old  and  faithful  soldiers  of  bygone  conflicts, 
the  Piedmontese  Moderates  and  Conservatives. 
The  Radicals  justified  his  faith.  They  proved 
that  they  were  not  so  terrible  as  he  had  been  told 
— that  they  soon  became  tractable  when  in  power. 
And  the  Right,  later  on,  had  its  turn,  with  other 


THE  HOUSE  OF  SAVOY  69 

men  ;  Signor  Salandra  is  to-day  the  representative 
of  the  new  spirit.  No  more  timid  than  his  grand- 
father, Victor  Emmanuel  HI  was  not  afraid  of 
universal  suffrage,  and  the  event  proved  that 
he  too  was  right,  since,  at  the  first  electoral  con- 
sultation, the  scrutiny  in  which  all  Italy  took 
part  sent  only  fourteen  Republicans  to  the 
Chamber — fewer  than  had  been  elected  by  the 
limited  suffrage  !  And  what  Republicans,  more- 
over !  Signor  Barzilai  was  of  their  number : 
to-day,  beside  a  conservator  like  Signor  Salandra, 
he  is  a  minister  of  the  Monarchy. 

The  throne  should  be  that  point  whereat  all 
the  colours  of  a  country  mingle.  Thus  the 
members  of  the  House  of  Savoy  were  able  to  tell 
themselves  that  the  red  of  a  Garibaldian  shirt 
might  well,  from  their  point  of  view,  blend  with 
the  purple  of  a  Cardinal's  mantle.  They  suffered 
neither  from  the  superstitious  fear  of  emblems, 
nor  a  dread  of  popular  songs.  They  allowed  the 
revolutionary  and  patriotic  hymn  of  Mameli  to 
be  sung  at  the  same  time  as  the  royal  anthem. 
Have  not  all  tunes  seven  notes  ?  Blacks  or  whites, 
they  have  made  no  distinctions  ;  and  more  than 
one  gentleman  of  their  Court  has  had  a  relative, 
a  brother,  in  the  Noble  Guard  of  the  Vatican. 
So  the  national  fusion  has  been  effected  ;  the 
"  pacification,"  according  to  the  desires  of  that 
French  statesman  one  of  whose  political  formulae 
we  just  now  discovered,  unexpressed  as  yet,  in 
the  baggage  of  the  Italian  monarchy. 

Without  any  Machiavellism,  by  the  sole  effect 
of  their  application  to  professional  duty  (is  not 
the  vocation  of  king,  with  its  dangers,  of  which 
King    Humbert    used   to   speak   so   serenely,    a 


70  ITALY   AND   THE    WAR 

profession  like  any  other  ?)  ;  by  what  their  minds 
possessed  of  freedom  also,  and  their  conscience 
of  nobility,  the  men  of  the  House  of  Savoy  have 
succeeded  in  forging  the  moral  unity  of  Italy. 
And  was  not  this  still  more  difficult  of  achieve- 
ment than  its  political  unity  ?  Having  come  to 
the  throne  of  Italy  by  virtue  of  the  conflict 
between  two  opposing  principles,  they  have 
rendered  them  impotent,  and  have  put  an  end 
to  their  autonomy,  replacing  it  by  the  national 
synthesis.  All  the  rival  or  inimical  Italics  of 
other  days  are  reconciled  in  Nationalism  and 
Imperialism.  The  House  of  Savoy  has  disarmed 
the  reaction.  As  for  the  Revolution,  it  might 
well,  reviving  a  famous  phrase,  boast  that  it  has 
"  taken  the  stain  out  of  it."  Both  reaction  and 
revolution  form  part  of  the  Italian  past,  of  the 
Italian  inheritance,  but  neither  one  nor  the  other 
prevails  in  public  life.  If  one  day  a  reaction  sets 
in,  or  a  revolution,  they  will  no  longer  resemble 
themselves  ;  they  will  no  longer  be  what  they 
were.  All  that  past  has  subdued  itself  with  the 
heart  of  Carlo  Alberto.  His  sufferings  have  freed 
his  successors,  and  thanks  to  them  the  sole  watch- 
word of  Italy  is  henceforth  :    the  Future. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    NATIONALIST   TRADITION 

Independence  and  "  Liberty  *' — ^The  period  of  conflict  and  its 
sacrifices — How  a  nation  is  born — ^The  union  of  classes — 
The  Princess  Belgiojoso — The  Chevalier  Nigra — ^The  work 
of  the  people — ^The  hunchback  of  Brescia — Irredentism — 
Guglielmo  Oberdank — ^The  primordial  importance  of 
literature — From  Gioberti  to  d'  Annunzio — Italian  poetry 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  or  Nationalist  lyricism — 
Leopardi,  the  false  pessimist — Carducci,  the  national  poet 
of  the  Third  Italy — The  Fourth  Italy  and  Gabriele 
d'  Annunzio. 

The  Italy  of  the  nineteenth  century,  whose 
thoughts  and  feelings  prepared  and  nourished 
the  Italy  of  to-day,  was  in  its  day  very  imper- 
fectly comprehended  by  contemporary  France. 
Perhaps  it  has  yet  to  be  discovered.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  understand  the  Italy  of  to-day,  and,  for 
example,  the  movement  which  impelled  it  to 
make  war  in  191 5,  if  we  persist  in  misunderstand- 
ing the  Italy  of  yesterday. 

The  public  opinion  of  France,  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  was  very  seriously  in  error  respecting  a 
great  many  points  of  foreign  politics ;  many  of 
which  points  were  of  essential  importance  to 
France.  As  far  as  Italy  was  concerned,  the 
common  error  was  to  confound  Liberty,  as 
the  French  conceived  it  for  themselves,  with  the 

71 


72  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

liberty  to  which  the  Italians  aspired.  Here 
there  was  a  remarkable  historical  contradiction. 
When,  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
a  Frenchman  spoke  of  "  Liberty,"  it  was  political 
liberty  that  he  meant.  France  was  an  ancient 
nation,  which  had  long  ago  achieved  unity,  had 
attained  her  frontiers,  no  longer  expected  very 
much  from  the  outer  world,  and  was  more  used 
to  dominating  other  peoples  than  to  see  foreigners 
intervening  in  her  affairs.  Liberty,  therefore, 
was  in  France  conceived  in  relation  to  the  Govern- 
ment, institutions,  and  society.  The  liberty  in 
question  was  a  sort  of  supererogatory  liberty  :  it 
implied  universal  suffrage,  the  exercise  of  certain 
political  rights,  the  appropriation  of  power  by 
the  popular  classes,  the  extension  of  democracy. 
To  the  eyes  of  the  Italians  of  the  same  period, 
and  in  their  dreams,  liberty  appeared  in  a  very 
different  shape.  On  the  two  sides  of  the  moun- 
tains the  goddess  was  far  from  representing  the 
same  symbol.  The  Italians  were  burning  to  win 
their  national  independence.  They  had  to  free 
themselves  from  the  yoke  of  the  conqueror,  to 
knit  together  the  scattered  members  of  their 
country,  to  constitute  themselves  as  a  State  and 
as  a  nation.  The  liberty  which  they  demanded 
was  the  liberty  to  live,  and  therefore  to  develop, 
to  increase  their  stature,  as  Italians. 

So  there  was  only  an  apparent  relation,  almost 
a  fictitious  one,  and  merely  a  fortuitous  similarity 
of  words  between  the  aspirations  of  the  Italian 
patriot  and  those  of  the  French  Liberal.  The 
one,  perhaps  without  realising  it,  was  tending 
toward  nationalism  ;  the  other  toward  demo- 
cracy.    As  so  often  happens  in  this  world  where 


THE   NATIONALIST  TRADITION   73 

union  and  fraternity  are  concerned,  the  Franco- 
Italian  friendship  has  lived  long  and  endured  and 
prospered  on  a  misunderstanding.  And  when, 
as  on  various  occasions,  relations  between  the 
two  peoples  have  become  strained,  this  deplorable 
result  must  again  be  attributed  to  the  same 
misunderstanding.  The  French  democracy  has 
been  bitterly  disappointed  whenever  it  has 
discovered  that  Italy  neither  feels  nor  thinks 
precisely  in  its  own  fashion  ;  when,  for  example, 
it  saw  Italy  taking  another  path  than  that  of  the 
ideal  of  1848,  and  retaining  her  monarchy  ;  when 
it  saw  Italy,  resuscitated,  working  for  herself, 
thinking  of  herself,  indifferent  to  the  future  of 
European  liberalism,  associating  herself  with 
Imperial  Germany,  and  even  with  her  oppressor 
of  the  day  before,  no  other  than  the  Austria 
of  the  Habsburgs.  France  was  at  times  irritated 
by  the  policy  which  Italy  followed  between  1870 
and  the  red-letter  day  of  her  recent  break  with 
the  Triple  Alliance.  This  feeling  of  irritation, 
which  was  extremely  dangerous,  and  has  by  no 
means  facilitated  the  task  of  our  diplomatists,  has 
always  been  born  of  error  and  illusion,  of  the 
misunderstanding  which  was  cherished  by  the 
France  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

It  is  by  understanding  whence  Italy  has  come 
and  whither  she  is  going  that  we  shall  enjoy  the 
best  chance  of  maintaining  good  relations  with 
her.  To  wish  to  love  is  not  everything.  One 
must  know  w^hat  one  loves,  and  one  loves  in 
proportion  as  one  understands  the  beloved  object ; 
as  a  great  Italian,  Leonardo  da  Vinci,  once  ob- 
served. Let  us  then  realise  that  the  Italians  of 
to-day  bear  within  their  veins  and  cherish  in  their 


74  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

memories  one  of  the  noblest  national  passions 
that  history  has  beheld.  Such  is  the  legacy 
which  the  last  century  bequeathed  to  them. 
Such  is  their  great  moral  and  intellectual  inherit- 
ance. To  them  has  been  handed  on  the  flame 
of  a  devouring  patriotism. 

How  insipid  have  the  majority  of  French 
writers  made  this  high  adventure,  which  is 
yet  of  so  dramatic  an  essence  ;  the  adventure  of 
a  whole  people  conceiving  the  same  ideal,  and, 
at  the  call  of  a  few  inciting  voices,  devoting  them- 
selves to  the  same  task  !  The  struggles  for  the 
deliverance  and  the  resurrection  of  Italy,  the 
spirit  of  that  stormy  period — these  we  under- 
stand better,  since  we  ourselves  have  experienced 
the  domination  of  the  foreigner  and  the  conquest 
of  our  native  soil.  In  tenacity  and  the  capacity 
for  sacrifice  the  Italian  patriots  of  the  nineteenth 
century  are  worthy  to  serve  as  models  for  all 
those  who  in  the  future  shall  be  ambitious  to 
deliver  and  uplift  their  native  country.  Aristo- 
crats, intellectuals,  plebeians :  men  of  all  classes, 
united  in  the  same  aspiration,  the  same  effort, 
collaborated  in  the  same  work.  While  a  Cavour 
was  labouring  to  realise  Italian  unity  by  the 
subtlest  methods  of  diplomacy  and  politics,  one 
might  have  seen  even  an  Orsini,  through  his 
fanatical  regard  of  the  same  ideal,  devoting  him- 
self to  the  propaganda  of  action.  And  we  are 
not  ignorant  of  the  influence  of  Orsini's  bombs 
on  the  course  of  history,  since  it  was  from  the 
day  of  his  attempt  that  we  must  date  that  sort 
of  conscientious  crisis  in  the  mind  of  Napoleon 
III,  after  which  he  resolved  to  intervene  actively 


THE  NATIONALIST  TRADITION    75 

in  favour  of  Italy.  But  even  this  intervention, 
which  was  so  popular  in  France,  would  not  have 
been  possible  without  a  long  period  of  prepara- 
tion, a  patient  and  enthusiastic  propaganda. 
The  cause  of  United  Italy  had  begun  by  gaining 
eloquent  missionaries,  zealous  propagandists, 
among  the  elect,  before  it  was  able  to  obtain  from 
Europe  the  assistance  of  which  it  stood  in  need. 
The  Italian  patriots,  before  they  gathered  the 
harvest,  had  been  sowing  the  seed  for  more  than 
twenty-five  years.  With  a  complete  knowledge 
of  the  European  situation,  and  a  veritable  power 
of  divination,  they  understood  that  it  was 
France  which  they  must  begin  by  conquering, 
and  above  all  the  elect  of  France.  This  was 
foreseen  with  perfect  conviction  by  such  pre- 
cursors as  Princess  Belgiojoso,  whose  name  will 
remain  inscribed  in  the  history  of  the  new  Italy 
no  less  than  in  the  history  of  French  literature 
and  French  society. 

One  would  not  venture  to  wish  for  any  woman 
the  fate,  nor  the  way  of  life,  of  a  Princess  Belgio- 
joso. Yet  the  example  of  this  Italian  woman 
shows  what  the  influence  of  a  woman  of  heart 
and  intellect  may  be  when  she  devotes  herself 
to  the  service  of  a  great  cause.  Princess  Belgiojoso 
consecrated  to  the  cause  of  Italian  unity  not  only 
her  intelligence,  her  fortune,  and  her  name.  Her 
personal  misfortunes,  and  the  liberty  of  her  life 
— these  too  she  devoted  to  her  country.  Suckled 
on  conspiracies,  bred  up  in  the  hatred  of  the 
foreign  oppressor,  this  young  Milanese  girl,  a 
daughter  of  the  illustrious  family  of  Trivulce, 
was  familiar  from  earliest  childhood  with  the 
first  hopes  and  the  first  battles  of  the  Italian 


76  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

patriots.  At  sixteen  years  of  age  Cristina  Trivulce 
married  Prince  Belgiojoso.  This  was  at  the 
moment  of  the  Congress  of  Verona,  when  the 
Holy  Alliance  was  taking  measures  of  precaution 
against  the  symptoms  of  agitation  which  were 
then  appearing  in  Italy.  The  carbonari  were 
prosecuted ;  the  ventes  were  dissolved.  The 
Princess,  who  before  her  marriage  had  been  a 
gardiniera^  as  they  termed  the  women  who  were 
members  of  secret  societies,  had  to  tread  the 
path  of  exile.  An  adventurous  career  was  open- 
ing before  her.  Like  so  many  other  Italians  of 
the  Risorgimento,  she  was  henceforth  to  lead  the 
life  of  a  female  knight-errant,  and  she  might  have 
said,  as  Massimo  d'  Azeglio  said  later  :  "  I  have 
made  my  home  on  the  open  road." 

Her  tribulations  began  with  a  divorce.  Prince 
Belgiojoso  and  his  wife  were  unable  to  under- 
stand one  another.  Perhaps  they  were  both  too 
passionate  by  nature.  The  Princess  was  beautiful ; 
she  was  to  be  greatly  loved  ;  her  tender  and 
enduring  connection  with  Mignet  is  well  known. 
As  for  the  Prince,  he  too  was  the  hero  of  an  idyll 
— which  was  in  its  day  a  scandal.  One  day  he 
disappeared  from  Paris,  and  at  the  same  time 
also  disappeared  the  Duchess  of  Piacenza.  Both 
lived  for  many  years  on  the  banks  of  Lake  Como. 
The  Revolution  of  1848,  the  convulsions  which 
rent  his  country,  passed  by  the  Prince  without 
affecting  him ;  he  lived  his  personal  romance 
apart  from  the  great  national  romance  of  Italy 
— as  a  marginal  note,  so  to  speak. 

The  woman  who  in  Paris  bore  his  name  and 
was  making  it  illustrious  had,  on  the  contrary, 
never  ceased  to  feed  the  flame  of  Italian  patriotism. 


THE   NATIONALIST  TRADITION   77 

Her  work  was  to  aid  in  spreading,  as  an  intellectual 
fashion,  the  idea  that  the  cause  of  Italian  libera- 
tion was  the  noblest  cause  in  the  world  ;  a  cause 
in  which  generous  France  should  be  the  first  to 
interest  herself.  In  the  Princess  Belgiojoso's 
salon  the  wit  and  patience,  cunning  and  deter- 
mination of  a  woman  were  shaping  a  state  of 
mind  and  preparing  a  policy.  The  enthusiasm 
of  so  many  French  writers  for  United  Italy  was 
inspired  by  her  indefatigable  and  invincible  and 
ever-renewed  enthusiasm.  How  many  Press  cam- 
paigns, how  many  books  and  speeches  in  favour 
of  Italian  unity  would  never  have  been  written 
or  delivered  but  for  the  influence,  charm,  and 
seductiveness  of  the  Princess  Belgiojoso  !  Hein- 
rich  Heine  and  De  Musset,  to  speak  of  these 
only,  were  willingly  or  unwillingly  to  collaborate 
in  her  work ;  one  despite  his  irony,  and  the 
other  despite  his  detachment  and  his  dandyism. 
She  understood  how  to  utilise  to  the  dregs  the 
ambition  and  the  veering  convictions  of  Thiers. 
The  life  of  society,  literary  glory,  friendship,  love, 
and  even  good  cookery ;  Vincent  Bellini  and 
Buloz,  the  Opera  and  the  Revue  des  Deux-Mondes 
— Princess  Belgiojoso  enrolled  them  all  in  the 
service  of  her  unhappy  country.  All,  to  her 
thinking,  ought  to  serve  ;  and  as  a  matter  of 
fact  all  did.  It  would  be  no  exaggeration  to  say 
that  Magenta  and  Solferino  were  in  great  part 
the  work  of  her  salon.  In  any  case  her  salon  and 
her  circle  must  not  be  neglected  by  any  historian 
of  the  letters,  manners,  and  public  opinion  of  the 
nineteenth  century. 

The  revolution  of  1848  brought  disappointment 
to  Princess  Belgiojoso.     With  all  Italian  patriots, 


78  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

she  was  tortured  by  the  defeat  of  Novara,  which 
seemed  to  annihilate  all  hope  of  unity.  But 
it  was  especially  the  attitude  of  the  Second 
Republic,  and  the  French  intervention  in  Rome, 
which  wounded  her.  She  swore  that  she  would 
never  again  show  her  face  in  Paris,  in  the  city 
which  seemed  to  have  deceived  her.  However, 
ten  years  had  not  gone  by  when  she  was  able  to 
see  the  fruits  of  her  zeal  and  her  propaganda. 
She  was  able  to  see  little  Cavour  appointed  a 
minister  of  the  Kingdom  of  Italy,  a  kingdom  con- 
stituted by  the  aid  of  France  ;  Cavour,  now 
grown  so  great,  whom  she  had  formerly,  when  he 
was  still  unknown,  introduced,  in  Paris,  to  the 
statesmen  of  France.  .  .  . 

Princess  Belgiojoso  died  a  few  months  after 
the  Italians  had  made  their  entry  into  Rome. 
It  was  given  to  her  to  witness  the  complete 
realisation  of  the  Italian  dream.  But  did  she 
not  find  successors  to  continue  her  work  of  propa- 
ganda, to  occupy,  in  the  society  of  the  Second 
Empire,  the  position  which  she  had  held  under 
the  monarchy  of  July  ? 

Princess  Belgiojoso  seduced  our  statesmen  and 
our  men  of  letters.  The  task  of  the  Chevalier 
Nigra  was  to  conquer  the  Court  of  Napoleon  III. 
And  as  chance  willed  it  Nigra  died,  burdened 
with  years,  in  1907,  at  the  moment  when  Italy 
was  celebrating  the  centenary  of  Garibaldi's 
birth.  Nigra  and  Garibaldi,  so  different  in 
temperament,  as  in  their  origins,  their  actions, 
and  their  ideals,  had  nevertheless  both  aimed  at 
the  same  result.  The  young  aristocrat,  the  pro- 
tege of  Cavour,  and  the  red-shirted  agitator — 
each,  in  his  fashion,  served  the  cause  of  Italian 


THE    NATIONALIST   TRADITION   79 

unity  and  the  House  of  Savoy.  Each  delighted 
to  surround  himself  with  an  atmosphere  of 
mystery  and  legend,  which,  in  France  above 
all,  was  of  peculiar  value  in  the  accomplishment 
of  his  object.  One  as  a  man  of  the  world,  one 
as  a  man  of  the  crowd,  they  were,  by  reason  of 
their  commanding  appearance,  and  their  adven- 
tures of  all  kinds — adventures  warlike  or  amorous 
— the  heroes,  the  demi-gods  of  the  Italian 
cause. 

While  Garibaldi  made  the  conquest  of  the 
great  French  public  by  the  plebeian  epic  of  his 
career,  the  other  accomplished  the  more  difficult 
task  of  reducing  the  entourage  of  the  Emperor. 
Napoleon  III,  even  before  he  came  into  power, 
was  won  over  to  the  Risorgimento.  Around  him, 
close  to  his  person,  there  were  not  lacking  those 
who  were  ill  disposed  toward  the  interests  of 
United  Italy.  The  Chevalier  Nigra  was  the 
handsome,  melancholy  young  man  who  came  to 
the  Imperial  Court  to  move  the  women  in  favour 
of  the  noble  captive.  He  was  gallant  out  of 
patriotism,  or  at  least  he  made  his  affairs  of  the 
heart  serve  the  interests  of  his  country.  He 
came  to  Versailles  bringing  with  him  all  the 
poetry  of  the  peninsula.  Venice,  Florence  and 
Rome,  Dante  and  Petrarch,  Titian  and  Raphael, 
all  spoke  through  his  mouth,  and  spoke,  we  are 
told,  with  charm  and  eloquence.  Cavour  had 
made  an  artistic  choice  in  this  ambassador  of 
confidential  missions  ;  he  was  Don  Juan  as 
diplomatist,  who  in  the  midst  of  his  triumphs 
never  forgot  his  ambassadorial  duties. 

There  was  yet  one  heart  untouched  by  the 
cause  of  Italy,     And  this  heart  was  set  so  high 


8o  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

that  the  melancholy  Don  Juan  could  not  hope 
to  gain  access  to  it.  The  Empress  was  not  merely 
pious  as  a  Spaniard  ;  Morny  was  not  mistaken 
when  he  said  of  her  that  she  was  even  more 
"  legitimist  "  than  he.  By  her  feelings,  by  her 
beliefs,  the  Empress  was  opposed  to  the  Italian 
policy  of  the  Empire.  She  was  the  constant  and 
ardent  adversary  of  this  policy.  Protesting  by 
her  tears  even  more  eloquently  than  by  her 
gestures,  she  had  quitted  the  Council  of  Ministers 
at  which  the  Emperor  had  resolved  to  recognise 
the  new  Kingdom  of  Italy.  She  was  extremely 
hard  upon  Nigra,  as  on  everything  that  came 
from  Piedmont.  However,  the  skilful  courtier 
had  his  hour.  It  was  the  magic  of  the  name  of 
Venice  that  was  to  win  it  for  him.  It  was  he 
who,  on  the  lake  at  Fontainebleau,  replacing  the 
inarticulate  gondolier,  sang  a  celebrated  serenade, 
in  which,  it  is  said,  the  collaboration  of  Merimee 
counted  for  something.     And  the  serenade  said  : 

O  woman,  if  at  times 

Thy  peaceful  lake 

Sees  sailing  beside  thee 

The  silent  emperor, 

Tell  him  that  on  the  Adriatic  shore, 

Poor,  naked,  bloodless, 

Venice  pines  and  suffers. 

It  was  audacious ;  also  the  "  silent  emperor  " 
was  something  of  a  gem.  But  the  day  was  soon 
to  come  when  the  great  silent  figure  was  to  speak. 
And  his  speech,  which  was  to  announce  the 
deliverance  of  the  Italian  captives — did  not  the 
Chevalier  Nigra,  with  his  invocation  at  Fontaine- 
bleau, make  it  easier  for  him  to  pronounce  it  ? 

On  the  4th  of  September  it  was  Nigra,  assisted 


THE   NATIONALIST  TRADITION   8i 

— what  a  singular  conjunction  ! — by  Count 
Metternich,  who  dragged  the  Empress  from  the 
Tuileries,  and  saved  her  from  the  attacks  of  the 
mob.  In  their  persons  Italy  and  Austria  met 
above  the  tomb  of  the  Empire.  And  it  has  been 
claimed  that  the  two  ambassadors,  with  every 
appearance  of  chivalry  and  personal  devotion, 
were  thereby  accomplishing  a  skilful  operation 
which  rendered  a  service  to  their  countries. 
For  the  departure  of  the  Empress-Regent  was 
the  end  of  the  Imperial  Government,  and  thence- 
forth Italy  and  Austria  were  freed  from  their 
engagements  and  their  alliance  with  Napoleon 
III.  .  .  .  This  would  have  been  too  Machiavellic ; 
and  Nigra  never  deigned  to  defend  himself  against 
such  a  suspicion.  But  the  familiar  guest  at  the 
Tuileries  and  Compiegne,  the  friend  of  prosperous 
days,  was  always  sensible  of  the  reproach  directed 
against  Italy,  that  she  deserted  France  in  her 
misfortune.  All  his  life  he  protested  against  this 
accusation  of  ingratitude  ;  and  he,  who  wrote 
so  little,  published  a  sketch  of  the  events  of  1870 
in  which  he  proved  that  Russia,  desirous  of 
effacing  the  results  of  the  Crimean  War  and  the 
Congress  of  Paris,  had  intimidated  Austria  and 
Italy,  and  had  constrained  them  to  remain  neutral. 
Thus  Nigra,  who  had  so  well  served  his  country, 
was  not  willing  that  his  honour  as  a  gentleman 
should  be  sullied  by  the  suspicion  of  treachery 
toward  the  country  of  which  he  had  been  the 
guest,  feted,  admired,  and  beloved. 

Princess  Belgiojoso  and  Chevalier  Nigra  were, 
in  their  worldly,  fashionable  sphere,  as  much  the 
artisans  of  the  Italian  Risorgimento  as  Cavour, 
6 


82  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Garibaldi,  or  La  Marmora.  But  beside  these 
blazing  stars,  how  many  obscure  heroes  were 
there  !  Beside  these  illustrious  careers,  rewarded 
by  glory,  how  many  instances  of  devotion  which 
earned  no  wages  but  the  satisfaction  of  an  impas- 
sioned patriotism  !  In  the  course  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  which  has  seen  so  many  nationalist 
movements  awaken  and  flourish,  beside  those 
tragic  epics  enacted  by  Alsace-Lorraine,  Ireland, 
Poland,  Bohemia,  and  the  Slav  peoples  of  the 
Balkans,  the  martyrology  of  Italy  has  had  its 
magnificent  pages.  From  them  emanate  an 
enthusiasm  and  an  idealism  which  in  191 5,  across 
the  years,  were  not  without  their  influence  over 
the  sentiments  and  the  will  of  the  Italian  people. 

What  energy  of  love  and  hate  were  needed 
before  the  Italian  people  could  succeed  in  shatter- 
ing the  rule  of  Austria !  A  hundred  heroic 
episodes,  which  form  the  history  of  this  struggle 
against  the  rule  of  the  stranger,  find  their  sum- 
mary in  a  few  which  have  remained  particularly 
famous.  Such  is  the  story  of  the  hunchback  of 
Brescia.  It  is  like  those  tales,  gloomy  yet  ardent, 
which  M.  Barres  has  assembled  in  his  book  Du 
sang,  de  la  volufte,  et  de  la  mort.  It  might  with 
honour  take  its  place  there,  beside  that  dramatic 
short  story  for  which  the  Carlist  wars  provided 
the  subject,  and  which  is  entitled  La  haine 
emforte  tout. 

There  was  in  Brescia,  at  the  time  of  the  Austrian 
occupation,  a  garrison  composed  of  Croats  : 
notably  moustachio'd,  particularly  ferocious, 
especially  detested  ;  for  the  Croat  at  that  time 
stood  for  tyranny  and  oppression,  like  his  half- 
brother   the   Cossack,   and   no   one  had   as   yet 


THE    NATIONALIST   TRADITION   83 

dreamed  of  making  the  latter  the  soldier  of  right 
and  justice.  But  if  there  were  Croats  in  Brescia 
there  was  also  a  hunchbacked  patriot.  And  every 
time  the  hunchback  crossed  the  great  piazza  of 
the  city,  where  the  guard-house  was  situated, 
there  was  laughter  and  ignoble  jesting  among 
these  blackguards.  One  day,  profiting  by  the 
hour,  solitude,  and  the  absence  of  their  com- 
mander, the  Croats  seized  upon  the  cripple  with 
the  design  of  making  him  their  butt.  What 
atrocious  fancy  suddenly  entered  the  brain  of 
one  of  these  brutes  ?  A  voice  proposed  that  they 
should  smear  the  captive  with  tar,  then  burn 
him  alive.  The  hunchback  thought  at  first  that 
they  intended  a  test,  a  cruel  pleasantry.  When 
he  saw  the  Croats  proceeding  to  the  execution 
of  their  project,  which  was  pitilessly  to  reduce 
him  to  the  state  of  a  living  torch,  like  a  Christian 
in  the  Neronian  circus,  he  realised  that  he  was 
lost.  Then  he  conceived  a  sublime  and  horrible 
vengeance.  Seeking  with  his  eyes  that  one  amid 
his  murderers  whose  face  expressed  the  vilest 
cruelty  and  cowardice,  he  waited  until  the  fire 
began  to  devour  him  and  then,  bounding  upon 
his  victim,  he  embraced  him  with  a  grip  so  frantic 
that  the  other  soldiers  could  not  detach  him.  So 
the  Croat  was  burned  to  death  with  the  hunch- 
back, who  at  least  knew  the  delight  of  not  quitting 
this  life  without  dragging  his  enemy  down  to  the 
tomb  with  him. 

Such  episodes  form  the  tragical  climaxes  of  a 
long  history.  In  every-day  life,  in  the  never- 
ending  wars  of  defence  which  an  oppressed 
nationality  was  forced  to  wage,  the  nameless  bulk 
of  the  Italian  people  displayed  energy,   and  a 


84  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

patience  worthy  of  all  admiration.  Men  sacrificed 
their  lives,  and  their  possessions  too ;  a  daily 
sacrifice  which  produces  no  exaltation,  and  which 
must  be  obtained  from  the  many,  and  which,  for 
these  reasons,  is  not  obtained  without  effort. 
When  Milan  was  as  yet  in  chains  the  Milanese 
patriots  calculated  that  the  expenses  of  the 
Austrian  army  of  occupation  were  precisely 
liquidated  by  the  receipts  of  the  tobacco  regie 
in  that  city.  The  Milanese  therefore  resolved 
strictly  to  abstain  from  the  use  of  tobacco,  and, 
what  is  more,  they  kept  their  words.  When  an 
Italian,  breaking  the  pact,  appeared  in  the  streets 
cigar  in  mouth,  the  cigar  was  snatched  from  him  ; 
he  was  lucky  if  he  was  not  beaten,  treated  as  an 
accomplice  of  the  oppressor,  an  austriacante,  a. 
traitor.  This  was  a  petty  kind  of  warfare,  but 
such  instances  revealed  the  mental  state  of  the 
people,  and  its  fierce  resolution.  And  this  petty 
warfare  effectually  served  the  greater  conflict. 

Long  after,  in  Trieste  and  the  Trentino,  these 
memories  inspired  those  Italians  who  were  subject 
to  the  domination  of  Austria,  as  were  those  of 
Venice  and  Milan  before  the  great  liberation. 
These  examples  from  the  past  taught  resistance, 
hope,  and  sacrifice  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 
terre  irredente.  Guglielmo  Oberdank,  hero  and 
martyr  of  the  Italian  cause  in  the  new  period  of 
the  struggle  against  Austria,  who,  like  Orsini, 
risked  his  head  in  an  unsuccessful  attempt  at 
regicide,  was  nourished,  inspired,  and  exalted 
by  the  examples  afforded  by  the  patriots  of  the 
Risorgimento.  He  had  dreamed  of  doing  for 
Trieste  what  others  had  done  for  Venice  and 
Milan.     In  his  solitary  student's  chamber,  where 


THE    NATIONALIST   TRADITION   85 

he  had  formed  the  project  of  assassinating  the 
Emperor  Francis-Joseph,  of  striking  down  the 
tyrant,  he  intoxicated  himself  with  draughts  of 
history,  with  memories  refined  and  exalted  by 
literature  and  poetry.  As  he  was  hurling  his 
weapon  against  the  Habsburg,  a  thousand  sugges- 
tions were  stirring  in  his  mind.  And  on  the  day 
of  his  execution  perhaps  those  last  lines  of  the 
Saluto  italico  recalled  themselves  to  his  memory  : 
"  Confronting  the  foreigner  who  is  still  encamped, 
in  arms,  upon  our  soil,  sing  ye,  sing  ye,  Italy, 

Italy,  Italy !  " 

•  •  •  •  • 

For  the  influence  of  literature  upon  the 
destinies  of  the  Italian  people  has  been  consider- 
able. It  would  be  impossible  to  exaggerate  it. 
There  has  been  nothing  of  the  kind  in  France  ; 
we  cannot  imagine  anything  like  it.  Our  greatest 
poets  of  the  nineteenth  century  sang  of  humanity, 
liberty,  and  glory  rather  than  of  country  ;  when 
they  did  not,  like  Lamartine  in  his  Marseillaise 
de  la  Paix  (a  sublime  harmony,  incomparably 
musical,  based  on  a  false  idea  which  the  future  was 
to  prove  untrue),  actually  deny  the  very  ideal 
of  the  native  land. 

Nations !  mot  pompeux  pour  dire  barbaric, 
L'amour  s'arrete-t-il  ou  s'arretent  vos  pas  ? 
Dechirez  ces  drapeaux ;  une  autre  voix  vous  crie 
L'egoisme  et  la  haine  ont  seuls  une  patrie, 
La  Fraternite  n'en  a  pas.  .  .^ 

Even  Germany,  whose   modern  poetry  is  so 

^  "  Nations ! — a  pompous  word  signifying  barbarism — does 
love  tarry  where  your  steps  have  halted  ? — Rend  these  banners : 
another  voice  cries  to  you — that  egoism  and  hatred  alone  have 
a  country  : — fraternity  has  none." 


86  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

steeped  in  the  warlike  Teutonic  spirit,  cannot 
approach  what  Italy  has  produced  in  this  domain. 
The  whole  of  Italian  lyric  poetry,  and  the  noblest 
of  it,  is  nationalist.  Of  the  literature  of  the 
political  rebirth  of  Italy  the  French  are  principally 
aware  of  the  work  of  Silvio  Pellico.  Le  Mie 
Prigioni  was  the  sentimental  and  popular  romance 
of  United  Italy,  just  as  Uncle  Towls  Cabin  popu- 
larised the  cause  of  the  liberation  of  the  blacks. 
But  the  poets  of  whom  France  knows  little  (for 
they  would  be  difficult,  all  but  impossible,  to 
translate)  are  the  scholarly  poets  who  undertook 
to  restore  Italian  art  and  the  Italian  tongue  even 
as  the  country  itself  was  renovated.  From  Alfieri 
to  d'  Annunzio  all  the  great  poets  of  Italy  have 
in  the  deepest  sense  been  nationalists.  By  their 
method  and  their  passion  they  often  remind  us 
of  the  renaissance  of  the  Felibres,  of  that  powerful 
and  highly  original  movement  by  which  Frederic 
Mistral,  surrounded  by  a  whole  school  of  poets, 
resuscitated  his  native  Provence,  rehabilitating  its 
manners,  its  language,  and  its  literature,  by  means 
of  which,  at  the  same  time,  he  gave  expression 
to  new  conceptions  of  regionalism  and  decentra- 
lisation which  did  much  for  national  life.  An 
epic  poet,  a  philologist,  and  a  grammarian, 
Mistral  was  also,  by  the  natural  development  of 
his  mind,  one  of  the  most  fertile  propagandists 
of  political  ideals  known  to  his  time.  M.  Maurice 
Barres  has  justly  observed  that  Mistral's  work 
had  a  universal  value,  and  that  so  far  from  being 
confined  to  the  Provencal  world  it  has  had  a 
vivifying  eflfect  upon  the  whole  of  France.  Be- 
ginning at  Aries,  it  found  an  echo  in  Strasbourg. 
Those  who  know  Mistral,  the  Felibrige,  and  his 


THE    NATIONALIST   TRADITION   87 

poem  of  The  Countess  (captive  Provence)  in  The 
Isles  of  Gold,  those  who  know  what  the  school  of 
the  Fehbrige  has  been,  and  the  multiform  in- 
fluence which  it  has  exerted,  and  continues  to 
exert,  have  only  to  recall  this  example  in  order  to 
realise  what,  in  a  wider  sphere,  comprising  a  whole 
nation,  the  alliance  between  Italian  poetry  and 
Italian  nationalism  was  to  mean. 

Haughty,  tempestuous,  impassioned,  Alfieri, 
stifling  in  his  narrow  Piedmont,  was  already 
aspiring  after  a  greater  Italy.  We  accept 
Leopardi  as  the  poet  of  absolute  pessimism,  the 
poet  of  despair,  of  nothingness,  disgusted  with 
all  things.  Yet  does  the  man  who  nourishes 
himself  upon  tears,  the  man  who  is  "  spiritually 
dead,"  care  for  the  public  welfare,  the  greatness 
of  the  nation  ?  Does  he  feel  the  ills  of  his  country ; 
does  he  thrill  with  the  hatred  and  the  hopes  of 
the  oppressed  ?  But  Leopardi  felt  all  these 
things  keenly  and  interpreted  them  with  genius. 
His  poems  open  with  the  famous  Ode  to  Italy. 
"  O  my  country  !  .  .  .  Weep,  you  have  indeed 
cause  to  weep,  my  Italy,  born  to  surpass  the 
nations  !  "  Art  and  love,  glory  and  the  native 
land  :  we  may  say  of  Leopardi  that  he  knew  the 
highest  objects  which  give  value  to  human  life. 
And  he  clung  to  them  with  all  the  might  of 
passion  and  intelligence.  He  did  not  merely 
believe  ;  he  experienced  ;  he  knew  that  these 
things  were  worth  the  labour  of  living.  He  was 
no  incurable  pessimist.  His  verses  were  life- 
giving,  and  they  still  engender  action. 

The  case  of  Giosue  Carducci  is  perhaps  the 
most  characteristic  of  all.  Carducci  might  have 
boasted  with  as  much  reason  as  the  author  of 


88  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

the  Odi  funerali^  that  he  was  never  anything 
but  a  "  lyric  poet."  However,  through  his 
whole  career  and  through  all  his  work  resounded 
those  events  through  which  the  Italy  of  his  day 
was  passing.  The  purely  lyrical  writer  was  a 
great  national  poet. 

The  example  of  Carducci,  who  was  by  no 
means  a  popular  bard,  but  a  scholarly  poet,  a 
grammarian,  shows  how  political  ideals  and 
opinions  may  influence  literary  theories.  The 
conflict  between  the  classics  and  the  romantics, 
which  has  passed  through  so  many  phases  in 
France,  was  also  one  of  the  accompaniments  of 
the  internal  convulsions  through  which  the  Italy 
of  the  nineteenth  century  was  to  pass.  Carducci, 
who  was  born  in  1835,  attained  adolescence  at 
the  moment  of  Italy's  greatest  mental  enthusi- 
asm. His  father,  a  Carbonaro  of  the  old  school, 
was  a  democrat  and  a  Christian.  In  the  Maremma, 
"  where  flowered  his  sad  youth,"  the  young 
Giosue  worked  out  the  most  radical  ideas.  He 
wrote  his  first  verse  at  the  age  of  fourteen,  when 
Mazzini  was  urging  Rome  to  insurrection,  and 
the  young  Giosue's  verses  sang  of  ''  the  holy 
Republic."  Already  he  was  beginning  to  hate 
the  authors  which  his  father  forced  him  to 
read  ;  the  mawkish  Manzoni  especially,  and  all 
the  Romantics,  vaguely  tinged  by  Christianity 
of  the  same  school.  At  the  age  of  twenty,  like 
so  many  young  Italians  of  his  generation,  Carducci 
was  a  violent  atheist  and  republican,  the  enemy 
of  the  Pope  and  of  kings,  and  also  of  Austria, 
who  was  oppressing  his  native  country  ;  he  was 
consequently  a  nationalist.  Now  these  loves  and 
hates  existed,  at  that  time,  all  but  independently 


THE   NATIONALIST  TRADITION   89 

of  his  cult  for  Latin  literature,  so  that  Carducci 
was  necessarily  a  classic. 

For  Carducci  and  the  group  of  young  men  of 
which  he  was  a  member  during  the  harsh  years 
of  apprenticeship,  and  which  audaciously  styled 
itself  the  amici  fedanti,  romanticism,  a  foreign 
importation,  coming  from  the  North,  from 
Germany,  represented,  in  the  intellectual  order, 
the  servitude  which  in  the  political  order  was 
imposed  on  the  Latins  by  the  Tedeschi^  by  the 
barbarian  foreigners.  To  free  Italy  from  foreign 
domination  one  must  commence  by  liberating 
the  Italian  mind,  by  wresting  it  from  the 
literary  fashions  imported  from  Germany,  to 
lead  it  back  to  the  Latin  well-springs.  Car- 
ducci was  a  classic  because  he  was  a  patriot. 

"  Leave  it,"  his  earliest  verses  said,  "  leave  it 
to  groan  and  to  weary  its  feeble  sight  in  the 
contemplation  of  the  wan  planet,  this  scoundrelly 
abstemious  family  of  the  Romantics.  On  us, 
the  Italic  race,  may  they  continue  to  smile,  the 
gods  of  Latium,  the  mother  of  the  Aeneides  and 
the  harmony  of  Horace.  .  .  .  Thy  beautiful 
Apollo,  O  Flaccus,  has  fled  the  Latin  land,  giving 
place  to  Teutates  and  the  monstrous  Odin ; 
now  it  is  from  the  Germanic  Alps,  the  frozen 
Alps,  that  the  muses  come  to  us,  and  this  sorry 
band  muddies  the  springs  of  Helicon." 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  amici  fedanti  did  not 
beat  about  the  bush.  They  even  pushed  their 
literary  nationalism  so  far  as  derisively  to  translate 
the  names  of  the  more  famous  of  the  foreign 
Romantics,  calling  Byron  Birono,  Lamartine  La 
Martina,   and  Chateaubriand  Castelbriante. 

Carducci  and  his  friends  had  another  reason 


90  ITALY   AND   THE    WAR 

for  hating  romanticism.  They  saw  in  it  the 
token  not  only  of  foreign  domination,  but  also 
of  political  reaction.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
primitive  romanticism,  the  movement  which  first 
of  all  assumed  this  name  in  Germany,  was  mystical 
and  mediaeval ;  these  were  the  qualities  which 
Heinrich  Heine,  no  less  than  Goethe,  detested  in 
it.  France  also  for  a  time  (during  the  Restora- 
tion) was  familiar  with  these ''  knights  of  whimper- 
ing Gothicism  "  :  vide  the  Odes  et  ballades  of 
the  legitimist  Victor  Hugo.  The  young  Carducci 
attacked  this  literature  with  the  hatred  ''  of  a 
Catiline."  And  just  as  his  Rime^  his  first  verses, 
were  sprinkled  with  Latin  quotations,  with 
phrases,  expressions,  and  images  borrowed  from 
antiquity,  so  his  political  ideas  were  echoes  of 
Tacitus  and  Juvenal. 

Carducci  then  applied  himself  to  the  skilful 
transposition  into  the  Italian  tongue  of  the 
metres  of  Latin  poetry  :  a  difficult  task,  which 
did  much  to  train  his  talent,  to  break  it  in.  But 
towards  his  thirtieth  year  we  see  in  Carducci  the 
completion  of  an  extraordinary  development. 
Unnoticed  by  him,  romanticism  had  taken  its 
revenge.  It  was  a  French  romanticism — republi- 
can, anti-clerical,  revolutionary.  But  it  was 
none  the  less  romanticism.  Politics  had  played 
this  trick  with  the  literary  doctrines  of  the  poet. 
It  was  then  that  he  wrote  the  famous  Hymn  to 
Satan,  in  which  the  Devil  is  represented  as  the 
principle  of  good,  of  progress  and  knowledge,  etc. 

*'  Hail,  O  Satan,  O  rebelHon,  avenging  might 
of  the  human  name  !  To  thee  let  our  incense 
and  our  prayers  ascend  !  Thou  hast  overcome 
the  Jehovah  of  the  priests.  ..." 


THE   NATIONALIST  TRADITION  91 

This  provocative  poem  v^as  to  create  a  serious 
scandal  throughout  the  v^hole  of  Italy.  And 
the  harshest  criticism  which  Carducci  received 
W2LS  that  of  an  old  Republican,  who  slyly  objected : 

"  If  you  want  to  celebrate  Nature,  the  Universe, 
the  great  Whole,  why  call  it  Satan  ?  If  it  is 
not  an  abuse  of  words  it  is  an  intellectual 
orgy." 

And  in  truth  it  was.  In  the  course  of  the 
curious  "  Satanic  polemics  "  which  followed  the 
publication  of  the  Hymn,  Carducci  had  to  confess 
his  authorities  and  reveal  his  sources.  Shame 
and  misfortune !  The  classic  poet  had  been 
seduced  by  a  revolutionary  spirit  into  an  impure 
romanticism  !  It  was  from  Michelet's  Sorciere 
that  he  had  borrowed  the  idea,  and  some  of  the 
developments,  of  his  riotous  poem.  The  Hymn 
to  Satan  was  written  only  a  year  later  than  La 
Sorciere. 

Carducci  had  eaten  of  the  fruit  of  romanticism. 
Michelet  introduced  him  to  Hugo.  This  was 
at  the  moment  when  the  hopes  of  unification 
and  the  anti-clerical  passions  of  the  Italians  were 
becoming  exasperated,  having  nearly  attained 
their  goal.  The  France  of  those  days,  Napoleonic 
France,  after  showing  young  Italy  the  road  to 
Rome,  was  defending  Rome  against  the  attempts 
of  Garibaldi.  With  Carducci,  who  followed  the 
course  of  events  with  anger,  this  was  a  period 
of  extreme  political  fury.  He  forsook  old  Horace ; 
Hugo  was  more  congenial  to  his  sensitive  con- 
dition. Thenceforth  Carducci  imitated  Les 
Chdtiments,  and  at  times  imitated  them  very 
closely.  He  hurled  invectives  against  Pio  Nono, 
Victor  Emmanuel  II,  and  Napoleon  III  in  the 


92  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

manner  of  the  most  famous  pamphlet  in  verse  of 
modern  times.  Images,  methods,  antitheses  : 
the  whole  of  Les  Chdtiments  is  to  be  found  in  the 
Decennali.  The  Revolution  and  the  Republic 
had  turned  the  classic  poet  into  a  Vittor-hugiano. 
And  the  process  of  romantic  evolution  was  not  to 
stop  there :  with  amazement  Carducci  was 
observed  to  sacrifice  to  the  "  Cimbrian  Apollo," 
to  learn  German,  to  translate  and  imitate  the 
barbarians  whom  he  had  formerly  so  derided,  to 
enter  the  school  of  Uhland,  to  set  to  work  com- 
posing ballads.  .  .  . 

This  was  the  aberration  of  a  few  years  of 
feverish  agitation.  After  1870  and  the  taking  of 
Rome,  Carducci,  whose  revolutionary  tempera- 
ment always  wanted  to  protest  against  something, 
had  continued  his  violent  opposition  ;  the  new 
Italy  did  not  satisfy  his  idealism.  Italy  was 
monarchical,  and  he  remained  a  republican. 
But  the  Government  showed  him  every  considera- 
tion, and  insensibly  the  poet's  inflexible  disap- 
proval of  royalty  was  moderated.  At  the  same 
time  he  returned  to  classicism  ;  he  escaped  from 
Germany  by  way  of  Goethe,  and  recovered  the 
paths  of  antiquity.  His  political  evolution  was 
simultaneous  with  this  literary  counter-evolution. 
In  1878  Carducci  published  his  Ode  to  the  Queen, 
This  was  an  event.  By  personal  homage  to  the 
wit  and  beauty  of  Queen  Margherita  the  poet 
adroitly  announced  his  adhesion  to  the  monarchy. 
"  Whence  comest  thou  ?  What  are  the  centuries 
that  have  sent  thee  to  us,  so  fair  and  so  kind  ? 
In  which  of  the  songs  of  the  poets,  where,  O 
Queen,  did  I  one  day  behold  thee  ?  "  So  sang 
the  poet  in  his  Odi  barhari,  which  he  so  described, 


THE   NATIONALIST   TRADITION    93 

as  he  modestly  remarked,  because  the  ancients 
would  have  called  them  barbaric. 

Carducci  lived  tv^enty  years  longer,  the  poet 
of  the  nev^  Italy,  still  a  classic  and  a  nationalist. 
He  v^as  the  minstrel  of  Irredentism.  Every 
patriot  knows,  and  men  are  everywhere  at  this 
present  moment  repeating,  the  lines  of  the  Saluto 
italico  : 

"  Oh !  toward  the  beautiful  sea  of  Trieste, 
toward  the  mountains,  toward  the  souls  of  the 
dead,  fly,  with  the  New  Year,  antique  Itahan 
verses !  .  .  .  Salute,  in  the  Gulf  of  Giustinopoli, 
the  pearl  of  Istria,  and  the  harbour  with  the 
green  waters,  and  the  lion  of  Muggia  !  "  .  .  . 

In  1893  Carducci  definitely  and  explicitly 
expressed  his  adhesion  to  the  monarchy.  He 
had  by  this  time  even  somewhat  abated  his 
ancient  hatred  of  Catholicism.  As  a  reply  to  a 
well-known  poem  in  his  Odi^  which  is  full  of 
blasphemy  and  sarcasm  {In  a  Gothic  Cathedral)^ 
he  wrote  a  poem  in  connection  with  the  restora- 
tion, by  public  subscription,  of  the  church  of 
Polenta — that  in  which  Dante  and  Francesca 
had  kneeled.  And  it  was  a  universal  surprise 
to  read  over  the  signature  of  the  poet  who  had 
formerly  bidden  a  resounding  farewell  to  the 
semitico  nume  (to  Jesus,  the  "  Semitic  divinity  ") 
such  touching  lines  as  these  : 

"  Hail,  little  church  !  O  nation  of  manifold 
lives,  O  nation  re-arisen,  to  this  Mother,  broken 
with  age,  restore  the  power  of  speech  and  of 
prayer  ! — Let  us  hear  once  again  the  warning  of 
the  bell ;  may  the  belfry,  re-arisen,  pour  forth 
upon  the  country-side,  from  hill  to  hill,  the  Ave 
Maria:' 


94  ITALY   AND   THE    WAR 

But  Carducci  did  not  travel  far  in  this  direction. 
He  underwent  no  religious  conversion  to  match 
his  political  conversion.  Yet  how  remote  is  this 
last  note  from  the  turbulent  anticlericalism  of  his 
beginnings  ! 

Thus  we  are  able  to  follow,  through  the  work 
of  Carducci,  the  evolution  and  the  metamorphosis 
of  modern  Italy.  A  poet,  and  in  the  ranks  of  the 
greatest,  Carducci,  by  his  difficult  and  lofty  art, 
has  interpreted  the  life,  the  feelings,  and  the 
experiences  of  a  people. 

Carducci  was  fitly  called  "  the  national  poet 
of  the  Third  Italy."  He  found  a  successor  in  this 
high  vocation  in  Gabriele  d'  Annunzio. 

We  in  France  had  learned  something  of  his 
quality  previously.  Having  come  to  settle  in 
Paris  a  few  years  ago,  a  reception  was  organised 
in  his  honour,  and  a  French  man  of  letters,  who 
was  introduced  to  him,  congratulated  himself 
on  meeting  the  foremost  novelist  of  modern  Italy. 
"  I  am  worth  still  more  as  a  poet,"  replied  the 
author  of  La  Nave,  without  the  least  false  modesty. 
When  posterity  speaks  of  d'  Annunzio  it  will,  in- 
deed, assuredly  remember  him  first  as  poet,  for 
it  was  as  a  poet  that  he  achieved  the  great  and 
final  phase  of  his  mission  as  man  of  letters.  It 
is  as  a  poet  that  he  has  most  influenced  the  men 
in  whose  tongue  he  sings.  And,  by  a  natural 
reaction,  it  was  as  a  poet  that  he  himself  was 
drawn  into  the  life  of  action.  We  shall  see  later 
on  how  and  as  a  result  of  what  circumstances  he 
inscribed  his  name  upon  one  of  the  pages  of 
Italian  history  which  is  of  all  least  likely  to  be 
forgotten. 


THE   NATIONALIST   TRADITION   95 

One  may  say  that  it  was  the  lyrical  spirit  of 
Italy  which  breathed  through  those  decisive 
days  of  the  Roman  May  of  191 5,  and  that  in 
those  days  the  poetry  of  d'  Annunzio  was  realised. 

A  disciple  of  Carducci,  his  equal  in  the  difficult 
technique  of  a  complex  and  refined  prosody, 
aspiring,  like  Carducci,  to  the  summits  of  his  art, 
Gabriele  d'  Annunzio,  once  again  like  Carducci, 
will  appear  to  the  future  as  a  national  poet.  But 
he  must  be  styled  the  national  poet  of  the  Fourth 
Italy  ;  no  longer  the  reviving  Italy  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  but  the  great,  powerful,  and 
victorious  Italy  of  the  twentieth. 

As  always  happens  in  such  a  case,  the  nationalist 
ideals  which  determined  Italian  intervention  in 
191 5  had  for  a  long  time  been  in  the  air.  Dis- 
tributed under  a  score  of  different  forms,  to  the 
measure  of  all  temperaments  and  all  imaginations, 
having  acquired  a  considerable  power  of  diffusion, 
it  was  their  poetical  expression  which  gave  them 
their  unity  and  their  power  of  expansion,  made 
them  accessible  to  the  great  public,  assured  them 
of  their  advantage  over  the  various  conceptions — 
as,  for  example,  those  of  socialism  or  democracy 
— which  were  simultaneously  making  a  bid  for 
men's  minds.  In  this  respect  certain  representa- 
tions of  the  lyrical  dramas  of  Signor  d'  Annunzio, 
by  the  unanimity  and  enthusiasm  which  were 
manifested  on  these  occasions,  might  already  be 
regarded  as  premonitory  signs,  as  already  marking 
the  stages  of  progress.  In  191 5,  at  the  voice  of 
the  poet,  all  the  suggestions,  images,  and  symbols 
transmitted  from  the  intellectual  aristocracy 
to  the  crowd  rose  up  in  men's  minds  to  become 
invincible  powers  of  sentiment. 


96  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Vates,  poet,  prophet,  the  aged  Victor  Hugo 
liked  to  say.  Gabriele  d'  Annunzio  will  have 
been  the  prophet  of  the  war  of  1915.  Who  sang 
of  it  before  the  event,  who  foresaw  and  announced 
it  as  he  did  ?  Let  us  look  about  us  :  what  French 
poet  (I  speak,  of  course,  of  poets  of  the  same  rank) 
had  an  equal  intuition  of  the  future,  or  produced 
anything  like  those  forebodings  of  the  future 
which  are  to  be  found  on  almost  every  page  of 
his  Laudi  ?  It  was  he  who,  nearly  ten  years  ago, 
heard  the  "  roar  of  warfare  "  overpowering  the 
roar  of  the  workshops.  It  was  he  who,  calling 
the  youth  of  Italy  to  arms,  proposed  to  it  the 
programme  of  which  1915  was  to  witness  the 
realisation.  "  For  the  conquest  of  this  ideal 
programme,  of  the  greater  Italy,  set  forth  and 
prepare  yourselves.  .  .  .  There  are  many  dawns 
which  have  not  yet  shone.  ..."  His  divina- 
tion was  even  more  precise  :  "  The  days  draw 
near  :  let  us  prepare  for  the  holy  war  "  ;  so  that 
more  than  one  characteristic  of  the  present  war 
may  be  found  recorded  in  these  poems.  "  l^hy 
war,  sacred  Italy,"  says  an  inaugural  song  ;  and 
the  present  war  is  "  Nostra  guerray 

Still  more  prophetically,  perhaps  (and  many 
have  been  struck  by  the  circumstance),  Gabriele 
d'  Annunzio  announced  the  part  which  Victor 
Emmanuel  III  was  called  upon  by  destiny  to 
play  in  the  great  historic  phase  through  which  we 
are  now  passing.  The  "  Roman  days  "  of  1915, 
which  the  poet  was  to  control,  were  announced 
in  the  famous  ode  To  the  young  King,  and  this 
prediction  does  not,  like  the  "  centuries "  of 
a  Nostradamus,  consist  of  incoherent  or  sibylline 
§tatements,  a  tangle  of  obscure  metaphors  and 


THE   NATIONALIST   TRADITION  97 

images,  in  which  one  may,  if  sufficiently  ingeniouG, 
discover  any  meaning  one  pleases.  Gabriele 
d'  Annunzio  confined  himself  to  exact  and  pene- 
trating inductions,  when,  saluting  the  advent  of 
the  new  prince,  he  warned  him,  in  high  and 
solemn  language,  that  his  reign  must  witness 
great  events,  or  else  it  would  not  be.  Humbert  I 
had  just  been  assassinated,  and  the  Prince  of 
Naples  was  cruising,  when  the  news  of  the  crime 
which  made  him  king  was  announced.  ' 

"  O  thou,  young  man,  who,  summoned  by 
Death,  hast  come  by  the  Sea,  O  thou  who,  elected 
by  Death,  hast  been  made  king  upon  the  Sea. 
.  .  .  Destiny  has  chosen  thee  for  the  great 
audacious  adventure.  Take  the  bow,  light  the 
torches,  strike,  and  light  the  way  for  us,  O  Latin 
hero  !  Open,  to  our  courage,  the  gates  of  future 
empires  !  " 

And  then  suddenly  followed  those  verses  in 
which,  as  in  a  sort  of  menace,  we  see  the  Roman 
people  of  1 91 5  ''  in  tumult,"  awaiting  the  Royal 
word  which  was  to  deliver  the  nation  from 
traitors  and  from  the  foreigner,  and  to  set  Italy 
upon  the  great  Imperial  highway. 

'*  For  if  the  shame  were  to  last,  when  the  hour 
should  sound,  then  close  at  hand  among  the  rebellious 
thou  wouldst  behold  in  the  front  rank  he  who  to-day 
salutes  thee.''"' 

Many  Italians,  sensitive  to  poetry  and  to 
prophecy,  must  have  repeated  these  lines  in  the 
month  of  May,  while  the  tempest  of  popular 
commotion  seemed  gathering  over  Rome. 

"The  holy  war,"  said  Gabriele  d' Annunzio 
nearly  ten  years  before  it  was  due  to  break  forth. 
It  is  the  war  whence  Italy  is  to  emerge  greater 


98  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

and  more  powerful,  equal  to  her  destinies,  such 
as  the  patriots  of  the  past  beheld  her  in  their 
dreams,  those  who  died  in  the  days  of  her  modest 
beginnings,  those  who  were  destined  to  witness 
only  the  first  stages  of  her  growth,  but  who  none 
the  less  had  faith  in  her  future,  who  in  the  seed 
perceived  the  tree.  In  this  respect  the  war  is  for 
Italy  the  result  of  a  hundred  years  of  nationalist 
passions  and  ideals.  It  is  the  daughter  of  philo- 
sophy and  literature,  a  conception  created  in 
common  by  all  the  noble  minds  and  the  high 
imaginations  of  a  people.  It  was  natural  that 
Italy,  awakened  to  self-consciousness  by  the  book 
in  which  Gioberti,  with  a  confidence  almost 
mystical,  revealed  to  her  her  **  primacy,"  while 
she  was  yet  in  servitude,  should  still  be  guided  by 
poetry  on  the  day  when  she  was  to  assert,  in  the 
face  of  the  world,  her  rights  and  her  duties  as  a 
great  nation. 


CHAPTER  IV 

ITALY  IS  NO  LONGER  THE  COUNTRY  OF  THE  DEAD 

The  scorn  of  the  nineteenth  century — Literary  witchcraft — 
Italy  wishes  to  "  live  her  life  " — From  beyond  the  tombs 
— ^The  forerunners — ^The  intuition  of  Proudhon — First 
outlines  of  an  Italian  Imperialism — ^The  dream  of  Victor 
Emmanuel  II — Don  Amadeo — Italian  dynamism — ^The 
conservative  nations  and  the  progressive  nations — ^The 
tendency  of  ideas  before  the  war — "  Futurism  "  and 
Nietzscheism — ^The  new  Nationalist  party — ^The  Cathedral 
of  Reims — ^The  Italian  spirit  and  the  war. 

"  In  the  end  we  become  the  slaves  of  the  creatures 
which  we  have  made."  This  great  saying  of 
Goethe's  is  especially  true  in  the  domain  of 
imaginative  life.  Thus  the  French  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  created  for  themselves  a  sort  of 
mythological  Europe,  which  was  to  have  a  power- 
ful suggestive  effect  on  their  foreign  policy. 
Afterwards,  they  experienced  a  serious  difficulty 
in  liberating  themselves  from  this  unreal  world. 
Under  the  empire  of  literary  recollections,  the 
French  had  made  of  the  majority  of  foreign 
peoples  a  seductive  image,  the  arbitrary  character 
of  which  yielded  only  with  difficulty,  and  little 
by  little,  to  the  lessons  of  experience,  so  strongly 
were  their  progenitors  attached  to  the  children 
of  their  mind.  In  1827  the  French  had  just 
liberated  the  Greeks.     And  Admiral    de  Rigny 

99 


100  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

discovered  "  with  an  ever-increasing  surprise," 
as  his  reports  told,  that  modern  Greece  offered  no 
resemblances  to  the  Greece  of  Homer,  Phidias,  and 
Plato.  Yet  this  v^as  the  Greece  of  w^hich  France 
had  championed  the  cause.  Similarly  the  image 
of  a  disinterested  and  idealistic  Germany,  which, 
according  to  Mme  de  Stael's  expression,  reserved 
to  itself  "  the  kingdom  of  the  air,"  had  not  com- 
pletely, even  after  1870,  given  way  to  the  harsher 
reality.  In  spite  of  the  lessons  of  the  present  war, 
it  is  probable  that  some  trace  of  the  old  illusions 
may  still  survive  in  the  minds  of  a  few  French- 
men. 

The  Italy  for  which  France  felt  such  enthu- 
siasm in  the  nineteenth  century,  and  for  which 
she  went  to  war  in  1859,  bore  but  a  distant 
resemblance  to  the  real  Italy.  Similarly,  the 
Greece  of  Constantine  I  is  not  the  Greece  of 
the  Orientales,  nor  is  the  Germany  of  Mme  de 
Stael  that  of  Prince  Bismarck.  The  French 
who,  under  the  monarchy  of  July,  and  under 
the  second  Republic,  demanded  intervention  in 
favour  of  oppressed  Italy,  and  subsequently 
acclaimed  Napoleon  III,  who,  obedient  to  the 
voice  of  the  nations,  was  setting  out  for  the  battle- 
fields of  Lombardy — these  same  Frenchmen 
would  have  been  greatly  astonished  had  they 
been  told  that  the  Italians  desired  that  their 
country  should  eventually  be  something  more 
than  the  land  of  art  and  beauty,  the  country 
where  the  orange-tree  flowers  amid  noble  ruins. 
What  France  did  not  then  understand  was  that 
Italy  wished  *'  to  live  her  own  life."  France  had 
formed  a  romantic  conception  of  an  Italy  which 
conceived  herself  in  the  most  positive,  realistic, 


NO  LONGER  COUIntTRY  OF  DJEADioi 

and  practical  spirit.  The  misconception  was 
serious.  Its  result  was  to  create  a  misunder- 
standing between  the  two  countries  which  has 
lasted  until  our  own  days. 

In  vain  did  a  few  well-informed  or  clear-sighted 
persons  wisely  advise  France  as  to  her  error. 
Marc  Monnier  wrote  a  book  whose  title  alone 
gave  an  indication  of  its  contents  :  Ultalie  est- 
elle  la  terre  des  Morts  P  This  was  about  i860, 
when  Italy  was  already  a  robust  personality,  full 
of  the  future,  by  no  means  addicted  to  loitering 
in  cemeteries.  Already  Italy  was  "  futurist." 
One  might  say  that  she  had  been  so — setting 
aside  all  exaggeration,  all  deliberate  intention  of 
astonishing  the  bourgeois^  all  tendency  to  paradox 
— from  the  moment  when  she  had  first  defined 
herself  as  a  nation.  Long  before  Signor  Mari- 
netti  and  his  disciples  had  demanded,  to  the 
scandal  of  artists,  that  the  canals  of  Venice  should 
be  filled,  and  the  gondolas  done  away  with ; 
long  before  Signor  d'  Annunzio,  in  one  of  his 
Roman  speeches,  had  exclaimed  that  Italy  must 
be  something  more  than  a  background  to  honey- 
moon journeys,  Gioberti,  the  gentle  mystic,  had 
written  in  his  Primato  : 

"  What  are  we  doing  that  is  great  and  beautiful, 
we  Italians  ?  Where  are  our  performances  ? 
Where  are  our  fleets  and  colonies  ?  What  rank 
do  our  envoys  occupy  in  the  foreign  Courts  ? 
What  power,  what  influence  have  they  ?  What 
weight  does  the  name  of  Italy  cast  into  the 
European  balance  ?  Do  the  foreigners  yet  know 
our  peninsula,  do  they  visit  it  yet,  for  any  other 
reason  than  to  rejoice  in  the  immutable  beauty 


102  ITALY    AND   THE    WAR 

of  its  skies  and  to  contemplate  its  ruins  ?     But 
who  speaks  of  glory,  of  riches  and  power  ?  " 

Glory,  riches,  power — such  were  the  aspira- 
tions of  Italy  at  the  moment  when  she  was  born 
into  the  political  world,  when  she  made  her 
appearance  in  the  society  of  nations.  Thus, 
coming  into  the  world,  the  child  brings  its  need 
of  growth,  an  irresistible  force  of  development. 
Yet  those  abroad  who  believed  themselves  the 
friends  of  Italy  had  fixed  the  limits  of  her  growth 
beforehand.  They  readily  imagined  that  Italy 
would  content  herself  with  the  sort  of  life  they 
had  dreamed  of  as  hers — a  noble,  yet  idle  exist- 
ence, a  delicate  lazzaronism  amid  the  relics  and 
the  memories  of  antiquity  and  the  Renaissance. 
It  was  vaguely  supposed  that  picturesque  Italy, 
when  she  had  achieved  unity,  would  form  a 
democracy  of  artists  and  archaeologists.  This 
ridiculous  dream  was  never  Italy's.  Was  it  for 
this  that  her  patriots  had  so  long  hoped  and 
suffered  and  striven  ?  To  think  so  was  to  mistake 
the  ardour  of  the  blood  which  flowed  through 
their  veins.  It  was  to  plan  the  life  of  an  old  man 
for  a  young  creature  intoxicated  with  puberty. 

All  this  had  been  realised  with  remarkable 
force  by  a  man  who  had  observed,  without 
benevolence,  and  often  in  a  spirit  of  frank  hostility, 
the  first  steps  of  Italy.    Proudhon  wrote,  in  1863 : 

"  France  is  a  nation  fatigued  and  uncertain  of 
her  principles,  seeming  to  doubt  her  star.  Italy, 
on  the  contrary,  aroused  from  her  long  lethargy, 
seems  to  have  all  the  fire  and  inspiration  of  youth. 
France  longs  for  repose.  .  .  .  Italy  asks  only  to 
go  forward,  no  matter  under  what  conditions,  no 
matter  under  what  system.      Let  a  few  men  be 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  103 

born  to  her — a  Richelieu,  a  Colbert,  a  Conde — 
and  in  less  than  a  generation  ...  as  a  united 
State,  she  will  take  her  place  among  the  great 
Empires,  and  her  influence  in  Europe  may  be- 
come formidable." 

Perhaps  Italy  has  had  no  Richelieu,  no  Colbert, 
no  Conde  ;  Cavour  and  Victor  Emmanuel  were 
enough.  In  a  few  years,  in  less  than  a  generation, 
Italy  became  a  political,  military,  naval,  and  com- 
mercial power  of  the  first  rank.  Suddenly  she 
stood  on  a  footing  of  equality  with  the  great 
European  States,  and  the  '^  pentarchy  "  of  the 
Old  World  became  a  "  hexarchy  "  by  the  addition 
of  the  new  kingdom.  Even  the  word  ''  Empire," 
still  new  in  the  sense  intended  here,  which  had 
slipped  from  the  pen  of  Proudhon — even  this 
word,  which  then  appeared  extreme  and  inexact, 
soon  displayed  a  tendency  to  become  exact. 
"  Italy  will  be  imperialist,"  said  Proudhon.  To 
become  so  she  had  only  to  follow  her  inclination. 

Italy  was  barely  created  when  her  first  King 
gave  her  a  programme  of  action.  "  Italy  is 
free  and  united,"  he  said,  "  Henceforth  it  depends 
on  us  alone  to  make  her  great  and  happy." 
Thus  Italy  heard  the  call  of  life,  submitted  to 
the  law  of  being.  Her  lot  was  very  fair,  almost 
unhoped  for.  She  would  not  content  herself 
with  her  lot.  Already  she  abhorred  stagnation, 
resignation,  and  mediocrity.  Pope  Nicolas  V, 
who  was  a  Florentine,  used  to  say,  if  report 
speaks  true,  "  that  an  Italian  has  no  sooner 
obtained  possession  of  a  post  than  he  already 
considers  the  means  of  attaining  the  post  above 
it."  This  is  true  of  the  Italian.  It  is  also  true 
of  many  others.     It  is  true  of  any  active  man 


104  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

until  he  has  one  leg  in  the  grave.  It  is  true  of 
every  nation  until  it  is  ripe  for  decadence. 

Because  he  was  descended  from  the  petty 
seigneurs  of  Maurienne,  because  he  had  himself 
reigned  only  over  Piedmont  and  Savoy,  Victor 
Emmanuel  II  by  no  means  felt  obliged  to  content 
himself  with  the  kingdom  of  Italy  as  it  was  in 
i860,  nor,  in  1870,  with  that  kingdom  enlarged 
by  the  addition  of  Rome.  He  had  even,  like 
many  of  his  faithful  supporters  and  subjects, 
passed  through  a  phase  of  premature  ambition, 
of  megalomania  if  you  will,  which  was  quickly 
corrected  by  his  commonsense  and  tempered  by 
reality. 

The  Italians  have  remembered,  as  a  kind  of 
promise,  as  an  invitation  to  fortune,  the  saying 
of  Colonel  Marselli :  ''  The  destinies  of  Italy 
summon  her  one  day  to  be  the  England  of  the 
South."  Of  her  great  role  in  the  Mediterranean 
Victor  Emmanuel  had  an  intuition  even  before 
Rome  had  become  his  capital.  Hardly  was  he 
king  of  the  new  Italy,  when  he  began  to  dream 
of  extending  the  influence  of  Italy  beyond  her 
frontiers,  of  making  the  Mediterranean  a  species 
of  Italian  lake — mare  nostrum — by  means  of  a  sort 
of  family  pact  borrowed  from  the  French  mon- 
archy, and  imitated  from  the  Bourbons.  The 
Germans  have  shown  us  since  then,  more  especially 
in  the  East,  what  can  be  done  by  the  rational 
exploitation  of  dynastic  alliances.  In  1867  the 
Spanish  throne  had  fallen  vacant.  Victor  Em- 
manuel did  not  hesitate  to  urge  his  son  Amadeo 
to  put  himself  forward  as  candidate,  and  so 
"  Don  Amadeo  "  became  king  of  Spain — like  the 
Due  d'Anjou,  and  the  grandson  of  Louis  XIV 


NO   LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  105 

before  him.  And  a  Princess  of  Savoy,  Maria 
Pia,  married  to  King  Louis,  was  Queen  of  Portu- 
gal. Through  his  son  Victor  Emmanuel  thought 
to  be  master  in  Madrid.  Through  his  daughter 
his  influence  might  predominate  in  Lisbon. 
Already  vast  plans  were  attributed  to  him,  a 
complete  and  audacious  policy,  of  which  the 
goal  would  have  been  the  unification  of  the 
Iberian  peninsula  under  the  sceptre  of  a  prince 
of  the  House  of  Savoy,  as  he  himself  had  accom- 
plished the  unification  of  the  Italian  peninsula. 
But  in  spite  of  the  advice  and  encouragement  of 
his  father,  '*  Don  Amadeo,"  after  a  reign  of  three 
years,  which  were  three  years  of  tribulations, 
returned,  full  of  bitterness,  to  his  own  country, 
resuming  his  name  and  title  as  a  Prince  of  Pied- 
mont ;  resuming,  too,  with  profound  relief,  his 
independence.  It  was  he  who,  on  abandoning 
the  throne  of  Spain,  exchanged  the  Escurial  for 
a  simple  furnished  apartment  in  the  "  Fonda  de 
Paris,"  whence  he  sent  his  father  this  historic 
telegram,  which  so  greatly  amused  Europe : 
"  All  is  over,  will  write  ;  Amadeo."  This  was 
a  check  for  the  young  Italian  monarchy.  But, 
following  the  House  of  Savoy,  the  Hohenzollerns, 
tempted  by  the  example  of  the  Habsburgs  and 
the  Bourbons,  were  in  turn  to  aspire  to  the  Spanish 
throne.  On  leaving  Spain  Don  Amadeo,  who  had 
no  suspicion  of  the  fact,  was  leaving  behind  him 
the  cause  of  the  war  of  1870,  the  beginning  of  a 
conflict  by  the  issue  of  which  the  face  of  Europe 
was  to  be  transformed.  Such  are  the  abysmal 
surprises  which  yawn  at  every  step  in  the  domains 
of  politics  and  history. 


io6  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

It  has  not  been  sufficiently  remarked  that  the 
year  1870  had  almost  the  same  significance  and 
the  same  importance  for  Italy  as  for  Germany. 
For  each  country  it  was  a  historic  moment  of 
equal  value,  in  that  it  marked  the  accomplish- 
ment, the  last  stage,  of  its  unification. 

The  comparison  between  Prussia  and  Piedmont 
was  for  a  long  time  perfect.  What  one  aspired 
to  do  in  the  peninsula,  the  other  aspired  to  do 
in  the  Germanic  Confederation.  Moreover,  in 
respect  of  France  their  position  was  the  same  ;  it 
is  natural,  therefore,  that  their  policies  should 
have  joined  issue,  and  that  the  alliance  between 
Prussia  and  Piedmont,  concluded  in  1866,  should 
have  become  an  alliance  between  Italy  and 
Germany  after  1870.  It  was  a  phenomenon 
which  was  based  on  potent  historical  causes. 
Having,  up  to  the  date  of  Sadowa,  left  Bismarck 
a  free  hand  in  Germany,  Napoleon  then  effected 
a  sudden  change  of  front  and  made  approaches 
to  Austria.  After  taking  up  arms  for  the  cause 
of  Italian  unity  in  1859  ^^  sought  to  impose 
limits  upon  the  process  of  unification.  He 
barred  the  road  to  Rome  after  pointing  the  way 
thither.  Once  the  Empire  had  fallen,  and 
France  was  defeated,  Germany  and  Italy  were  to 
obtain  that  which  had  been  forbidden  to  them 
so  long  as  France  was  strong  enough  to  enforce 
her  veto.  Italy  might  regard  as  null  and  void 
the  famous  convention  of  September,  and  might 
seize  upon  Rome  (there  are  still  aged  Romans 
living  who  remember  to  have  seen  ''  the  Italians," 
as  they  ingenuously  call  them,  entering  the  city), 
while  the  King  of  Prussia  was  making  ready  to 
proclaim  the  German  Empire.     In  the  course  of 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  107 

the  years  that  followed  Germany  and  Italy  were 
to  show  themselves  equally  anxious  not  to  allow 
French  influence  to  make  itself  felt  in  their 
domestic  affairs.  And  in  these  countries  this 
desire  survived  the  defeat  of  France.  Yet  France 
entertained  barely  a  thought  of  meddling  with 
the  life  of  her  neighbours  ;  and  had  she  cherished 
the  intention  the  means  would  have  been  lacking. 
Italy  continued  to  regard  an  unwelcome  inter- 
vention of  France  in  the  matter  of  Rome  as 
possible,  and  for  a  long  while  this  apprehension 
guided  her  foreign  policy.  Similarly,  Bismarck 
long  feared,  or  feigned  to  fear,  lest  France  should 
become  a  rallying-point  for  the  particularist, 
and,  as  he  called  them,  the  "  centrifugal "  elements 
which  might  still  be  encountered  in  the  interior 
of  the  new  German  Empire.  Cunningly  ex- 
ploited, these  apprehensions  were  in  great  measure 
to  serve  in  transforming  the  occasional  alliance 
of  1866  into  a  more  comprehensive  system,  that 
of  the  Triple  Alliance,  German  and  Italian  unity 
being  regarded  each  as  guaranteeing  the  other. 
This  historical  phase  must  be  kept  in  view ; 
there  will  always  be  men,  in  Italy  as  in  Germany, 
in  certain  eventualities  of  the  future,  who  will 
evoke  it  anew  and  seek  to  restore  it  to  its  old 
significance. 

Thus  Germany  and  Italy,  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  had  similar  points  of  departure  ;  their 
positions  were  similar ;  and  they  passed  through 
similar  vicissitudes.  Italian  unity  was  accom- 
plished by  means  of  the  same  ideals  and  the  same 
methods  (or  very  nearly  the  same)  as  those  by 
which  the  unity  of  Germany  was  established. 
Piedmont   had   filled   in   Italy   the   part   which 


io8  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Prussia  had  occupied  in  the  German  world. 
Despite  many  slight  variations,  of  which  we  must 
not  lose  sight,  Cavour  and  Bismarck,  Wilhelm  I 
and  Victor  Emmanuel  II,  the  Italian  patriots 
and  the  German  intellectuals,  had  fulfilled  the 
same  function  and  were  actuated  hy  the  same 
desire  :  that  of  constituting  great  nations  and 
powerful  States  where  there  had  so  far  been  only 
division,  dispersion,  and  weakness.  The  state 
of  men's  minds  and  the  general  trend  of  ideas 
were  the  same,  so  long  as  it  was  a  question  of 
attaining  the  goal.  When  that  was  attained  was 
it  not  natural  that  the  same  identity  of  thoughts 
and  feelings  should  continue  ?  Each  with  her 
peculiar  genius,  Germany  and  Italy,  unified  at 
last,  were  youthful  Powers  with  all  the  needs  and 
appetites  and  desires  of  youth.  The  peoples, 
who  are  almost  immortal,  do  not  experience,  as 
is  too  often  believed,  the  same  sequence  of  ages 
and  the  same  decline  as  man,  but  a  succession  of 
winters  and  springs.  In  a  Europe  in  which  the 
great  nations  were  either  exhausted  or  replete, 
after  a  century  of  expansion  and  conquest,  Ger- 
many and  Italy  came  forward  with  blood  renewed, 
with  fresh  energies  and  ambitions.  They  were 
equally  eager  to  grow,  to  dominate,  to  enrich 
themselves  :  the  society  of  nations  has  its  Rastig- 
nacs,  just  as  the  society  of  human  beings,  and 
what  nation  has  not  been,  or  will  not  be,  Rastignac 
in  its  turn  ?  France  and  England  were  inclined 
to  retire,  having  made  their  fortunes.  They 
had  become  conservative,  and,  thenceforth,  timid. 
Germany  and  Italy  had  their  fortunes  to  make. 
This  again  was  bound  to  develop  common 
characteristics  in  the  two  nations. 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  109 

The  reader  must  not  misunderstand  our  argu- 
ment. We  know  how  greatly  civilisation  and 
race  differ  in  the  two  countries.  We  know  the 
limits  of  this  parallel.  But  numerous  Italians, 
in  the  intellectual  world,  do  not  hesitate  to  admit 
the  comparison  in  so  far  as  it  is  just  and  honour- 
able. Germany  has  disgraced  herself  by  her 
uncouthness,  her  savagery,  her  contempt  for  the 
law  of  nations  and  the  traditions  of  public 
morality.  But  no  one  would  deny  that  she 
has  afforded,  during  the  last  fifty  years,  a  wonder- 
ful example  of  tenacious  labour  and  effort  and 
sacrifice,  even  though  it  has  been  in  a  bad  cause. 
With  more  wisdom,  more  balance,  the  qualities 
she  has  displayed  might  have  assured  her  of  that 
hegemony,  that  domination  of  which  she  has 
dreamed,  and  which,  by  her  very  excess  of  brutal 
infatuation,  she  has  missed.  Italy,  most  assuredly, 
has  displayed  more  taste,  moderation,  discretion, 
and  tact  in  the  quest  of  power  and  greatness. 
But  that  which  in  the  depths  of  her  nature 
invincibly  impelled  her  to  become  a  military, 
naval,  colonial,  and  industrial  power  was  the 
same  instinct  which  was  at  the  same  time 
actuating  Germany.  The  same  dynamic  forces 
were  at  work  in  either  case.  The  same  "  will  to 
power  "  was  revealed  by  either  nation.  We  will 
not  speak  of  the  new  Balkan  nationalities,  which 
are  so  turbulent,  and  whose  evolution  is  yet  so 
imperfect  and  their  destiny  so  uncertain  :  but 
where  in  Europe,  in  the  last  forty  years,  has  there 
been  displayed,  in  the  domain  of  high  politics, 
more  imagination,  more  enterprise,  more  love 
of  novelty,  movement,  and  conflict  than  in 
Germany   and    Italy  ?     What    nations   have   so 


no  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

acutely  felt  the  need  to  find  employment  for 
their  energies  ?  What  nations  have  thought 
more  of  the  future,  and  have  more  readily  con- 
ceived of  alterations  of  the  map  of  Europe  and 
of  territorial  aggrandisement  ?  No  one  can 
hesitate  as  to  the  reply  to  this  question.  And 
one  is  finally  inclined  to  suggest  that  Germany 
and  Italy,  precisely  because  they  commenced 
in  the  same  manner,  because  they  were  driven 
by  the  same  needs,  were  bound  one  day,  by  a  sort 
of  necessity,  to  find  themselves  in  opposing  camps, 
for  their  aspirations  and  their  profounder  senti- 
ments, being  similar,  were  necessarily  incom- 
patible, and  were  bound,  in  the  end,  to  clash. 


Nevertheless,  by  a  curious  phenomenon,  this 
Nationalist  or  Imperialist  frame  of  mind  (to-day 
the  two  terms  are  indifferently  employed),  which 
was  involved  in  the  very  origins  of  the  new  Italy, 
was  for  a  long  time  to  pass  unperceived  by  the 
eyes  of  contemporaries.  More  attentive  to  the 
manifestations  of  Italy's  public  life  than  to  the 
tendencies  of  her  profounder  self,  foreigners,  and 
often  enough  the  Italians  themselves,  allowed 
themselves  to  be  deceived  by  the  appearances  of 
political  institutions  and  manners.  Italy  had 
followed  the  fashion  in  the  matter  of  a  Parlia- 
mentary government.  It  needed  only  a  step  to 
conclude  that  the  whole  Italian  mind  was  ex- 
pressed by  the  elections  and  by  Parliament.  Yet 
the  Chamber  alone,  and  the  opinions  then 
represented  (although  universal  suffrage  did  two 
years  ago  to  a  certain  extent  renew  the  atmosphere 
therein)  were  far  from  yielding  a  truthful  image 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  in 

on  the  complete  moral  and  intellectual  physiog- 
nomy of  the  country. 

In  the  course  of  the  years  immediately  pre- 
ceding the  European  war  the  observer  who 
contented  himself  by  recording  the  tendencies 
of  the  electoral  body  and  the  composition  of  the 
majorities — not  only  at  Montecitorio  and  the 
Palais  Bourbon,  but  also  in  the  House  of  Commons 
and  the  Reichstag — would  inevitably  have  con- 
cluded that  an  armed  conflict  was  impossible. 
Whether  a  radical  socialist,  as  in  France,  or  a 
clerical,  as  in  Belgium,  the  elector  demanded 
peace,  tranquilHty,  the  improvement  of  his 
conditions,  and  an  increasing  share  in  the  national 
wealth.  Yet  the  observer  who  confined  himself 
to  these  symptoms  would  have  committed  a 
stupendous  error,  because  these  symptoms  were 
insufficient  and  superficial.  There  were,  almost 
everywhere,  forces  and  elements  which,  while 
they  found  but  an  imperfect  expression  in  Parlia- 
ment or  among  the  electorate,  none  the  less 
exerted,  unknown  to  the  majority,  a  considerable 
influence  over  the  life  of  the  nations.  Even  in 
France,  where  the  democracy  had  achieved 
complete  domination,  two  superimposed  currents 
might  be  distinguished  ;  that  of  internal  politics, 
which  was  making  for  a  diminished  effort  and 
progressive  disarmament,  and  that  of  foreign 
politics,  which,  by  means  of  the  Triple  Entente, 
and  the  alliances  with  England  and  Russia,  was 
making  for  resistance,  and  consequently  for  a 
collision  with  Germany.  This  essential  contra- 
diction will  perhaps  impress  posterity  more  than 
it  has  impressed  us.  Later  on,  perhaps,  men  will 
see  in  the  pacifist  movement  of  the  years  which 


112  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

preceded  the  conflict  something  like  an  obscure 
and  instinctive  reaction.  The  imminence  of  the 
catastrophe  made  some  aspire  for  an  international 
entente  of  the  peoples,  and  this  desire  was  the 
more  extreme  as  it  appeared  capable  of  realisation 
and  more  plainly  contradicted  by  events.  Thus 
the  periods  v^hich  are  distinguished  by  dreams  of 
humanitarian  fraternity  and  effusions  of  tender- 
ness among  the  citizens  of  the  same  country 
precede,  with  remarkable  regularity,  atrocious  in- 
testine struggles  and  worse  than  civil  wars. 

We  do  not  believe  that  the  electoral  consulta- 
tion of  the  autumn  of  191 3,  in  which,  for  the 
first  time,  all  Italians  took  part  without  distinction 
of  fortune  or  education,  could  have  given  anyone 
a  positive  indication  of  the  attitude  which  Italy 
would  adopt  in  the  event  of  a  European  conflict. 
One  knew  that  Signor  Giolitti  had  presided  over 
these  elections,  and  one  supposed  that  by  virtue 
of  his  omnipotence  in  the  administrative  and 
political  life  of  Italy  he  had  formed  this  Parlia- 
ment, the  result  of  universal  suffrage,  in  his  own 
image,  as  readily,  perhaps,  as  he  had  previously 
formed  the  Parliaments  elected  by  the  limited 
suffrage.  And  in  truth,  as  we  shall  see,  the 
Chamber,  in  May  1915,  was  very  near  supporting 
Signor  Giolitti,  very  near  enabling  him  to  keep 
Italy  neutral.  That  it  did  not  do  so  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  elements  came  into  play  which  were 
alien  to  political  life. 

For  some  years  there  had  appeared  in  Italy 
schools  of  literature,  philosophy,  or  politics,  which 
were  hardly  taken  seriously,  on  account  of  their 
eccentric  character,  or  were  regarded  merely  as 
curiosities,  if  not  as  examples  of  mental  deformity. 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD    113 

But  the  public  was  wrong ;  they  should  at  least 
have  been  regarded  as  symptoms.  Without 
going  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  paradox  alone  is 
fruitful,  and  that  it  always  represents  the  truth 
of  to-morrow  (for  the  complete  history  of  para- 
doxical opinions  would  be  only  too  likely  to  prove 
the  apotheosis  of  the  commonplace),  we  should 
beware  of  giving  our  attention  only  to  accepted 
ideas.  It  is  a  middle-class  prejudice,  an  academic 
conception,  which  attributes  influence  and  value 
only  to  official  doctrines,  those  which  are  trium- 
phant in  the  academies  and  parliaments,  while 
the  reprobated  doctrines  are  kept  in  a  sort  of 
ideological  quarantine,  at  the  other  extremity 
of  the  intellectual  world. 

"  Futurism,"  in  Italy,  was  one  of  these  doc- 
trines. Nationalism  was  another.  And  we  cannot 
swear  that  the  adepts  of  these  schools  of  thought, 
who  pass,  in  the  eyes  of  people  of  common- 
sense,  for  mystificators  or  enthusiasts,  have  not 
sometimes  yielded  to  the  temptation  of  amazing 
the  bourgeois  and  annoying  the  Philistine.  This 
is  a  defect,  a  vice,  which  appears  in  the  origins  of 
all  youthful  schools ;  and  the  "  futurists  "  have 
been  greatly  addicted  to  it.  But  behind  the 
very  real  extravagances  of  these  painters  and 
literary  men  we  find  a  guiding  idea  which  responds 
to  a  profound  instinct  of  the  new  Italy.  Their 
blasphemies  have  given  offence,  and  this  offence 
seems  to  some  extent  to  have  entered  into  their 
calculations.  But  when  they  proclaimed  the 
necessity  of  shaking  off  the  servitude  of  the  past, 
what  were  they  doing  but  expressing,  in  an  ex- 
tremer  fashion,  the  feeling  already  interpreted  by 
Gioberti  ?  The  '*  futurists  "  laid  the  foundation 
8 


114  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

of  their  rackety  reputation  by  asserting  that  it 
was  essential,  for  the  good  of  Italy,  to  destroy 
her  museums  and  libraries.  Their  leader  and 
theorist,  Signor  F.  T.  Marinetti,  one  day  "  dedi- 
cated the  ruins  of  Rome  to  the  earthquake."  He 
has  celebrated  the  *'  increasing  triumph  of  the 
Machine,"  and  the  beauty  of  factories  and  blast- 
furnaces, which  is  greater  than  that  of  classical 
landscapes.  He  has  derided  Pegasus  and  sung  the 
aeroplane.  .  .  .  This  negation  of  art,  this  revolt 
against  antiquity — what  was  it,  at  bottom,  but 
an  exaggerated  image,  distorted  by  literature, 
of  one  of  the  keenest  aspirations  and  ambitions  of 
modern  Italy  ?  for  Italy  herself  has  desired  to 
become  a  great  industrial  nation,  to  gaze  with 
pride  on  the  smoking  chimneys  of  her  factories. 
The  "  futurists  "  conceived  a  violent  disdain 
for  Signor  Gabriele  d'  Annunzio.  They 
reproached  him  with  having  cultivated  *'  the 
morbid  and  nostalgic  poetry  of  memory  and 
remoteness."  In  short,  Signor  d'  Annunzio  was 
reckoned  by  them — and  this  was  the  supreme 
insult — as  one  of  the  "  passists."  However,  the 
time  was  to  come  when  they  were  forced  to 
applaud  him,  and  to  recognise  themselves  in  his 
words.  It  is  true  that  this  was  when  all  modern 
Italy  was  doing  so.  It  was  on  one  of  those  almost 
revolutionary  nights  of  May  191 5  when  150,000 
Romans  received  from  the  poet's  lips  the  watch- 
word, the  call  to  action.  And  in  the  city  of 
tourists,  the  ''  cosmopolis  "  of  Europe,  the  follow- 
ing words  were  acclaimed  :  ''  No,  we  are  not, 
we  will  not  be  a  museum,  a  hotel,  a  holiday  resort, 
a  horizon  painted  in  Prussian  blue  for  international 
honeymoons."     Perhaps  nothing  will  be  left  of 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  115 

"  futurism  "  beyond  these  words  and  that  even- 
ing. But  by  that  very  fact  "  futurism "  v^ill 
have  proved  that  it  had  more  to  do  than  appeared 
with  the  development,  the  direction,  and  the 
instinct  of  the  "  fourth  Italy." 

What  must  before  all  else  have  struck  the  true 
observer — he  who  neglects  nothing — was  the 
fact  that  this  school,  which  seduced  or  at  least 
interested  a  section  of  Italian  youth  by  invoking 
the  future,  was  teaching  precisely  the  opposite 
of  that  which  is  known  and  usually  propagated 
as  the  progressive  doctrine.  Far  from  represent- 
ing the  future  in  such  colours  as  the  last  two 
centuries  would  have  seen  it  in,  the  "  futurists  " 
could  not  be  sufficiently  sarcastic  at  the  expense 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  French  Encyclopaedists 
and  the  men  of  1789.  They  disdained  it  and 
abused  it  as  violently  as  they  did  Christianity. 
Both,  in  their  eyes,  were  things  of  the  past ; 
in  their  jargon,  they  were  "  pastism."  As  for 
the  conception  of  a  universal  and  perpetual 
peace,  marking  the  end  of  the  bloodthirsty  in- 
stincts of  humanity,  they  rejected  it  with  disgust. 
What  they  demanded  in  their  prayers  was  war, 
"  the  world's  only  hygiene."  They  addressed 
their  hymns  to  Trieste,  "  our  beautiful  powder- 
magazine,"  which  was  destined  to  blow  up  the 
opportunist  policy — that  cowardice,  as  they  called 
it.  They  demanded  at  the  tops  of  their  voices 
that  Italy  should  attack  Austria.  Long  before 
the  hour  struck  they  were  summoning  the 
monarchy  to  "  consolidate  the  national  pride 
by  preparing  for  war."  Finally  they  exalted 
patriotism,  a  warlike  spirit,  and  contempt  for 
death,  deriding  international  pacifism.     And  all 


ii6  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

this  was  done  defiantly,  in  a  mood  of  excess,  in 
the  spirit  of  a  literary  clique.  Yet  we  can  but 
admit,  with  astonishment,  that  here  again  these 
enthusiastic  theorists,  more  noisy  than  influential, 
were  after  all  in  agreement  with  the  most  powerful 
tendencies  of  their  country  and  their  time. 
Since  then,  moreover,  the  young  "  futurist " 
artists  have  enthusiastically  hailed  the  desired 
war,  the  war  achieved  in  spite  of  the  resistance 
of  certain  of  those  "  passist "  forces  which  they 
had  opposed.  And  they  left  in  a  body  for  the 
front.  They  had  willed  the  war  ;  their  will  was 
accomplished.  In  the  mysterious  elaboration  of 
popular  movements  such  as  that  through  which 
Italy  has  passed,  who  can  ever  define  the  precise 
share  of  each  man  or  each  ideal  ? 

By  the  "  futurists "  Nietzsche  was  despised 
and  loudly  rejected.  They  hated  the  German 
philosopher  in  him.  Moreover,  what  reputation 
did  they  not  assassinate  ^  However,  they  most 
certainly  absorbed  something  of  the  Nietzschean 
spirit  and  the  Nietzschean  paradox,  and  that  of 
the  least  refined  quality.  The  Germanic  world 
was  also  and  at  the  same  time  invaded  by  these 
uncouth  and  rudimentary  adaptations  of  the 
Nietzschean  philosophy,  reduced  to  the  shibboleth 
of  the  "  superman,"  the  injunction  "  let  us  be 
hard,"  the  justification  of  "  master-morality," 
and  the  criticism  of  pity.  And  here  again  is 
something  like  a  strange  affinity  between  Italy 
and  Germany. 

There  is  one  party  which  recognises  this 
affinity,  is  not  ashamed  of  it,  is  perhaps  even 
proud  that  Italy  displays  it.     This  is  the  Nation- 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  117 

alist  party.  And  it  is  also  one  of  those  parties 
which  did  most  to  impel  Italy  to  participate 
in  the  European  conflict  and  to  break  with 
the  Germanic  Powers.  This  is  the  party  which 
has  continually  contended  that  the  Italian  war 
should  enjoy  the  greatest  possible  extension,  and 
it  understood  from  the  first  that  by  limiting 
itself  to  the  redemption  of  the  terre  irredente 
the  war  would  lose  the  greater  part  of  its  raison 
d'etre-^  firstly,  because  it  was  not  worth  while 
to  go  forth  to  conquer,  weapon  in  hand,  that 
which  Austria  was  offering  of  her  own  accord, 
and  secondly,  because  such  conquests  as  Italy 
might  achieve,  were  Trieste  to  fall  into  her  hands, 
would  remain  precarious  so  long  as  Germany  and 
Austria,  being  undefeated,  still  possessed  the 
means  to  annul  them.  The  adversaries  of  Ger- 
many— very  consciously  and  warily  the  adversaries, 
having  been  the  first  to  denounce  the  progressive 
and  surreptitious  encroachments  of  the  Germans 
in  the  Peninsula,  and  the  domination  which  they 
looked  to  exercise  over  Italy  under  cover  of  an 
Alliance,  by  means  of  Parliamentary  politics  and 
the  influence  of  banking  circles — the  Italian 
nationalists  none  the  less  do  not  conceal  the  fact 
that  they  admire  the  military  preparedness  and 
organisation  of  Germany,  and  have  a  certain 
liking  for  her  institutions.  Moreover,  they  like 
to  recognise  some  of  their  own  sentiments  in  the 
passion  for  conquest,  self-enrichment,  and  develop- 
ment which  characterises  the  German  Empire, 
together  with  its  force  of  expansion,  its  spirit  of 
enterprise,  and  its  constructive  imagination. 
The  principal  organ  of  the  Nationalists,  the 
Idea   nazionaUy   published   in    Rome,   has    not 


ii8  ITALY  AND   THE   WAR 

hesitated  on  many  an  occasion  to  stimulate  the 
Italian's  amour  propre  by  setting  Germany  and 
Italy  side  by  side  as  representing,  for  the  same 
reasons,  the  will  to  live  and  effectual  politics  in 
the  society  of  the  nations  of  to-day  ;  France  and 
England,  desirous  of  repose,  fixed  in  an  attitude 
of  conservation  and  defence,  and  exposed  to 
aggression,  being  upheld  as  the  models  to  be 
avoided  by  a  nation  which  has  not  yet  gained  the 
'*  place  in  the  sun  "  which  should  complete  its 
career.  The  nationalists  are  very  far  from 
admiring  everything  in  Germany.  They  are 
severe  judges  of  her  spirit,  her  culture,  and  those 
repugnant  and  irritating  qualities  which  Ger- 
manism always  possesses  for  the  Latins.  But  one 
feels  that  they  divine,  in  its  very  harshness  and 
uncouthness,  some  of  the  virtues  which  they 
have  most  highly  recommended  to  the  Italian 
people.  And  it  is  precisely  for  this  reason  that 
they  wish  to  fight  the  German  Empire.  They 
are  pitiless  logicians,  coldly  realistic,  true  pupils 
of  the  real  Machiavelli :  by  virtue  of  their 
resemblances,  Germany  and  Italy  appear  to  them 
as  inevitable  rivals,  both  having  had  the  same 
point  of  departure,  having  followed  the  same 
course  of  evolution,  having  also  the  same  aims, 
the  same  aspirations  to  greatness  and  Empire. 
There  are  other  countries  in  which  the  admiration 
of  the  German  strength  has  degenerated  into 
servility.  The  nationalists  leave  this  degrading 
attitude  to  weak,  timid  States  devoid  of  pride. 
Their  fundamental  thought  is  perhaps  that  if 
the  Germans,  according  to  Mr.  Balfour's  fine 
saying,  have  been  unable  to  use  the  power  which 
they  have  created,  other  peoples  will  succeed 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  119 

in  recovering  their  secret,  and  with  wisdom  and 
moderation  will  derive  a  greater  benefit  from  it, 
will  make  a  wider  use  of  it. 

The  Nationalist  party  is  of  recent  date.  Its 
beginnings — its  very  small,  very  humble  be- 
ginnings— do  not  date  back  before  the  first  years 
of  the  twentieth  century.  Those  who  created 
it,  who  launched  it,  were  merely  a  handful  of 
literary  men  and  intellectuals.  Their  funda- 
mental originality  consisted  in  distinguishing 
themselves  from  the  Italian  patriots  of  the  old 
school,  which  was  kneaded  of  republican,  liberal, 
and  democratic  elements.  They  commenced 
by  a  criticism  of  democracy  and  of  Garibald- 
ism.  Anticlericalism  they  rejected,  for  philo- 
sophical and  political  reasons.  For  this  work  of 
elaboration  and  construction,  they  successfully 
adapted  many  of  the  elements  borrowed  from 
the  poHtical  literature  of  France.  They  had 
studied  Maurice  Barres,  Charles  Maurras,  and 
Georges  Sorel.  They  were  familiar  with  the 
ideas  of  U Action  frangaise,  and  as  one  of  their 
best  writers — Signor  Francesco  Coppola — has 
remarked,  French  nationalism  and  Italian  nation- 
alism have  on  the  whole  followed  "  parallel  lines." 
So,  little  by  little,  a  doctrine  emerged  which 
obviously  responded  to  the  needs  of  Italy,  since 
this  is  the  doctrine  which  finally  imposed  itself 
on  the  people,  and  which  guided  public  opinion 
by  rallying  the  directing  elites  in  May  191 5. 

"  The  whole  of  Italy  is  very  far  from  being 
Nationalist  in  the  sense  in  which  we  understand 
the  term,"  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  movement 
at  that  time  informed  me.  "  But  it  is  penetrated 
by  our  ideas  to  a  greater  extent  than  it  realises ; 


120  ITALY   AND   THE    WAR 

perhaps  to  a  greater  extent  than  we  ourselves 
suppose."  Nationalism  has  developed  v^ith  extra- 
ordinary rapidity.  Ten  years  ago  the  same  sofa 
could  almost  have  contained  its  disciples.  In 
the  summer  of  191 3,  being  in  Rome,  v^e  noticed 
the  Idea  nazionale  in  the  form  of  a  modest 
weekly.  Eighteen  months  later  we  found  it  had 
100,000  readers,  the  successful  competitor  of  the 
greatest  Roman  newspapers ;  the  war  had  made 
electrical  contact  between  the  intellectuals  and 
the  crowd.  But  even  before  the  great  European 
clash  the  nationalist  doctrines  had  made  immense 
strides  by  virtue  of  the  expedition  to  Tripoli, 
which  marked  Italy's  entrance  upon  a  period  of 
political  expansion.  At  the  last  general  elections 
— which  were  an  experiment,  a  trial  of  universal 
suffrage — one  of  the  most  prominent  contributors 
to  the  Idea  nazionale,  Signor  Federzoni,  was 
elected  by  one  of  the  Roman  colleges.  For  these 
adversaries  of  the  Parliamentary  system  did  not 
hesitate  to  solicit  the  suffrages  of  the  citizens 
in  order  to  enter  Parliament.  This  was  in  order 
that  they  might  get  better  acquainted  with  the 
enemy  and  keep  a  closer  watch  upon  him. 

It  will  probably  happen  that  Italian  Nationalism 
will  undergo  transformation  by  the  way  :  nearly 
all  political  conceptions  destined  to  succeed  have 
known  such  avatars.  As  its  heroic  and  primitive 
period  grows  remoter  it  will  shed  the  asperities 
of  its  doctrine.  Already  it  has  begun  to  do  so, 
and  is  thereby  only  becoming  more  popular. 
It  has  so  well  responded,  during  the  last  few  years, 
to  the  tendencies  of  the  nation,  it  has  so  clearly 
interpreted  what  were  merely  fleeting  aspirations 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  121 

and  obscure  desires,  that  it  cannot  fail  to  have  a 
future.     Henceforth  it  must  be  reckoned  with. 

What  a  lesson  to  those  politicians  who  believe 
that  they  and  their  formulae  are  assured  of  an 
uninterrupted  domination  !  Far  removed  from 
power,  from  the  Ministries,  from  the  vital  centres 
of  the  State,  a  few  young  men  who  were  thinkers, 
who  were  drawn  together  by  the  same  ideas,  who 
discussed  them  and  worked  them  out  in  common, 
were  preparing,  in  their  despised  obscurity,  a 
renewal  of  the  face  of  things.  The  spirit  of  the 
times  was  in  them,  was  inspiring  them.  It  was 
thus  with  the  party  which  proudly  styled  itself 
the  Junimiste  party  (the  party  of  youth)  in 
Roumania.  The  adventure  has  been  repeated  a 
hundred  times  in  the  history  of  mankind.  Thus 
Gambetta,  still  a  student,  loitering  of  a  Sunday 
in  the  roadside  inns,  while  Napoleon  III  passed 
by  on  his  way  to  Compiegne,  never  dreaming  of 
the  man  who  was  to  overthrow  the  Empire. 

But  it  is  important  to  recollect  that  Italy  is  a 
country  in  which  the  appearance  of  sudden  and 
prof oundcurrents  of  public  opinion  is  still  possible. 
That  atony,  that  indifference,  that  prudence 
which  we  have  witnessed  for  so  long  in  France  do 
not  yet  prevail  everywhere.  The  Italian  people 
has  not  been  crushed  by  bureaucratic  tyranny, 
by  the  oppressive  mechanism  of  a  centralised 
administration.  The  Italian  people — the  people, 
that  is,  of  the  great  cities — has  remained  capable 
of  spontaneous  reactions.  It  is  not  inclined  to 
put  up  with  anything.  From  many  points  of 
view  it  reminds  the  observer  of  the  France  of  the 
Restoration  and  Louis-Philippe  ;  like  that  France 
it  is  capable  of  revolt  and  upheaval.     But  its 


122  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

energies  of  innovation  are  applied  to  very  different 
objects.  We  find  that  it  is,  as  a  vv^hole,  by  no 
means  in  favour  of  the  old  conceptions  of  liberal- 
ism ;  these  no  longer  appeal  to  its  imagination  ; 
they  are  things  of  yesterday,  a  part  and  parcel  of 
the  past ;  they  represent,  in  a  less  concrete  form, 
those  noble  burial-places,  those  w^hited  sepulchres 
which  v^eighed  upon  it  and  from  which  it  longed 
to  free  itself.  Italy — like  Germany — had  had  her 
internal  revolutions  in  the  nineteenth  century. 
They  have  left  behind  them  a  certain  effervescence, 
a  need  of  action.  As  her  energies  have  increased 
tenfold  since  her  unity  was  achieved,  they  have 
tended  to  find  development  and  employment 
beyond  her  frontiers.  The  revolutionary  and 
nationalistic  energies  of  the  Italian  people  were 
bound  to  lead  it  into  great  external  adventures. 
Italy  has  but  lately  entered  boldly  upon  her  new 
path,  and  everything  tends  to  show  that  it  will 
be  a  long  time  before  she  learns  to  press  forward 
in  this  direction. 

It  is  especially  important  to  obtain  a  thorough 
knowledge  and  understanding  of  the  spirit  of 
modern  Italy.  In  the  summer  of  191 5  I  went  to 
see  a  well-known  writer  on  art  who  lives  in  one 
of  the  larger  Italian  cities.  As  we  were  speaking 
of  Reims  and  the  destruction  of  the  cathedral 
by  the  Germans  I  asked  him  if  so  many  acts  of 
vandalism  had  not  produced  a  great  feeling  of 
indignation  among  the  Italians,  and  if  this  had 
not  been  one  of  the  factors  which  determined 
them  to  intervene. 

"  Don't  let  us  confuse  things,"  he  said.  "  Of 
course  I  do  not  regard  the  pretext  invoked  by 
the   Germans   for   destroying   the   cathedral   as 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  123 

having  any  real  foundation.  But  as  a  general 
thing,  I,  who  am  an  archaeologist,  who  live,  by 
my  profession,  amid  the  monuments  of  the  past, 
I  think  one  has  the  right  to  fire  projectiles  against 
all  the  cathedrals  in  the  world  from  the  moment 
a  military  interest  is  at  stake,  and  I  think  the  ruin 
of  no  matter  what  masterpiece  would  be  prefer- 
able to  the  death,  even  the  possible  death,  of  a 
single  soldier  of  my  own  country." 

I  recollect  the  calm,  self-possessed,  natural  tone 
of  voice  in  which  this  profession  of  faith  was 
made  by  an  Italian  who  was  neither  a  "  futurist  " 
nor  a  *'  nationalist."  I  regarded  it  as  an  ex- 
pression of  that  new  Italy,  hard  and  utilitarian, 
which  must  henceforth  supplant  in  our  mind  the 
old  romantic  Italy,  which  has  departed  to  join 
the  dust  of  dead  things ! 

We  cannot  better  terminate  this  chapter  than 
by  appending  this  curious  passage,  quoted  from 
the  review  Critica^  and  signed  by  Signor  Bene- 
detto Croce,  the  most  influential  philosopher  of 
modern  Italy.  It  would  be  easy  to  put  a  name 
to  those  philosophers  of  other  countries  to  whom 
Signor  Croce  makes  such  hard  and  contemptuous 
allusion  : 

"  When  I  read  the  pamphlets  and  articles  which 
reach  me  from  the  Allied  countries,  and  especially 
from  France,  and  when  I  see,  opposed  to  the 
effective  demonstration  of  the  military  power  of 
Germany,  hollow  theories  concerning  the  demo- 
cratic ideal  and  the  reign  of  peace  and  justice  ; 
when  I  hear  the  Russian  Sazonov  himself  replying 
to  the  taking  of  Warsaw  by  upbraiding  '  the 
abominable  theory  of  force,'  a  grcat^melancholy 


124  ITALY   AND  THE   WAR 

invades  me,  because  it  seems  to  me  that  here  are 
signs  of  weakness,  or  at  least  a  sign  that  the  minds 
of  men  of  the  Latin  and  Slav  countries  are  not 
equal  to  the  events  v^hich  are  coming  to  pass. 
Would  it  be  so  difficult  simply  to  say  : 

" '  We  Italians  (or  French,  or  English,  or 
Russians)  are  Italians  (or  Frenchmen  or  English- 
men, or  Russians),  and  since  the  course  of  events 
has  drawn  Europe  into  war  we  shall  fight  to  the 
last  and  shall  make  all  sacrifices  for  our  country, 
come  what  may.  This  is  the  only  thing  that 
matters  to-day,  and  we  do  not  want  to  know 
about  anything  else.' — Is  there  any  philosophy 
finer  and  truer  than  this  ?  Is  it  necessary  to 
embellish  it  by  theoretical  and  historical  non- 
sense ?  I  think  I  can  hear  Gargano  retort : 
^  Yes,  since  this  nonsense  responds  to  a  need  of 
the  peoples  at  war.'  And  this  is  obviously  the 
case,  for  everything  that  happens  responds  to  a 
need,  even  the  lying,  the  stammering,  and  the 
cribbing  of  the  schoolboy  who  has  not  learned 
his  lesson.  But  one  cannot  thereby  deduce  the 
proposition  that  it  is  desirable  to  increase  the 
prevalence  of  such  foolery.  As  for  me,  I  am  not 
made  for  this  sort  of  thing,  and  I  deplore  the  fact 
that  in  other  countries  my  philosophical  colleagues 
have  undertaken  such  a  task  when  it  would  have 
been  more  fitting  to  keep  silence.  *  But  you 
must  at  least  feel  the  need  of  refuting,  for  the 
benefit  of  all,  what  you  qualify  as  foolery.'  That 
is  what  I  am  doing,  but  with  discretion,  because, 
as  I  have  said,  this  is  not  the  moment  for  school- 
masters. There  are  other  things  to  do :  we 
have  got  to  be  victorious  for  the  sake  of  Italy. 
And  he  who  cannot  co-operate  directly  in  our 


NO  LONGER  COUNTRY  OF  DEAD  125 

victory  does  better  to  apply  himself  to  the  tasks 
of  ordinary  every-day  life,  as  the  Germans  have 
done  and  are  doing  :  on  the  one  hand,  in  pre- 
vision of  what  will  come  after  the  war ;  and  on 
the  other  hand,  out  of  national  pride,  so  that  it 
may  not  seem  that  the  war  has  made  everybody 
lose  his  head." 

In  point  of  celebrity  and  wide  diffusion, 
"  Crocism,"  in  Italy,  may  be  compared  with 
"  Bergsonism  "  in  France.  The  philosophy  of 
Signor  Benedetto  Croce,  by  the  way,  is  influenced 
by  that  of  Hegel.  It  is  curious  to  remark  that  the 
University  of  Naples,  where  Signor  Croce  is 
professor,  has  long  been  a  citadel  of  Hegelianism. 
Many  Italians  even  attribute  to  this  circumstance 
the  Teutonic  preferences  of  which  a  section  of  the 
Neapolitan  elite  is  accused. 


CHAPTER   V 

THE    QUIRINAL   AND    THE   VATICAN 

The  two  Queens — ^The  Duchessa  d'  Aosta — A  significant  be- 
trothal— A  "  King  Deadweight  " — ^Victor  Emmanuel  III 
and  the  Republicans — Universal  suffrage — ^The  crisis  of  the 
Masonic  idea — ^The  Italian  monarchy  and  the  Papacy — 
Coexistence  of  the  two  Powers — ^The  Latapie  incident — 
Germany  and  the  Holy  See — An  ingenuous  symbol — A 
prophecy  concerning  the  Italian  Empire — ^The  expiring 
Revolution. 

During  the  imposing  demonstrations  which  took 
place  in  Rome  last  May,  in  favour  of  the  war, 
the  procession  of  demonstrators,  passing  one 
evening  down  the  Via  Boncompagni,  had  to  pass 
before  Queen  Margherita's  palace.  All  heads 
were  bared,  and  acclamations  arose  from  the 
street,  which  the  Roman  crowd,  with  its  usual 
dignity  and  courtesy,  took  care  not  to  make  too 
noisy  ;  acclamations  which  expressed  both  defer- 
ence and  admiration.  For  no  one  in  Rome  was 
ignorant  of  the  fact  that  from  the  first  day  of  the 
European  conflict  the  Queen-Mother's  feelings 
had  been  those  of  a  woman  who  shrank  from  the 
crimes  committed  against  the  weak  and  against 
morality,  and  those  too  of  a  great  Italian  patriot, 
the  widow  and  the  mother  of  a  king. 

On  Queen  Margherita's  writing-table,   I   am 
126 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     127 

told,  is  to  be  seen  a  touching  and  symbolical 
picture.  It  is  a  picture-postcard  of  the  usual 
type,  the  reproduction  of  a  photograph  which 
appeared  some  months  ago  in  an  illustrated 
paper.  This  photograph  represents  King  Albert 
of  Belgium  and  Queen  Elizabeth,  alone,  on  a 
deserted  beach  near  Nieuport,  in  that  corner  of 
the  kingdom  which  the  supreme  resistance  of  the 
Belgian  Army  has  succeeded  in  preserving  un- 
defiled  by  the  foot  of  the  invader.  The  whole 
tragedy  of  these  noble  sovereigns  and  of  Belgium 
is  expressed  by  this  picture,  which  reminds  one 
of  a  scene  from  Shakespeare.  And  the  place  of 
honour  which  this  modest  print  has  found  on  the 
Queen's  table  in  itself  reveals  the  sympathies  of  a 
great  heart,  and  interprets  the  verdict  pronounced 
by  a  royal  conscience  upon  the  crimes  of  Germany. 

Everyone  in  Italy  knows,  and  it  is  only  right 
that  everyone  in  France  should  know,  that  the 
judgment  which  Queen  Margherita  has  formed 
upon  the  European  war  was  formed  upon  the  very 
day  of  the  German  aggression  :  that,  on  one  of 
the  summits  of  Italian  society,  in  a  palace  whence 
radiates  a  lofty  moral  and  intellectual  influence, 
there  has  been,  since  the  August  of  1914,  a 
rallying-point,  a  landmark  of  direction.  Anyone 
who  is  aware  of  the  multiplicity  of  causes  on 
which  the  great  events  of  history  depend,  the 
manner  in  which  great  national  movements  are 
created,  and  the  mutual  interaction  of  the 
opinions  of  the  elite  and  the  opinions  of  the 
crowd,  will  readily  realise  the  important  part 
which  the  salon  of  the  Queen-Mother  has  played 
in  determining  the  decision  of  Italy. 

Not  that  Queen  Margherita  has  ever  derogated 


128  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

from  her  proud  reserve,  or  attempted  to  bring 
any  pressure  to  bear  upon  anyone.  From  what 
one  might  call  the  constitutional  point  of  view 
her  attitude  has  displayed  a  dignity  and  discretion 
which  Prince  von  Biilow  miscalculated  when  he 
attempted  to  promote  the  German  cause  in  the 
Palazzo  Margherita  itself.  It  was  on  this  occasion 
that  the  widow  of  Humbert  I  proudly  informed 
him  :  "In  the  House  of  Savoy  only  one  person 
reigns  at  a  time." 

This  was  a  particularly  telling  remark,  being 
made,  as  it  was,  when  the  King,  in  agreement 
with  his  ministers,  was  about  to  take  the  supreme 
decision ;  when  German  intrigues  were  pressing 
upon  Italy,  making  her  feel  the  weight  of  the 
foreign  yoke.  On  the  great  evening  of  the 
13th  of  May  Gabriele  d'  Annunzio,  addressing  the 
crowd,  repeated  this  fine  saying  of  the  Queen's. 
With  his  eloquence  and  his  lyrical  force  he  brought 
out  its  full  national  quality.  More,  he  drew  from 
it  a  poetical  commentary  which  aroused  en- 
thusiastic acclamations.  The  Hotel  Regina,  from 
whose  balcony  he  was  speaking,  is  not  far  from 
the  Palazzo  Margherita.  And  the  Roman  news- 
papers of  the  following  day  related  that  the  form 
of  a  woman  had  been  seen  behind  one  of  the 
windows  of  the  Palace — that  of  the  Queen- 
Mother  herself — who  was  listening  to  the  voice 
of  the  Italian  people  yet  again  acclaiming  the 
war  of  liberation. 

The  war  which  the  Italian  people  desired, 
upon  which  it  has  entered  of  its  own  free  will, 
is  in  fact  the  sequel  to  the  wars  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  wars  of  independence,  the  wars  in 
which,  from  the  days  of  Carlo  Alberto,  the  people 


THE   QUIRINAL   AND   VATICAN    129 

has  always  been  led  by  the  princes  of  the  House 
of  Savoy.  The  war  undertaken  by  Italy  in  1915, 
in  which  it  has  Victor  Emmanuel  III  at  its  head, 
is  in  this  sense  a  war  of  a  profoundly  traditional 
character.  And  the  Italian  traditions,  com- 
mingled with  the  traditions  of  the  House  of 
Savoy,  have  been  absorbed  by  Queen  Margherita 
with  her  breath,  since  first  she  came  into  the 
world.  The  daughter  of  the  Duke  of  Genoa 
naturally  thinks  and  feels  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  the  royal  and  warlike  family  which 
founded  Italy. 

All  travellers  who  have  passed  through  Turin 
know  the  statue,  so  curiously  posed,  which  repre- 
sents the  Duke  of  Genoa  at  the  battle  of  Novara, 
pointing  to  the  enemy  with  his  sword,  while  his 
horse  founders  under  him.  This  soldier-prince 
died  before  he  could  witness  the  noble  revenge 
which  destiny  had  in  store  for  Italy.  But  his 
spirit  lives  again  in  his  daughter,  who  sees  at  this 
moment,  with  profound  pride,  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  supreme  desire  of  the  princes  of  her 
race,  the  completion  of  the  work  to  which  Italy 
has  applied  and  devoted  herself.  On  the  walls 
of  the  hospital  which  she  gave  to  the  nation  for 
the  Italian  wounded  Queen  Margherita  has  had 
inscribed  certain  maxims  which  she  herself  has 
composed.  One  of  these  maxims  runs  :  ''  Blest 
are  the  Italian  soldiers  !  By  their  heroism  the 
dream  of  old  has  become  a  reality."  The  idea  of 
the  war  of  191 5,  the  dream  of  old,  the  hope  which 
has  grown  to  fruition  through  many  generations, 
suggested  by  great  memories  and  great  examples, 
first,  perhaps,  assumed  its  most  definite  shape  and 
consciousness  in  the  mind  and  heart  of  this  Queen, 


130         ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

twice  a  member  of  the  House  of  Savoy,  through 
her  father  and  through  her  husband. 

Quite  recently,  in  the  Queen-Mother's  salon, 
when  there  was  speech — as  how  should  there 
not  be  ? — of  the  campaign  against  Austria, 
someone  suggested  that  the  King  was  perhaps 
exposing  himself  rather  too  perilously.  It  was 
a  senator  who  expressed  this  fear,  for  at  the  age 
attained  before  one  became  a  senator  one  is 
usually  prudent.  But  Queen  Margherita  at  once 
replied  gently  but  firmly  : 

"  If  the  King  were  to  act  otherwise  he  would 
not  be  a  King." 

And  these  are  the  feelings  which  animate  the 
whole  of  the  Italian  royal  family  :  Queen  Elena  has 
a  heart  no  less  heroic  than  the  Queen-Mother's. 

What  the  Queen's  feelings  have  been  since  the 
outbreak  of  the  European  war  may  be  imagined 
when  we  remember  that  she  was  born  a  Princess 
of  Montenegro.  Yonder,  for  long  months,  in  the 
indomitable  Tchernagora,  her  brothers  fought  at 
the  head  of  their  mountaineers,  for  the  great 
European  cause.  With  what  thoughts  Queen 
Elena  followed  the  vicissitudes  of  this  struggle, 
and  with  what  joy  she  saw  Italy  enter  into  line 
with  the  rest  of  the  Allies,  it  is  easy  to  imagine. 
As  for  the  opinions  which  prevail  in  her  entourage, 
it  is  enough  to  say  that  one  of  her  ladies  of  honour, 
Princess  Viggiano,  is  by  birth  a  Beauffremont, 
the  daughter  of  a  great  and  noble  line  of  illustrious 
French  soldiers. 

Did  not  a  peculiar  destiny  preside  over  and 
smile  upon  the  happy  marriage  of  the  Princess 
Elena  and  the  Prince  of  Naples — a  marriage 
dictated  by  the  choice  of  two  hearts  ?     Was  not 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     131 

this  marriage  of  inclination  approved  by  the 
frigid  science  of  politics  ?  Did  it  not  even  then 
symbolise,  as  a  striking  proof  of  Italy's  Slav 
sympathies,  the  future  raffrochement  between 
Italy  and  the  Russian  Empire  ?  It  will  be  re- 
membered that  the  interview  of  Victor  Emmanuel 
III  and  Nicolas  II  at  Racconigi  was  one  of  the 
prolegomena  of  the  Quadruple  Entente.  Who 
knows  but  that  the  links  of  this  chain  were  forged 
at  Cettinje  ?  Who  can  say  whether  the  betrothal 
of  1896  did  not  announce  the  alliance  of  191 6  ? 

An  admirable  wife  and  mother.  Queen  Elena 
avoids  politics  as  she  avoids  the  glitter  of  courts. 
In  the  House  of  Savoy  she  found  and  continued 
a  tradition  of  simplicity.  But  if  she  has  never 
sought  to  impose  her  opinions,  she  has  never 
made  a  mystery  of  them.  A  great-hearted  queen, 
years  ago,  during  the  earthquake  of  Messina, 
whither  she  hastened  in  despite  of  danger,  she 
restored  the  courage  of  the  unfortunate  by  words 
of  profound  intuition.  To-day  she  is  able  at 
once  to  lament  the  miseries  of  the  war  and  to 
exalt  the  sacrifice  of  the  soldier.  And  when  the 
perils  incurred  by  the  princes  are  discussed  in  her 
hearing.  Queen  Elena  has  only  one  reply  : 

"  I  regret  that  my  son  was  not  of  an  age  to  go 

to  the  front." 

.  •  •  •  • 

For  the  decisive  act  of  its  national  life  which 
the  Italian  people  has  just  accomplished,  ante- 
cedents were  necessary,  a  period  of  preparation, 
and  outstanding  pinnacles  of  moral  support.  Of 
this  the  people  is  aware  ;  and  understanding  this, 
it  does  not  forget  to  associate  with  its  mani- 
festations the  two  Queens  whose  sentiments  have 


132  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

been  those  of  the  people  since  the  first  day  of  the 
war.  History  is  well  aware  of  the  influence  of 
women  in  the  great  events  of  the  world  ;  aware 
of  all  that  the  radiancy  of  their  hearts  may  effect, 
even  when  they  most  jealously  stand  aside  from 
the  operations  of  diplomacy,  and  when  they  are 
least  desirous  of  playing  a  political  part.  Thus, 
without  realising  it,  without  wishing  it,  simply 
because  they  are  the  two  foremost  Italian  women 
and  because  their  minds  at  once  reverted  to  that 
which  was  great  and  noble,  Queen  Margherita 
and  Queen  Elena  have  had  no  little  share  in  all 
that  Italy  has  willed.  They  acted  without 
words.  This  is  the  wonderful  mystery  of  in- 
fluence, of  moral  authority,  which,  at  the  given 
moment,  finds  work  to  be  done. 

France  should  know  as  Italy  knows  what  part 
of  the  rightful  cause  is  owing  to  the  two  Queens. 
But  it  is  pleasant  that  we  may  add  to  their  names 
that  of  a  princess  of  the  House  of  France.  An 
Italian  by  her  marriage,  the  Duchess  Helene 
d'  Aosta  has  devoted  herself  heart  and  soul  to 
the  Italian  Red  Cross.  She  has  hurried  hither 
and  thither,  visiting  the  hospital  organisations 
without  regard  to  her  health,  without  taking  a 
moment's  repose.  Her  eldest  son  went  to  the 
front  ;  she  would  not  prevent  him,  despite  his 
youth.  Destiny  made  hers  a  fruitful  alliance  : 
as  Italy,  through  her  Queen,  gave  a  hand  to  the 
Slav  Orient,  so,  through  the  Duchess  d'  Aosta,  she 
gave  a  hand  to  France.  Indeed,  in  speaking  the 
name  of  this  princess  we  can  but  recall  the  pro- 
phetic poem  which  d'  Annunzio  dedicated  to 
her  more  than  two  years  ago  :  "O  Helen,  who 
on  the  brow  of  our  dead  seest  imprinted  the 


THE   QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN    133 

virtue  of  Rome — for  the  great  Latin  pact  thou 
bearest  this  day — the  augural  vervein  in  thy 
hair."^ 

While  the  renewal  of  the  Franco-Italian  friend- 
ship is  still  radiant,  it  is  only  just  to  remember 
the  great  hearts  and  the  noble  women,  the  eager 
crowds  and  the  poets  who  prepared  the  way  for 
it.  But  let  us  also  remember  that  it  never  could 
have  taken  place  had  one  man  desired  the  con- 
trary.    And  this  one  man  was  the  King. 

The  example  of  Bulgaria,  Roumania,  and  Greece 
has  shown  us  that  the  sympathy  of  the  peoples 
for  the  cause  of  France  was  not  always  a  sufficient 
motive  to  make  their  Governments  support  it. 
The  affirmative  pronounced  by  Victor  Emmanuel 
III  was  thus  of  no  less  significance  than  the  nega- 
tive uttered  by  Ferdinand  and  Constantine.  It 
needed  these  terrible  circumstances  to  reveal  the 
fact  that  the  power  of  royalty  in  modern  Europe 
was  not  so  ineffective,  so  imaginary,  as  people  were 
tempted  to  suppose. 

Before  he  fell  under  the  stroke  of  the  assassin, 
Humbert  I,  who  had  already  been  the  subject  of 
several  attempts  upon  his  life,  used  to  say  that 
such  attempts  were  "  the  wages  of  his  trade." 
Victor  Emmanuel  III  has  also  been  subjected  to 
the  same  risk,  which  he  has  met  with  the  same 
quiet  courage.  In  March  191 2,  as  he  was  going 
to  the  Pantheon,  there  to  salute  the  tomb  of  his 
father,  an  anarchist  fired  two  revolver-shots  at 
the  King,  seriously  wounding  an  officer  of  his 
escort.  In  the  midst  of  the  patriotic  fever  which 
the  expedition  to  Tripoli  had  awakened,  the  un- 
successful  attempt   of   Dalba   served   merely   to 


134  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

strain  Italian  loyalism  to  a  higher  pitch.  The 
anarchist  was  behind  the  times.  As  a  regicide 
he  would  have  stood  outside  his  age. 

Victor  Emmanuel  III  has  not  the  geniality 
of  his  father  and  his  grandfather.  We  do  not  see 
him  walking  the  streets  of  Rome  or  Turin, 
familiarly  saluted  by  the  passers-by.  Studious 
and  rather  uncommunicative,  it  has  been  said  of 
him  that  he  is  an  "  intellectual  "  on  the  throne. 
But  he  possesses  in  the  highest  degree  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  House  of  Savoy.  He  has  thoroughly 
mastered  his  profession  of  constitutional  sovereign, 
and  everyone  knows  the  part  which  he  has  played 
in  all  affairs  of  State.  In  politics  it  is  said  that 
his  preferences  have  often  been  given  to  ad- 
vanced radicalism.  He  has  been  called  the 
"  lay  king."  One  Italian  journalist  even  styled 
him,  half  as  a  compliment  and  half  as  a  jest,  a 
*'  King  Deadweight."  Deadweight  if  you  will, 
but  Victor  Emmanuel  III  has  none  the  less,  in 
the  fifteen  years  since  he  succeeded  his  father, 
conducted  two  national  campaigns,  of  which 
the  second  is  the  boldest  enterprise  into  which  the 
Italian  monarchy  has  thrown  itself  for  the  last 
fifty  years.  Deadweight  perhaps,  but  he  has  suc- 
ceeded perfectly  in  coming  to  an  understanding 
with  the  Church.  And  it  is  during  his  reign  that 
Italy  has  inaugurated  in  the  Orient  a  new  and 
active  foreign  policy  founded  on  the  defence  and 
protection  of  her  Catholic  interests. 

The  war  of  191 5  will  have  won  an  enormous 
personal  popularity  for  Victor  Emmanuel  III. 
His  courage,  and  the  simplicity  with  which  he 
lives  in  the  midst  of  his  soldiers,  have  already 
created  a  legend.     And  where  a  member  of  the 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     135 

House  of  Savoy  is  concerned,  legend  is  always 
ready  to  crystallise.  Some  time  after  the  attempt 
on  the  King's  life  made  in  191 2  a  distinguished 
Italian  writer,  Signor  Gabriele  Fiorentino,  de- 
fined his  loyalism,  and  that  of  the  vast  majority 
of  his  countrymen,  in  the  following  terms  : 

"  We  have  taken  our  kings  from  a  rough, 
energetic,  soldierly  family,  neither  dilettante  nor 
artistic  nor  intellectualist,  if  I  may  be  permitted 
so  barbarous  an  expression.  And  we  love  them 
because  we  feel  that  we  have  in  them  a  central 
point,  a  leader  who  is  embarrassed  neither  by 
dreams  nor  by  sentimental  foolishness.  All  rally 
in  a  mass  round  the  present  King,  as  was  seen 
after  the  attempt  upon  his  life  ;  all,  from  the 
cure  to  the  Garibaldian,  from  the  great  noble 
to  the  street-porter  ;  because  he  is  a  man ;  be- 
cause he  holds  in  check  all  the  bewildered,  bour- 
geois Governments  of  Europe  ;  because  he  breaks 
through  the  cobwebs  of  cantankerous  diploma- 
tists ;  because  he  has  made  us  conscious  of  our 
strength." 

Moreover,  Victor  Emmanuel  III  may  flatter 
himself  that  he  has  already  rallied  to  the  monarchy 
almost  as  many  notable  republicans  as  his  father 
and  grandfather  before  him. 

To  the  list  of  ''  royal  conquests,"  for  example, 
he  has  added  Signor  Enrico  Ferri,  and,  recently, 
Signor  Barzilai.  When  this  eminent  representa- 
tive of  republican  Irredentism  consented,  in  July 
191 5,  to  enter  the  Salandra  Cabinet  as  minister 
without  portfolio,  the  Idea  nazionale  commented 
upon  the  incident  as  follows  ; 

"  It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  the  appointment 
of  Signor  Barzilai  has  yet  another  political  signifi- 


136  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

cation  :  namely,  the  adhesion  to  the  monarchical 
system  of  a  known  and  tenacious  supporter  of  the 
republican  system.  In  assuming  the  function 
of  a  councillor  of  the  Crown  Signor  Barzilai  has 
renounced  his  ideal,  which  was  to  replace  monar- 
chical institutions  by  republican.  He  has  recog- 
nised in  the  monarchical  institutions  virtues  which 
he  had  hitherto  believed  peculiar  to  republican 
institutions  alone.  Thus  is  repeated  the  ex- 
ample already  given  by  other  politicians  of  the 
little  Italy  school.  Veterans  of  the  republican 
system  have  gone  over  to  the  monarchy  on  finding 
in  it  the  effective  interpretation  and  the  concrete 
application  of  their  national  ideal." 

It  was,  moreover,  during  the  reign  of  Victor 
Emmanuel  III  that  the  Italian  monarchy  was  to 
make  an  experiment  which  assuredly  none  of  its 
supporters  would  have  dared  to  advise  twenty-five 
years  earlier  :  an  experiment  in  which  prophets 
of  ill  augury  would  perhaps  have  seen  the  be- 
ginnings of  ruin  for  the  House  of  Savoy  and 
Italian  unity,  but  which,  on  the  contrary,  has 
succeeded  with  the  utmost  brilliance.  The 
Italian  Government  gave  yet  another  proof  of  its 
sense  of  opportunity  and  its  address  when  it 
introduced  universal  suffrage.  It  is  a  fact  that 
universal  suffrage,  formerly  feared  by  the  Govern- 
ment as  a  species  of  monster,  no  longer  frightens 
it  to-day.  Instructed  by  the  examples  of 
Napoleon  III  and  Bismarck,  statesmen  finally 
came  to  understand  that  universal  suffrage  was 
essentially  an  approbative  and  ratificatory 
suffrage,  while  all  the  limited  or  property  suffrages 
were  disputative,  unstable,  and  anarchical.  In 
France  two  monarchies,  the  Restoration  and  the 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     137 

July  Monarchy,  made  the  experiment  of  the 
limited  suffrage,  and  died  of  it ;  so  that  a  wit  was 
inspired  to  remark,  not  without  justification,  that 
if  Charles  X  had  granted  the  right  of  the  vote 
to  every  Frenchman  he  would  still  have  been  on 
the  throne.  Like  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph, 
who  had  granted  it,  a  short  time  previously,  for 
other  reasons,  Victor  Emmanuel  III,  ably  advised 
by  Signor  Giolitti,  gave  universal  suffrage  to 
Italy,  and  he  has  had  no  reason  to  regret  it  from 
any  point  of  view  :  neither  from  that  of  the 
king,  nor  from  the  dynastic  point  of  view,  nor 
from  the  national. 

One  of  the  prominent  characteristics  of  the 
elections  of  October  191 3  was,  in  the  first  place, 
the  waning  of  the  traditional  republican  ideal. 
In  the  Swiss  democracy  the  Journal  de  Geneve 
recorded  this  phenomenon  with  interest. 

"  The  republican  group,"  it  said,  "  in  the 
last  Italian  Chamber,  numbered  twenty-three 
deputies ;  there  are  now  only  ten.  An  evident 
proof  that  the  republican  ideal  is  going  out  of 
favour  with  the  popular  masses.  ...  If  the  re- 
publican party  sees  its  ranks  depleted  from  day 
to  day,  this  is  precisely  because  it  now  represents 
an  anachronism  merely.  The  Italy  of  to-day, 
which  has  very  definite  aspirations  and  ambitions, 
regards  the  monarchy  more  than  ever  as  the 
condition  of  its  present  prosperity  and  its  future 
greatness,  while  the  Republic  inevitably  evokes 
ideas  of  subdivision  and  diminishment ;  it  is 
everything  that  is  anti-nationalist." 

Indeed,  the  reply  given  by  universal  suffrage 
when  applied  for  the  first  time  in  Italy  was  before 
everything  nationalist  in  quality.     Signor  Giolitti, 


138  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

who  was  then  Prime  Minister,  and  a  real  Parlia- 
mentary dictator,  was  not  yet  regarded  as  a 
**  Little  Italian."  He  had  even  been  favoured, 
after  the  Roman  fashion,  with  the  surname  of 
"  the  African,"  because  he  had  been  the  initiator 
of  the  Libyan  campaign. 

As  a  sort  of  symbol  intended  to  show  how 
closely  the  external  activity  of  Italy  was  bound  up 
with  its  domestic  policy,  Signor  Giolitti  had 
caused  the  day  of  the  elections  to  coincide  with 
the  despatch  to  Athens  of  a  very  imperious  note 
relating  to  affairs  in  the  Epirus.  He  had  prefaced 
this  solemn  day  by  a  great  speech,  in  which  he 
drew  the  most  flourishing  picture  of  the  general 
situation  of  the  kingdom.  The  picture,  for  that 
matter,  was  hardly  flattered  ;  the  progress  of  all 
kinds  which  Italy  has  achieved,  especially  during 
the  last  fifteen  years,  at  home  as  well  as  abroad, 
cannot  have  escaped  any  serious  observer.  Signor 
Giolitti  propounded  this  progress  to  the  self- 
love  of  the  Italians.  He  insisted  in  particular, 
and  not  without  reason,  on  the  financial  progress 
of  the  country,  which  has  been  one  of  the  sur- 
prises of  the  age.  If  one  were  to  compare  the 
state  of  Italian  finances  as  it  was  at  this  moment 
with  what  it  was  in  the  past — and  this  past  had 
known  difficult  moments — one  would  be  forced 
to  recognise  that  the  progress  of  Italy  had  not 
been  least  remarkable  in  this  domain.  The 
kingdom  of  Italy  succeeded  in  creating  rather  than 
in  re-creating  its  finances,  and  in  transforming 
deficits  into  surplus  values  by  an  effort  of  will 
which  deserves  to  be  upheld  as  an  example  to 
more  than  one  other  Government.  It  astonished 
many  observers  to  note,  during  the  two  or  three 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     139 

years  which  preceded  the  European  war,  that  in 
the  midst  of  the  great  "  slump  "  in  the  most 
celebrated  Government  stocks,  the  Italian  Rente 
formed  an  exception  by  the  firmness  of  its  prices. 
Who  would  have  dared  to  suggest,  who  would 
have  consented  to  believe,  only  twenty  years  ago, 
that  during  a  period  of  turmoil  the  Italian  Rente 
would  behave  more  steadily  and  stand  at  a  higher 
figure  than  the  French  Rente  ?  Who  would  have 
dared  to  put  forward  such  an  impertinent  para- 
dox ? 

It  is  said  that  one  of  the  best  known  of  our 
financiers,  one  of  the  authorities  of  economic 
science,  and  at  the  same  time  one  of  the  powers 
of  the  French  banking  world,  was  solicited,  about 
ten  years  ago,  to  interest  himself  and  other  French 
capitalists  in  Italian  affairs.  Although  a  man  of 
great  experience,  and  as  a  rule  very  clear-sighted, 
he  refused,  and  allowed  the  true  reason  of  his 
refusal  to  be  divined  :  it  was  an  invincible  distrust 
of  Italy,  a  country  which  he  refused  to  take 
seriously,  which  he  regarded  merely  as  a  land  of 
beggars  and  accordion-players.  The  result  was 
that  the  German  banking  world  occupied  the 
place  left  vacant  by  France. 

A  strange  country,  France  !  It  is  perhaps  the 
first  country  in  the  world  in  letters,  art,  and 
invention.  At  the  present  moment  it  is  giving 
daily  proofs  of  heroism,  determination,  and 
energy,  and  its  moral  resiliency  is  incomparable. 
Yet  when  it  is  a  question  of  utilising  these  gifts, 
of  employing  them  to  the  profit  of  national  life,  it 
seems  as  though  a  faculty  were  lacking.  The  im- 
mense majority  of  Frenchmen  are  to-day  ignorant 
of  almost  everything  outside  their  own  country, 


140  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

and  of  the  real  aspect  of  the  face  of  the  earth. 
They  have  entered  upon  one  of  the  most  stupen- 
dous wars  of  history  with  a  conception  of  the 
world  which  is  dangerous  in  its  falsity. 

The  newspapers,  the  public,  the  diplomatists — 
they  are  all  deluded,  but  not  merely  concerning 
Turkey,  Bulgaria,  and  Greece.  They  have  made 
their  greatest  mistakes  in  respect  of  our  chiefest 
enemies.  They  were  guilty  of  false  imaginings 
as  to  the  real  strength  of  Germany  and  the  resist- 
ing powers  of  Austria.  They  began  by  com- 
mitting stupendous  errors  of  calculation  because 
they  lived  on  prejudices  and  stereotyped  ideas 
which  were  far  removed  from  the  reality.  It  is 
not  merely  that  we  have  misunderstood  our 
Allies,  that  we  have  failed  to  appreciate  the 
character  of  their  institutions  considered  in  re- 
lation to  the  war,  and  the  nature  of  the  assistance 
which  they  would  be  able  to  lend  us.  We  have 
been  dominated  by  a  sentimental  view  of  politics, 
while  to  this  conception  Germany  opposed  her 
experience  of  men  and  things,  her  realism,  and 
her  implacable  use  of  force.  But  at  the  same 
time,  and  by  a  contrast  which  finally  disarmed 
us,  and  put  an  end  to  proper  understanding,  all 
that  section  of  the  French  elite  which  invoked 
the  practical  spirit  despised  and  rejected — with 
very  few  exceptions — all  general  ideas,  professing 
to  rely  upon  figures  and  statistics  alone.  As 
though  the  very  financiers  even  confined  them- 
selves to  these  and  these  only  ! 

The  great  fact  relating  to  modern  Italy  is  its 
national  feeling,  which  is  carried  to  the  verge  of 
passion.  In  the  economic  domain  this  passion 
finds  expression  in  tenacious  industry,  an  ardent 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     141 

desire  to  equal  the  great  industrial  nations,  and 
an  absolute  confidence  in  the  credit  of  the  Italian 
State.  Italy,  in  order  to  achieve  her  unity,  in 
order  to  endow  herself  with  the  organism  of  a 
modern  State,  was  obliged  to  borrow  money 
from  abroad.  Little  by  little  Italian  savings  have 
redeemed  this  debt,  have  brought  it  home  again, 
as  a  point  of  national  honour.  This  is  what  has 
assured  the  financial  solidity  of  Italy  in  critical 
periods.  This  has  been  her  salvation  in  the  past, 
and  it  constitutes  an  enduring  promise  for  her 
future.  Those  who  do  not  reckon  upon  these 
forces,  or  fail  to  discern  them,  are  false  realists, 
exposed  to  every  kind  of  error  and  misconception. 

The  elections  of  191 3  marked  an  important 
date  in  the  public  life  of  Italy.  In  many  respects 
they  announced  the  events  of  to-day.  If,  as  we 
believe,  the  year  191 5  saw  Italy  enter  upon  a  new 
phase  of  history,  the  phase  of  expansion,  then 
191 3  was  the  preface  to  this  phase,  for  it  effected 
a  concentration  of  energies,  still  further  appeased 
the  conflicts  of  the  past,  and  subordinated  party 
politics  to  national  politics. 

The  manner  in  which  this  electoral  consultation 
was  effected,  and  the  results  which  it  yielded, 
were  especially  significant  for  those — and  we  were 
of  the  number — who  regarded  Italy  as  one  of  the 
few  Powers  which  had  preserved  their  liberty 
of  movement  in  Europe,  and  which  were  capable 
of  choosing  and  directing  events,  instead  of  sub- 
mitting to  be  led  by  them.  From  that  moment 
it  was  obvious  that  Italy  was  preparing  for  ex- 
ternal action.  But  one  might  still  have  felt  some 
uncertainty  as  to  the  direction  which  she  would 


142  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

give  to  this  action.  It  is  sufficient  to  recall  the 
fact  that  Signor  Giolitti  was  President  of  Council. 
And  as  we  know  the  attitude  observed  by  Signor 
Giolitti  in  1915,  we  can  hardly  doubt  that  if  he 
had  been  in  power  during  the  European  crisis, 
the  line  which  he  would  have  forced  Italian 
politics  to  follow  would  not  have  differed  sensibly 
from  that  adopted  by  Signor  Salandra  and 
Baron  Sonnino.  So  Signor  Giolitti  sowed  and 
others  have  reaped.  But  it  was  by  his  doing  that 
Italy  was  placed  in  a  position  to  follow  an  imperial 
policy  beyond  her  frontiers ;  or  so,  at  least,  we 
believe  history  will  judge. 

Already,  in  the  Chamber,  which  was  dominated 
by  his  authority,  Signor  Giolitti  had  practically 
suppressed  the  existence  of  parties,  which  were 
made  mutually  to  exhaust  one  another  by  ex- 
cessive friction.     The  effects  of  the  same  policy 
began  to  be  felt  by  public  opinion,  the  conflicts 
of  former  days  tending  to  quiet  down,  the  old 
passions    being   forgotten    and    the    old    revolu- 
tionary idealism  obscured.     For  a  long  time  the 
new   Italy,  fearing  a  renewed  offensive  on  the 
part  of  the  Church,  had  demanded  protection 
and  defence  from  opposing  influences,  and  had 
given   Freemasonry  an  important   place  in   the 
State.     This,   by  the  way,  was   a  very  natural 
phenomenon.     Freemasonry,  owing  to  the  part 
it  had  played  in  the  unification  of  Italy,  was 
incorporated   in    the   history   and    therefore   in 
the  public  life  of  the  nation.     But  from  the  day 
on  which  Freemasonry  ceased  to  be  regarded  by 
the  Italian  people  as  one  of  the  instruments  of 
unity  it  was  bound  to  lose  its  raison  (Tetre  and  a 
great  part  of  its  prestige. 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     143 

However,  it  was  no  easy  task  to  divorce  the 
masonic  ideal  from  the  national  ideal.  If  there 
was  in  Italy  one  historic  memory  which  counted 
for  something,  one  sentimental  force  which  con- 
spired to  favour  the  anticlerical  democracy,  it 
was  Garibaldism.  It  took  more  than  one  cam- 
paign to  outwear  this  tradition,  and  in  these 
campaigns  the  Nationalists  were  the  leaders. 
They  succeeded  in  proving  to  their  contemporaries 
that  as  far  as  Italian  interests  were  concerned  the 
masonic  idea  was  an  anachronism,  and,  as  such, 
dangerous,  and  therefore  to  be  eliminated.  Reve- 
lations as  to  the  influence  of  masonic  elements  in 
the  Army  produced  a  tremendous  sensation,  and 
were  followed  by  a  tremendous  protest.  Wounded 
to  the  heart,  the  Italian  Grand  Orient  had  to 
emerge  from  its  secrecy  and  appeal  to  the  public  ; 
we  saw,  in  the  summer  of  191 3,  on  all  the  walls  of 
Italy,  the  manifesto  by  which  it  recalled  the 
services  which  it  had  rendered  to  the  nation. 
It  had  assumed  a  posture  of  defence,  which 
enabled  one  to  prophesy  retreat,  and  the  defeat 
which  the  elections  ratified.  Here  and  there, 
to  be  sure,  the  Government  supported  candidates 
whose  affiliation  to  masonry  was  indubitable ; 
Signor  Giolitti  excelled  in  such  experiments  in 
political  chemistry,  whereby  he  was  accustomed 
to  compose  his  Parliamentary  dough.  On  the 
whole,  the  Governmental  programme  sanctioned 
by  the  elector  excluded  anticlericalism,  passed  it 
over  in  silence,  at  the  moment  when  the  Papacy, 
for  its  own  part,  had  removed  the  non  exfedit 
authorising,  and  almost  urging,  all  Catholics  to 
make  use  of  their  voting-papers.  Universal  suf- 
frage had  realised  that  from  the  moment  Italy 


144  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

made  ready  to  enter  upon  a  far-reaching  foreign 
policy,  interest  bade  her  make  use  of  the  influence 
and  the  expansive  force  of  Catholicism.  In  this 
new  orientation  of  Italy  the  part  played  by 
positive  and  deliberate  calculation  has  been  noted 
by  more  than  one  French  observer  :  for  example, 
by  M.  Frangois  Deloncle,  a  Radical  deputy,  and  by 
M.  Andre  Tardieu  of  the  Temps .^ 

For  forty-five  years  the  successor  of  St.  Peter 
and  the  King  of  Italy  have  lived  facing  one 
another.  From  the  Quirinal  one  may  see  the 
Vatican,  and  half  an  hour's  v^alk  v^ill  take  you 
from  one  palace  to  the  other.  However,  the  two 
powers  ignore  one  another.  Four  Popes  and 
three  Kings  have  succeeded  one  another,  and  the 
diplomatic  situation  remains  as  it  was  created 
by  the  protest  of  Pio  Nono  on  the  morrow  of 
the  entry  through  the  breach  in  the  Porta  Pia. 
The  Papacy  does  not  recognise  the  accomplished 
fact.  It  has  rejected  the  law  of  guarantees,  and 
the  indemnity  which  was  offered  it,  and  is  un- 

^  One  might  devote  a  whole  chapter  to  the  greatness  and 
the  decadence  of  Italian  Freemasonry.  Of  late  years  numerous 
incidents  have  given  evidence  of  a  reaction  against  masonic 
influence.  We  need  only  recall  the  case  of  Signor  Camera,  a 
deputy,  and  some  of  his  colleagues,  whose  indictment  was 
demanded  by  the  lodges  of  the  Scottish  rite,  because  they  voted 
in  favour  of  religious  instruction  in  the  schools.  Signor  Giolitti 
was  then  accused  of  having  designedly  caused  dissension  and 
discussion  in  the  ranks  of  Freemasonry,  by  supporting  moderates 
like  Signor  Fera  against  the  more  advanced  section  led  by 
Dr.  Ballori,  then  assistant  to  the  Radical  Mayor  of  Rome, 
Dr.  Nathan.  The  fall  of  Dr.  Nathan's  municipal  government 
and  of  the  Roman  bloc  was,  by  the  way,  one  of  the  most  notable 
episodes  of  this  conflict. 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     145 

willing  to  owe  anything  to  the  Italian  monarchy. 
The  latter,  for  its  part,  retains  the  same  position  : 
it  has  fulfilled  and  is  still  ready  to  fulfil  the 
engagements  which  it  undertook  in  1870.  It 
goes  no  farther.  The  protest  of  the  Holy  See, 
renewed  by  each  Pontiff,  has  finally  created  a 
state  of  affairs  which,  although  it  appeared 
provisional,  has  lasted  up  to  the  present,  and 
which  the  Italian  Government  has  come  to  regard 
as  one  of  the  conditions  of  everyday  life  ;  so 
much  so,  that  it  would  regret  its  disappearance 
(or  at  least  professes  that  it  would  do  so). 

It  happens  that  this  absence  of  contact  between 
the  two  powers  has  in  the  long  run  become  one 
of  the  conditions  of  Italian  politics.  No  relations : 
therefore  no  conflicts,  no  discussions.  We  have 
here  a  translation  into  fact — somewhat  unex- 
pected, but  possibly  not  the  worst — of  the 
celebrated  formula  ;  '^  A  free  Church  in  a  free 
State."  Complete  liberty  :  each  of  the  elements 
evolves  in  an  independent  sphere.  So  it  has  come 
about,  by  an  unforeseen  and  almost  paradoxical 
result  of  the  conflicts  between  Church  and  State 
in  the  nineteenth  century,  that  Italy  is  one  of 
the  few  corners  of  the  world  in  which  there  are 
no  real  difficulties  in  matters  of  religion.  In 
the  country  in  which  the  Pope  resides  there  is, 
properly  speaking,  no  "  clericalism "  and  no 
"  clerical  party."  In  the  kingdom  which  dis- 
possessed the  Holy  See  and  suppressed  its  tem- 
poral power,  there  is  no  religious  warfare.  Here 
is  another  result,  which  is  no  less  fortunate  :  the 
protest  of  the  Holy  See,  and  its  refusal  to  recognise 
the  accomplished  fact,  facilitate,  from  the  inter- 
national point  of  view,  the  task  of  the  Italian 

10 


146  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Government,  for  this  protest  and  this  refusal 
constitute  a  guarantee  of  Papal  independence. 
Europe  formerly  feared  that  in  a  united  Italy  the 
Pope  would  be  subordinated  to  the  State. 

'*  The  influence  of  the  King  of  Sardinia  in 
Rome,"  said  a  memorandum  addressed  by  Marshal 
de  Noailles  to  Louis  XV,  "  would  be  increased 
to  such  a  point  that  the  Pope  would  be  nothing 
more  than  a  sort  of  first  chaplain  to  the  King, 
forced  to  follow  the  inspirations  of  the  Court  of 
Turin." 

The  Popes,  although  Italians,  and  elected  by 
a  College  in  which  the  majority  of  the  Cardinals 
are  Italians,  did  not  desire  and  would  not  con- 
descend to  become  the  Grand  Almoners  of  the 
new  Kings  of  Italy,  nor  did  the  latter  seek  any 
such  method  of  gratifying  their  vanity.  So  the 
Papacy,  although  deprived  of  its  temporal 
sovereignty,  has  remained,  in  complete  inde- 
pendence, the  highest  spiritual  authority  in  the 
world. 

What  words  would  have  been  cunning  enough 
to  explain  the  subtle  mystery  by  which  Italy, 
while  officially  ignoring  the  Holy  See,  has  yet 
been  able  to  steep  herself  in  the  effulgence  of 
that  authority  which  is  above  all  the  nations  ? 
By  what  genius  for  reconciling  ideals,  by  what 
intuition  of  the  politics  and  history  of  the  new 
Italy  was  she  able,  on  making  Rome  her  national 
capital,  to  preserve  its  character  as  the  capital 
of  Catholicism  ?  For  such  are  the  facts.  Every 
Italian,  down  to  the  last  Mazzinist,  or  the 
traditional  "  anticlerical "  of  the  Trastevere,  is 
intimately  convinced  that  the  city  would  be 
uncrowned,  that  the  nation  would  suffer  loss, 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     147 

were  the  Pope  to  abandon  it.  *'  All  Italians 
trembled  lest  the  tiara  should  pass  to  those  beyond 
the  mountains,  to  the  great  loss  and  dishonour 
of  Italy,"  said  a  Florentine  chronicler,  after  the 
election  of  Pius  II  over  Cardinal  d' Estouteville. 
And  this  is  a  feeling  which  has  not  ceased  to 
dwell  in  the  hearts  of  Italians.  It  has  only  in- 
creased with  the  Nationalist  and  Imperialist  state 
of  mind  characteristic  of  modern  Italy,  and  the 
development  of  a  great  Italian  policy  in  the 
Mediterranean  basin  and  the  East. 

We  arrived  in  Rome  just  as  the  interview 
between  M.  Latapie  and  the  Pope  had  been 
published  in  France  :  one  of  the  most  startling 
"  scoops  "  which  this  journalist  has  ever  effected. 
We  had  read  this  document,  with  the  comments 
of  the  Italian  press  upon  it,  on  the  journey  from 
Florence  to  Rome.  And  we  expected  to  find 
the  city,  on  the  morrow  of  the  May  demonstra- 
tions, once  more  in  a  state  of  excitement,  possibly 
of  insurrection.  .  .  .  One  word  especially  struck 
us,  among  the  remarks  which  M.  Latapie  attri- 
buted to  Benedict  XV  :  it  was  the  word  "  neu- 
trality." At  the  moment  when  the  "  neutralists  " 
were  regarded  as  bad  Italians,  a  few  days  after 
the  most  notorious  of  them  had  been  chased 
through  the  streets  of  Rome,  was  there  not  reason 
to  fear  that  an  equivocation  or  a  mistranslation 
placed  in  the  mouth  of  the  Pope  might  give  rise 
to  serious  incidents,  and  awaken  old  ferments  ? 
A  phrase  imperfectly  understood  or  interpreted, 
an  inflexion  of  the  voice  omitted,  would  be 
enough,  perhaps,  to  revive  old  quarrels.  There 
was  a  time  when  M.  Latapie's  article  would 
assuredly  have  brought  thousands  of  demonstra- 


148  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

tors  to  the  Piazza  di  San  Pietro.  The  windows 
of  the  Vatican  would  have  been  broken,  and 
priests  would  have  been  thrashed  along  the 
Borgo.  However,  nothing  of  the  kind  befell. 
Italy  is  no  longer  in  those  days  when  the  Roman 
youth,  on  the  Ponte  Sant'  Angelo,  tried  to  throw 
the  coffin  of  Pio  Nono  into  the  Tiber. 

No  one  had  been  unaware  of  the  persevering 
labours  of  German  and  Austrian  diplomacy  in 
the  Vatican  during  the  years  preceding  the  war. 
Here  again  was  a  labour  of  preparation  for  the 
war,  a  work  of  investment,  which  lasted  until  the 
day  when  Italy  broke  with  her  ancient  Allies. 
The  task  was  all  the  easier  in  that  the  field  was 
clear  and  the  adversary  absent.  France  was  not 
represented  at  the  Holy  See.  England  has  since 
then  been  represented,  but  late  in  the  day. 
Without  competitors,  the  Austrian  Ambassador 
and  the  Ministers  of  Prussia  and  Bavaria  were 
profuse  in  amiability  and  in  promises.  They 
neglected  no  means  of  pleasing,  even  the  pettiest  : 
honours,  decorations,  and  a  luxurious  table  were 
not  neglected  ;  and  we  must  not  forget  intimida- 
tion, threats  of  reprisals  ("  Josephism  "  or  the 
Kulturkampf)  which,  in  the  German  manner, 
alternated  with  fair  words.  Here  we  have  the 
explanation  of  certain  movements  and  certain 
attitudes  which  have  given  rise  to  some  surprise. 
But  did  they  think  the  Papacy  was  to  be  won 
over  so  easily — that  it  would  renounce  its  free-will 
for  so  little  ?     They  little  knew  it  who  thought  so. 

This  is  why  public  opinion  in  Italy  was  not 
aroused.  The  public  did  not  believe  that  the 
Holy  See  was  conquered  by  Germany ;  it  had 
too  high  an  ideal  of  the  political  spirit  of  the 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     149 

Vatican  and  of  its  love  of  independence.  In 
Rome,  indeed,  men  take  a  world-wide  view  of 
things.  Moreover,  they  remember.  Of  all  the 
cities  of  the  world,  time  counts  for  least  in  Rome. 
History  does  not  allow  its  lessons  to  be  forgotten 
there  ;  and  men's  minds  are  not  oppressed  by 
the  power  of  the  passing  day,  by  the  immediate 
reality.  Imperial  Germany,  for  the  sake  of  her 
political  necessities,  was  lavish  of  advances  toward 
the  Church.  The  Church  accepted  them  all  the 
more  readily,  in  that  she  had  not,  for  a  long  time, 
been  spoiled  in  this  direction.  But  she  accepted 
them  calmly.  We  remarked  one  day  that  the 
well-known  appellation  of  Kulturkamff,  which 
stands  for  German  and  Imperialistic  anti- 
clericalism,  contains  and  implies  that  famous 
Kultur  in  whose  name  Germany  has  undertaken 
her  war  of  conquest,  and  it  seemed  to  us  that 
our  remark  was  understood. 

"  It  is  certainly  the  case,"  we  were  informed, 
"  that  Germany  has  performed  impossibilities  in 
order  to  win  for  her  cause  the  Catholic  element 
in  Italy,  and  in  Spain,  and  indeed  in  all  the  neutral 
countries.  In  coming  to  Rome  she  came  to  the 
wrong  place  !  We  are  on  the  spot  which  wit- 
nessed the  struggles  between  the  priesthood  and 
the  Empire,  and  which  has  never  forgotten  the 
vicissitudes  of  that  struggle.  Wc  know  that  the 
Germanic  Emperor  never  flattered  the  Holy  Sec 
save  to  enslave  it,  to  make  it  his  tool,  and  that 
he  bullied  it  every  time  the  successor  of  St.  Peter 
attempted  to  make  his  independence  respected. 
Whether  it  be  a  Hohenstaufen  of  the  Middle 
Ages  or  a  HohenzoUern  of  modern  times,  the 
spirit  and  the  methods  are  the  same.     And  no 


ISO  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

one  here  has  forgotten  how  Leo  XIII  was  re- 
warded for  having  sought  to  bear  himself 
courteously,  as  the  great  seigneur  he  was,  toward 
Wilhelm  11. 

"  It  was  in  1888.  Wilhelm  II  had  recently 
ascended  the  throne.  As  he  was  in  Rome  a  visit 
to  the  Pope  was  agreed  upon,  according  to  the 
formal  rules  observed  in  such  a  case.  Leo  XIII 
intended  to  speak  of  important  matters  to  the 
young  Emperor,  and  it  was  a  favourable  occasion 
for  the  discussion  of  several  matters  of  high 
politics.  Bismarck  did  not  wish  this  to  happen  ; 
neither,  in  all  probability,  did  Wilhelm  II.  For 
hardly  had  the  Pope  had  time  to  exchange  a  few 
words  with  the  Emperor,  when  Count  Herbert 
von  Bismarck,  accompanied  by  Prince  Henry  of 
Prussia,  entered  the  antechamber,  and,  hustling 
the  majordomo,  forced  their  way  into  the  Ponti- 
fical cabinet,  and  put  an  end  to  the  conversation 
between*  the  two  sovereigns,  who,  after  an  ex- 
change of  commonplace  civilities,  parted  from  one 
another. 

"  This  serious  and  gratuitous  insult  to  the 
Papacy,  this  revival  of  mediaeval  violence,  has  not 
been  forgotten. 

"  And  that  is  not  all.  Rome  is  not  ignorant 
of  -the  ideas  of  Wilhelm  II  concerning  religion. 
Although  the  Emperor  has  on  several  occasions, 
and  in  the  most  public  manner,  spoken  in  praise 
of  Catholicism,  and  although,  with  his  peculiar 
art  of  dissimulation,  of  giving  pleasure,  without 
exception,  to  his  interlocutors  of  the  moment, 
he  has  often  displayed  his  sympathy  for  the 
Church,  his  real  opinion  is  no  secret.  He  has 
betrayed  it  on  several  occasions.     Wilhelm  IPs 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     151 

fixed  idea,  in  the  matter  of  religion,  is  to  achieve 
the  fusion  of  confessions  and  unity  of  belief  in 
his  own  Empire.  It  was  at  Munster,  in  the  heart 
of  Catholic  Germany,  that  he  uttered,  seven 
years  ago,  these  solemn  words,  which  have  been 
remembered  :  '  To  achieve  German  unity  there 
is  only  one  means ;  that  is  religion,  not  understood 
in  the  rigorous  sense  of  ecclesiastical  dogma,  but 
in  a  wider  sense,  more  practical  for  the  purposes 
of  life.' 

"  As  has  been  well  said  by  a  French  writer  ^ 
who  has,  in  all  departments,  closely  studied  the 
ideas  of  Wilhelm  II,  the  Emperor  dreams  of  a 
Germany  in  which  Catholics  and  Protestants 
would  be  confounded  in  a  vague  unformulated 
Christianity,  which  would  be  nothing  more  or 
less  than  a  sort  of  Imperialist  religion,  a  State 
religion.''  We  have  already,  for  that  matter, 
been  able  to  observe  the  effects  of  the  Imperial 
policy  on  the  spirit  of  German  Catholicism.  The 
Catholic  Centre,  formerly  vivified  by  the  Bis- 
marckian  persecution,  is  strangely  altered.  Ah, 
we  are  far  from  Windthorst,  the  noble  Windt- 

^  M.  Jules  Arren,  who  died  on  the  field  of  honour  in  the  war 
of  1914. 

2  Compare  this  passage  from  one  of  the  theorists  of  Pan- 
germanism,  Ernest  Hasse,  in  his  book  The  German  Empire  as  a 
National  State,  published  in  1905  :  "  We  shall  not  renounce 
the  hope  of  restoring  the  population  of  the  German  Empire 
to  confessional  unity.  For  the  need  of  national  German 
churches  is  not  a  religious  matter  only,  but  a  national  matter. 
Considerations  of  a  national  order  demand  that  the  Roman 
Catholics  shall  be  detached  from  foreign  influences,  that  is  to 
say  from  Italo-Roman  influences,  and  that  a  national  German 
Catholic  Church  shall  be  founded,"  etc.  (See  M.  Charles 
Andler's  Pangermanisme  continental  sous  Guillaume  II.) 


152  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

horst  and  his  friends  !  The  Centre  of  to-day 
is  led  by  such  men  as  Erzberger,  Bachem,  Spahn, 
who  are  intriguing  politicians  in  the  service  of 
the  Empire  and  Pangermanism,  and  whose 
maleficent  work  is  not  yet  sufficiently  realised. 

"  This  work  has  been  twofold.  In  the  first 
place,  it  has  consisted  in  weakening  German 
Catholicism  at  home  by  depriving  it  of  its  peculiar 
characteristics  by  means  of  the  principle  of  inter- 
confessionality,  which,  in  a  country  where  the 
majority  is  Protestant,  in  which  both  influence 
and  power  are  on  the  side  of  Protestantism, 
delivered  the  lesser  number  into  the  hands  of 
the  greater.  The  leaders  of  the  Centre — the 
Centre  such  as  it  has  become  in  the  hands  of 
those  whom  one  German  Archbishop  has  called 
'  the  infected  citizens  of  Cologne  ' — have  worked^ 
with  a  conscious  understanding  of  their  cause, 
in  the  direction  of  the  fusion  desired  by  Wil- 
helm  II. 

"  Abroad  they  have  devoted  themselves  frankly 
to  the  service  of  Pangermanism.  The  Belgian 
Catholics  have  revealed  the  false  oaths  and  lying 
assurances  which  Erzberger  and  the  other  agents 
of  the  Centre  had  showered  upon  them  before 
the  war.  The  crime  of  the  Belgian  Catholics 
was  that  they  trusted  these  harbingers  of  the 
invasion,  who  came  to  them  swearing  that  never, 
never  had  it  entered  into  the  plans  of  the  Imperial 
Government  or  of  the  Prussian  Great  General 
Staff  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Never 
was  more  cynical  trickery  heard  of,  nor  a  plainer 
abuse  of  confidence. 

"  But  this  was  not  enough.  So  far  people 
have  heard  only  of  what  happened  in  Germany. 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     153 

One  day  they  will  know  that  the  German  Centre 
treated  the  Catholics  of  the  whole  world  as 
Social  Democracy  treated  the  Socialists  in  France 
and  elsewhere  :  using  its  influence  to  gain  sympa- 
thies for  Germany,  or  else  to  avert  suspicion  from 
the  schemes  of  Wilhelm  II. 

"  Very  often  Germany,  a  Lutheran  country, 
has  caused  the  Papacy  grievous  anxiety.  More 
than  once  Catholic  Germany  itself  has  displayed 
a  spirit  of  rebellion.  Rome  has  not  forgotten 
that  there  was  nowhere  more  opposition  to  the 
dogma  of  infallibility  than  in  Germany,  and  that 
a  theologian  like  DoUinger  went  to  the  length  of 
schism,  in  which  he  persisted  :  DoUinger,  as  Pio 
Nono  said,  would  have  liked  to  make  himself  the 
Pope  of  the  Germans.  And  one  still  remembers 
the  Los  von  Rom  movement,  inspired  in  Austria 
by  Pangermanism.  One  remembers  too  that  the 
last  years  of  Pius  X  were  saddened  by  the  re- 
sistance which  the  German  faculties  of  theology 
opposed  to  the  anti-modernist  oath.  There  are 
many  reasons,  of  different  kinds,  but  equally 
forcible,  which  should  prevent  one  from  regarding 
Germany  as  the  rampart  of  Catholicism,  and 
above  all  as  its  only  rampart." 


Among  the  peasants  of  Apulia  and  the  Abruzzi 
one  often  meets,  in  the  place  of  honour,  a  picture 
which  represents  the  Pope  and  the  King  seated 
side  by  side  in  a  gilded  car.  This  popular  coloured 
print  is  the  ingenuous  symbol  of  one  of  Italy's 
profoundest  desires.  It  is  the  new  alliance,  to- 
ward which  the  Italian  people  has,  in  its  secret 
heart,  aspired  since  the  first  days  of  the  unification. 


154  ITALY  AND   THE   WAR 

Will  the  peasant's  picture,  which  makes  so 
light  of  theology,  politics,  and  history,  one  day 
become  a  reality  ?  Shall  we  see  the  Pope  and 
the  King  reconciled  ?  Would  there  not  be  so 
many  inconveniences,  so  many  dangers  involved 
by  a  solemn  reconciliation  that  the  happiest 
chances  are  still  offered  by  a  continuation  of  the 
present  state  of  affairs — that  is,  mere  neighbour- 
hood, without  direct  contact,  and  without  hos- 
tilities ?  This  is  a  provisional  solution,  no  doubt. 
Will  the  future  bring  any  other  ?  No  one 
knows,  although  more  than  one  rumour  is  current 
of  arrangements  which  the  Italian  Government 
is  supposed  to  hold  in  reserve,  and  which  might 
come  into  being  after  the  war.  But  the  Church 
is  patient  and  will  await  her  hour. 

It  will  be  noted  that  even  in  the  war  the 
Church  has  found  her  place.  From  the  Pope 
to  the  humblest  country  curate,  there  have  been 
no  black  looks,  and  no  one  has  shirked  his  duty. 
The  Church  eagerly  seized  upon  the  occasion  to 
prove  that  she  was  not  estranged  from  the  national 
Italian  spirit.  The  "  Black "  aristocracy  has 
furnished  as  many  volunteers  as  the  "  White," 
and  the  Vatican  has  made  no  attempt  to  deter 
them.  The  bishops  recommended  the  faithful 
to  serve  their  King  and  their  country  :  witness 
the  collection  of  documents  published  by  Senator 
Vittorio  Polacco,  which  contains  the  testimony 
of  sixty  cardinals,  archbishops,  and  bishops. 
Here,  for  example,  is  a  pastoral  letter  in  which 
the  Bishop  of  Tortona  invites  his  clergy  and  his 
people  to  pray  for  the  Pope,  and  also  for  the 
Sovereign,  "  the  august  descendant  of  a  race  of 
strong  and  wise  men,"  and  at  the  same  time  for 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     155 

"  our  beloved  Italy,  dearer  than  ever  to  the  heart 
of  her  sons." 

However,  the  civil  power  was  not  behindhand, 
and  Signor  Salandra  signed  a  telegram  in  which 
the  Grand  Almoner  of  the  Navy  was  called  a 
"  soldier  of  Christ  and  the  King."  So,  in  this 
sequel  (but  a  sequel  so  singularly  aggrandised)  of 
the  struggle  for  unity,  in  this  enterprise  of  Italian 
Nationalism  and  Imperialism,  the  Church  finds 
herself  quite  naturally  engaged,  because  the  Medi- 
terranean is  involved  as  much  as  the  Adriatic, 
and  the  East  as  much  as  the  Trentino.  Is  it 
a  sign,  an  indication  for  the  future  ?  Must  we 
regard  it  as  the  beginning  of  the  realisation  of 
that  vehement  prophecy  which  was  uttered  by 
Proudhon  fifty  years  ago,  and  which  then  ap- 
peared so  excessive  ? 

"  What  the  Italians,  full  of  their  grandiose 
and  dramatic  memories,"  he  said,  "  are  dreaming 
of,  is  to  make  Italy,  from  the  political  point  of 
view,  a  sixth  Great  Power  ;  from  the  religious 
point  of  view,  after  subordinating  the  Papacy  to 
the  monarchy,  to  confer  upon  the  latter  the 
protectorate  of  Catholicism.  .  .  .  They  rightly 
covet  Rome,  with  her  pontifical  prestige,  for  their 
United  Italy ;  they  covet  the  Papacy,  but 
accommodated  to  the  constitutional  system. 
Italy,  whatever  people  say,  is  still  Papal ;  the 
sarcasms  of  Garibaldi  and  Mazzini  concerning 
the  priesthood  do  not  affect  this  fact.  They 
hope,  by  subordinating  the  Papacy  to  the  new 
order  of  things,  to  bestow  upon  Italy  the 
supremacy  of  the  Catholic  world,  to  supplant 
France  and  Austria,  henceforth  mere  satellites 
of  the  great  Roman  and  Christian  planet.     Rome 


iS6  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

and  unity  :  then,  presently,  Venice,  the  Ticino, 
Corsica,  Nice,  Algeria  :  to  consummate  this 
great  revival  nothing  is  needed  but  to  change  a 
word  ;  instead  of  calling  Victor  Emmanuel  King 
he  should  be  called  Emperor.  Then  Italy,  more 
than  ever,  being  Pontifical  and  Imperial,  would 
find  herself  at  the  summit  of  her  dreams  :  she 
would  have  recovered,  as  Mazzini  says,  the 
apostolate  of  Europe." 

Carried  away  on  the  tide  of  polemics,  Proudhon, 
perhaps,  exaggerated  slightly.  But  at  the  time 
he  wrote  these  words  his  was  almost  the  only 
mind  in  France  to  believe  in  the  possibility  of 
such  a  future  for  the  youthful  Italy.  Those  of 
the  Right  agreed  with  those  of  the  Left  in  pre- 
dicting revolution.  Now  the  Revolution,  in  these 
early  years  of  the  twentieth  century,  appears,  in 
Italy  as  elsewhere,  as  an  expiring  force,  an  out- 
worn passion,  far  exceeded  by  the  passion  of 
Nationalism.  Yet,  by  a  strange  hazard,  only  a 
few  weeks  before  the  European  war  broke  out,  a 
revolutionary  movement,  which  at  first  appeared 
serious,  aroused  the  people  of  the  Romagna. 
Surprised,  with  his  staff,  by  the  insurgents,  a 
general  was  even  compelled  to  surrender  his 
sword.  What  alarming  prognostics  were  once 
more  in  circulation  concerning  the  situation  in 
Italy !  However,  when  events  were  observed 
more  closely  they  appeared  in  their  just  propor- 
tion. 

The  Count  Soderini,  a  deputy  for  Ancona, 
informed  me  that  he  had  become  convinced  that 
this  "  red  week  "  was  surreptitiously  excited  by 
Austria,  that  suspicious  companion,  uncertain 
even  of  herself.     But  it  was  also  apparent  that 


THE  QUIRINAL  AND  VATICAN     157 

Austria  had  a  very  poor  run  for  her  money,  for 
the  movement,  which  did  not  affect  a  single  large 
town,  was  merely  a  sort  of  Jacquerie,  an  eruption 
of  peasant  anarchy,  with  a  few  reminiscences  of 
the  old  communist  and  federalist  spirit  which  is 
always  alive  among  the  Italians.  At  the  same 
time,  these  rural  troubles,  although  repressed  by 
the  end  of  three  days,  had  determined  an  im- 
mediate reaction  of  the  most  definite  nature  in 
the  greater  cities.  Rome,  on  the  20th  of  June, 
at  the  municipal  elections,  overthrew  the  bloc 
and  the  government  of  Dr.  Nathan.  If  the  revo- 
lutionary idea  was  able  to  find  favourable  soil,  it 
was  in  the  rural  districts,  among  backward  popu- 
lations, while  the  urban  populations  proved 
refractory  to  anarchy.  Thus  the  revolution 
reappeared  in  Italy  only  for  a  moment,  on  the 
eve  of  the  war,  and  only  to  assume  a  retrograde 
character,  the  aspect  of  a  phenomenon  of  another 
age,  without  influence  upon  the  forward  march 
of  the  nation,  and  only  to  be  swiftly  and  surely 
chastised. 


CHAPTER   VI 

FROM    THE    TRIPLE    ALLIANCE    TO    THE 
QUADRUPLE    ENTENTE 

A  saying  of  Thiers' — A  false  conception  of  Italian  "  gratitude  " 
— ^The  origins  of  the  triple  pact — Italy  between  France 
and  Austria — Sentiment  and  reason — The  policy  of  Crispi : 
modification  of  the  system — Italy  and  England  :  maritime 
assurance — ^The  "  turns  round  the  ballroom  " — ^The 
"  penetration  of  alliances  " — ^The  Franco-Italian  rapproche- 
ment— Renewed  tension,  and  a  fresh  obstacle — Italy's 
Mediterranean  policy — ^Vain  attempts  of  Germany — ^The 
question  of  the  Twelve  Islands — Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the 
Marquis  di  San  Giuliano — What  happened  in  April  1914 — 
A  reason  for  confidence — Neutrality  or  intervention  ? 

"  The  gratitude  of  Italy  will  endure  in  propor- 
tion to  its  feebleness."  This  saying  of  Thiers' 
is  famous.  But  the  idea  thus  expressed  was 
false  ;  Thiers  had  fallen  into  the  common  error 
of  the  time,  that  Italy  had  contracted  a  debt  of 
gratitude  toward  France.  This  conception  of  the 
benefactor  holding  a  mortgage  over  his  frotege 
was  once  made  the  subject  of  a  celebrated  comedy. 
It  arises  from  a  vice  of  the  mind,  a  serious  obliquity 
which  for  more  than  fifty  years  has  in  the  most 
unfortunate  manner  burdened  the  relations  be- 
tween France  and  Italy. 

One  might,  like   Thiers  and  Proudhon,  have 
been  hostile  to  Italian  unity  ;  and,  like  them,  one 

158 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  159 

might  have  blamed  the  Second  Empire  for 
labouring  to  set  up  a  powerful  neighbour  at  its 
gates.  The  Italians  are  sufficiently  experienced 
as  politicians  to  put  themselves  in  the  place  of 
others,  to  understand  the  interest  and  the  point 
of  view  of  the  foreigner,  even  of  the  enemy. 
They  do  not  take  exception  to  a  sentiment  which, 
as  they  will  readily  admit,  would  be  their  own  in 
case  of  necessity ;  and  they  bear  no  one  ill-will 
because  he  frankly  expresses  it.  But  that  they 
should  be  regarded  as  constrained  to  eternal 
gratitude — that  is,  dependence — for  a  service 
rendered — this  they  will  not  admit.  And  here  it 
is  the  turn  of  the  Frenchman  to  understand,  to 
enter  into  the  state  of  the  Italian  mind. 

France  has  largely  contributed  to  the  indepen- 
dence and  unity  of  Italy  ;  so  much  is  true.  But 
did  France  seek  to  create  Italy  for  her  own  sake, 
or  for  Italy's  ?  When  the  Italian  State  was 
called  into  being,  was  it  expected  to  live  for  its 
own  sake  or  for  others  ?  After  helping  Italy  to 
come  to  life,  France  should  have  been  willing  to 
see  her  walk  upon  her  own  feet.  The  obscure, 
ill-defined,  scarcely  avowed  feeling  that  the 
Italian  people  remained  under  an  obligation  to 
France  was  to  exercise,  on  the  relations  between 
France  and  Italy,  a  more  disastrous  effect,  and 
engender  more  misunderstandings,  than  violent 
and  open  polemics.  Let  us  remember  that  we 
have  just  seen  the  Bulgarians  reply  almost  in  the 
same  terms  to  their  Russian  liberators  :  '*  Why 
did  you  give  us  our  liberty  if  only  to  control  us, 
if  only  to  reproach  us  for  the  use  we  choose  to 
make  of  it  ?  " 

The  Italians  have  given  a  complete  explana- 


i6o  ITALY   AND   THE    WAR 

tion  of  the  motives  which,  after  1870,  led  them 
to  adhere  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  Their  policy 
responded  to  a  necessity  of  equilibrium.  They 
sought  to  guarantee  themselves  against  France  on 
the  one  hand,  against  Austria  on  the  other. 
For  the  young  Italian  State  France,  even  in 
defeat,  was  yet  too  powerful,  and  her  power  of 
attraction  too  formidable.  "  I  abhor  above 
everything  the  haughty  French  protectorate," 
said  Mazzini  in  a  well-known  letter  to  Nino 
Bixio.  Italy  wished  it  to  be  clearly  understood 
that  she  was  her  own  mistress.  In  allying  her- 
self with  Germany  she  traced  a  definite  line  of 
demarcation  on  the  French  side,  by  which  her 
enfranchisement  was  to  be  consecrated.  How- 
ever, Austria  was  still  too  menacing.  Let  Italy 
find  herself  alone  in  the  presence  of  Austria 
and  her  unity,  still  a  new  and  fragile  thing,  would 
run  a  serious  risk.  From  the  moment  when 
Italy  was  unwilling  and  unable  to  live  with 
Austria  as  her  declared  enemy,  there  was  only 
one  resource  :  to  come  to  an  understanding  with 
her.  But  to  do  this  without  surrender,  to 
ensure  an  honourable  solution,  which  should  not 
entail  more  drawbacks  than  advantages,  it  was 
needful  to  resort  to  a  third  party.  Bismarck 
was  there,  offering  his  services.  Italy's  rela- 
tions with  the  Court  of  Vienna  were  established 
through  Berlin.  Thus  the  German  alliance 
became  a  guarantee  against  Austria. 

Many  of  the  characteristics  of  the  old  policy 
of  the  Dukes  of  Savoy,  a  policy  of  equilibrium 
and  prudence,  were  to  be  found  in  this  combina- 
tion, applied  to  the  new  Italy.  It  would  seem, 
moreover,   that    the   statesmen   who   concluded 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  i6i 

the  triple  pact  had  designed  to  safeguard  Italy 
against  two  sentimental  tendencies.  One  was 
hatred  of  Austria,  which,  by  provoking  a  pre- 
mature war,  would  have  exposed  the  Italian 
people  to  disaster.  The  other  tendency — ever 
to  be  dreaded,  no  doubt,  but  not  entirely 
imaginary — might  have  arisen  from  the  sympathy 
of  one  section  of  public  opinion  (a  section  larger 
and  more  influential  thirty-five  years  ago  than 
to-day)  for  the  institutions,  men,  and  ideals  of 
the  French  democracy.  To  hold  the  balance 
equal  between  Italy's  two  neighbours,  to  be  a 
slave  neither  to  hatred  of  Austria  nor  to  affection 
for  France — such,  thirty-five  years  ago,  was  the 
fundamental  idea  of  Italian  diplomacy.  Prince 
von  Billow  was  therefore  quite  correct  when  he 
stated,  in  his  treatise  on  German  Politics,  that 
Italy  was  united  to  Germany  "  by  reason," 
although  he  himself  since  then  has  not  been  able 
to  derive  all  the  consequences  from  this  principle 
which  he  implied.  Bismarck,  more  penetrating, 
had  on  the  contrary  perfectly  comprehended 
the  empirical  nature  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
when  he  so  prophetically  recommended  his 
successors  not  to  count  absolutely,  uncondition- 
ally, or  eternally  upon  the  assistance  of  Italy. 

However,  the  Italians  have  sometimes  per- 
mitted themselves  to  exceed  the  limits  which 
they  established.  Politic  as  it  may  be,  the 
Italian  people  is  also  given  to  enthusiasms.  A 
few  impassioned,  immoderate  spirits,  cleverly 
handled,  unknown  to  themselves,  by  the  Machi- 
avellism  of  Berlin,  sufficed  for  a  long  time  to 
distort  the  system  of  a  purely  rational  foreign 

II 


1 62  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

policy  at  which  Italy  had  arrived  about  1880. 
Crispi,  whose  name  evokes  all  the  differences, 
all  the  difficulties,  all  the  hitches  which  have 
occurred  between  France  and  Italy,  does  not 
greatly  resemble  the  classic  portrait  which 
Macaulay  has  traced  of  the  Italian  statesman  : 

"  His  passions,  like  well-drilled  troops,  are 
impetuous  by  discipline,  and  never  forget,  in 
their  stubborn  fury,  the  rule  to  which  they  have 
submitted  themselves.  Vast  and  complex 
schemes  of  ambition  fill  his  entire  mind,  yet  his 
countenance  and  his  language  display  only  a 
philosophic  moderation.  .  .  .  Never  does  he  excite 
the  suspicion  of  his  enemy  by  petty  provocations. 
His  design  appears  only  when  it  is  accomplished." 

But  Crispins  passions  knew  no  discipline.  He 
could  not  even  abstain  from  petty  provocations. 
M.  Billot  has  related  this  anecdote  in  his  memoirs 
of  the  time  when  he  was  Ambassador  in  Rome  : 
Having  gone  to  see  the  Minister,  at  a  moment 
when  relations  between  the  two  countries  were 
strained,  Crispi  received  him  with  his  most  dis- 
dainful air,  barely  rising  from  his  chair  to  welcome 
the  representative  of  France.  Then  M.  Billot, 
bethinking  himself  of  a  trick,  pretended  not  to 
understand  him,  and  asked  if  the  chimney  was 
not  on  fire.  Crispi  jumped  up.  And  immedi- 
ately, comprehending  the  witty  lesson  in  manners, 
he  recovered  his  usual  courtesy. 

It  is  quite  obvious  to-day  that  by  his  excessive 
and  excitable  nature,  and  his  megalomaniac  spirit, 
Crispi  seriously  distorted  the  Triple  Alliance,  as 
conceived  by  its  authors  on  the  Italian  side.  A 
combination  intended  to  give  Italy  liberty  of 
movement  with  security  on  her  eastern  frontier 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE      163 

became,  through  him,  an  instrument  in  the  hands 
of  Bismarck.  By  succumbing  to  the  Bismarckian 
temptations  and  aggravations  Crispi  placed  his 
country  in  a  state  of  dependence  on  Germany. 
He  had  listened  too  long  to  the  Mephistopheles 
of  Berlin,  who  as  early  as  1806  had  whispered  to 
Mazzini  that  "  the  empire  of  the  Mediterranean 
ought  to  be  the  constant  ideal  of  Italy."  In 
directing  France  toward  Tunis,  Bismarck  had 
calculated  in  the  first  place  that  he  would  divert 
her  attention  from  continental  problems,  and 
then  that  he  would  envenom  with  jealousy  the 
relations  between  France  and  the  Italian 
monarchy.  At  the  back  of  his  mind  was  the 
idea  (revived  with  no  greater  success  by  Herr 
Kiderlein-Wachter,  his  disciple,  at  the  moment 
of  the  famous  Manouba  and  Carthage  incidents) 
that  Germany's  only  chance  of  finding  Italy 
beside  her  in  a  war  against  France  lay  in  a  war 
engendered  between  France  and  Italy  by  rivalry 
in  the  Mediterranean.  So,  according  to  the 
just  expression  which  M.  Andre  Tardieu  has 
employed  in  his  book  on  France  et  les  Alliances, 
Italy,  in  the  course  of  this  period,  became  the 
"  offensive  point  "  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 

The  fall  of  Crispi  restored  to  Italy  her  inde- 
pendence, made  her  shake  off  the  yoke  of  Ger- 
many, and  gave  scope  to  the  Italian  alliances. 
Thenceforth  Italy  desired  to  keep  herself  free 
within  the  Triple  Alliance.  This  was  the 
period  which  Prince  von  Biilow,  predestined  to 
be  disappointed  by  Italy,  styled  the  period  of 
the  "  turns  round  the  ballroom."  ^  For  nearly 
twenty  years,  from  1896  to  191 5,  the  incompar- 
^  Tours  de  valse. 


1 64  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

able  virtuosi  who  succeeded  Cavour  were  to  run 
over  the  whole  keyboard  of  European  combina- 
tions. 

Even  before  the  form  of  continental  assurance 
represented  by  the  German  alliance  was  concluded, 
Italy  had  concluded  a  maritime  assurance  with 
Great  Britain.  England  had  favoured  the  birth 
of  Italian  unity.  Palmerston  was  its  godfather. 
Since  then  Italy  had  not  ceased  to  cultivate  Eng- 
land's friendship.  With  Great  Britain  she  had 
agreed  to  make  the  status  quo  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean respected.  Where  Great  Britain  was 
concerned,  as  the  Marquis  di  Rudini  remarked, 
Italy  was  aware  of  no  conflicting  interests. 
Until  the  old  colonial  rivalry  of  France  and 
Great  Britain  was  appeased  by  the  initiative  of 
Edward  VII,  until  the  Entente  Cordiale  was 
concluded,  the  Anglo-Italian  agreement,  it  will 
be  readily  understood,  only  complicated  and 
embittered  the  relations  between  France  and 
Italy.  Matters  changed  their  aspect  when  France 
and  England  had  established  a  rapprochement. 
As  the  ice  between  Paris  and  London  thawed, 
so  the  material  distrust  of  Rome  and  Paris  de- 
creased. As  Fashoda  was  forgotten,  Tunis 
became  a  less  poignant  memory ;  so  that  the 
tendencies  toward  a  Franco-Italian  raffroche- 
ment,  which  had  already  been  manifested  by  the 
Delcasse-Prinetti  agreement,  became  more  fully 
pronounced  when  the  old  irritating  disputes 
between  the  French  and  British  Governments 
were  settled  in  1904.  It  would  even  seem  that 
a  secret  convention,  concluded  on  the  basis  of 
"  Tripoli  for  Fez,"  was  dated  from  this  year ; 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  165 

a  convention  of  which  one  more  particularly 
mysterious  clause  promised  France  that  in  the 
event  of  her  being  attacked  by  Germany  Italy 
v^ould  not  mobilise  on  the  Alpine  frontier,  and 
would  remove  her  fleet  from  the  Western 
Mediterranean  ;  Italy  being  above  all  preoccupied 
in  safeguarding  her  interests  and  in  arresting 
the  extension  of  Austro-Hungarian  rule  in  the 
Balkans.  It  will  therefore  be  seen  that  the  stage 
of  the  events  of  1914  was  set  ten  years  in  advance. 

These  agreements,  the  admirable  fruit  of  the 
activity  of  M.  Camille  Barrere,  the  French 
Ambassador  in  Rome,  were  proved  efficacious  at 
the  Algegiras  Conference.  There,  to  her  great 
disgust,  Germany  found  herself  supported  only 
by  Austria,  while  the  bulk  of  this  European 
tribunal,  before  which  Germany  had  dragged 
France,  under  the  threat  of  war,  in  order  to  settle 
the  problem  of  Morocco,  overruled  her  and 
decided  against  her.  It  was  not  difficult  to  see 
that  after  such  an  experience  Germany  would 
never  again  consent  to  submit  any  dispute  to  a 
general  conference  of  the  Powers,  but,  to  a 
process  which  she  would  feel  certain  of  losing, 
would  thenceforth  prefer  intimidation,  which  of 
itself  would  inevitably  lead  to  war. 

This  menace  was  doubtless  apparent  to  the 
Governments  of  the  Great  Powers  ;  for  they  were 
no  sooner  constituted  into  two  hostile  groups — 
the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente — 
than  they  endeavoured  to  temper  those  elements 
of  the  system  which  seemed  likely  to  engender 
collisions,  as  though  they  had  foreseen  that  by 
striving  to  re-establish  that  European  equilibrium 
which  the  might  of  Germany  had  threatened  they 


i66  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

had  created  a  more  certain  occasion  of  exciting 
the  dreaded  conflict. 

For  several  years,  accordingly,  we  saw  all  the 
members  of  the  European  hexarchy  seeking,  one 
after  another,  in  addition  to  the  assurance  pro- 
vided by  their  allies,  a  sort  of  counter-assurance 
from  the  allies  of  the  adverse  group.  It  was 
no  longer  a  question  of  "  turns  round  the  ball- 
room," but  of  whole  dances.  Russia,  at  the 
Potsdam  interview,  concluded  an  agreement  with 
Germany.  The  French  Government  maintained 
the  best  relations  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy,  and  the  Order  of  St.  Etienne,  given  to 
M.  Fallieres  by  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph 
after  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
bore  witness  to  this  policy,  which  was  also  fur- 
thered by  M.  Crozier's  mission  to  Vienna.  This 
process  is  known  in  France  as  the  "  penetration  of 
alliances."  The  alliances  formed  did  more  than 
penetrate  one  another;  until  191 2  they  were 
confounded  and  intermingled.  Italy,  especially, 
with  her  usual  suppleness,  excelled  in  these 
brilliant  diplomatic  complexities,  in  which  she 
felt  quite  at  home.  Always  the  friend  of  Eng- 
land, without  allowing  her  friendship  with  Ger- 
many to  cool,  she  maintained  good  relations  with 
France,  and,  as  the  Anglo-French  entente  resulted 
in  a  raffrochement  between  Rome  and  Paris,  so 
the  Franco-Italian  raffrochement  led,  by  way  of 
the  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  to  cordial  relations 
between  the  French  Republic  and  the  Russian 
Empire.  In  1909,  on  the  day  when  Nicholas  II 
at  Racconigi  visited  King  Victor-Emmanuel — a 
visit  which  slightly  preceded  an  Austro-Russian 
negotiation  in  which  Italian  diplomacy  was  the 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  167 

intermediary — on  that  day  the  circuit  was  accom- 
pHshed  and  the  disintegration  of  the  alliances 
seemed  complete.  It  seemed  as  though  the 
rivalry  of  the  two  hostile  groups  had  disappeared, 
as  though  the  conflict  of  the  two  systems  had 
become  impossible.  In  reality  Italy  was  the  only 
country  which  was  to  retain  her  liberty  of  move- 
ment, and  to  remain  free  to  extricate  herself  from 
difficulties,  while  the  logic  of  events  was  dragging 
all  the  rest  toward  the  unknown,  whether  they 
would  or  no. 

With  such  precedents  how  did  it  happen  that 
precisely  two  years  before  the  European  war 
fresh  misunderstandings  arose  between  Italy  and 
France,  so  that  after  the  incidents  of  the  Manouba 
and  the  Carthage  it  was  feared  that  the  worst 
days  of  the  time  of  Crispi  or  that  of  the  Aigues- 
Mortes  affair  might  be  revived  ? 

It  must  be  admitted  that  France  was  not 
wholly  innocent  of  responsibility  for  this  mis- 
understanding. Hardly  had  friendly  contact  been 
established,  when  the  fundamental  principal  of 
Talleyrand — "  No  enthusiasm  !  " — ^was  infringed. 
Old  memories  flew  to  the  heads  of  a  section  of  the 
political  world  in  France.  As  though  the  Italy 
of  the  twentieth  century  had  still  been  the 
revolutionary  and  liberal  Italy  of  Mazzini  and 
Garibaldi,  there  were  those  who  expected  her  to 
respond  to  the  ideals  and  sentiments  of  a  vanished 
world.  This  anachronism  resulted  in  disappoint- 
ment, and  this  resulted  in  bitterness,  and  this, 
again,  in  blunders.  In  cool  blood,  and  in  all 
justice,  can  we  reproach  the  Italians  for  having 
thought  of  their  own  interests,  for  having  been 


1 68  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

diplomatic,  for  having  devoted  their  minds  to 
serious  questions  and  results,  v^hile  the  French 
indulged  in  a  sentimental  policy  and  seemed  to 
think  that  they  were  still  hugging  Silvio  Pellico 
to  their  bosoms  ? 

As  M.  Andre  Tardieu  has  remarked,  even  if 
the  Franco-Italian  agreement  had  merited  entire 
approbation  "  the  manner  in  v^hich  we  have 
practised  it  is  assuredly  less  w^orthy  of  praise  ; 
thus,  it  was  imprudent  to  compromise  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Holy  See  by  President  Loubet's 
visit  to  Rome,  and  thereby  to  prepare  for  the 
rupture  of  the  Concordat.  We  should  have 
appreciated  our  interests  better ;  and  Italy 
incurs  no  reproach  from  the  fact  of  our  error. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  certain  that  she  has  bene- 
fited by  the  weakening  of  our  position  in  the 
East,  and  that  by  the  agreement  of  January  1907 
we  dedicated  this  enfeeblement  to  her  profit. 
But  here  again  we  alone  are  to  blame  in  that  we 
did  not  foresee  that  by  breaking  with  Rome  we 
should  sooner  or  later  lose  all  the  advantages 
attached  to  the  exercise  of  the  Catholic  protec- 
torate in  the  Levant."  ^ 

The  fundamental  error  consisted  in  regarding 
Italy  as  a  fossil  power,  in  supposing  that  she  had 
remained  at  the  same  point  as  ourselves  ;  that  she 
was  conducting  a  philosophic  struggle  against 
Catholicism  and  the  Papacy ;  while  she  was 
above  all  considering  how  she  should  conciliate 
these  two  powers  to  the  advantage  of  her  own 
expansion.  The  quid  fro  quo,  being  detected, 
gave  rise  to  irritation ;  error  upon  error  !  At 
least  let  us  remember  our  mistake  ! 

^  La  France  et  les  alliances,  p.  108. 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  169 

It  was  the  same  where  Libya  was  concerned. 
To  obtain  a  free  hand  in  Morocco,  France,  as  a 
matter  of  reciprocity,  proclaimed  her  disinterest- 
edness in  respect  of  the  Tripohtaine.  But  this 
was  perhaps  going  a  little  too  far,  as  M.  Tardieu 
again  remarks  in  the  book  which  we  have  just 
cited,  believing  in  his  heart  that  Italy  would 
not  foreclose  on  her  mortgage,  and  that  the 
permission  would  remain  platonic.  Here  our 
mistake  had  another  cause.  It  arose  from  an 
inaccurate  estimate  of  the  sentiments,  desires, 
and  energies  of  Italy.  France  had  no  greater 
belief  in  Italian  nationalism  than  in  the  progress 
and  development  of  the  country.  Here  again 
public  opinion  in  France  was  behind  the  times, 
existing  upon  ready-made  ideas,  upon  a  concep- 
tion of  things  and  a  vision  of  Europe  which  was 
fifty  years  out  of  date.  France  must  no  longer 
be  ignorant  of  her  neighbours  ;  to  know  them  is 
the  best  means  of  living  on  good  terms  with  them. 
She  must  no  longer  estimate  some  above  and 
others  below  their  true  powers ;  events  will  then 
no  longer  leave  her  hurt  and  disappointed. 

The  expedition  to  the  Tripolitaine,  which  led 
to  regrettable  incidents  between  France  and  Italy, 
and  an  aggravating  state  of  tension,  was  also  to 
facilitate,  as  far  as  public  opinion  in  Italy  was 
concerned,  the  renewal  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  a 
renewal  which  might  for  a  moment  have  seemed 
compromised  by  the  assistance  which  Germany 
had  surreptitiously  given  to  Turkey.  From  that 
moment  European  affairs  became  more  compli- 
cated, moreover,  and  in  the  most  disquieting 
fashion.  It  seems  to-day  plain  enough  that  the 
Italo-Turkish  war,   brief  as   it  was,  constituted 


170  ITALY  AND   THE   WAR 

one  of  the  three  or  four  great  events  which  were 
to  shake  Europe.  The  two  Balkan  campaigns 
followed  it  at  no  great  distance.  And  Italy,  who, 
by  virtue  of  her  conflict  with  the  Porte,  had 
gained  a  foothold  in  the  ^gean  Sea,  occupied 
the  Twelve  Islands,  and  laid  the  foundation  of 
her  Oriental  ambitions — Italy,  with  considerable 
skill  and  considerable  felicity,  had  intervened 
whenever  her  interests  were  at  stake,  in  order  to 
assure  herself  of  favourable  positions,  and  to 
obtain  guarantees  for  the  future.  After  the 
Conference  of  London,  and  after  the  Peace  of 
Bucharest,  it  appeared  that  the  State  which  had 
in  silence  advanced  itself  and  helped  itself  the 
most  was  Italy. 

As  regards  the  delimitation  of  the  southern 
frontiers  of  Albania  she  had  obtained  the  con- 
cessions which  she  had  demanded,  and  had  also 
caused  the  demands  of  Greece  to  be  rejected. 
As  for  the  islands  of  the  iEgean  Sea,  bases  intended 
to  prepare  the  way  for  a  settlement  in  Asia  Minor 
(Rhodes  in  particular  being  a  choice  morsel), 
Italy  won  her  cause  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  who  doubtless  remembered  that, 
like  the  occupation  of  the  Twelve  Islands,  the 
occupation  of  Egypt  had  begun  by  being  ''  pro- 
visional," subject  to  promises  of  conditional 
evacuation. 

Finally,  even  in  Albania  Italy  had  played  and 
won  a  difficult  game,  passing  over  her  youthful 
rival,  the  Serbia  of  the  Adriatic,  rousing  the 
Austrians  against  the  Serbs,  and  perhaps  reserv- 
ing to  herself,  in  the  future,  with  the  Albanian 
condominium,  another  "  affair  of  the  duchies," 
a  means  of  breaking  with  Austria  at  her  own  time. 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  171 

In  any  case,  there  were  those  in  Vienna  who 
considered  that  it  was  not  Count  Berchtold  who 
got  the  better  of  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano, 
and  the  7^eit  wrote  that  the  Italian  policy  had 
succeeded  in  "  occupying  itself  only  with  its 
own  particular  interests,"  and  that,  inspired  by 
the  old  Bismarckian  methods,  Italy  had  "  fooled 
Austria  while  assuming  the  appearance  of  a  loyal 
ally." 

In  short,  by  virtue  of  the  events  in  the  East, 
leaning  upon  Germany  the  better  to  safeguard 
herself  against  Austria,  Italy  had  consolidated 
her  position  in  the  Adriatic,  and,  by  penetrating 
into  the  iEgean  Sea,  had  added  considerable  fresh 
progress  to  the  great  stride  which  had  taken  her 
across  the  Mediterranean,  and  had  landed  her 
in  Northern  Africa.  She  was  a  greater  Mediter- 
ranean Power  than  before.  But  it  was  observed 
that  her  policy  was  slightly  modified  by  these 
changes  and  expansions.  France,  for  example, 
once  more  became  suspect  to  Italy,  and  Signor 
Giulio  di  Frenzi  wrote  frankly  in  the  Giornale 
d' Italia  : 

"  There  is  to-day  an  antithesis  between  France 
and  Italy.  On  the  one  hand  we  have  Italy's 
elementary  necessity  of  defending  her  shores  by 
means  of  the  question  of  the  southern  frontier 
of  Albania,  and  the  sacred  rights  of  a  treaty  which 
has  formally  recognised  her  occupation  of  the 
Twelve  Islands.  On  the  other  side  we  see  un- 
justifiable jealousy,  a  tardy  preoccupation  with 
the  interests  of  France  in  the  East,  and  the  im- 
possibility of  growing  accustomed  to  the  idea  of 
Italian  expansion  in  a  sea  which  can  never  again 
be  a  French  lake." 


172  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

There  was  no  need  to  take  such  symptoms 
tragically.  Yet  it  was  necessary  to  take  them 
seriously.  Obviously  a  new  phase  of  Italian 
politics  was  commencing,  a  phase  in  which  the 
problems  of  the  Mediterranean  would  henceforth, 
it  seemed,  assume  the  foremost  place.  Germany 
immediately  endeavoured  to  exploit  this  situa- 
tion, to  lay  hands  upon  it  for  her  own  benefit. 
Germany  did  profit  by  it,  and  not  only  in  order 
to  renew  the  Triple  Alliance  ;  this  renewal  came 
about  of  itself,  and  the  Triple  Entente,  with  its 
constant  preoccupation  not  to  disturb  Europe, 
saw  in  it  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo^  and 
therefore  a  guarantee  of  peace.  Now  the  per- 
spective which  Wilhelm  II  in  particular  had  in 
mind  was  more  extensive.  The  moment  seemed 
to  have  come  to  extend  the  Triple  Alliance  to 
the  Mediterranean.  Bismarck  had  years  before 
refused  this  extension  to  Crispi,  who  desired 
it ;  for  Bismarck's  politics  were  pre-eminently 
continental.  But  since  then  fresh  ambitions 
had  awakened  in  the  heart  of  the  German  people  : 
"  Our  future  is  on  the  seas."  Such  was  the  Im- 
perial watchword.  Germany  too  was  looking 
to  the  East,  pressing  forward  on  the  road  to 
Bagdad.  And  how  could  she  develop  a  great 
Oriental  policy  without  penetrating  the  Mediter- 
ranean— without  seeking  to  lay  hands  on  the 
Suez  Canal  ? 

The  Imperial  Government  thus  remarked 
without  difficulty  that  Italy  seemed  to  fear  lest 
her  establishment  in  the  Twelve  Islands  should  be 
contested  by  England  and  France.  These  appre- 
hensions, it  appeared  to  Wilhelm  II,  were  favour- 
able to  his  designs.     At  the  time  of  the  expedition 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  173 

to  Tripoli  Germany  had  been  seriously  em- 
barrassed. At  the  moment  when  she  was  labour- 
ing to  recover,  under  the  Young  Turk  regime, 
the  influence  which  she  had  wielded  in  Con- 
stantinople under  Abdul  Hamid,  Italy  had  forced 
her  to  take  sides,  thereby  placing  her  in  an  emi- 
nently disagreeable  position.  Finally,  whatever 
prudence  and  duplicity  she  might  bring  to  the 
business,  it  was  with  the  Ottoman  Empire  that 
Germany  had  sided,  against  the  Italians.  Public 
opinion  in  Italy  was  not  unaware  of  this,  and  had 
been  seriously  aroused.  Germany  thought  to 
see  an  occasion  for  repairing  the  annoyance  caused 
thereby,  and  for  recovering  the .  good  graces 
of  the  Italian  people  and  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment, and  this  occasion  she  joyfully  seized.  She 
offered  her  assistance  in  Mediterranean  affairs — 
of  course,  for  a  consideration. 

Italy  wisely  suspected  the  snare.  Whatever 
value  she  might  attach  to  the  possession  of  the 
Twelve  Islands,  she  would  not  sacrifice  her 
policy  of  equilibrium  thereto,  nor  involve  her 
future.  It  would  seem  that  she  had  never  more 
skilfully  manoeuvred  to  preserve  her  precious 
liberty  of  movement.  She  had  refused  Ger- 
many's suggestion  that  she  should  introduce,  in 
the  old  treaty  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  a  clause 
which  should  treat  of  Mediterranean  questions. 
But  she  took  her  precautions  in  another  direction. 
On  the  23rd  of  February,  191 3,  the  Marquis  di 
San  Giuliano,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  de- 
livered a  famous  speech  in  which  were  plainly 
indicated  the  distinctions  which  Italy  intended 
to  maintain  : 

*'  Before    the    Turco-Italian    war,"    said    the 


174  ITALY  AND  THE   WAR 

Marquis,  ''  two  great  problems  confronted  us  : 
equilibrium  in  the  Mediterranean  and  equili- 
brium in  the  Adriatic.  This  latter  is  the  problem 
which  is  about  to  be  solved,  thanks  to  the  close 
collaboration  of  Italy  and  Austro-Hungary,  the 
co-operation  of  Germany,  and  the  large  and 
pacific  spirit  of  the  other  Great  Powers.  These 
powers  are  equally  agreed  to-day  in  their  desire 
effectively  to  maintain  the  present  equilibrium 
in  the  Mediterranean.  .  .  . 

"  The  possession  of  Libya  has  resolved,  for  Italy, 
the  problem  of  equilibrium  in  Northern  Africa, 
but  it  will  certainly  not  diminish  our  interest 
in  maintaining  the  general  balance  of  power  in 
the  Mediterranean. 

"  Austro-Hungary  also  has  interests  identical 
with  ours,  which  will  reinforce  our  mutual 
friendship.  The  two  allied  Governments  are 
fully  aware  of  this  identity  of  interests. 

"  The  Mediterranean  is  no  longer  to-day,  as  in 
the  days  of  Graeco-Roman  antiquity,  the  sole 
centre  of  civilisation,  but  its  importance  in  the 
world  is  not  lessened  for  that.  On  the  contrary, 
the  Mediterranean  having  become  the  centre 
and  the  crossing-point  of  communications  be- 
tween Europe  and  all  the  oceans  and  continents, 
its  importance,  from  this  point  of  view,  has 
increased ;  no  one  has  to-day  or  will  have  in 
future  the  right  to  call  it  mare  nostrum.  It  is 
and  must  remain  the  free  highway  of  the  nations ; 
no  one  can  or  may  have  control  over  it ;  all  must 
enjoy  it ;  and  among  the  Powers,  one  of  the  first 
places  has  been  conquered  and  will  be  retained 
by  Italy." 

If  the  allusion  to  mare  nostrum  was  significant, 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  175 

the  insistence  with  which  the  Marquis  spoke  of 
the  good  relations  existing  between  Austria  and 
Italy  was  no  less  remarked.  "  Close  collabora- 
tion," *'  identical  interests,"  "  mutual  friend- 
ship." Never  perhaps  had  language  such  as 
this,  or  terms  so  engaging,  been  employed  in 
respect  of  the  Austrian  ally.  And  this  was  only 
two  years  before  the  rupture  !  It  might  have 
seemed  that  the  time  of  Crispiwas  about  to  return, 
that  Italian  politics  was  abandoning  the  judicious 
equilibrium  which  it  had  for  fifteen  years  main- 
tained. The  Austrians  were  so  completely 
deceived  that  a  Viennese  newspaper  stated  that 
no  speech  more  favourable  to  the  Triple  Alliance 
had  been  pronounced  in  Italy.  However,  a  more 
careful  exegesis  of  Signor  di  San  Giuliano's  speech 
enabled  one  to  perceive  appreciable  distinctions 
therein.  If  Italy  chose  loudly  to  assert  that  she 
was  not  disposed  to  submit  to  any  control  over 
her  actions  in  the  Mediterranean,  she  indicated 
clearly  enough,  to  those  who  could  read,  that 
she  did  not  intend  to  introduce  the  wolf  into 
the  sheepfold,  nor  deliver  herself  into  the  hands 
of  Germany.  In  his  Problems  of  Power  Mr. 
W.  Morton  Fullerton  remarks  with  justice  that 
Signor  di  San  Giuliano  had  ''  established  a  neat 
distinction  between  the  balance  of  the  Adriatic 
and  that  of  the  Mediterranean  in  general."  The 
agreements  as  to  Mediterranean  affairs  whose 
persistence  he  confirmed  were  those  which  Italy 
had  concluded  with  Great  Britain  and  France, 
and  all  allusion  to  "  German  co-operation  "  was 
carefully  omitted  from  that  portion  of  the  sen- 
tence which  spoke  of  the  equilibrium  of  the 
Mediterranean.     Afterwards,  under  whatever  cir- 


176  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

cumstances,  Italian  statesmen  had  with  subtle 
tact  to  avoid  uttering  any  word  or  taking  any 
steps  which  would  be  interpreted  as  even  an  im- 
plicit adhesion  to  Germany's  designs  upon  the 
Mediterranean. 

However,  in  the  months  which  followed  the 
speech  in  question  the  Germans  were  to  experi- 
ence several  deceptive  delights.  An  extra- 
ordinary state  of  things  was  witnessed,  indeed  ; 
a  certain  cooling  of  the  traditional  good  relations 
between  Great  Britain  and  Italy.  For  the  first 
time  Italy  no  longer  seemed  to  hold  so  firmly  by 
what  we  have  called  her  British  maritime  assur- 
ance. For  the  first  time  impatient  words  in 
respect  of  Great  Britain  were  heard  in  Italy. 
This  great  change  had  a  serious  cause. 

During  the  year  191 3  and  in  the  early  part  of 
1 91 4  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  endeavoured,  in  short, 
to  induce  Italy  to  evacuate  the  Twelve  Islands. 
Sometimes  Italy  eluded  the  question  ;  sometimes 
she  manifested  opposition.  In  a  note  of  semi- 
ofi^icial  aspect,  published  on  the  12th  of  January 
1914,  under  the  heading,  '' England  has  not 
requested  Italy  to  evacuate  the  islands  of  the 
^gean  Sea,"  the  Trihuna  stated  : 

"  If,  against  all  probability,  a  proposition  of 
this  kind  had  been  made,  it  would  have  no  other 
result  than  to  disturb,  in  a  lasting  manner,  the 
friendship  which  exists  not  only  between  the  two 
Governments,  but  also  between  the  two  peoples ; 
it  would,  for  the  rest,  have  no  practical  effect, 
for  Italy,  supported  by  her  Allies,  would  oppose 
it  by  a  categorical  refusal."  And  a  few  days 
later  the  same  journal  insisted  :  "  Italy  wishes 
at  all  costs,  as  a  Mediterranean  Power,  to  take 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  177 

part  in  the  pacific  struggle  which  the  Great 
Powers  are  conducting  in  the  economic  domain, 
and  to  assure  herself  of  a  position  worthy  of 
her  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  Here  is  an 
interest  which  is  vital  to  Italy,  and  she  will  on 
no  account  renounce  it." 

This  interest  was  regarded  as  so  vital  that  in 
May  1914  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  announced 
in  the  Chamber  that  he  had  requested  an  ex- 
planation from  the  British  Government  in 
respect  of  certain  remarks  uttered  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey  regarding  the  question  of  the  Twelve 
Islands.  Of  course  Italy — as  she  has  proved — 
had  no  intention  of  breaking  with  England. 
Still  less  did  she  desire  to  enter  into  conflict 
with  her.  But  her  policy  was  affected  by  the 
confidence  which  she  derived  from  her  own 
powers,  and  from  the  slight  decline  which  was 
making  itself  felt  in  other  directions.  She  did 
not  intend  to  be  subordinated  to  any  Power. 
She  asserted  her  desire  to  be  treated  as  a  major 
party.  This  is  an  important  omen,  which  must 
be  remembered  in  time  to  come. 


The  international  events  of  the  first  few 
months  of  1914  assuredly  did  not  seem  likely  to 
announce  the  successful  developments  of  Italian 
policy  which  we  have  seen  accomplished.  Those 
observers  who  saw  the  European  war  approaching 
with  rapid  strides  remarked,  not  without  anxiety, 
the  renewal  of  intimacy  which  appeared  in  the 
relations  between  Italy  and  Austria.  The  inci- 
dents   of   Trieste    and   the    rivalry   of   the   two 

12 


178  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Powers  in  Albania  seemed  to  have  left  no  traces. 
Austria  and  Italy  had  never  seemed  so  harmoni- 
ously disposed. 

Toward  the  end  of  191 3  they  had  both 
made  a  comminatory  application  to  Athens  in 
order  to  fix  the  date  by  which  Greece  was 
to  evacuate  the  territory  in  the  Epirus  which 
the  Italian  Government  and  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  monarchy  intended  to  incorporate  with 
Albania.  Even  close  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
in  April  1914,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  and 
Count  Berchtold  met  at  Abbazia  and  spent 
several  days  together  there.  On  the  19th  of 
April  the  news  agencies  despatched  the  following 
news  : 

"  The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  has  sent,  from 
Nabresina,  a  telegram  to  Count  Berchtold,  in 
which  he  thanks  him  in  the  most  cordial  manner 
for  the  pleasant  days  which  they  spent  together 
at  Abbazia. 

"  Count  Berchtold  has  replied  by  a  telegram  in 
which  he  expresses,  in  phrases  full  of  cordiality, 
the  great  pleasure  which  the  visit  of  the  Marquis 
di  San  Giuliano  has  afforded  him." 

At  the  same  time  a  message  was  despatched  from 
Rome  : 

"  The  newspapers  in  general,  while  observing 
a  certain  reserve  as  regards  the  results  of  the 
interview  at  Abbazia,  which  referred  to  the 
internal  policy  of  Austria  in  respect  of  the  Italians 
of  the  Empire,  appear  to  be  convinced  that  it 
will  reinforce  and  extend  the  common  activity 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  in  the  international 
domain." 

Finally,    Herr    Bethmann-HoUweg    addressed 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  179 

the  following  telegram  from  Corfu,  where  he 
was  in  attendance  on  Wilhelm  II,  to  the  Mar- 
quis di  San  Giuliano  : 

"  Pray  accept  my  best  thanks  for  the  friendly 
telegram  which  you  and  Count  Berchtold  have 
just  sent  me.  In  warmly  congratulating  you 
upon  the  happy  results  of  your  conversations  at 
Abbazia,  I  can  but  concur  in  the  feelings  of 
satisfaction  which  you  are  experiencing,  and  it  is 
a  real  pleasure  to  renew,  on  this  occasion,  the 
expression  of  my  sincerest  friendship." 

Rarely  had  the  Triple  Alliance  appeared  so 
compact,  so  solid.  However,  those  who — like 
our  Ambassador,  M.  Camille  Barrere — did  not 
despair  of  seeing  Italy  follow  a  different  direction 
in  the  event  of  a  European  war,  had  reason  for 
their  opinion,  for  they  were  aware  of  the  com- 
plexity of  interests  which  Italian  politics  has 
to  face,  the  equilibrium,  often  difficult,  which 
her  very  position  forces  her  to  maintain,  and  the 
circumstantial  character  of  the  decisions  which 
she  is  called  upon  to  form. 

If  there  were  unknown  factors  which  might 
affect  the  position  which  Italy  would  assume  in 
the  event  of  a  European  war,  one  point  might 
yet  be  regarded  as  settled,  that  Italy  would  not 
blindly  or  passively  follow  an  aggression  deter- 
mined and  directed  by  Germany.  In  default  of 
other  indications,  one  might  have  felt  certain  of 
this  from  the  care  which  Bismarck  expended  in 
creating  (for  example,  in  the  Tunisian  affair)  a 
situation  which  he  believed  would  bring  France 
into  direct  conflict  with  Italy.  This  seemed  to 
him  the  only  means  of  making  the  Triple  Alliance 
operate  as  a  single  body,  and  procure  for  Ger- 


i8o  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

many,  as  a  matter  of  absolute  certainty,  the 
assistance  of  Italy  in  the  event  of  a  war  with 
France.  This  case  excepted,  Bismarck  foresaw 
that  Italy  would  refuse  to  enter  an  offensive  war 
declared  by  the  German  Empire.  On  this 
point  he  was  to  leave  warnings  of  remarkable 
lucidity  to  his  successors. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  state  more  clearly 
than  he  did  in  his  thoughts  and  Recollections 
that -Germany  would  have  been  imprudent  to 
count  absolutely  and  unconditionally  on  the 
assistance  of  Italy.  Prince  von  Biilow,  again, 
in  his  German  Politics,  was  to  express  the  same 
reservations.  f'    - 

Yet  again,  like  Bismarck,  the  ex-Chancellor 
of  Wilhelm  II  believed  that  Germany  could 
at  least  rely  on  Italian  neutrality :  "  Even 
if  Italy,"  wrote  Prince  von  Biilow,  '*  could 
not  in  all  situations  proceed  to  the  ultimate 
consequences  with  Austria  and  ourselves  ;  even 
if  we  and  Austria  could  not  throw  ourselves 
with  Italy  into  all  the  complications  of  the 
wheels  of  world-politics,  yet  the  existence  of 
the  Alliance  would  nevertheless  prevent  any 
one  of  the  three  Powers  from  ranging  itself  on 
the  side  of  the  adversary  of  the  two  other 
Powers.  This  is  what  Prince  Bismarck  had  in 
mind  when  he  said,  one  day,  that  it  was 
enough  for  him  that  an  Italian  corporal,  with 
the  Italian  flag  and  a  drum  at  hand,  should 
face  to  the  west — that  is,  against  France — and 
not  to  the  east — that  is,  in  the  direction  of 
Austria." 

How  little  are  diplomatic  dogmas  to  be 
trusted  !     It  was  a  dogma,  in  the  years  which 


FROM  ALLIANCE  TO  ENTENTE  i8i 

divided  the  foundation  of  the  Italian  kingdom 
from  the  war  of  1870,  that  in  case  of  a  great 
European  conflict  Italy  could  not  remain  neutral. 
In  support  of  it  Machiavelli  was  quoted,  and 
the  policy  of  the  Dukes  of  Savoy.  Proudhon, 
who  was  in  this  instance  mistaken,  said  : 

"  In  any  conflict  in  which  the  Great  Powers 
were  engaged  Italy  could  not  remain  neutral  and 
abstain  from  the  conflict,  as  Switzerland  and 
Spain  would  do.  .  .  .  Italy  would  enter  into  the 
campaign,  simply  because  her  intervention  in  the 
Crimea  was  successful,  and  because  of  this  ancient 
maxim  of  the  House  of  Savoy,  still  widely  credited 
to-day,  that  neutrals  are  generally  sacrificed, 
and  that  peace  is  always  concluded  at  their 
expense."  ^ 

Italy,  which  remained  neutral  in  1870,  inter- 
vened in  191 5,  and  in  both  cases  she  was  to  give 
the  lie  to  numerous  auguries.  But  her  interven- 
tion was  not  mechanically  determined.  Nothing 
rendered  it  absolutely  necessary,  neither  did  it 

^  The  European  war  has  brought  so  many  elements  into  play 
that  its  complete  history  will  be  very  difficult  to  write.  It  is 
the  same  with  the  political  and  diplomatic  history  of  the  months 
which  immediately  preceded  the  conflict.  Thus,  according  to 
evidence  of  the  highest  order  which  has  come  to  our  knowledge, 
the  interview  at  Abbazia  was  not  what  Count  Berchtold  and 
Herr  Bethmann-HoUweg  would  have  had  Europe  believe. 
The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  left  Abbazia  alarmed  by  the- 
Serbian  question,  convinced  of  the  imminence  of  a  serious  crisis,, 
and  resolved  above  all  else  to  avoid  making  war  beside  Austrisk 
and  against  England.  The  attempts  made  by  his  allies  ta 
enlist  him  had  put  the  Minister  on  his  guard.  They  had  inspired 
him  with  such  uneasiness  that  the  contrary  effect  to  that  calcu-* 
lated  by  his  interlocutor  was  produced.  This  is  not  the  only 
occasion  on  which  Austro-German  diplomacy  has  taken  thi 
desire  for  the  reality. 


i82  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

come  about  of  itself.  Men's  wills  were  needed  to 
produce  it.  Certain  events  also  were  needful, 
which  we  shall  now  relate,  and  which  will  mark 
a  red-letter  day  in  the  politics  and  history  of 
Italy. 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE    HISTORIC    MONTH    IN    ITALY 

(May  1915) 

The  aspect  of  Rome  after  the  great  days  of  May — A  drama  of 
the  national  conscience — The  protagonists  of  intervention 
— Baron  Sonnino  and  Article  VII — From  Count  Berchtold 
to  Baron  Burian — A  great  statesman  who  is  a  great  and 
honest  man  :  Signor  Salandra — ^A  diplomatic  "  sixteen- 
inch  shell "  :  the  Biilow  mission — A  return  from  the 
Parliamentary  Elba  :  Signor  Giolitti — "  Down  with  the 
farecchio  P'' — Gabriele  d'Annunzio  takes  the  field — Poet 
versus  Parliamentarian — Rome  in  an  uproar — The  appeal 
to  the  King — ^The  liberty  of  the  Crown — ^The  victory  of 
Italian  Nationalism. 

On  arriving  in  Rome  in  the  month  of  June,  some 
days  after  Italy's  declaration  of  war  upon  Austria, 
the  traveller  already  familiar  vi^ith  the  city  v^as 
inclined  at  first  sight  to  see  nothing  unusual  in 
the  appearance  of  Rome.  In  the  streets,  to  be 
sure,  there  was  much  more  movement  than  is 
usual  during  the  summer  season ;  above  all,  there 
were  more  uniforms,  and  these  were  noted  and 
saluted  with  patriotic  pride  by  the  passers-by ; 
and  under  the  olive-green  campaigning  kit,  so 
neat  and  sober  and  so  military  in  appearance, 
people  were  pointing  out  children  of  the  terre 
irredente,  like  the  son  of  the  podesta  of  Fiume, 
who,  with  so  many  more  of  his  compatriots,  had 

183 


1 84  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

hastened  into  Italy  in  order  to  fight  Austria,  and 
to  help  to  liberate  his  native  soil  .  .  .  and  this 
protracted,  animated  Roman  summer — a  season 
commonly  more  languid — did  not  affect  the 
pavements  merely.  Among  the  representatives 
of  Roman  society  the  traveller  noted  more  well- 
known  faces  than  is  usual  in  the  hot  season.  The 
Romans,  this  year,  had  sacrificed  their  holidays, 
or  considerably  abbreviated  them.  They  pre- 
ferred to  feel  that  they  were  united,  near  their 
duty,  and  where  news  was  available.  They  felt 
an  inclination  to  live  as  far  as  possible  in  common 
during  these  months  of  war  and  these  days  of 
excitement.  I  might  instance  a  great  friend  of 
France  who  resolved  to  remain  by  the  Tiber 
"  until  victory,"  and  who,  for  the  first  time  in 
his  life,  was  going  to  spend  the  summer  in  his 
palace ;  a  delightful  retreat,  for  that  matter, 
where  one  is  welcomed  with  incomparable  charm ; 
a  retreat  so  rich  in  books  and  works  of  art  that 
one  would  brave  therein  all  the  ardours  of  the 
Roman  sun  without  fear  and  even  with  delight. 

However,  on  observing  the  city  more  closely 
one  quickly  discovered  certain  symptoms  which 
were  more  worthy  of  attention  and  more  novel. 
Evidently  a  great  wave  had  swept  through  the 
city,  leaving  visible  traces.  The  eye  discovered, 
for  example,  in  many  side-streets,  and  even  on 
the  walls  of  the  larger  and  more  frequented 
thoroughfares,  inscriptions,  graffiti  in  the  fashion 
of  antiquity,  devoting  such  or  such  a  politician 
to  execration.  Again,  in  the  newspaper  kiosks 
and  the  shops  where  postcards  and  engravings 
were  sold,  there  were  reproductions  of  drawings 
and  caricatures  in  which  ^e  same  personages  were 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  185 

represented  in  the  most  unkind  and  insulting 
manner.  Who,  for  instance,  is  the  public  man 
who  is  here  represented  as  a  Calabrian  bandit, 
waiting  behind  a  tree,  carbine  in  hand,  ta 
assassinate  Madame  Italy,  who  is  coming  down 
the  road  ? 

But  here  he  is  again;  you  may  know  him  by 
his  curving  nose,  his  fierce  white  moustache,  and 
his  broad  Piedmontese  shoulders.  And  the 
ancient  Garibaldi  raises  an  accusing  finger,  and, 
while  in  the  distance  the  profiles  of  the  Germanic 
Emperors  may  be  seen,  the  legend  makes  the 
national  hero  say  :  "  I  drove  one  of  them  out, 
and  you  want  to  bring  two  in !  "  Another 
picture  finally  shows  the  unpopular  personage 
lying  in  a  coffin.  This  time  his  work  is  done. 
Wilhelm  II  and  Francis  Joseph  are  weeping 
over  his  remains  ;  and  the  legend  reads, 
Rimfianti!  (Regrets  !).  In  a  corner  is  a  sack  of 
golden  coins,  on  which  is  inscribed  the  famous 
word,  Parecchio  I  ,  .  .  Such  is  the  severity,  one 
may  even  say  the  ferocity,  with  which  public 
opinion,  when  victorious,  treated  the  partisans 
of  neutrality  and  their  chieftain. 

Now  here,  on  the  other  hand,  are  those  who 
have  won  love  and  popularity.  Portraits  of  the 
king  and  the  royal  family  are  everywhere  ;  por- 
traits of  Signor  Salandra  too,  and  Baron  Sonnino, 
and  of  the  military  leaders :  General  Cadorna,. 
venerated  beyond  the  Alps  as  General  Joifre  is  m 
France;  the  Duke  of  the  Abruzzi,  loved  for  his 
wit  and  valour,  and  because  he  incarnates  the 
hope  which  the  nation  has  put  in  its  navy,  the 
great  Adriatic  and  Mediterranean  dream.  We 
must  not  forget,  above  all,  the  innumerable  por- 


1 86  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

traits  of  Signer  Gabriele  d'  Annunzio,  the  singer 
'Of  this  war  of  deliverance  and  expansion.  ...  In 
our  days  the  Capitol  and  the  Tarpeian  Rock  have 
been  transported  to  the  publishers.  And  to  this 
Capitol  the  people  of  Rome  send  up  those  who 
took  the  initiative  of  the  rupture  with  the 
Triple  Alliance.  From  this  Rock  they  hurl  those 
who  have  supported  the  party  of  neutrality. 

Thus,  for  the  foreigner  who  entered  Rome, 
those  events  of  which  the  capital  had  been  the 
theatre  in  the  preceding  month  began  to  explain 
themselves  even  before  inquiry  could  be  made  : 
those  manifestations  of  which  the  telegraph  had 
given  the  world  a  succinct,  insufficient,  rather 
confused  account. 

Finally,  although  the  inhabitants  of  the  city 
still  preserved  the  Roman  gravity  and  dignity 
which  nothing  seems  able  to  disturb,  a  little 
observation  enabled  one  to  perceive  that  men's 
minds  had  recently  been  swept  by  great  passions. 
The  storm  had  sunk,  but  ripples  still  appeared 
on  the  surface  of  the  flood.  In  the  evening, 
in  the  open  places,  it  is  the  custom  of  the 
Roman  to  assemble  and  ''  hold  a  forum."  In 
these  days  one  felt  that  the  forum  was  tingling 
with  recent  conflicts.  A  cry,  a  rumour,  an  inci- 
dent of  the  street — a  foreigner,  suspected  of 
espionage,  a  pessimist  roughly  requested  to  cease 
from  propagating  his  alarming  suggestions — and 
immediately  the  popular  wave  showed  a  tendency 
once  more  to  rear  its  head. 

All  these  phenomena  of  the  superficial  life  of 
the  city  grouped  themselves  together,  became 
luminous,  and  assumed  an  intense  significance 
when   one   presently   discovered   the   fact    that 


THE  HISTORIC  MONTH   IN  ITALY  187 

Rome,  during  the  last  few  weeks,  had  in  reality- 
been  bearing  herself  like  a  true  capital,  the  heart 
and  brain  of  a  whole  people,  and  had  been  living 
through  the  most  decisive  days  ever  known 
to  her  since  she  first  served  as  the  seat  of  the 
Government  of  the  new  Italy. 


Massimo  d' Azeglio  wrote,  in  the  year  1859, 
a  year  which  in  some  respects  affords  many 
points  of  comparison  with  the  times  in  which 
we  live,  the  following  unaffected  lines  to  one  of 
his  French  friends  : 

"  People  will  censure  the  ambition  of  Victor 
Emmanuel ;  it  is  quite  simple  ;  the  shrewdest 
would  be  overcome  by  it.  Yet  I,  who  know  the 
king — if  you  would  know  how  it  makes  me 
laugh,  to  think  of  Victor  Emmanuel  devoured  by 
ambition !  No,  that  would  explain  nothing. 
We  can  only  admit  that  there  are  inevitable 
impulses,  antagonisms  as  well  as  affinities,  which 
are  willed  by  the  nature  of  things,  and  that  at 
certain  moments  great  revivals  take  place.  Why  ? 
Because  they  are  in  every  man's  heart  and  brain." 

These  lines  were  written  more  than  fifty  years 
ago.  And  the  pyschological  explanation  which 
Massimo  d'  Azeglio  then  offered  of  the  events 
which  he  had  witnessed,  of  the  movement  which 
was  impelling  Italy  to  take  yet  another  step 
toward  her  unification — this  explanation  is  still 
valid,  still  correct.  No,  it  was  certainly  not 
ambition  which  led  Victor  Emmanuel  III  into 
war,  and  this  motive  is  as  alien  to  the  King  of 
Italy  as  it  was  to  his  grandfather,  the  King  of 
Sardinia    merely.     Victor    Emmanuel    III    is    a 


i88  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

conscientious,  thoughtful  prince,  moderate,  and 
incapable  of  acting  upon  any  other  motives  than 
the  security,  interest,  and  honour  of  the  State 
of  which  he  is  the  head.  And  if,  during  the  days 
of  May  191 5,  when  a  whole  people  turned  to  him, 
appealing  to  his  supreme  arbitration — if  the  King 
then  formed  the  decisions  and  uttered  the  words 
which  heralded  the  war — it  was  because  he  was 
able — as  the  first  King  of  Italy  was  able — to 
understand  the  aspirations  of  the  country,  and 
to  make  himself  the  interpreter  of  the  sentiments 
which,  in  d'  Azeglio's  words,  were  in  the  heart 
and  the  mind  of  each  and  all. 

So  the  drama  of  the  national  conscience  which 
was  performed  in  Rome  already  revealed  its  two 
protagonists  :  on  the  one  hand,  the  King  ;  on- 
the  other,  the  people.  But  there  were  many 
additional  actors.  We  shall  see  these  appear  as 
the  tragedy  is  unfolded — the  tragedy  which  was 
resolved  on  the  24th  of  May  by  the  solemn 
rupture  with  Austria. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  whom  Signor 
Salandra,  on  succeeding  to  Signor  Giolitti,  had 
been  anxious  to  leave  in  his  place,  died,  after  a 
brief  illness,  on  the  i6th  of  October,  1914.  A 
highly  complex  personality,  more  than  a  little 
mysterious,  was  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano. 
To-day  the  Germans  would  like  to  make  him 
pass  for  a  convinced  and  absolute  '' Triplicist." 
They  loudly  lamented  his  loss,  and  Count  Re- 
ventlow  has  recently  gone  so  far  as  to  state  that 
the  Italian  interventionists  did  not  shrink  from 
employing  the  poisons  of  the  Borgias  in  order  to 
suppress  the  Minister  who  stood  in  the  way  of 
a  war  against  Austria.     This  is  the  sort  of  men- 


THE  HISTORIC   MONTH  IN   ITALY  189 

strous  fable  which  the  Germans,  in  their  dis- 
appointment and  their  rage,  have  not  ceased  to 
invent  for  the  last  year  or  more,  as  much  for 
consumption  by  their  own  public  as  for  the 
benefit  of  neutrals. 

In  reality  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  (who 
succumbed — need  we  say  ? — to  a  clearly  defined 
attack  of  uraemia)  had  not  always  enjoyed  the 
favour  and  the  confidence  of  Germany.  Ten 
years  ago  the  Germanic  press  attacked  him 
violently  for  having  sent  the  Marquis  Visconti- 
Venosta  as  a  delegate  to  the  Algegiras  Confer- 
ence ;  a  grand  seigneur^  always  full  of  sympathy 
for  France,  who  died  just  as  his  ideal  was  about 
to  be  accomplished.  Visconti-Venosta  was 
largely  to  contribute  toward  turning  the  Con- 
ference, so  brutally  demanded  by  the  Imperial 
Government,  against  Germany.  He  was  to 
sketch,  at  this  Conference,  a  European  league  of 
resistance  against  the  German  pretensions  to 
hegemony :  that  diplomatic  coalition  which 
Prince  Billow  pretended  to  qualify  contemptu- 
ously as  "  the  much-overrated  constellation  of 
Algegiras,"  but  which  has  nevertheless  become 
the  Quadruple  Entente  of  to-day.  Later  still,  the 
Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  once  again  incurred  the 
wrath  of  the  German  press,  when  the  campaign 
in  Tripoli  was  decided  and  war  declared  upon 
Turkey.  On  the  other  hand,  he  was  high  in 
Germany's  favour  when  he  signed  the  renewal  of 
the  Triple  Alliance,  and  when,  in  February  1913, 
he  delivered  the  great  speech  outlining  a  pro- 
gramme which  seemed  to  announce  the  exten- 
sion of  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  until  then  had 
been  purely  continental,  to  maritime  questions. 


190  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

and  to  promise  the  collaboration  of  Italy  with 
Germany  and  Austria  in  the  Mediterranean. 

In  short,  the  long  management  of  Italy's 
foreign  affairs  by  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano, 
whose  ministry  was  extremely  eventful  and  fertile 
in  results,  had  as  its  principle  a  kind  of  equilibrium 
between  the  Central  Empires  and  the  Triple 
Entente.  The  declaration  of  neutrality  made  by 
Italy  on  the  3rd  of  August  19 14  was  the  natural 
corollary  of  this  equilibrium.  But  it  was  not 
easy,  in  the  midst  of  this  policy,  to  read  the 
fundamental  idea  of  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano. 
We  may  even  believe  that  he  rather  liked  to  pro- 
duce an  enigmatical  impression.  Had  he  adapted 
to  the  situation  of  modern  Italy  the  famous 
'*  deliberate  versatility  of  the  old  Dukes  of 
Savoy  "  ?  Did  he  intend  to  practise  a  policy  of 
discretion  and  postponement,  with  regard  to  the 
storms  which  he  beheld  gathering  ?  One  thing 
is  certain — his  mind  seemed  to  shrink  from 
decisions  which  allowed  of  no  appeal,  from  irre- 
vocable resolutions.  Men  who  knew  him  inti- 
mately assert  that  the  root  idea  of  this  Sicilian 
gentleman  was  scepticism,  a  spirit  of  doubt  and 
inquiry  applied  successively  to  all  the  forces 
operating  in  modern  Europe  ;  Italian  neutrality 
was  perfectly  consistent  with  such  a  tendency. 

And  if  nothing  gives  us  the  right  to  believe 
that  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  would  have 
persisted  to  the  end  in  his  original  point  of  view, 
that  he  would  not  eventually  have  taken  the 
path  which  his  successor  was  to  take,  in  order  to 
range  himself  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  and  with 
them  to  enforce  respect  for  the  European 
equilibrium  threatened  by  the  aggression  of  the 


THE  HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  191 

Central  Empires,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  up 
to  the  day  of  his  death  Italy  strictly  regarded,  in 
respect  of  the  belligerents,  the  attitude  of  neu- 
trality which  she  declared  it  her  intention  to  pre- 
serve at  the  beginning  of  the  great  war.  France 
in  particular  could  not  forget  the  loyalty  with 
which  this  complete  gentleman  was  to  observe 
the  promise  which,  on  the  1st  of  August,  he  spon- 
taneously and  in  person  made  to  our  Ambassador. 

It  is  a  singular  thing  that  the  Marquis  di  San 
Giuliano's  successor  came  to  the  Consulta  with 
a  character  and  a  temperament  very  different 
from  his,  but  with  ideas  which  passed  as  being 
very  much  more  backward.  Baron  Sonnino  had 
the  reputation  of  being  a  *'  Triplicist  "  when  he 
assumed  the  direction  of  foreign  affairs.  But  had 
not  Signor  Tittoni  also,  the  Italian  Ambassador 
in  Paris,  been  formerly  described  as  a  thorough- 
going "  Triplicist  "  ?  And  the  Duca  d'  Avarna, 
Italian  Ambassador  in  Vienna — was  not  he  a 
'persona  grata  at  the  court  of  the  Emperor 
Joseph  ?  Was  not  Signor  Bollati,  on  arriving  in 
Berlin  in  November  191 2,  welcomed  as  "  a  par- 
tisan of  the  traditions  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and 
a  sincere  friend  of  Germany,"  as  the  Frankfurter 
Zeitung  observed  ?  Nevertheless,  this  was  the 
diplomatic  staff  which  shattered  an  alliance  of 
thirty  years'  standing  with  the  two  Germanic 
Empires,  and  brought  Italy  into  the  war  beside 
France,  England,  and  Russia. 

During  the  illness  of  the  Marquis  di  San  Giu- 
liano,  and  for  some  time  after  his  death,  Signor 
Salandra  had  temporarily  taken  charge  of  foreign 
affairs.  At  one  moment  it  was  believed  that  he 
would  assume  this  charge  in  a  permanent  fashion- 


192  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Whatever  temptation  he  may  have  felt,  whatever 
suggestions  may  have  been  made  to  him  (for  Signor 
Salandra's  star  v^as  already  beginning  to  rise), 
the  President  of  the  Council  preferred  to  retain 
the  portfolio  of  the  Interior.  In  the  meantime 
•events  v^ere  growing  ripe.  The  European  war 
was  spreading  to  the  East,  owing  to  the  numerous 
provocations  which  the  Germanised  Young 
Turkey  was  inflicting  upon  the  Triple  Entente, 
and  Italy  saw  herself  forced  to  consider  the 
question  of  safeguarding  her  interests  in  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean,  where  she  has  so  many 
projects  respecting  the  future.  Public  opinion 
'displayed  an  increasingly  strong  tendency  in 
favour  of  preparing  Italy  for  all  eventualities. 

In  the  heart  of  the  Government  itself  there 
j  were  certainly  divergences  of  view,  for  early  in 
November  1914  Signor  Salandra  sent  in  his 
resignation  to  the  King.  Victor  Emmanuel  III, 
-after  a  few  conversations  with  the  leaders  of  the 
Parliamentary  groups,  again  entrusted  Signor 
Salandra  with  the  formation  of  a  Cabinet.  In 
this  new  combination,  which  was  soon  put  in 
hand,  it  was  immediately  remarked  that  General 
-Zupelli,  a  determined  supporter  of  army  rein- 
forcement, remained  at  the  Ministry  of  War,  while 
Signor  Rubini,  whose  opposition  to  military 
expenditure  was  a  secret  to  no  one,  abandoned 
the  Ministry  of  Finance,  where  Signor  Carcano 
replaced  him.  As  for  Signor  Salandra,  he  finally 
chose  the  portfolio  of  the  Interior.  Finally 
Baron  Sonnino  was  summoned  to  the  Consulta. 

It  is  reported  that  Prince  von  Biilow,  in  the 
course  of  his  difficult  negotiations  with  Baron 
Sonnino,  a  formidable  adversary,  exclaimed  one 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  193 

day,  feigning  a  genial  humour  which  imperfectly 
concealed  his  vexation  :  "  In  a  country  of  chatter- 
boxes I  have  to  deal  w^ith  the  only  man  who  does 
not  speak  !  "  And  indeed  Baron  Sonnino,  who, 
by  the  way,  when  he  pleases,  knows  very  well  how 
to  speak,  is  endowed  with  a  truly  British  frigidity 
— which  is  not  surprising  when  one  considers 
his  origin  ;  an  Anglo-Saxon  on  his  mother's  side, 
he  combines  an  imperturbable  composure  with 
an  Italian  vivacity  of  mind.  It  is  curious  to 
remember  now,  after  the  event,  that  Baron 
Sonnino's  appointment  to  the  Consulta  first  of 
all  disappointed  the  Nationalist  elements  and  the 
deputies  of  the  Left,  who  w^ere  already  partisans 
of  an  energetic  policy  of  intervention  against 
Austria  and  Germany,  and  were  alarmed  by  his 
reputation  as  a  ''  Triplicist." 

Baron  Sonnino  let  them  talk.  He  allowed 
himself  to  be  regarded  as  a  sphinx.  During  the 
whole  of  November  he  watched  events,  studying 
the  European  problem  from  the  Italian  point  of 
view.  On  the  9th  of  December,  by  means  of 
the  telegram  to  the  Duca^*"Avarna  with  which 
the  Green  Book  commences,  he  led  Italian 
politics  into  a  new  path,  by  demanding  of  Austria 
that  she  should  respect  Article  VII  of  the  treaty 
of  the  Triple  Alliance,  an  article  which  foresaw 
the  possibility  that  Austro-Hungary  might  dis- 
turb the  equilibrium  of  the  Balkans,  and  which 
justified  Italy  in  demanding  compensation  for 
herself.  From  that  moment  Italy  was  moving 
toward  a  rupture  and  war.     The  die  was  cast. 

We  may  say  that  the  wording  of  this  Article 
VII — which  was  drafted  with  great  foresight  and 
extreme  skill — was  a  determining  factor  of  Italy's 

13 


194  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

decision.  Over  a  distance  of  more  than  thirty 
years  the  Italian  negotiators  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
had  reserved  the  future  of  their  country,  had 
safeguarded  its  liberty,  by  inserting  in  the  treaty 
the  cancelling  clause  w^hich  assured  Italy  of 
justice  in  her  future  difficulties  with  the  Vienna 
Government,  procuring  her  the  means  of  breaking 
justly  and  honourably  wdth  her  ancient  Allies. 
This  text,  the  bearing  of  which  had  been  so  well 
calculated,  and  whose  effect  was  to  be  so  certain, 
reminds  one  of  the  most  famous  examples  of  this 
kind  recorded  in  the  history  of  treaties.  It  is 
as  valuable  as  the  famous  "  in  consideration  of  " 
in  the  Peace  of  the  Pyrenees,  which  enabled 
Louis  XIV  to  put  an  end  to  the  scheme  of  Spain. 
It  is  as  good  as  the  ''  then  and  in  this  case  "  of 
which  the  Emperor  Leopold,  at  the  beginning  of 
the  wars  of  the  Revolution,  said  that  for  him  it 
was  the  law  and  the  prophets.  So  was  Article 
VII  the  law  and  the  prophets  for  Baron  Sonnino. 


However,  Baron  Sonnino  had  acted  according 
to  the  indications  which  Signor  Salandra  and 
himself  had  obtained  from  the  internal  politics 
of  the  country  and  from  public  opinion.  The 
great  regularity  and  moderation  of  his  procedure 
was  made  manifest  by  the  stages  which  led  to 
intervention. 

On  the  3rd  of  December  1914  the  recon- 
structed Ministry  made  its  bow  to  the  Chambers, 
and  Signor  Salandra  delivered  a  great  speech,  of 
the  nature  of  a  programme,  which  hinted  that 
Italy  was  on  the  point  of  striking  out  on  a  new 
path.     Amid    the    applause    of    the    assembly. 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  195 

Signer  Salandra  asserted  that  the  first  duty  of 
the  Government  must  be  "  the  vigilant  care  of 
the  future  destinies  of  Italy  in  the  v^orld." 
And  developing  this  idea,  he  showed  that  at  no 
moment  of  history  had  the  future  of  the  nations 
been  more  gravely  involved ;  never  had  the 
problems  of  the  morrov^  been  so  urgent,  so 
imperious.  "  Neutrality,  freely  proclaimed  and 
loyally  observed,"  cried  the  President  of  the 
Council,  "  is  not  enough  to  guarantee  us  from 
the  consequences  of  the  upheaval  which  day  by 
day  grows  completer,  and  whose  end  it  is  given 
to  no  one  to  foresee.  On  the  land  and  on  the 
seas  of  the  ancient  continent,  whose  political 
configuration  is  now  being  transformed,  Italy 
has  vital  rights  to  safeguard,  just  aspirations  to 
assert  and  maintain  ;  she  has  her  position  as  a 
Great  Power  to  preserve  intact ;  more,  she 
must  so  contrive  that  this  position  shall  not  be 
diminished  by  comparison  with  the  possible 
aggrandisements  of  other  States.  It  follows 
from  this  that  our  neutrality  cannot  remain 
inert  and  flabby  ;  it  must  be  active  and  vigilant ; 
not  impotent,  but  strongly  armed  and  ready  for 
every  eventuality." 

These  words  were  warmly  welcomed  by  the 
Chamber,  which,  to  emphasise  its  sentiments, 
sent  its  greetings  to  Belgium.  Did  Parliament 
consider,  then,  that  such  a  manifestation  was 
platonic  and  pledged  it  to  nothing  ?  Very 
probably.  But  at  the  same  time  Baron  Sonnino's 
speech  was  enthusiastically  welcomed  by  the 
public,  which  immediately  saw  in  it  an  announce- 
ment and  a  pledge  of  intervention.  As  Signor 
di  Felice  said,  on  leaving  the  Chamber  (he  is  a 


196  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

"  social  reform  "  deputy),  "  these  declarations 
meant  war."  Europe  could  not  mistake  their 
meaning.  And  the  German  press,  on  the  follow- 
ing day,  reproduced  Signor  Salandra's  speech 
without  a  word  of  commentary. 

This  great  Parliamentary  session  was  to  be 
followed  immediately  by  two  extremely  remark- 
able counter-strokes. 

In  the  first  place,  Prince  von  Billow's  mission 
as  Ambassador  Extraordinary  to  Rome,  a  mission 
announced  and  contradicted  on  several  occasions, 
immediately  became  certain  and  official.  The 
Imperial  Government  betrayed  the  peculiar 
anxiety  which  the  attitude  of  its  ancient  ally 
was  causing  it,  by  deciding  that  no  less  a  per- 
sonage than  the  ex-Chancellor  was  needed  to 
attempt  a  solution  of  the  Italian  difficulty.  This 
return  to  activity  of  a  statesman  who  had  fallen 
into  disgrace  was  indeed  highly  significant. 
Everybody  knew  that  Wilhelm  II  bore  a  serious 
grudge  against  the  man  whom  he  had  formerly 
called  his  "  faithful  Bernard,"  whom  he  had 
made  a  prince  after  the  Tangier  affair,  but  whose 
presence  had  become  odious  to  him  since  the 
famous  "  days  of  November  "  when  the  Chan- 
cellor pretended  to  take  the  sovereign  under  his 
protection,  after  having  let  him  in  for  a  public 
recantation  and  public  obloquy.  So  in  entrust- 
ing Prince  von  Biilow  with  this  delicate  mission 
Wilhelm  II,  it  is  said,  made  this  double  calcu- 
lation :  "  If  Biilow  succeeds,  and  among  my 
diplomatic  staff  I  can  see  no  one  else  who  would 
be  capable  of  succeeding,  then  I  and  my  Empire 
will  reap  the  benefit.  If  he  fails  it  will  be 
because  anyone  would  have  failed  in  his  place. 


THE  HISTORIC  MONTH  IN  ITALY    197 

His  set-back  will  diminish  him,  and  my  vengeance 
will  be  more  complete." 

However,  the  departure  of  Prince  von  Biilow 
to  Rome  was  hailed  with  cries  of  delight  by  the 
German  newspapers,  and  the  Miinchener  Nach- 
richten^  with  perfect  bad  taste,  spoke  of  a  "  dip- 
lomatic 16-inch  shell."  To  which  a  Nationalist 
newspaper  in  Rome  replied  with  severity : 

''  Philip  of  Macedon  said  that  every  fortress 
could  be  overcome  by  an  ass  laden  with  gold. 
It  seems  that  the  ass  laden  with  gold  should 
have  arrived  in  Rome  some  time  ago,  but  the 
fortress  of  Italian  politics  has  not  fallen.  To-day 
Germany  wishes  to  employ  more  modern  and 
more  perfected  methods,  in  the  shape  of  the 
diplomatic  16-inch  howitzer  represented  by  Herr 
von  Biilow ;   but  Italy  is  not  a  Belgian  fortress." 

Thus,  even  before  Prince  von  Biilow  was  back 
in  his  Villa  Malta,  misunderstandings  arose,  and 
the  national  susceptibilities  of  Italy  were — justly 
— aroused.  Nipped  in  the  bud,  the  mission  of 
the  Envoy  Extraordinary  was  inevitably  doomed 
to  disaster. 

The  other  incident  precipitated  by  Signor 
Salandra's  speech  has  remained  a  mystery  even  to 
this  day. 

Signor  Salandra,  on  the  Friday,  had  expounded 
his  programme.  On  the  Saturday  Signor  Giolitti 
spoke  amid  general  attention.  What  declara- 
tions were  about  to  fall  from  the  lips  of  the  most 
powerful  man  in  Italy,  the  head  of  the  Govern- 
ment for  so  many  years,  who  was  still  regarded 
as  capable  of  returning  to  power  when  his  time 
came  ?  Now  Signor  Giolitti  did  not  merely 
state   that   he  would   support   Signor   Salandra 


198  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

by  his  vote.  He  made  a  serious  revelation ; 
namely,  that  in  August  191 3  Austria  had  v^^arned 
the  Italian  Government  that  it  was  already  pre- 
paring for  an  offensive  movement  against  Serbia. 
And  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  in  agreement 
with  Signor  Giolitti,  had  replied  to  Vienna  that 
he  refused  to  see  a  casus  foederis  in  a  war  declared 
by  Austria  upon  Serbia,  and  that  Italy,  conse- 
quently, would  observe  neutrality,  leaving  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  act  at  its 
own  risk  and  peril. 

This  declaration  of  the  ex-President  of  the 
Council  confirmed  the  thesis  of  Signor  Salandra. 
At  the  same  time,  it  overwhelmed  Austro-Hun- 
gary,  whose  premeditation  was  definitely  estab- 
lished. But  perhaps  the  press  of  the  Triple 
Entente  understood  Signor  Giolitti's  words  in  a 
sense  somewhat  different  from  that  which  the 
statesman  had  intended  to  give  them.  On 
reading  the  report  of  the  session  at  Montecitorio 
certain  observers  had  already  conceived  a  doubt. 
Had  not  a  slight  misconception  arisen  as  to 
Signor  Giolitti's  real  meaning  ?  Witnesses  had 
remarked  the  quite  peculiar  insistence  with  which 
the  orator  had  added  that  the  refusal  with  which 
Italy  had  met  the  invitation  of  Austria  had  in 
no  way  disturbed  the  amicable  relations  between 
the  two  allied  powers.  Was  not  one  therefore 
justified  in  demanding  whether  Signor  Giolitti 
had  not  intended  to  suggest  to  the  Chamber  and 
to  the  public  the  idea  that  the  Triple  Alliance, 
having  survived  the  incident  of  191 3,  ought 
equally  to  survive  the  declaration  of  neutrality 
made  in  1914  ?  This  at  all  events  is  the  hypo- 
thesis   which   immediately    occurred   to    certain 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  199 

minds,  and  the  attitude  afterwards  assumed  by 
Signer  Giolitti  confirmed  this  hypothesis  up  to  a 
certain  point. 

However,  the  Salandra  Ministry  got  to  work, 
strong  in  the  approbation  of  the  Chamber  and 
powerfully  supported  by  public  opinion.  The 
work  of  military  preparation  proceeded  with 
redoubled  ardour  and  activity.  Baron  Sonnino 
opened  negotiations  with  the  Ballplatz  which  he 
was  to  bring  to  their  conclusion  with  immovable 
firmness,  while  Prince  von  Bulow,  in  his  rose- 
covered  villa,  brought  into  action  all  the  resources 
of  his  mind,  all  his  means  of  influence,  to  prevent 
Italy  from  descending  the  slope,  without  sus- 
pecting— and  this  was  his  gravest  error — that  he 
was  in  this  way  to  increase  the  national  reaction 
against  alien  interference  in  the  affairs   of  the 

nation. 

•  •  •  •  • 

The  Green  Book  is  both  a  political  and  a  psy- 
chological document.  Here,  in  the  severe  and 
measured  language  of  diplomacy,  is  a  dialogue 
in  which  two  states  of  mind  make  their  appear- 
ance. Count_Berchtold  is  succeeded  by  Baron 
Burian  ;  a  grand  seigneur,  rather  bored,  slightly 
detached,  by  a  Hungarian  magnate,  a  more  active 
and  more  rugged  type  ;  the  conversation  proceeds 
at  the  same  pace,  and  it  is  always  Baron  Sonnino 
who  leads  it.  In  vain  does  German  diplomacy 
struggle  to  intervene,  to  throw  out  bridges,  to 
find  the  middle  path.  On  the  Italian  side  is  an 
inflexible  determination ;  a  sharpness  of  sight 
which  avoids  every  snare,  renders  every  ruse 
useless,  and  discourages  any  hope  of  subsequent 
trickery.     On  the  Austro-Hungarian  side,  beneath 


200  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

all  the  ability  of  the  negotiations,  one  is  conscious 
of  a  resignation,  a  fatalism  before  the  violence  of 
the  attack.  Austria  feels  that  manoeuvring  w^ill 
do  nothing  for  her,  or  v^ill  at  most  only  gain 
time.  She  understood,  from  the  first  note 
delivered  by  the  Duca  d'  Avarna,  that  her 
ancient  feud  with  Piedmont  was  in  force  once 
more,  and  that  a  fourth  armed  encounter  was 
inevitable.  ''  Italy  and  Austria  can  only  be  allies 
or  enemies."  The  famous  saying  of  Nigra  may 
be  read  between  the  lines  of  all  the  telegrams  in 
the  Green  Book.  Count  Berchtold  and  Baron 
Burian  engaged  and  broke  away  and  parried,  but 
they  had  to  play  the  game  of  their  powerful 
adversary.  Prince  von  Biilow,  who  sought  to 
direct  this  diplomatic  battle,  had  as  much  as  he 
could  do  to  parry  the  direct  blows  aimed  at  him. 
Prince  von  Biilow  proposed,  and  Baron  Sonnino 
disposed. 

On  the  4th  of  May  the  Duca  d'  Averna,  by 
order  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  placed 
in  Baron  Burian's  hands  the  communication — it 
was  in  French — which  formed  the  climax  of  five 
months'  negotiations,  and  which  notified  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  that  its  point  of 
view  and  that  of  the  Italian  Government  were 
irreconcilable.  "  It  is  useless  to  maintain  a 
formal  appearance  of  an  alliance  which  would  be 
destined  only  to  dissimulate  the  reality  of  con- 
tinual suspicion  and  daily  opposition." 

This  was  the  end.  Still,  it  was  not  yet  war. 
For  Prince  von  Biilow,  humiliated  by  his  defeat, 
there  was  still  one  faint  hope  :  that  Italy,  at  the 
supreme  moment,  would  recoil  before  the  gravity 
of   the   act.     He   reckoned   on   the   external   or 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  201 

internal  event  which  would  modify  the  intentions 
of  the  Italian  Government  and  the  Italian 
people  ;  and  he  therefore  redoubled  his  subter- 
ranean activities.  Innumerable  secret  interviews 
took  place  in  the  Villa  Malta,  whither  mysterious 
visitors  repaired  every  night,  like  so  many  con- 
spirators, betrayed  only  by  the  roaring  of  their 
motor  cars,  which  startled  the  inhabitants  of  the 
peaceful  Pincio. 

Prince  von  Biilow  employed  all  his  talents, 
and  his  profound  acquaintance  with  the  Parlia- 
mentary and  financial  map  of  Italy  ;  could  he 
not  hint,  with  justification,  that  he  was  himself 
half  an  Italian  by  his  marriage  and  in  his  tastes  ? 
He  is,  indeed,  allied  to  the  family  of  that  Min- 
ghetti,  the  precursor  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  who 
in  1873  had  accompanied  Victor  Emmanuel  II  to 
Berlin  and  Vienna. 

-^Prince  von  Biilow  made  a  serious  mistake  for  a 
politician ;  he  had  the  very  German  defect  of 
nourishing  himself  to  excess  on  historic  memories. 
Why  did  he  not  rather  look  about  him  ?  The 
tide  of  popular  opinion  was  rising  on  every  hand. 
Already  a  few  collisions  had  occurred  here  and 
there  between  ''  neutralists  "  and  ''  interven- 
tionists," those  Ghibellines  and  Guelfs  of  modern 
Italy.  But  the  party  of  intervention  was  daily 
increasing  in  strength.  The  denunciation  of  the 
Austrian  alliance  was  not  as  yet  official ;  but  it 
was  divined,  foreseen.  By  a  curious  coincidence, 
this  event,  known  only  to  a  few  statesmen  and 
diplomatists,  coincided  with  the  ''  Consecration 
of  the  Thousand,"  with  the  fetes  organised  in 
Genoa  in  honour  of  Garibaldi ;  a  commemora- 
tion which  was    held    precisely  at  the  moment 


202  ITALY   AND   THE    WAR 

when  it  would  be  most  likely  to  excite  the  sense  of 
nationalism, 

From  the  rock  of  Quarto,  whence  on  the  5th 
of  May  i860  Garibaldi  and  his  companions  set 
forth — Cavour  complacently  closing  his  eyes — 
on  their  adventurous  expedition  to  Sicily,  it  was 
on  all  sides  expected  that  the  destinies  of  the 
new  Italy  would  be  proclaimed.  Fifty-five  years 
earlier  the  Genoese  had  murmured  "  fartono 
stanotte "  ;  in  speaking  of  the  Thousand  they 
uttered  it  joyfully  and  aloud  ;  but  now  it  applied 
to  the  Italian  army,  with  its  millions  of  soldiers, 
which  had  become  one  of  the  great  armies  of 
Europe.  The  great  departure  seemed  close  at 
hand.  The  King  and  the  Ministers  were  expected 
at  Quarto,  where  they  were  to  make  the  solemn 
announcement.  And  putting  an  end  to  his 
term  of  voluntary  exile,  an  Italian  poet  was 
returning  to  his  native  country,  in  order  not  to 
miss  this  solemn  moment.  Signor  d'  Annunzio 
had  declared  that  he  would  not  return  to  Italy 
until  the  day  of  her  awakening.  Had  he  then 
any  conception  of  the  part  that  events  would 
reserve  for  him  in  this  awakening  ?  Did  he 
know  that  from  the  rock  of  Quarto  he  too  would 
set  forth  upon  his  adventures  ? 

We  may  say  that  while,  during  this  day  of 
festival,  no  one  yet  knew  that  the  rupture  with 
Austria  was  an  accomplished  fact,  the  entire 
Italian  people,  Europe,  and  the  whole  world  was 
gazing  at  the  historic  rock.  There,  it  was  believed, 
the  entrance  of  Italy  into  the  war  would  be 
announced.  It  will  be  remembered  with  what 
mixed  feelings  the  news  was  received  that  neither 
the    King  nor   the   Ministers  would   be   present 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  203 

at  the  ceremony ;  some  feared  a  withdrawal, 
while  others  congratulated  themselves  upon  it. 
Suddenly,  however,  the  King's  telegram  of  excuse 
brought  matters  to  a  head.  Anyone  who  could 
read  could  interpret  that  message.  Perhaps  it 
contained  no  phrase  so  startling  as  the  famous 
grido  di  dolore  by  which  Victor  Emmanuel's 
grandfather,  in  a  similar  case,  had  aroused  all 
Europe. 

But  the  King  revealed  his  thoughts  and  his 
intentions  precisely  by  evoking  the  memory  of 
that  grandfather  ;  and  by  associating  with  the 
memory  of  il  Re  galantuomo,  and  of  him  who  was 
the  first  to  ''  extol  the  unity  of  the  country," 
that  of  the  ''  Captain  of  the  Thousand  "  who 
set  forth  from  the  historic  shore  of  the  Ligurian 
Sea  "  with  immortal  audacity,  toward  an  immortal 
destiny."  Victor  Emmanuel  II,  Mazzini,  and 
Garibaldi ;  this  trinity,  boldly  composed  by  the 
King,  was  the  symbol  of  the  Risorgimento,  which 
was  again  renewed  ;  and  it  meant  the  fourth  war 
of  liberation,  and  the  promise  of  national  expan- 
sion ;  it  was  impossible  to  be  mistaken.  One  of 
the  leading  newspapers  of  Milan,  which  favoured 
intervention,  defined  the  situation  by  printing 
this  simple  statement :  "  Quarto  marks  not  an 
end,  but  a  beginning." 

No  one  knew  this  better  than  Prince  von 
Billow.  Informed  day  by  day  as  to  the  progress 
of  Baron  Sonnino's  negotiations,  he  had  seen  his 
hopes  vanish  one  by  one.  He  had  burned  his 
last  powder  in  an  audience  at  the  Quirinal,  when, 
perhaps — but  this  point  is  not  yet  very  clear — 
he  handed  to  the  King  an  autograph  letter  from 
Wilhelm  II,  the  supreme  appeal  of  an  ancient 


204  ITALY    AND   THE   WAR 

ally.  From  this  moment  Herr  von  Biilow  can 
have  had  no  illusions  ;  his  mission  had  failed. 
With  his  experience  of  men  and  things,  it  is 
doubtful  if  he  could  have  found  much  reason  to 
hope  in  the  incident  which  v^as  about  to  super- 
vene, and  which  seemed  as  though  it  might  make 
everything  once  more  uncertain.  Although  he 
was  not  willing  to  withdraw  from  the  game  be- 
fore he  had  tempted  his  fortune  to  the  utmost, 
many  remarks  of  his  have  been  recorded  which 
allow  one  to  conclude  that  he  no  longer  believed 
in  the  possibility  of  success. 

However,  it  was  no  negligible  effort,  that  of 
the  last  partisans  of  neutrality  on  the  morrow  of 
the  Quarto  celebrations.  On  the  day  when 
Signor  Giolitti  left  his  villa  to  repair  to  Rome — 
it  was  the  7th  of  May — the  public  opinion  of  all 
Italy,  with  its  keen  political  sense,  understood 
that  a  decisive  event  was  imminent. 

Even  out  of  power — he  had  voluntarily  retired 
some  months  before  the  war — Signor  Giolitti 
was  still  regarded  as  the  most  influential  per- 
sonality in  all  Italy.  The  statesman  who  had 
entered  upon  the  Tripoli  campaign,  had  given 
his  country  universal  suffrage,  and  had  ruled  over 
Parliament,  where  his  powerful  hand  had  merged 
the  parties,  and  allowed  only  one  majority  to 
survive — the  Giolittian  majority — if  this  powerful 
statesman  spoke,  was  it  not  more  than  probable 
that  he  would  find  a  hearing  ?  If  he  showed  a 
desire  to  return  to  power,  was  it  possible  that 
power  would  not  immediately  be  restored  to 
him  ?  In  short,  had  he  not  delegated  the 
government  to  Signor  Salandra  as  to  a  lieutenant 
whom  he  proposed  to  replace  when  the  burden 


THE  HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  205 

should  become  too  heavy,  should  demand  the 
return  of  the  old  pilot  ?  And  again,  it  was 
Piedmont,  and  not  only  commercial,  industrial, 
and  financial  Piedmont,  but  military  and  loyalist 
Piedmont,  which  Signor  Giolitti  represented, 
and  in  which  he  was  master  ;  and  Piedmont,  the 
heart  of  the  monarchy,  seemed  to  come  with  him 
to  Rome,  to  present  itself  before  Parliament  and 
in  the  Royal  Palace.  Taking  all  the  elements 
of  the  situation  into  account,  this  move  of  Signor 
Giolitti's,  whose  doubts  as  to  the  best  attitude 
to  be  observed  by  his  country  were  well  known, 
might  have  seemed  capable  of  putting  a  stop  to 
itsmtervention. 

<=^Tt  is  important,  by  the  way,  to  give  calm 
consideration  to  the  reason  why  Signor  Giolitti 
was  so  little  disposed  to  accept  the  idea  of  war. 
His  argument  may  be  summed  up  in  one  word  : 
the  farecchio,  a  word  which  was  so  unpopular 
only  because  it  involved  a  sense  of  belittlement,^ 
and  because  the  more  general  state  of  mind  in 
Italy,  being  nobly  ambitious,  and  looking  toward 
national  greatness  and  expansion,  was  hostile  to 
bargains  and  calculations.  Signor  Giolitti  saw 
the  situation  as  a  positive  thinker,  an  economist 
who  does  not  care  for  a  gamble,  avoids  risk,  and 
considers  that  a  bird  in  the  hand  is  worth  two 
in  the  bush,  especially  when  to  get  the  two  one 
must  suffer  all  the  uncertainties  of  a  war,  risk 
precious  lives,  and  pay  the  expenses  of  a  cam- 

^  Parecchio  is  a  term  employed  more  particularly  in  the 
Piedmontese  language.  It  has  been  translated  into  French  by 
"  quelque  chose."  The  true  sense  of  the  word  would  be  rather 
"  a  certain  number  of  things,"  or  even,  given  the  familiar 
character  of  the  expression,  "  not  a  few  things." 


2o6  ITALY   AND    THE   WAR 

paign.  More  than  one  of  La  Fontaine's  fables, 
more  than  one  of  Cervantes'  proverbs,  v^ould 
perhaps  have  justified  Signor  Giolitti  in  this 
connection. 

But  there  v^as  another  aspect  of  his  case  : 
Signor  GioHtti  belonged  to  an  older  generation, 
v^hich  saw^  the  beginnings  of  the  new  Italy,  v^hich 
v^as  acquainted  v^ith  the  difficult  years,  and  v^hich 
was  naturally  inclined  to  moderation  and  pru- 
dence. To  such  calculating  minds  the  proposi- 
tions of  Austria  were  more  than  acceptable  ;  they 
were  tempting.  "  Let  us  take  what  is  offered 
us  for  nothing,"  they  thought.  "  If  this  parecchio, 
this  something  which  will  reward  our  neutrality, 
is  not  altogether  the  best  that  we  could  desire, 
it  will  none  the  less  have  the  advantage  of  having 
cost  not  a  drop  of  Italian  blood  nor  a  halfpenny 
of  our  wealth."  These,  to  be  sure,  are  argu- 
ments likely  to  weigh  with  a  serious  Senate,  grey- 
headed, a  little  timorous,  and  suspicious  of  sudden 
enthusiasm.  Such  arguments  are  still  more 
peremptory,  irresistible  even,  to  an  assembly  of 
stock-holders.  Signor  Giolitti  reckoned  that 
when  the  question  should  be  debated  in  the 
Chamber  it  would  be  an  easy  matter,  with  his 
authority,  his  prestige,  and  his  dexterity  as  a 
great  Parliamentarian,  to  overcome  all  objections 
and  sweep  away  all  obstacles. 

As  for  public  opinion,  he  did  not  take  it  into 
calculation.  This  is  why  he  brushed  aside,  as 
importunate  and  negligible  babblings,  the  cries 
of  "  Down  with  the  parecchto  !  "  with  which 
a  few  students  in  Turin  greeted  his  passage.  In 
Rome,  however,  he  was,  to  his  great  surprise,  to 
find    that    these    manifestations    had    singularly 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH  IN   ITALY  207 

increased  and  were  further  increasing  day  by 
day.  The  public  had  a  very  clear  intuition  that 
once  the  question  was  in  any  shape  or  form  put 
before  the  Chamber  it  would  certainly  be  solved 
in  a  sense  contrary  to  its  desires  ;  that  the  ex- 
President  of  Council  would,  at  the  first  sign, 
recover  his  tried  and  faithful  majority.  There 
would  be  a  sort  of  return  from  a  Parliamentary 
Elba.  The  arrival  of  Signor  Giolitti  in  Rome 
was  thus  productive  of  great  excitement  and 
considerable  disturbance.  And  Rome  was  to 
witness  this  curious  spectacle  :  the  man  who 
was  lately  the  most  influential  and  the  least 
criticised  man  in  all  Italy,  the  strong-handed 
dictator,  who  had  so  long  kneaded  the  dough  of 
Italy's  public  life,  was  checked  for  the  first  time 
by  a  popular  movement,  a  movement  of  the 
streets,  which  was  to  be  led  by  a  poet — which 
was  perhaps  even  more  unexpected  and  extra- 
ordinary, and  certainly  the  very  last  thing  which 
Signor  Giolitti  had  looked  for,  accustomed  as 
he  was  to  reckon  only  with  the  psychology  of  the 
Assemblies  and  the  usages  of  the  representative 
system. 

On  the  1 2th  of  May  Signor  Gabriele  d'  Annun- 
zio  arrived  in  Rome  by  an  evening  train.  The 
city  was  already  over-excited  by  the  rumours  of 
the  last  few  days,  and  the  reports  which  were 
current  in  all  directions  concerning  the  "  neu- 
tralist intrigues  "  and  the  "  Parliamentary  con- 
spiracy." The  Romans  were  all  for  the  war  and 
for  Signor  Salandra.  The  presence  of  Signor 
Giolitti  in  Rome  alarmed  and  irritated  them. 
In  vain  did  Signor  Giolitti,  in  a  public  letter  to 
the   Tribuna,   assert  that  it  had  never  entered 


2o8  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

his  mind  to  overthrow  the  Ministry,  and  that 
he  had  confined  himself  to  responding  to  a 
summons  from  the  King  and  the  President  of 
the  Council  himself,  with  whom  he  had  to 
discuss  the  general  situation.  In  this  connection 
there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  Signor  Giolitti's 
loyalty.  Unhappily  for  him  he  had  friends, 
and  a  clientele,  and  he  also  found  partisans 
for  this  occasion  who  were  far  less  moderate 
and  circumspect,  and  who  compromised  him 
gratuitously. 

In  the  course  of  a  few  days  Signor  Giolitti 
found  that  he  had  become  the  prisoner  of  his 
party.  His  statesmanlike  point  of  view,  which 
weighed  carefully  and  scrupulously  the  reasons 
for  and  against  intervention,  disappeared  in  the 
tumult  created  by  the  violent  conflict  of  two 
ideals,  two  opposing  passions.  Signor  Giolitti 
found  himself  overwhelmed.  Rome  was  passing 
through  one  of  those  periods  when  the  breath  of 
popularity  and  unpopularity  blows  whither  it 
listeth,  capriciously  and  often  at  hazard.  Swiftly 
it  rose  to  a  tempest.  No  explanation  had  any 
chance  of  a  hearing  now.  Guelf  or  Ghibelline — 
men  were  classed  without  appeal,  and  proper 
names  became  standards  of  battle.  Like  Farinata 
dcgli  Uberti,  Signor  Giolitti  might  have  asked 
himself  the  sorrowful  question  :  *'  Why  does  this 
people  hate  me  .?  " 

However,  the  same  phenomenon  carried 
Gabriele  d'  Annunzio  to  the  head  of  the  crowd 
which  favoured  intervention.  That  a  subtle 
artist  in  literature,  a  scholarly  poet,  a  writer  of  a 
refined  aestheticism,  inaccessible  to  the  vulgar, 
should  have  become  a  tribune,  an  agitator  of  the 


THE   HISTORIC  MONTH   IN   ITALY  209 

masses,  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  character- 
istics of  this  troubled  period,  and  one  that  will  be 
remembered  by  history.  Italy  is,  in  the  modern 
world,  one  of  those  privileged  lands  where  these 
metamorphoses  still  remain  possible,  where  litera- 
ture mingles  with  life,  where  all  are  accessible 
to  lyrical  feeling,  where  it  is  near  the  surface 
in  all.  We  must  recall  Lamartine  in  1848  to 
find  a  precedent  for  such  a  part  played  by  poetry 
in  a  great  political  movement.  But  the  poems 
of  Lamartine,  like  his  speeches,  appealed  to  the 
most  general  feelings,  we  might  say  to  the  common 
ground  of  the  human  heart ;  while  in  Signor 
d'  Annunzio's  work  all  is  erudite,  even  the 
language  of  the  passions,  even  the  expression  of 
patriotism  and  loyalty.  Anywhere  but  in  a 
Mediterranean  country  Signor  d'  Annunzio  would 
have  been  condemned  for  ever  to  incompre- 
hension so  far  as  the  crowd  is  concerned  ;  would 
have  been  doomed  to  the  ivory  tower.  .  .  . 

On  the  1 2th  of  May,  the  first  night  of  his 
arrival  in  Rome,  150,000  people  had  come  to 
welcome  him.  From  the  balcony  of  the  Hotel 
Regina — facing  the  palace  of  the  Queen-Mother, 
who,  from  one  of  its  windows,  witnessed  the 
spectacle — Signor  d'  Annunzio  delivered  a  speech 
comparable  to  the  speeches  delivered  at  the 
Quarto  and  in  Genoa  ;  a  sonorous  harangue,  in 
which  Nationalism  was  nourished  by  classic 
poetry  and  history,  in  which  memories  of  the 
Risorgimento  and  the  famous  sayings  of  the 
Garibaldian  leaders  and  warriors  were  mingled 
with  lines  from  Dante.  Signor  d' Annunzio's 
first  speech  to  the  Romans  had  but  one  subject  : 
patriotism.     It  was  by  the  force  of  events  that 

H 


210  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

his    following    speeches    took    on    more   violent 
touches,  and  the  accents  of  civil  v^ar. 

What  manoeuvres,  v^hat  menaces,  w^hat  influ- 
ences v^ere  brought  into  play  at  the  last  moment, 
in  order  to  prevent  the  intervention  of  Italy  ? 
It  is  still  a  mysterious  story  as  far  as  the  details 
are  concerned,  but  the  main  outlines  are  abun- 
dantly plain.  Did  Signor  Giolitti  realise  that 
his  presence  in  Rome  must  at  least  have  given 
rise  to  false  appearances,  have  given  the  "  neu- 
tralists "  an  argument  and  a  point  of  support, 
and  have  even  begun  to  exercise  pressure  upon 
the  Government  and  Parliamentary  circles  ? 
Parliament  v^as  to  assemble  on  the  20th  of  May, 
to  decide  upon  peace  or  v^ar.  By  insistently 
spreading  the  rumour  that  the  majority  of  the 
Chamber,  still  Giolittian,  v^ould  not  accept  v^ar ; 
by  putting  forv^ard  the  name  and  authority  of 
Signor  Giolitti,  the  ''  neutralists  "  disturbed  the 
political  w^orld,  v^eakened  the  Ministry,  and 
destroyed  in  advance  the  effect  of  the  decisions 
v^hich  the  President  of  the  Council  was  to  make 
known.  It  no  longer  seemed  at  all  certain  that 
there  was  in  the  Chamber  a  majority  in  favour 
of  a  break  with  Austria  and  armed  intervention. 
A  little  intimidation  of  the  Cabinet,  a  little 
blackmailing  of  the  Chamber,  and  "  neutralism  " 
might  flatter  itself  that  it  would  wipe  out  by  a 
vote  the  results  obtained  by  six  months'  diplo- 
macy on  the  part  of  Signor  Salandra  and  Baron 
Sonnino. 

However,  to  the  great  disappointment  of  the 
"  conspirators,"  this  plan  was  destined  to 
exposure ;     events    were    to    take    a    turn    very 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH  IN   ITALY  211 

different  from  that  they  had  hoped.  As  happens 
to  all  politicians  who  see  calculations  of  this 
kind  miscarry,  the  partisans  of  neutrality  had 
reckoned  without  the  open  air.  They  had 
elaborated  a  conspiracy  of  the  lobby,  conformable 
to  the  nature  of  things  parliamentary.  They 
had  counted,  on  the  part  of  Signor  Salandra,  on 
an  acceptation  pure  and  simple  of  the  situation 
which  they  had  arranged  for  him.  They  had 
forgotten  only  one  point  :  that  up  to  the  20th  of 
May  Signor  Salandra  had  time  to  act,  to  create 
a  situation  which  enabled  him  to  impose  his  will 
upon  Parliament  by  relying  on  forces  alien  to 
Parliament.  Within  a  week,  indeed,  the  aspect 
of  things  was  on  the  point  of  turning  to  Signor 
Salandra's  advantage,  and  he,  playing  a  bold 
game,  did  not  hesitate  to  make  an  appeal  to  public 
opinion. 

On  the  13  th  of  May  the  report  was  current, 
and  was  hourly  gaining  force,  that  Signor 
Salandra,  confronted  by  the  neutralist  oppo- 
sition, was  about  to  resign  from  power.  The 
excitement  in  Rome  increased,  and  at  night  the 
same  crowd  which  on  the  previous  day  had 
acclaimed  Signor  d'  Annunzio  gathered  beneath 
his  windows  and  again  demanded  a  speech  from 
him.  The  poet  obeyed  the  desire  of  the  crowd. 
But  how  his  tone  had  altered  since  the  night 
before  !  The  text  of  this  speech  will  be  found 
in  the  collection  of  "  Orations  and  Messages," 
which  he  has  published  under  the  title  Per  la 
fiu  grande  Italia.  Beneath  the  headline,  "  The 
Law  of  Rome  "  it  appears  under  a  title  such  as 
a  somewhat  romantic  Titus  Livius  might  have 
selected  :    "  Harangue  to  the  Roman  People  in 


212  ITALY   AND   THE    WAR 

Tumult."  This  "  harangue  "  makes  one  think  of 
those  which  Brutus  and  Antony  pronounced  in 
the  forum  in  Shakespeare's  Julius  C-:esar.  On 
reading  these  pages,  indeed,  one  recalls  the  most 
tumultuous  days  through  which  the  Eternal 
City,  in  its  long  history,  has  passed. 

"  Comrades,"  cried  the  poet,  "  it  is  no  longer 
the  time  to  speak,  but  to  act ;  it  is  no  longer  the 
time  for  speeches,  but  for  deeds,  and  for  Roman 
deeds. 

"  If  the  fact  of  inciting  the  citizens  to  violence 
is  regarded  as  a  crime,  I  will  boast  of  this  crime, 
I  will  take  it  upon  myself  alone. 

*'  Listen  to  me.  Hear  me.  To-day  the 
treason  is  manifest.  We  not  only  breathe  its 
horrible  odour  ;  but  already  we  feel  the  whole 
ignominious  weight  of  it.  Treason  is  being 
accomplished  in  Rome,  in  the  city  of  the  soul,  the 
city  of  life  !  In  our  Rome  they  are  trying  to 
strangle  the  mother  country  with  a  Prussian 
cord  !  ...  It  is  in  Rome  that  this  murder  is  being 
committed.  And  if  I  am  the  first  to  proclaim 
it,  and  the  only  one,  to-morrow  you  will  thank 
me  for  my  courage.  But  that  matters  little  to 
me  !  .  .  . 

"  Listen.  We  are  on  the  point  of  being  sold 
like  a  flock  of  beasts.  Over  our  human  dignity, 
the  dignity  of  each  one  of  us,  over  the  brow  of 
each  one  of  us,  over  mine  and  yours,  over  that  of 
your  son,  and  those  of  your  children  yet  to  be 
born,  there  hangs  the  threat  of  a  servile  brand. 
To  call  oneself  Italian  will  be  to  bear  a  name 
which  will  make  one  blush,  a  name  which  will 
make  one  hide  oneself  for  shame,  a  name  which 
will  blister  the  lips." 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  213 

It  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  the  effect  that 
words  so  fiery  as  these  must  have  exercised  on  a 
crowd  whose  nerves  had  for  long  been  severely 
tried.  In  this  speech  there  was  something  of 
the  ardour  of  civil  war,  and  on  the  morrow,  when 
the  resignation  of  the  Salandra  Ministry  was 
officially  known,  there  was  an  outbreak  of  numerous 
manifestations  of  civil  war.  Two  ''  interven- 
tionist "  deputies,  the  Hon.  Signori  Pais  and 
Faustini,  did  not  hesitate  to  cry,  *'  War  or  revo- 
lution !  "  in  their  speeches  to  the  crowd.  And 
indeed  the  premonitory  signs  of  a  popular  rising 
were  visible.  And  it  is  a  remarkable  thing  : 
since  the  beginning  of  the  European  war  this  was 
the  first  time  that  a  profound  movement  of  public 
opinion  had  been  seen  in  a  European  capital ; 
the  first  time  that  insurrectionary  committees 
had  been  formed  ;  the  first  time  that  there  was 
a  threat  of  building  barricades  (they  were  actually 
begun  in  the  Via  Viininale).  And  here  was  a 
great  sign  of  the  times  :  there  was  no  question 
of  proclaiming  a  Republic  or  the  Commune ; 
but  merely  of  protesting  against  a  Parliamentary 
majority  too  ready,  in  the  eyes  of  the  people,  to 
accept  the  proposals  and  submit  to  the  pressure 
of  a  foreign  ambassador. 

The  violence  of  these  "  days  "  was  imperfectly 
realised  in  foreign  countries.  People  had  no 
real  conception  of  the  passion  which  had  aroused 
Rome  ;  and  Rome  was  immediately  followed  by 
all  the  great  cities  of  Italy.  Montecitorio,  at  a 
given  moment,  was  invaded  by  the  crowd  ;  and 
if  the  demonstrators — unfamiliar  with  the  ins 
and  outs  of  Parliament — had  not  gone  astray  in 
the  corridors  of  the  Chamber,  whence  the  police 


214  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

succeeded  in  ejecting  them,  if  they  had  reached 
the  Chamber  itself  at  the  first  rush,  it  is  impossible 
to  say  what  might  not  have  happened.  Out- 
of-doors,  however,  notorious  "  neutralists  "  were 
actually  being  chased  through  the  streets  ;  it  is 
a  miracle  that  no  blood  was  shed.  A  number  of 
politicians,  ex-lieutenants,  and  collaborators  of 
Signor  Giolitti,  who,  together  with  their  leader, 
had  for  some  days  been  treated  with  extreme 
violence  by  a  section  of  the  press,  were  recog- 
nised, hooted,  threatened,  and  finally,  with  great 
difficulty,  rescued  by  the  carabinieri.  Signor 
Bertolini  in  particular  passed  a  very  bad  quarter 
of  an  hour,  during  which  he  was  forcibly  re- 
minded of  the  affairs  of  various  banks  and  rail- 
ways. Presently  the  Government,  which  was 
carefully  watching  over  the  safety  of  all,  was 
forced  to  advise  Signor  Giolitti,  for  the  general 
good,  in  the  interest  of  order,  to  return  to  his 
villa  in  Piedmont.  Such  was  the  effervescence  of 
the  public,  and  the  language  employed  by  the 
newspapers  in  speaking  of  him,  that  it  might 
well  have  been  thought  that  his  life  was  in  danger. 
As  for  the  more  seriously  unpopular  ''  neu- 
tralist "  deputies,  they,  on  the  advice  of  the 
police,  passed  the  night  preceding  the  session  of 
May  the  20th  not  in  their  homes,  but  in  a  hotel 
facing  Montecitorio.  To  reach  the  Chamber 
without  coming  into  contact  with  the  hostile 
crowd  they  had  only  to  cross  the  small  piazza, 
all  of  whose  entrances  were  closed  by  detach- 
ments of  police.  Here  was  a  glaring  manifesta- 
tion of  the  discord  between  the  nation  and  the 
Parliament,  and  there  were  plenty  to  make  sport 
of  this  allegorical  situation,  which  was  humiliat- 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  215 

ing  enough  for  the  "  Giolittians  " — the  ''  Gio- 
littian  Camorra,"  as  they  were  styled  by  the 
Nationalist  press. 

To  understand  the  state  of  mind  of  the  Roman 
population  we  must  remember  that  the  universal 
suffrage,  at  the  last  elections,  had  been  divided 
between  the  Nationalists,  a  newly  born  party, 
at  once  reactionary,  demagogic,  and  doctrinaire, 
and  the  traditional  Democrats,  the  heirs  of 
Mazzini  and  Garibaldi,  the  representatives  of  the 
Irredentist  ideal,  and  the  champions  of  the 
completion  of  Italian  unity.  All  the  forces  of 
the  capital,  all  its  moral  and  intellectual  elements, 
the  aristocracy  as  well  as  the  flebs,  were  thus 
marching  in  the  same  direction.  The  Nationalist- 
Imperialists  of  the  Idea  Nazionale,  who  flattered 
themselves  on  banishing  all  sentimentality  from 
politics,  and  on  considering  everything  solely 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  national  interests  of 
Italy,  employed  the  same  impassioned  language 
as  the  writers  of  the  Messaggero,  who  were  free- 
thinkers and  ''  unitarians  "  of  the  old  school.  A 
sort  of  Committee  of  Public  Safety  was  even 
constituted,  in  which  the  leaders  of  these  two 
camps,  the  contributors  to  these  two  organs, 
met  and  concerted,  and  meditated,  perhaps,  if 
matters  should  go  farther,  upon  a  common  politi- 
cal action.  For  forty-eight  hours  there  was,  in 
Rome,  Milan,  and  ten  other  Italian  centres,  the 
equivalent  of  certain  days  of  revolution  during 
the  period  of  the  Risorgimento.  Impatience  of 
foreign  intervention,  the  appeal  to  the  Govern- 
ment to  declare  war,  even  the  famous  cry : 
''  Away  with  the  Barbarians  !  " — nothing  was 
lacking  in  this  revival  of  history. 


2i6  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

The  excitement  and  indignation  and  anger  of 
Rome  were  raised  to  their  highest  point  on  the 
evening  of  the  14th  of  May,  by  a  fresh  public 
address  from  Signor  d'  Annunzio.  The  direct 
accusations  and  the  precise  information  which 
the  poet  introduced  into  this  speech  made  it  a 
political  event  of  the  highest  importance,  after 
which  there  could  not  fail  to  be  some  decisive 
movement  of  public  opinion.  Here  are  the 
principal  passages  of  the  philippic.  Erecting  the 
crowd  into  a  tribunal,  the  poet  addressed  it  in 
these  terms  : 

''  We  are  assembled  here  to  judge  a  crime  of 
high  treason,  and  to  denounce  the  guilty  man  or 
men  to  the  contempt  and  vengeance  of  good 
citizens. 

''  What  I  tell  you  now  is  not  mere  bombastic 
verbiage  ;  it  is  the  precise  description  of  an  estab- 
lished fact. 

"  The  Italian  Government,  the  Government 
which  yesterday  evening  placed  its  resignation  in 
the  hands  of  the  King,  had  abolished,  on  the  4th 
of  May,  on  the  eve  of  the  "  Benediction  of  the 
Thousand,"  the  treaty  of  the  Triple  AlHance. 
It  had  declared  that  this  treaty,  so  far  as  Austria 
was  concerned,  was  null  and  void.  I  can  assure 
you  of  the  exactitude  of  that  very  phrase  :  I 
repeat,  it  was  null  and  void. 

"  The  Government  of  Italy,  that  Government 
which  yesterday  evening  placed  its  resignation  in 
the  hands  of  the  King,  had,  in  consequence, 
concluded  precise  agreements  with  another 
group  of  nations,  solemn  and  conclusive  engage- 
ments, confirmed  by  an  exchange  of  strategic 
plans  and  by  a  scheme  of  combined  military  action. 


THE   HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  217 

"  Such  is  the  truth,  the  undeniable  truth.  I 
had  certain  information  of  these  facts  before 
leaving  France,  where  the  officers  of  our  General 
Staff  and  our  Navy  had  already  arrived  and  had 
set  to  work. 

*'  Thus  on  the  one  hand  there  was  a  treaty 
abolished  ;  on  the  other  an  agreement  concluded. 
On  the  one  hand  the  honour  of  the  country  was 
avenged  ;  on  the  other  hand  it  was  pledged. 

"  The  coalition  inaugurated  at  Quarto  was 
about  to  be  accomplished.  Discussion  was 
quieting  down.  The  ideal  necessity  had  over- 
come all  the  trivialities  of  politics.  The  Army 
was  valiant  and  confident.  Examples  of  civic 
virtue  were  beginning  to  shine  above  the  tumult, 
now  assuaged.  The  good  leaven  was  already 
causing  the  inert  mass  to  rise. 

"  And  now  the  painful  effort  of  months  upon 
months  is  interrupted  by  a  vile  and  unforeseen 
aggression.  This  aggression  is  inspired,  excited, 
aided  by  foreigners.  Its  authors  are  an  Italian 
statesman  and  Italian  members  of  Parliament, 
who  are  treating  with  the  foreigner,  are  in  the 
service  of  the  foreigner,  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
basing and  enslaving  and  dishonouring  Italy  for 
the  benefit  of  the  foreigner. 

"  That  is  patent,  that  is  undeniable.  Listen. 
The  chief  of  the  malefactors,  whose  soul  is 
nothing  but  a  frigid  lie  set  forth  with  cunning 
wiles,  just  as  the  dismal  sac  of  the  cuttlefish  is 
furnished  with  adroit  tentacles — the  manipu- 
lator of  this  base  undertaking  knew  of  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  old  treaty.  And  he  knew  of  the 
constitution  of  the  new  treaty,  both  steps  being 
taken  with  the  King's  consent. 


21 8  ITALY   AND    THE   WAR 

"  Thus  he  is  betraying  the  King  and  he  is 
betraying  his  country. 

"  He  is  serving  the  foreigner,  against  the  King 
and  against  the  country.  He  is  guilty  of  treason. 
And  this  is  not  an  insulting  manner  of  expressing 
myself,  it  is  not  an  abuse  of  polemical  speech ; 
it  is  the  reality,  the  truth,  in  accordance  with 
the  most  notorious  nature  of  this  crime. 

"  This  is  what  we  have  to  prove  to  the  country  ; 
this  is  what  we  have  to  imprint  upon  the  con- 
science of  the  nation. 

"  Listen !  Listen !  The  country  is  in  danger  ! 
The  country  is  on  the  point  of  proceeding  to 
its  fall !  To  save  it  from  irreparable  ruin  and 
ignominy  it  is  the  duty  of  each  of  us  to  give  him- 
self wholly  and  to  arm  himself  with  every  weapon. 

"  A  Ministry  formed  by  Herr  von  Biilow  does 
not  seem  to  have  the  approbation  of  the  King  of 
Italy.  But  whether  full  or  empty  the  servants  of 
Herr  von  Biilow  will  not  resign. 

''So  long  as  they  are  not  immured  in  their 
vile  laboratories  they  will  seek  to  poison  the  life 
of  Italy,  to  contaminate  every  strong  and  beauti- 
ful thing  in  our  midst. 

"  For  this  reason,  I  repeat,  every  good  citizen 
must  be  a  soldier  against  the  enemy  within  the 
gates  ;  every  good  citizen  must  fight  him  without 
let,  without  quarter.  The  same  blood  must 
flow — and  it  will  be  sacred  blood — as  that  which 
is  shed  in  the  trenches. 

"  The  Italian  Parliament  will  open  on  the 
20th  of  May.  .  .  .  And  the  20th  of  May  is  the 
anniversary  of  the  wonderful  march  of  Garibaldi, 
the  march  upon  the  Parco  di  Palermo. 

"  Let  us  celebrate  this  anniversary  by  closing 


THE  HISTORIC  MONTH   IN   ITALY  219 

the  doors  of  Parliament  against  the  scullions  of 
the  Villa  Malta,  by  driving  them  back  to  their 
hypocritical  employer. 

'^  And  in  the  Italian  Parliament  the  free  men, 
liberated  from  hideous   promiscuities,  will  pro- 
claim the  liberation  and  the  completion  of  the 
mother  country." 

We  may  judge  of  the  emotion  which  such 
language  was  bound  to  produce  in  the  crowd, 
supported  as  it  was  by  such  exciting  revelations, 
revelations  of  such  an  unusual  nature,  concerning 
the  diplomatic  under-side  of  the  European 
conflict ;  the  piazza  once  more  became  the 
forum  where  the  affairs  of  the  State  were  ex- 
pounded to  the  citizens.  And  the  good  name 
and  the  honour  of  the  nation  were  at  stake.  Not 
only  was  the  accomplishment  of  the  national 
destinies  in  danger  of  being  arrested  by  foreign 
intervention ;  but  Italy's  engagements  toward 
other  Powers  would  not  be  kept.  This  was 
servitude ;  it  was  humiliation ;  and  public 
opinion  was  thereby  wounded  in  its  most  sensitive 
part  :  in  the  course  of  these  fiery  and  tumultuous 
days  the  Nationalist  ideal,  which  had  been  slowly 
preparing  for  ten  years,  and  had  been  further 
developed  by  the  expedition  to  Libya,  took  an 
enormous  leap  upwards.  How  many  moral  forces, 
intellectual  currents,  and  traditions,  which  had 
perhaps  been  nourished  in  unconsciousness, 
how  many  conflicting  sentiments  and  hitherto 
obscure  desires,  emerged  and  effected  their  con- 
junction at  this  moment !  The  pride  of  the 
Roman  citizen — who  in  our  days  has  revived, 
and  not  in  vain,  the  symbol  S.P.Q.R.  in  his 
municipal  life — was   mingled  with  memories   of 


220  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

the  Risorgimento  and  the  vivid  notion  v^hich 
modern  Italy  possesses  of  her  rights  and  duties 
as  a  Great  Power. 

What  a  mistake,  what  a  false  note,  what  a 
grievous  defect  on  the  part  of  Prince  von  Biilow, 
not  to  have  understood  that  his  extraordinary 
mission,  his  personal  importance,  and  the  sus- 
picious goings  and  comings  at  the  Villa  Malta 
were  bound  to  alarm  the  susceptibilities  of  the 
Italian  people,  who  were  still  full  of  memories 
of  foreign  domination  !  The  sense  of  national 
dignity  and  independence,  which  was  so  potent 
and  so  decisive  a  feeling  in  the  crisis  of  May  191 5, 
has  found  in  Signor  Guglielmo  Ferrero  an  inter- 
preter who  has  given  prominence  to  its  historical 
character,  just  as  Signor  d' Annunzio  has  trans- 
lated it  lyrically. 

''  Prince  von  Biilow,"  wrote  the  eminent 
historian  in  the  Secolo,  "  attempted  to  overthrow 
a  legal  Government  which  he  knew  was  inacces- 
sible to  his  proposals.  These  are  the  methods 
which  German  diplomacy  employs  in  Constan- 
tinople and  Teheran,  and  which  she  used  to 
employ  in  Fez  before  Morocco  was  placed  under 
the  protection  of  France.  The  ambassador  who 
did,  in  any  European  capital,  what  Herr  von 
Biilow  has  done  in  Rome  must  have  been 
instantly  recalled  upon  the  demand  of  the  Power 
to  which  he  was  accredited.  This  formidable 
crisis  ought  to  make  it  plain  before  all  the  world 
whether  Italy  is  disposed  to  allow  German 
diplomacy  to  treat  her  as  it  treats  Turkey,  Persia, 
and  Morocco,  making  no  distinction  between 
Rome  and  Byzantium." 

These     insurrections    of     Italian     patriotism 


THE  HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  221 

against  the  Imperial  representative,  the  missus 
dominicus  of  Wilhelm  II,  have  often  reminded 
us  of  an  incident  of  Roman  life,  which  occurred 
some  years  ago,  in  w^hich  three  personages  destined 
to  play  a  part  of  the  first  importance  in  the 
circumstances  v^hich  we  are  describing  appeared 
side  by  side,  united  by  those  conventions  of  the 
world  which  assemble  friends  and  enemies  in  the 
same  drawing-room.  There  was  a  reception  in 
the  Palazzo  Farnese.  Beneath  the  magnificent 
vaulted  ceilings,  on  which  are  painted  the 
mythological  deities  of  Caraccio,  were  the  staffs 
of  the  embassies  and  the  representatives  of  the 
world  of  Italian  politics  and  the  Roman  aris- 
tocracy. There  was  also  present  a  French 
military  mission,  commanded  by  a  general  who 
was  to  be  Governor  of  Paris  in  tragic  circum- 
stances. How  many,  since  then,  must  have  met 
face  to  face  on  the  field  of  battle,  of  those  who 
that  evening  were  chatting  about  the  buffet — 
loaded  with  the  wines  of  a  Champagne  which  the 
German  armies  had  not  yet  ravaged  !  On  that 
evening  too — in  those  days,  which  already  seem 
so  distant,  when  peace  yet  reigned  over  Europe 
— the  French  Ambassador  had  invited  Prince  von 
Biilow,  as  he  had  invited  all  distinguished  foreigners 
then  sojourning  in  Rome.  Who  would  have 
prophesied  then  that  the  ex-Chancellor  of  the 
German  Empire,  living  in  retirement  in  his  Villa 
Malta,  somewhat  as  Bismarck,  after  his  disgrace, 
had  lived  in  retirement  at  Varzin,  would  presently 
be  instructed  by  his  master  to  make  a  supreme 
effort  to  retain  Italy  in  the  alliance  of  the  two 
Central  Empires  ? 

Chance  would  have  it  that  at  a  given  moment 


222  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

the  French  Ambassador,  Signer  Tittoni,  and 
Prince  von  Biilow  came  under  our  observation  in 
the  same  salon  of  the  wonderful  palace  which 
is  the  home  of  France  in  Rome.  What  an  in- 
teresting contrast  between  the  fine,  expressive 
features  of  M.  Camille  Barrere,  and  the  strongly 
modelled  countenance,  lit  by  a  glance  of  fire, 
of  the  Italian  diplomatist,  and  the  broad,  power- 
ful German  shoulders  of  Prince  von  Biilow,  sur- 
mounted by  a  foppish  countenance,  in  the  midst 
of  which  opened  a  large  mouth,  a  veritable 
picture  of  the  German  appetite  for  conquest ! 
Even  when  this  mouth  intended  to  smile  it  had 
an  expression  of  wanting  to  swallow  everything. 
The  contrast  between  the  person  of  the  ex- 
Chancellor  and  the  French  Ambassador  or  the 
Italian  Minister  was  a  concise  datum,  an  indica- 
tion worth  remembering.  Let  these  three  types 
of  humanity  be  brought  together  in  circum- 
stances of  any  difficulty,  and  it  was  almost  certain 
that  Prince  von  Biilow,  though  by  no  means 
without  experience,  would  be  carried  away  by 
his  Prussian  brutality,  his  excessive  confidence  in 
the  forces  of  Germanism,  and  would  commit  one 
of  those  mistakes  of  which  the  Latins  are  im- 
mediately sensible,  and  which  those  who  have 
to  deal  with  them  should  particularly  avoid. 

On  this  point  the  feeling  of  the  Italians  is 
unanimous.  "  Prince  von  Biilow,"  an  ex-Am- 
bassador of  Italy  informed  us,  "  relied  above  all, 
and  almost  entirely,  upon  the  opinion  of  a  number 
of  '  neutralist '  deputies,  who  kept  on  repeating 
that  war  was  a  serious  matter,  a  very  serious 
matter.  The  hesitations  of  these  politicians  were 
no  secret  to  him.     And  he  proceeded  to  suggest 


THE   HISTORIC  MONTH  IN  ITALY  223 

to  them  :  '  What  Italian  patriotism  desires, 
that  I  can  obtain  for  you,  while  you  need  not 
run  the  risk  of  an  armed  conflict.'  It  was  the 
part  of  Mephistopheles ;  Prince  von  Biilow  never 
got  beyond  that.  He  stopped  short  at  the 
epidermis  of  the  country ;  he  never  felt  the 
flesh  under  the  skin.  Which  proves  that  although 
he  may  pass  in  Germany  for  a  shrewd  dealer,  he  is 
really  quite  devoid  of  real  penetration.  Prince 
von  Biilow  showed  Italy  what  combinations  and 
compensations  were  possible  at  the  expense  of 
other  States  than  Austria.  He  pointed  out  the 
road  to  Tunis  and  the  road  to  Egypt.  And  it 
never  entered  his  mind  that  these  temptations 
must  remain  ineffectual,  because  the  Italians 
very  soon  felt  that  in  a  European  crisis  the 
enduring  profit  and  the  undying  honour  would 
be  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  and  not  with  the 
Germanic  Empires.  To  facile,  inglorious  and, 
for  that  matter,  uncertain  annexations,  the 
Italian  people  preferred  the  conquest,  at  the 
price  of  blood,  of  the  terra  fatrum,  the  soil  to 
which  it  had  for  so  many  long  years  laid  claim, 
so  that  an  Italy  morally  and  materially  aggran- 
dised should  issue  from  this  war  with  her  ancient 
allies,  while  the  combinations  proposed  by 
Prince  von  Biilow,  however  advantageous — and 
they  were  not  greatly  so — could  only  leave  a 
diminished  and — it  must  be  said — a  discredited 
Italy.  .   .  ." 

But  before  Prince  von  Biilow  could  understand 
that  he  would  first  of  all  have  to  cease  to  think 
and  to  feel  as  a  German,  or  to  retain  in  his  veins 
a  drop  of  authentic  Prussian  blood. 

"  One  thing  that  was  particularly  intolerable 


A 


224  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Italian  opinion,"  a  popular  tribune  told  us, 
*  was  that  Prince  von  Biilow,  the  ambassador  of 
a  foreign  State,  should  have  professed  to  nego- 
tiate v^ith  a  group  of  Parliamentarians,  should 
have  meddled  in  our  domestic  affairs,  should 
have  attempted  to  create,  in  the  political  world, 
a  movement  contrary  to  the  activities  of  the 
Government.  By  so  doing  Prince  von  Blilow 
allowed  Germany's  schemes  in  respect  of  Italy 
to  be  seen  through.  He  betrayed  the  mental 
reservation  of  our  ancient  allies  ;  their  intention 
to  manage  us  in  their  own  way.  Italy  perfectly 
understood  this  intention  and  would  not  suffer 
it.  There  was  an  outburst  of  popular  indig- 
nation, and  the  war  was  virtually  declared  on 
the  day  when  the  Italian  people  became  conscious 
of  the  foreign  oppressor." 

Prince  von  Biilow  should  have  known,  in  fact, 
that  few  peoples  are  so  sensitive  as  the  Italian 
people  to  anything  of  a  nature  to  make  them  fear 
foreign  intervention  or  domination.  Italy  has 
suffered  sufficiently  to  be  aware  of  the  fate  of  a 
country  which  has  lost  its  national  independence. 
The  memories  of  the  Austrian  occupation  are 
not  so  remote.  And  in  a  flash  the  tedesco  was 
seen  returning.  The  Italians  beheld  the  "  bar- 
barians "  recrossing  the  Alps,  descending  once 
more  into  Italy,  according  to  the  old  historic 
aspirations  which  are  still  acting  on  the  German 
peoples.  The  invasion  was  indeed  approaching, 
although  it  had  assumed  the  political  form  of 
an  alliance  and  the  economic  form  of  a  com-^ 
mercial  and  financial  collaboration.  Italy,  for 
some  years,  had  been  beginning  to  realise  that 
she  had  merely  expelled  the  German — under  his 


THE  HISTORIC  MONTH   IN  ITALY  225 

Austrian  aspect — by  the  door,  to  see  him  return — 
under  his  Prussian  aspect — by  the  window. 
Hence  the  immense  relief,  the  profound  satis- 
faction which  the  rupture  with  the  Central 
Empires  was  to  bring. 

It  was  only  at  the  last  moment  that  Prince  von 
Biilow  realised  the  extent  of  his  imprudence  and 
his  mistake.  When  it  was  learned  at  the  Villa 
Malta  that  the  crowd  had  just  held  a  sympathetic 
demonstration  before  the  Palazzo  Farnese,  ac- 
claiming France  and  the  Triple  Entente,  and  the 
French  Ambassador,  M.  Camille  Barres,  the 
patient  and  successful  author  of  the  Franco- 
Italian  agreement,  someone,  thinking  perhaps  to 
please  the  ex-Chancellor  of  Wilhelm  II,  exclaimed 
that  these  popular  demonstrations  were  without 
significance  ;  that  they  were  the  work  merely 
of  a  populace  without  ideals  or  consciousness, 
among  whom  agents  provocateurs  had  been  dis- 
tributing money.  But  Prince  von  Biilow,  it  is 
said,  recovering  his  statesmanship  and  rejecting 
the  illusions  of  his  circle,  replied  to  these  frivolous 
remarks  in  the  most  serious  tone  : 

"  Do  not  believe  that  a  people  will  rise  for  a 
few  pence.  What  is  inspiring  Italy  is  a  great 
national  passion,  and  it  is  against  us  that  this 
passion  has  been  invoked." 

This  comprehension  of  the  situation  had  come 
too  late,  and  Prince  von  Biilow  was  displaying 
the  ''  philosophy  of  the  staircase,"  or  rather,  of 
his  letters  of  recall. 

Among  the  psychological  errors,  the  defects  of 
intuition,  and  the  proofs  of  inability  to  enter 
into  the  minds  of  others  which  the  Germans 
have  displayed  in  the  course  of  this  war  the 

15 


226  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

historian  will  experience  an  emharras  du  choix. 
In  the  case  of  Italy  these  errors  were  quite 
supremely  clumsy,  owing  to  a  complete  mis- 
understanding of  Italy.  The  Germany  which 
was  defeated  in  Rome  in  May  191 5  was  not 
merely  the  diplomatic  and  political  Germany  ; 
it  was  Germany  the  historian,  the  intellectual 
Germany,  so  proud  of  her  science  and  her  masses 
of  documents  and  data. 

At  this  moment,  when  the  popular  excitement 
was  reaching  its  crisis,  the  observer  saw  that  the 
drama  was  approaching  resolution,  following,  if 
we  may  say  so,  the  classic  lines.  Italy  was  at  the 
cross-roads ;  she  had  to  choose  between  two 
policies.  And  who  was  master  of  this  choice — 
who  would  be  the  supreme  arbiter  ?  The  crowd, 
with  an  instinctive  movement,  turned  toward 
one  of  the  hills  of  Rome — that  on  which  the 
royal  palace  stands.  It  was  to  the  heir  of  those 
who  had  founded  modern  Italy  that  the  people 
turned  ;  he  it  was  they  demanded  should  inter- 
pret the  national  feeling.  In  him  they  placed 
all  their  trust.  Thus,  by  the  strictly  constitu- 
tional method  of  the  dismissal  of  the  Ministry  the 
crisis  resulted  in  leaving  public  opinion  and  the 
monarchy  face  to  face.  Certain  of  the  popular 
feeling,  Signor  Salandra  was  perhaps  no  less 
certain  of  the  Royal  sentiments.  By  bringing 
these  two  forces  into  contact  his  shrewd  and 
opportune  retirement  saved  the  situation. 

The  "  appeal  to  the  King  " — so  we  might 
name  the  last  of  these  Roman  "  days  "  :  and  the 
King  to  whom  the  people  appealed  was  the 
successor    of    Carlo   Alberto    and   Victor   Em- 


THE  HISTORIC  MONTH   IN  ITALY  227 

manuel  II,  of  the  soldier-kings  who  had  led  Italy 
to  greatness.  Was  there  reason  to  doubt  for  a 
moment  that  their  twentieth-century  successor 
would  follow  in  their  footsteps  ?  The  princes 
of  the  House  of  Savoy  possess  military  traditions : 
in  their  veins  flows  a  warlike  blood,  and  they 
have  been  soldiers  and  war-lords  in  all  the  great 
crises  of  their  history.  Moreover,  for  the  last 
hundred  years  one  idea  has  become  co-substantial 
with  their  race,  and  has  continually  inspired  and 
guided  their  policy  :  the  national  ideal,  the  ideaL 
of  a  greater  Italy.  This  ideal,  one  might  say,, 
has  found  its  tabernacle  in  the  House  of  Savoy,, 
even  as  it  has  found  its  servitors  there.  The 
House  of  Savoy  in  return  has  derived  therefrom 
its  popularity  and  its  strength.  This  ideal 
has  been  its  title  to  the  crown  of  Italy.  It  still 
constitutes  its  great  raison  d^etre.  As  Baron 
Sonnino  stated  in  the  Green  Book,  as  he  instructed 
Signor  Bollati,  in  February,  to  represent  in 
Berlin :  **  The  monarchy  of  Savoy  finds  its 
stoutest  root  in  the  personification  of  the  national 
ideals."  And  Wilhelm  II,  better  than  any, 
ought  to  have  realised  this  ;  for  have  not  the 
Hohenzollerns  known  a  destiny  similar  to  that  of 
the  house  of  Carignan-Savoy,  and  has  not  Prussia, 
through  them,  played  the  same  part  in  Germany 
as  that  which  Piedmont  has  played  in  Italy  ? 

In  1848,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Risorgimento, 
in  the  celebrated  newspaper  which  took  its  name 
from  the  movement,  Cavour,  then  tingling  with 
youth,  had  written  these  unforgotten  lines  : 

"  When  the  hour  of  liberation  is  striking,  it 
would  be  a  cowardice  to  allow  time  to  stand 
still !     It  would  be  not  a  great  and  noble  policy^ 


228  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

but  a  mean  policy,  which  without  safeguarding  us 
against  existing  dangers,  would  cover  the  nation 
with  ignominy,  and  would  perhaps  undermine 
the  ancient  throne  of  the  Savoyard  monarchy 
amid  the  indignation  of  the  trembling  peoples." 

These  lines,  written  nearly  three-quarters  of  a 
century  ago,  were  reprinted  during  the  critical 
days  of  May  191 5  ;  and  the  voice  of  Cavour, 
sounding  across  the  gulf  of  the  years,  had  lost 
nothing  of  its  vigour.  The  House  of  Savoy  found 
itself  confronted  by  one  of  those  historic  moments 
which  have  come  to  it  from  generation  to  genera- 
tion, and  for  Victor  Emmanuel  HI,  as  for  all 
Italy,  a  solemn  hour  was  again  striking. 

Like  his  ancestor  Carlo  Alberto,  to  whom 
Cavour's  adjuration  was  addressed,  Victor  Em- 
manuel III  might  assume  as  his  motto  :  "  I  await 
my  star."  During  the  fifteen  years  since  the 
death  of  Humbert  I  had  called  him  to  the  throne, 
what  opportunity  had  the  successor  of  it  Ri 
galantuomo  and  il  Re  huono  of  manifesting  his 
ideals  and  his  character  ?  Now,  suddenly  and 
magnificently,  the  occasion  presented  itself.  The 
King,  standing  at  the  cross-roads,  had  to  act  at 
once  as  a  constitutional  sovereign  and  as  a  tra- 
ditional sovereign.  He  had  to  resolve  a  Cabinet 
crisis  which  was  involved  in  a  national  crisis. 
On  the  one  hand  he  must  act  as  the  representa- 
tive of  the  executive  power  in  a  Parliamentary 
Government.  On  the  other  hand,  the  will  of  the 
public  and  the  urge  of  the  populace  invested  him 
with  a  mandate  infinitely  more  comprehensive 
than  the  consultation  of  politicians  and  the  dis- 
cernment of  the  wishes  of  the  Chamber  regarding 
the  constitution  of  a  new  Ministry.    The  general 


THE  HISTORIC  MONTH  IN  ITALY  229 

opinion  had  entrusted  Victor  Emmanuel  III  with 
the  initiative  and  the  supreme  responsibiUty  in 
the  matter  of  peace  or  war.  For  the  formula 
"  the  king  reigns  but  does  not  govern  "  has  never 
been  understood  by  the  crowd.  In  times  of 
crisis,  at  all  events,  the  crowd  always  tends  to 
turn  to  the  head  of  the  State  ;  to  expect  from 
him,  if  not  to  demand  from  him,  decisions  and 
deeds.  It  is  related  that  on  one  of  the  most 
fervid  days  of  the  May  demonstrations,  the 
crowd  having  assembled  before  the  Quirinal,  the 
Syndic  of  the  Roman  municipality  was  received 
at  the  Palace,  and  that  the  following  brief 
conversation  took  place  between  the  King  and 
the  aedile  : 

"  You  come  with  the  whole  people  ?  "  Victor 
Emmanuel  inquired. 

A  little  uncertain  of  the  sense  of  this  query, 
thinking,  perhaps,  that  it  conveyed  disappro- 
bation. Prince  Colonna  hastened  to  reply  : 

"  It  is  for  the  greatness  of  your  Majesty." 

"  For  the  greatness  of  the  nation  !  "  responded 
the  sovereign  quickly.  And  the  King  has  indeed 
fulfilled  the  two  portions  of  the  part  which  has 
fallen  to  him  in  the  most  national  spirit  imagin- 
able ;  but — and  he  here  displayed  a  rare  versa- 
tility— he  employed  very  different  methods  in 
the  two  cases. 

In  the  resolution  of  the  ministerial  difficulty 
Victor  Emmanuel  III  proved  himself  a  consum- 
mate politician.  This  aphorism  is  attributed  to 
him,  as  summing  up  his  personal  experience  : 
*'  When  the  Ministers  are  strong,  the  Crown  may 
be  weak,  and  when  the  Ministers  are  weak  the 
Crown  must  be  strong,"     Signor  Giglittij  whose 


230  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

Ministries  had  formerly  displayed  exceptional 
vitality,  cannot,  in  his  conversations  with  the 
King  during  the  critical  days  of  191 5,  have  re- 
covered the  old  atmosphere.  And  the  King, 
having  gone  through  the  list  of  those  available 
as  Ministers,  allovi^ed  them  to  take  their  leave, 
convinced  that  the  only  policy  to  pursue  v^as 
that  of  Signor  Salandra  ;  having  proved  to  them 
that  if  Signor  Salandra  had  resigned  it  was  an 
act  of  personal  disinterestedness,  designed  to 
show  that  he  did  not  covet  the  glory  of  attaching 
his  name  to  the  war ;  and  having  done  so  much 
the  King  had  cleared  the  ground  and  solved  the 
Parliamentary  crisis  :  it  only  remained  for  him 
to  recall  to  power  the  men  who  had  denounced 
the  Austrian  Alliance  and  concluded  an  agree- 
ment with  the  Triple  Entente. 

So,  by  a  veritable  master-stroke,  did  the  King 
constitutionally  interpret  the  popular  will. 
Without  incurring  the  risks  of  a  dissolution  and 
a  general  election  in  a  disturbed  country,  and  in 
the  face  of  the  most  serious  of  European  crises, 
he  had  made  an  end  of  the  conflict  which  was 
threatening  between  Parliament  and  public 
opinion.  The  political  world  therefore  owes  to 
Victor  Emmanuel  an  honourable  solution  of  the 
conflict,  a  pacification  of  which  more  than  one 
Parliamentarian  realises  the  value  to-day.  Italy 
owes  to  him  the  decision  which  has  laid  the  whole 
future  open  to  the  Italian  nation,  and  is  guiding 
it  towards  its  loftier  destinies.  The  King  has 
returned  to  the  traditions  of  his  house.  He  has 
been  what  was  expected  of  him — a  prince  of 
the  House  of  Savoy.  For  the  country  he  has 
been  the  guide Jand  leader,  and,  in  the  morq 


THE  HISTORIC  MONTH  IN  ITALY  231 

Roman  sense  of  the  word,  the  dictator.  His 
personal  prestige  is  now  immense.  The  dynasty 
has  never  been  more  powerful,  more  firmly 
established,  more  popular  throughout  Italy. 
And  once  again,  following  the  example  of  Maz- 
zini  and  Garibaldi,  patriotic  republicans  have 
rallied  to  the  monarchy  for  reasons  of  national 
interest. 

Are  we  justified  in  going  still  farther  ?  Can 
we  say  (as  some  are  saying  in  Rome)  that  the 
greatest  service  which  the  Crown  performed  for 
Italy  under  these  circumstances  was  to  save  it 
from  a  revolution  ? 

If  Signor  Salandra's  return  to  power  and  the 
declaration  of  war  upon  Austria  could  not  have 
been  contrived — if  the  partisans  of  neutrality  had 
won  the  day — would  the  popular  demonstrations, 
which  by  the  15  th  of  May  had  reached  their 
highest  pitch  of  violence,  have  degenerated  into 
a  movement  of  a  truly  revolutionary  character  ? 
Certain  observers  of  these  events  were  of  opinion 
that  they  would.  "  I  have  never  so  thoroughly 
understood  the  Terror,"  one  of  these  confided 

to  us.     Princess  X ,  again,  informed  us  that 

on  the  evening  of  the  15  th  of  May  she  felt  as 
though  transported  to  the  year  1793,  when  she 
saw  a  body  of  men  of  the  people  invading  her 
apartments.  However,  it  was  only  that  some 
orators,  who  were  followed  by  their  friends,  had 
decided  that  the  balcony  of  the  palazzo  was  an 
excellent  platform  from  which  to  address  the 
people. 

But  a  revolution,  in  our  days,  and  with  the 
powerful  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  Govern- 
ments, could  not  take  place  without  the  collabor^- 


232  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

tion  of  the  Army.  Would  the  Italian  Army  have 
given  ear  to  a  fro7iunciamento  ?  Or  was  there  in 
the  Italian  Army  anything  equivalent  to  that 
Military  League  which  a  few  years  ago,  in 
Greece,  succeeded  in  changing  the  direction  of 
politics  ?  There  is  nothing  to  justify  such  a 
supposition,  and  the  Italians  are  unanimous  in 
rejecting  it.  At  the  same  time,  however,  there 
are  many  who  insist  that  it  is  impossible  to  say 
what  would  have  happened  if  public  opinion 
had  not  been  satisfied,  and  if  Signor  Salandra 
had  not  returned  to  power.  At  the  same  time 
it  is  believed  that  if  the  "  neutralists  "  had  won 
the  day  they  would  have  resorted  to  severe 
measures  of  repression,  and  even  of  reprisal.  We 
have  heard  it  said — though  this  may  be  an 
exaggeration--that  Signor  Giolitti,  on  resuming 
his  dictatorship,  would  not  have  hesitated  to 
have  Signor  d'  Annunzio  shot.  So  the  King's 
authority  may  really  have  saved  Italy,  not  indeed 
from  a  revolution,  nor  even  from  an  actual  civil 
war,  but  at  least  from  a  serious  and  lasting  dis- 
turbance of  public  opinion,  a  disturbance  infinitely 
dangerous  at  a  moment  when  Italy,  like  all  the 
peoples  of  Europe,  had  need  of  all  her  strength 
and  all  her  forces  of  internal  cohesion. 

An  Italian  politician  of  great  experience,  who 
has  filled  high  offices  in  this  country,  informed 
us  that  he  had  remarked  that  no  one  in  Italy 
had  raised  the  cry  of  war  until  the  Government 
had  declared  itself.  The  nation  was  longing  for 
war,  but,  like  the  Army  itself,  it  was  waiting  for 
the  royal  declaration,  the  command  of  the 
supreme  chief.  These  popular  manifestations  of 
May  were  above  all  an  expression  of  national  pride 


THE  HISTORIC   MONTH   IN   ITALY  233 

wounded  by  German  intervention,  and  of  indig- 
nation caused  by  the  intolerable  feeling  that 
foreign  influences  were  seeking  to  force  themselves 
upon  the  policy  of  Italy.  Observers  were  struck 
indeed  by  the  violence  with  which  the  idea  of 
treachery  took  hold  of  the  public  mind  during 
these  days  of  excitement.  It  is  enough  to  recall 
the  fact  that  in  May  191 5  people  spoke  of 
"  Billow  and  Macchio  "  almost  as  they  used  to 
speak  of  '*  Pitt  and  Coburg  "  in  Paris  in  1793. 
Here,  again,  is  a  characteristic  fact  to  be  added 
to  those  which  we  have  already  cited  :  on  the 
critical  day  of  May  isth  the  clerks  of  the 
Ministries  held  a  demonstration,  in  a  body,  in 
favour  of  Signor  Salandra.  That  Government 
officials  should  fearlessly  give  vent  to  their  feel- 
ings, and  should  compromise  themselves  even  to 
the  extent  of  physically  maltreating  certain 
politicians,  would  be  a  highly  significant  symptom 
in  any  country.  It  was  one  of  the  signs  of  that 
dangerous  excitement  which  the  King's  declara- 
tion finally  allayed. 

But  if  the  King  had  replied  in  the  negative  ? 
If  he  had  preferred  the  calculations  of  '*  neutral- 
ism "  to  the  risks  of  war  ?  Well,  in  that  case 
it  is  more  than  probable  that  after  a  few  dis- 
turbances all  would  have  quieted  down  again. 
The  King  would  have  shattered  the  hopes  of  the 
patriots  and  disappointed  historic  aspirations. 
But  no  one  can  pretend  that  he  would  not  have 
carried  with  him,  not  merely  the  majority  of  the 
Chamber  and  the  Senate,  but  also,  in  the  mass  of 
the  Italian  people,  the  rural  portion  of  the  popu- 
lation, which  in  Italy  as  elsewhere  is  a  friend  of 
repose  and  the  enemy  of  change,  ready  to  follow 


234  ITALY  AND   THE   WAR 

the  impulses  and  suggestions  of  the  great  cities, 
which  are  in  turn  guided  by  their  elite. 

The  Italians  are  not  a  little  proud  of  the  energy 
which  they  displayed  and  the  capacity  for  action 
of  which  they  gave  proof  in  these  circumstances. 
"  The  European  crisis  has  revealed  on  the  one 
hand  peoples  which  have  responded  to  an  act  of 
provocation ;  on  the  other  hand,  peoples  which 
have  blindly  followed  their  aggressive  Govern- 
ment. All  have  accepted  a  situation  created 
without  their  knowledge  or  imposed  by  force  of 
circumstances.  We  only,  in  agreement  with  our 
Government  and  our  King,  have  chosen  ;  we 
only  have  willed  our  war."  So  say  the  Italians, 
and  rightly.  It  was  in  fact  a  popular  movement 
— and  this  we  must  not  forget — a  profound  and 
forcible  popular  movement  which  impelled  Italy 
to  intervene.  And  this  movement  found,  to 
guide  it,  a  national  dynasty,  and  to  exalt  it,  a 
poet.  At  the  same  time,  politicians  of  the  worth 
and  calibre  of  Signor  Salandra  and  Baron  Sonnino, 
of  a  breadth  of  view  and  an  uprightness  which 
have  never  been  surpassed  in  Italy,  were  to  hold 
the  reins  of  government  during  these  decisive 
days.  It  is  a  page  of  her  history  which  Italy  will 
love  to  recall.  This  page,  which  was  a  sort  of 
preface  to  and  preparation  for  her  national  war, 
deserves  no  little  admiration^ 


CHAPTER    VIII 

THE    FUTURE 

Italy's  objectives — ^The  "  sacred  egoism  " — Italian  realism  and 
the  principle  of  nationalities — Italy  and  Germany :  why 
they  both  expect  a  declaration  of  war — Hypotheses  concern- 
ing the  part  of  Italy  in  a  future  Congress — ^The  Austrian 
"  cushion  " — ^Threats  of  Pangermanism — "  The  war  which 
is  to  establish  Central  Europe  " — ^The  future  policy  of 
Italy  in  the  Balkans  and  the  East — The  future  of  the 
Franco-Italian  relations — Reasons  for  believing  in  a  durable 
entente  and  a  lasting  friendship. 

Italy  knows  perfectly  well  what  she  has  done 
and  what  she  desired  in  entering  into  the  Euro- 
pean War.  She  has  clearly  defined  her  intentions 
to  herself,  and  has  had,  from  the  first,  an  admir- 
ably lucid  consciousness  of  the  objectives  which 
she  was  proposing  to  herself. 

These  objectives  (it  is  always  important  to 
remember)  are  four  in  number.  Firstly,  the 
I  recovery  from  Austria  of  the  terre  irredente^  of 
t  Trieste  and  the  Trentino.  Secondly,  the  domina- 
tion of  the  Adriatic  and  the  maintenance  of 
equilibrium  in  the  Balkans.  Thirdly,  the  con- 
solidation of  the  results  obtained  in  the  iEgean 
Sea  by  the  occupation  of  the  Twelve  Islands,  the 
preface  to  the  development  of  Italian  penetration 
in  the  East,  especially  in  Asia  Minor.  Fourthly, 
the  affirmation  of  Italy  as  a  great  European  Poweri 

235 


236  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

liberated  from  all  subordination,  all  servitude  of 
whatever  kind.  It  was  in  the  face  of  the  Central 
Empires,  in  the  face  of  Germany,  still  so  imposing 
hy  reason  of  her  military  resources,  that  Italy,  in 
191 5,  proclaimed  her  complete  independence, 
her  intention  of  joining  herself  to  the  peoples 
battling  against  an  attempted  hegemony.  The 
latest  comer  in  the  high  society  of  European 
nations,  hitherto  rather  regarded  as  a  younger 
sister  by  the  Hexarchy,  Italy,  by  her  own  initia- 
tive, will  finally  classify  herself  as  a  State  of  the 
first  order.  From  this  point  of  view  her  inter- 
vention will  have  been  the  crowning  of  her  entire 
policy  since  1870.  It  will  even  have  been,  so  to 
speak,  an  aggrandised  revival,  extended  to  the 
European  field  of  action,  of  the  famous  formula  : 
fara  da  se.  Let  nations  of  the  second  class  tremble 
before  Germany.  Wilhelm  II  will  have  learned 
that  Italy,  in  future,  must  not  be  regarded  as 
anyone's  satellite.  Only  the  imprudent  will  fail 
to  realise  that  she  is  henceforth  on  an  equality 
with  the  greatest. 

Whatever  may  befall,  whatever  may  be  the 
outcome  of  the  understanding  of  the  Allies, 
here,  for  the  Italian  people,  is  the  first  benefit 
to  be  acquired.  And  this  moral  and  political 
benefit  cannot  be  taken  from  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  will  it  ransom,  at  the  price  of  blood,  the 
cities  and  provinces  claimed  by  the  irredentist  ? 
Will  it  restore  the  Venetian  Empire  upon  an 
Adriatic  which  will  have  ceased  to  be  a  "  very 
bitter  "  sea,  on  which  it  will  no  longer  have  to 
suffer  the  neighbourhood  of  an  Austria  favoured 
by  the  best  ports,  by  hospitable  coasts  and 
islands  f 


THE   FUTURE  237 

These  are  secrets  which  still  repose  in  the 
womb  of  the  future.  But  henceforth  Italy  has 
foreclosed  her  mortgage  on  Vallona,  that  Albanian 
Gibraltar  ;  and  her  possession  of  Rhodes  is  no 
longer  contested.  Materially  speaking,  she  will 
not  emerge  from  this  war  with  empty  hands. 

One  thing  of  which  we  must  not  lose  sight  is 
that  the  war  which  Italy  is  waging  is  above  all  a 
war  of  expansion  and  conquest.  Neither  France 
nor  England  nor  Russia,  to  speak  only  of  these, 
has  entered  upon  this  campaign  with  any  view 
of  aggrandisement.  We  know  this  well  enough  ; 
for  these  Powers  it  is  a  question  of  defending  their 
lives,  of  resisting  an  attack,  a  threat  of  destruction. 
There  is  here,  at  the  point  of  departure,  a  sensible 
difference  between  Italy  and  the  Allies.  This 
difference  in  no  wise  affects  their  relations.  It 
does  not  hamper  the  common  work.  But  it 
would  be  a  mistake  to  forget  it.  It  is  a  fact 
which  should  be  taken  into  account,  as  should  all 
facts.  It  may,  in  this  or  that  circumstance, 
imply  a  state  of  mind  peculiar  to  the  Italian 
Government  and  people. 

We  have  endeavoured  to  show,  in  the  course 
of  this  book,  in  what  manner  and  in  what  propor- 
tions idealism  and  realism  are  combined  to  shape 
the  politics  of  contemporary  Italy.  But  this 
idealism  itself,  we  have  seen,  has  one  dominant 
characteristic.  We  have  seen  that  it  is  above 
all  nationalist.  "  A  sacred  egoism " ;  this 
famous,  historic  phrase,  which  gave  rise  to  so 
many  hypotheses,  and  which  Signor  Salandra 
pronounced  at  a  moment  when  Italy's  course  was 
yet  uncertain,  is  profoundly  expressive  of  Italian 
thought.    Egoism,  when  it  is   the  egoism  of   a 


238  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

nation,  becomes  a  duty  and  a  virtue.     It  becomes 
purified.     Does  it  not  affect  the  fate  of  millions 
of  living  creatures,  millions  of  millions  of  men  yet 
to  be  born  ?    Those  Governments  which  have  not 
this  sense  of  egoism  are  guilty  ;    they  are  dan- 
gerously mischievous.     Those  peoples  who  know 
nothing  of  it  run  the  risk  of  a  cruel  awakening. 
But  the  Italian  people  will  never  find  themselves 
in  this  case.     It  has  set  out  for  this  war,  for  "  its 
war,"  with  the  most  definite  idea  of  its  interests, 
j  It  was   informed,   and  it  perfectly  understood, 
I  that  it  was  not  waging  a  war  for  the  sake  of 
i  magnificence  nor  for  the  sake  of  principles ;   that 
j  it  was  fighting  for  itself,  but  not  for  its  neigh- 
I  bours. 

At  the  same  time  it  must  not  be  concluded 
that  Italy  remained  indifferent  to  the  atrocities 
which  the  civilised  world  has  witnessed  during 
the  last  two  years.  Nothing  could  be  more 
unjust ;  nothing  could  be  more  untrue.  The 
fate  of  Belgium  aroused  public  opinion  to  indig- 
nation. When  the  German  armies  were  marching 
upon  Paris,  Italy  was  greatly  distressed,  and  the 
victory  of  the  Marne,  which  checked  the  invasion, 
allayed  a  cruel  anxiety.  Italy  is  far  from  being 
insensible  to  justice  ;  but  she  objects  to  making 
justice  and  equity  the  absolute  masters  of  her 
policy.  She  is  by  no  means  incapable  of  enthu- 
siasm and  generosity.  But  she  does  not  care  to 
be  generous  and  to  lose  thereby.  She  strongly 
objects  to  sacrifice  ;  so  that  this  State,  founded 
on  the  principle  of  nationalities,  which  has  bene- 
fited in  the  past  by  the  enthusiasm  aroused  by 
the  cause  of  the  peoples,  refuses — and  quite 
frankly — to    obey   this    principle  blindly,   unre- 


THE    FUTURE  239 

servedly  to  champion  this  cause.  There  is,  no 
doubt  (for  nothing  has  deeper  roots  than  an  idea), 
an  important  section  of  Italian  opinion  which  is 
still  actuated  by  the  doctrines  of  the  French 
Revolution  and  French  liberalism. 

The  presence  of  Garibaldians  in  the  Argonne 
is  proof  thereof.  //  Secolo,  for  example,  which 
did  so  much  for  the  cause  of  intervention,  spoke 
the  language  of  democratic  idealism,  the  language 
of  the  majority  of  French  newspapers.  And  this 
element  has  contributed  to  the  movement  which 
drew  Italy  into  the  conflict ;  but  it  was  not  the 
decisive  factor.  The  traditional  doctrines  of 
liberalism  were  years  ago  discarded  by  Italian 
criticism.  As  for  the  public,  it  is  extremely 
fond  of  the  discussions  of  political  philosophy, 
and  they  have  been  popularised  for  its  benefit. 

We  can  even  remember  to  have  read,  two  years 
ago,  in  a  popular  journal,  over  the  unexpected 
signature  of  Signor  Luzzatti,  an  analysis  of  the 
Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  which  was  in 
parts  extremely  ironical,  and  which  no  French 
politician  would  have  dared  to  sign,  owing  to  his 
respect  for  accepted  ideas  and  established  doctrine. 

Italy,  who  is  fighting  for  herself  in  this  war, 
is  therefore  in  danger  of  remaining  unaware  of 
certain  theoretical  or  sentimental  considerations 
which,  it  seems,  are  still  of  value  in  the  eyes  of 
at  least  some  of  the  Allies.  For  example,  if 
there  were  questions  in  a  future  Congress  of 
organising  Europe  in  conformity  with  the  principle 
of  nationalities,  as  has  often  been  proposed  in 
England  and  in  France,  we  may  doubt  whether 
Italy  would  find  herself  always  and  at  all  points 
in  agreement  with  France  and  England. 


240  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

As  far  as  the  East  is  concerned,  in  particular, 
independently  of  their  special  interest  and  their 
personal  views,  the  Italians,  with  a  fair  amount 
of  justification,  are  sceptical  of  the  virtue  of  the 
principle  of  nationalities,  and  would  be  inclined 
to  regard  it  as  a  factor  of  disturbance  rather  than 
as  a  means  of  pacification.  Do  not  let  us  forget 
that  these  questions  are  of  practical  and  immediate 
significance  to  the  ItaHan  ;  concerning  peoples 
with  whom  they  are  in  contact,  and  of  whom 
they  have  direct  experience.  They  do  not 
believe  that  a  formula  has  power  to  act  like  a 
magician's  ring,  and  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos. 
Above  all  they  are  not  inclined  to  sacrifice  either 
their  security  or  their  projects  for  a  theory, 
and  a  theory  which  seems  to  them  contestable. 
A  realist  in  war,  the  Italian  is  even  more  of  a 
realist  in  time  of  peace  ;  this  is  a  point  of  prime 
importance,  an  essential  fact  of  which  we  must 
never  lose  sight. 


The  question  of  the  relations  between  Italy 
and  Germany  belongs  to  the  same  order  of  con- 
siderations. 

It  is  often  asked  why,  months  after  breaking  with 
Austria,  Italy  was  not  yet  at  war  with  the  German 
Empire,  although  she  had  given  manifest  proofs 
of  her  agreement  with  the  Allies  and  had  even 
subscribed  officially  to  the  pact  of  London.  But 
it  will  be  seen  that  if  a  state  of  war  does  not  yet 
exist  between  the  two  countries,  it  is  because 
Germany  has  done  all  she  could  do  to  avoid  it, 
or  at  least  to  postpone  the  moment  of  its  advent. 

At  the  outset,  the  German  press  saluted  the 


THE   FUTURE  241 

denunciation  of  the  Triple  Alliance  by  an  explo- 
sion of  wrath.  Forty-eight  hours  later  the  tone 
adopted  by  the  press  in  speaking  of  the  Italian 
Government  and  people  was  perceptibly  modified. 
There  was  no  longer  any  question  of  espousing 
the  cause  of  Austria,  even  though  she  was  attacked. 
A  few  weeks  later  Maximilian  Harden  even  pub- 
lished an  article  in  which  he  offered  an  unexpected 
justification  of  the  policy  followed  by  Italy. 
Everyone  knows  that  in  Germany  even  those 
writers  who  appear  to  be  most  independent 
willingly  direct  their  efforts  as  those  in  high 
places  direct  them.  Harden's  article,  therefore, 
had  the  value  of  a  general  and  reliable  indication. 
From  that  day,  in  fact,  the  German  policy  has 
been  to  walk  delicately  upon  Italian  ground. 

Germany  has  many  reasons  for  discretion  in  her 
treatment  of  Italy.  Firstly,  from  the  military 
point  of  view,  it  goes  without  saying  that  the 
Emperor  has  nothing  to  gain  by  an  increase  in 
the  number  of  his  enemies.  A  declaration  of  war 
upon  Italy  which  was  not  followed  by  an  im- 
mediate and  energetic  offensive,  by  an  over- 
whelming campaign  in  the  Napoleonic  style, 
followed  by  an  entry  into  Milan  at  the  end  of 
three  weeks,  would  be  serious  evidence  of  Ger- 
many's weakness  and  the  exhaustion  of  her  armies. 
Now  the  Empire  has  no  means  of  executing  such 
a  plan.  Were  Germany  to  declare  war  upon 
Italy,  and  then  do  nothing,  or  wage  a  defensive 
war  merely,  as  the  Austrians  are  doing,  she 
would  by  her  own  action  diminish  her  military 
prestige.  It  is  easy  to  understand  that  she 
prefers  to  say  that  if  she  is  not  fighting  Italy 
it  is  because  Austria  (to  whom  she  has,  moreover, 

16 


242  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

lent  the  aid  of  Bavarian  troops)  is  abundantly 
sufficient  for  the  task. 

It  is  obvious,  again,  that  Germany  is  anxious 
that  v^hen  the  moment  comes  for  considering 
terms  of  peace,  when  a  Peace  Congress  is  con- 
vened, there  shall  remain  at  least  one  European 
Great  Power  which  has  not  been  her  enemy, 
which  she  has  not  encountered  on  the  battlefield, 
against  which  she  has  not  committed  the  inex- 
piable. Moreover,  from  the  economic  and  com- 
mercial point  of  view  Italy  was  lately  regarded 
by  the  Germans,  no  less  than  Belgium  and 
France,  as  a  sort  of  dependency  and  future 
protectorate.  It  is  painful  to  them  to  imagine 
their  future  activities  as  limited  in  that  direction. 
They  feel  that  they  are  henceforth  divided  from 
all  the  other  European  nations  by  a  river  of 
blood.  They  realise  that  the  resumption  of 
normal  relations  with  the  rest  of  Europe  will  be 
difficult.  They  prefer  that  there  should  remain 
at  least  one  great  European  State  with  which 
an  immediate  raffrochement  would  be  possible 
without  the  interposition  of  atrocious  memories 
and  enduring  resentment. 

On  her  side  also,  it  is  true,  Italy  has  not  de- 
clared war  upon  Germany.^  This  is  because  she 
has  no  love  of  vain  parade  or  useless  complica- 
tions. The  absence  of  common  frontiers  between 
the  two  countries  would  have  rendered  the  conflict 
theoretical.  And  this  conflict,  of  no  effect  in  a 
military  sense,  would  have  been  liable  to  give 
rise  to  certain  difficulties,  notably  in  the  interior 
of  the  country. 

We  must  not  blink  the  fact  that  the  repug- 

^  Written  towards  the  end  of  191 5. 


THE   FUTURE  243 

nance  with  which  the  war  was  regarded,  up  to 
May  1915,  by  several  elements  of  Italian  opinion, 
did  not  give  way  without  leaving  certain  traces. 
It  is  true  that  neutralism  bowed  with  a  good  grace 
to  the  accomplished  fact.  It  accepted  the  war 
against  Austria.  But  a  war  against  Germany 
would  have  given  rise  to  other  objections  and 
renewed  opposition.  The  Italian  Government 
preferred  to  proceed  by  stages,  leaving  events 
to  work  themselves  out.  It  knows  what  it  is 
doing ;  its  prudence  is  born  of  wisdom  and 
experience  ;  we  must  allow  it  to  judge  what  is 
opportune. 

It  is  not  unaware,  moreover,  that  any  advan- 
tages obtained  over  Austria  would  be  precarious 
and  even  illusory,  unless  Germany  were  van- 
quished, and  thoroughly  vanquished.  Italy 
knows  too,  that  in  the  event  of  a  German  victory 
she  would  fall  into  a  state  of  subjection  to  the 
Germanic  Empires,  and  that  her  very  security 
and  her  territorial  integrity  would  be  menaced. 
Her  feeling  that  the  peril  of  the  German  hege- 
mony exists  for  her  as  well  as  for  other  countries 
is  lacking  neither  in  force  nor  lucidity.  A  few 
voices,  during  the  last  few  years,  had  already 
given  warning  of  the  invasion  of  the  peninsula 
and  the  seizure  by  Germany  of  various  organisms 
of  the  Italian  State.  The  events  of  1914  finally 
enlightened  Italy  and  revealed  the  full  extent 
of  the  danger  of  that  political,  economic,  and 
even  spiritual  domination  to  which  Germany 
pretends.  In  a  little  book  which  caused  a  con- 
siderable sensation,  "  Italy  and  the  German 
Civilisation,"  Signor  Ugo  Ojetti  vigorously  pre- 
sented the  reasons  why  the  Italians  should  refuse 


244  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

to  suffer  the  tyranny  of  Germany,  either  in  the 
domain  of  the  intelHgence  or  elsewhere.  On  the 
other  hand,  numerous  works,  which  have  been 
widely  read,  have  revealed  and  demonstrated  the 
penetration  of  the  economic  life  of  Italy  by 
German  banking  and  German  commerce.  These 
revelations  produced  their  mental  effect.  With 
her  keen  consciousness  of  her  national  and  moral 
personality,  Italy  is  henceforth  on  her  guard 
against  the  methods  of  that  surreptitious  and 
persistent  invasion,  which  Germany  is  as  well 
able  to  conduct  in  a  peaceful  as  in  a  warlike  form. 
However,  although  the  suspicions  and  the  per- 
ceptions of  Italy  are  aroused,  we  must  reckon 
with  other  considerations,  which  may  one  day 
tend  to  approximate  the  Italian  point  of  view 
to  the  German.  There  is  something  more  than 
mere  chance  in  the  fact  that  the  two  unifications, 
that  of  Germany  and  that  of  Italy,  were  coincident 
in  history.  They  have  interacted  one  on  the 
other,  and  many  political  thinkers  in  Italy  are  of 
opinion  that  the  kingdom  would  be  endangered 
were  Germany  to  be  greatly  weakened,  or  if  she 
were  to  return  to  a  state  of  amorphous  confeder- 
ation, or,  worse  still,  the  condition  of  a  "  dis- 
jointed mosaic."  In  the  hypothesis  of  a  Congress 
in  which  the  victorious  Allies  should  seriously 
undertake  to  ruin  "  Prussian  militarism  "  by  sup- 
pressing the  very  condition  of  German  strength, 
which  is  the  unity  of  Germany  under  the  domina- 
tion of  Prussia,  there  are  reasons  to  believe  that 
Italy  might  be  disposed  to  raise  objections  to  a 
programme  which  would  entail  the  renewal,  so  far 
as  the  Germanic  nations  were  concerned,  of  the 
treaties  of  1815  and  the  treaties  of  Westphalia. 


THE   FUTURE  245 

Still,  the  question  is  as  yet  far  from  presenting 
itself  in  these  terms,  and  it  is  hardly  probable  that 
it  will  for  a  long  time  to  come  present  itself  thus 
definitely  and  rigorously.  The  objection,  which 
exists  in  certain  Italian  minds,  is  therefore  prac- 
tically negligible,  and  does  not  form  one  of  the 
real  problems  of  the  day. 

Contrary  to  a  prejudice  which  is  widely  dis- 
tributed in  France,  Italian  diplomacy  does  not 
seem  to  be  so  anxious  as  has  been  supposed  to 
see  the  Austro- Hungarian  monarchy  disappear. 
Once  her  old  causes  of  difference  with  Austria  were 
settled,  once  she  was  in  possession  of  the  terre 
irredente,  and  without  anxiety  as  regards  the 
Adriatic,  Italy  would  by  no  means  object  to  see 
the  survival  of  the  Habsburg  Empire,  provided 
it  were  sufficiently  strong.  If  this  Empire  were 
to  collapse,  Italy  would  find  herself  in  direct 
contact  with  a  Germany  whose  power  would  be 
formidably  increased,  and  that  is  a  proximity 
she  by  no  means  desires.  On  the  other  hand,  she 
has  for  a  long  time  foreseen  that  the  constitution 
of  a  Yougoslav  State,  which  would  follow  the 
dissolution  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  which  would 
appear  on  the  stage  of  the  world  with  youthful 
forces  and  fresh  appetites,  would  complicate  her 
position,  and  might  well  create  future  difficulties. 
Italy  rightly  prefers  the  known  to  the  unknown. 
Hence  the  theory  ingeniously  styled  the  theory 
of  the  '^  Austrian  cushion."  Nothing,  it  seems, 
could  better  agree  with  the  desires  of  Italy  than 
an  Austria  incapable  of  injuring  her,  yet  vigorous 
enough  to  serve  as  a  buffer-State,  interposed 
between  her  and  too  powerful  Empires  or 
exuberant  nationalities.     Owing  to  the  same  need 


246  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

of  equilibrium,  Italy  would  not  oppose  the 
reconstruction  of  an  autonomous  Poland  on  the 
confines  of  Russia  and  the  Germanic  world. 
Here  are  the  elements  of  a  wise  policy  of  em- 
piricism and  European  conservatism.  If,  after 
the  upheavals  of  this  stupendous  war,  we  are  to 
witness  one  of  those  returns  to  moderation  of 
which  history  shows  us  so  many  examples  as 
following  upon  great  cataclysms,  Italy,  working 
upon  these  lines,  may  find  herself  fated  to  play 
the  part  of  an  arbitress,  which  will  singularly  add 
to  her  stature. 

It  may  also  happen  that  events  will  take  such 
a  turn  that  the  policy  of  the  golden  mean  will 
come  too  late.  After  two  years  of  warfare  the 
schemes  and  views  of  Germany  begin  to  appear 
to  us  with  more  distinctness.  The  dreams  of 
European  hegemony  which  were  attributed  to 
Germany  were  vague.  As  the  struggle  has 
developed  they  have  become  more  precise.  We 
have  been  able  to  perceive  that  the  war  of 
1914-15  was  conceived  by  the  Germans  as  the 
natural  sequel  to  the  three  wars  of  1864,  1866, 
and  1870,  as  the  war  which  was  to  complete  the 
national  unity  of  Germany,  incomplete  until 
Austria  should  once  again,  as  of  old,  form  part  of 
the  Germanic  Empire.  The  essential  ideal  of 
Wilhelm  II  appears  to  be  that  which  the 
Pangermanist  theorists  have  adopted  one  after 
another — namely,  the  formation  in  Central 
Europe  of  a  mighty  State  by  the  union  of  the 
domains  of  the  Habsburgs  to  Germany  properly 
so-called.  The  manner  in  which  the  Imperial 
Government  has  laid  hands  upon  the  armies 
and  the  administration  of  Austria-Hungary  under 


THE   FUTURE  247 

cover  of  the  European  conflict  is  a  revelation. 
And  if  this  project,  so  menacing  to  Europe, 
should  be  realised,  with  the  consequences  which 
it  would  necessarily  involve — namely,  the  German 
hegemony  in  the  East,  in  that  Balkan  Peninsula 
which  professorial  Germany  has  defined  as  "  Sub- 
Germanic  Europe  " — if  this  should  come  to  pass, 
who  can  fail  to  see  how  Italy's  policy  would  be 
thereby  affected  and  the  future  of  Italy  com- 
promised ? 

Europe  has  not  taken  the  propaganda  of  the 
Pangermanist  school  with  sufficient  seriousness 
during  the  last  forty  years.  From  1870  down  to 
our  own  days,  the  theories  of  this  school,  which 
are  far  more  practical  than  they  seem,  have 
constantly  tended  to  translate  themselves  into 
action.  Europe  insisted  on  regarding  them  as 
intellectual  dreams.  But  political  Germany  was 
labouring  to  realise  these  dreams,  as  Bismarck 
had  already  realised  those  of  the  patriotic  ideolo- 
gists of  the  preceding  period.  From  the  historical 
point  of  view,  moreover,  the  sequence  is  easy  to 
follow.  In  1849  (when  revolutionary  Germany 
was  trying  to  establish  unity  by  the  aid  of  liberal 
principles),  what  did  the  Parliament  of  Frankfort 
represent  ?  All  the  Germanic  countries,  the 
whole  Germanic  confederation,  all  that  remained 
of  the  ancient  Holy  Empire  of  the  Germanic 
peoples ;  that  is,  the  Austrians  figured  in  this 
All-German  Parliament  on  the  same  footing  as 
the  Prussians.  But  the  Parliament  of  Frankfort 
was  not  to  succeed  in  founding  the  national  unity. 
Germany  remained  subject  to  the  particularist 
regime,  the  system  of  little  States,  aggravated  by 


248  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

the  rivalry  of  the  two  largest  among  them, 
Prussia  and  Austria.  Liberalism  and  the  Revo- 
lution had  proved  powerless  to  accomplish  fusion. 
Germany,  therefore,  had  to  resign  herself  to  see 
the  old  state  of  things  endure — dispersion  and 
division — or  she  had  to  accept  the  method  of 
Bismarck. 

Now  Bismarck  proceeded  by  stages.  In  1864 
(the  year  of  the  Danish  war)  he  caught  Austria, 
still  a  member  of  the  Confederation,  in  a  snare. 
In  1866,  the  affair  of  the  Duchies  having  furnished 
him  with  the  occasion  of  a  rupture,  he  defeated 
Austria  and  made  an  end  of  Austrian  influence  in 
Germany.  The  road  was  clear  for  Prussia,  who 
in  1870  united  Germany  and  assumed  the  presi- 
dency of  the  new  Confederation.  What  then 
remained  to  be  done,  in  order  that  the  last  stage 
should  be  achieved,  and  in  order  that  the  ideals 
of  the  Liberal  patriots  of  the  Frankfort  Parlia- 
ment, which  Bismarck  revived  by  authoritative 
means,  should  be  realised  ?  The  answer  is 
obvious  :  to  force  Austria  to  re-enter  the  pale  of 
the  Germanic  Empire.  This  is  the  achievement 
to  which  German  politics  has  been  leading  from 
1870  to  1915. 

Let  us  note  that  Bismarck  made  early  prepara- 
tions for  this  result ;  that  he  rendered  it  possible 
by  handling  Austria  tenderly  after  Sadowa,  by 
not  overwhelming  her,  by  not  making  her  irrecon- 
cilable. After  1870  he  sought  to  consolidate 
his  victories  by  constituting,  with  Austria  and 
Russia,  the  Alliance  of  the  Three  Emperors. 
But  as  soon  as  he  saw  that  the  Austro-Russian 
antagonism  was  cropping  up  and  coming  to  a 
head  (precipitated  by  affairs  in  the  East)  he  did 


THE   FUTURE  249 

not  hesitate  nor  count  the  cost.  His  choice 
was  made  beforehand.  And  he  chose  Austria. 
Thenceforth  to  support  Austria  against  Russia 
and  Slavism  became  the  German  programme  ; 
for  Austria  was  Germany,  flesh  of  the  flesh  of 
the  Greater  Germania. 

So,  in  1914,  the  German  Empire  undertook, 
even  against  the  will  of  Vienna,  the  defence  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire  against  Russia.  If  at 
some  moment  of  those  fatal  days  of  July  Austria 
— as  some  observers  believed — realised  that  it 
would  be  wiser  to  yield,  it  was  all  too  late ; 
Austria  no  longer  belonged  to  herself.  Germany 
was  deciding  for  her  whether  there  should  be 
peace  or  war.  Austrian  affairs  w^ere  German 
affairs,  for  Austria  is  the  continuation  of  Germany. 
And  the  community  of  arms  opened  a  source  of 
fraternity  between  the  peoples.  The  idea  at  the 
back  of  the  minds  of  the  Berlin  authorities — to 
reconstitute  a  compact  Germany  in  the  centre 
of  Europe,  a  single  State  under  the  direction  of 
Prussia — was  stimulated  by  common  efforts, 
trials,  and  victories.  "  From  Heligoland  to 
Warsaw,  we  all  gain  or  lose  as  one  person,"  said 
a  Radical  deputy  to  the  Reichstag,  Frederick 
Naumann,  in  a  book  entitled  Central  Europe^ 
which  appeared  in  Berlin  in  191 5.  In  this  the 
German  politician  joyfully  states  that  since  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  everything  has  tended  to 
make  Germany  and  Austria  two  vessels  with  an 
ever-increasing  intercommunication.  He  reckons 
that  after  the  war  this  result  will  be  permanent, 
and  that  the  renaissance  of  a  great  Germany, 
necessary  to  both  Empires,  will  in  any  case  be  a 
consequence    of    the    great    European    conflict, 


250  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

and  a  lasting  achievement.  Thereupon  all  Ger- 
man Imperialists  of  whatever  shade  are  agreed. 
A  Pangermanist  in  spite  of  his  French  name, 
Paul  de  Lagarde  had  already  announced,  in  1886, 
"  the  v^ar  which  was  to  establish  Central  Europe." 
It  is  this  war  which  we  are  witnessing  to-day. 

Italy  knows  perfectly  well  that  she  would  have 
nothing  to  gain  were  the  Adriatic  problem  to 
rest  not  between  her  and  Austria,  but  between 
her  and  a  Greater  Germany.  She  knows  that  the 
problem  of  Trieste  may  to-morrow  be  that  of 
Venice,  and  the  day  after  to-morrow  that  of 
Milan.  She  remembers  that  in  1859,  after 
Magenta  and  Solferino,  Prussia,  and  with  her  the 
whole  Germanic  Confederation,  considering  the 
affair  to  be  a  German  one,  declared  themselves 
ready  to  support  Austria,  and,  by  the  threat  of 
intervention  on  the  Rhine,  persuaded  Napoleon 
III  to  sign  the  preliminaries  of  Villafranca.  Italy 
is  too  well  aware  of  her  own  interests,  and  of  her 
position  in  Europe,  not  to  take  into  account  the 
possibility  of  the  creation  of  an  aggrandised 
Germanic  Power,  which  would  be  something 
resembling  the  Empire  of  Charles  V.  She  must 
know  that  she  would  be  its  first  victim,  and  the 
worst  treated.  Moreover,  if  Italy  entered  the 
war  it  was  that  she  realised  that  her  immobility 
would  facilitate  Germany's  task,  and  would  help 
to  further  her  ambition  ;  and  foresaw,  enlightened 
by  history,  that  a  German  victory  would  be 
followed  by  her  enslavement,  or  even  her  dis- 
memberment. 

Thus  the  point  of  view  of  the  solidarity  of  these 
two  unities,  the  Italian  and  the  German,  appears 
outworn    and    archaic,    superseded    by    events. 


THE   FUTURE  251 

Germany  closely  welded  to  Austria,  according  to 
the  programme  drawn  up  by  the  Pangermanists, 
would  no  longer  be  interested,  as  she  was  from 
1866  down  to  our  own  days,  in  the  maintenance 
of  the  Italian  unity.  On  the  contrary,  she 
would  revive  the  old  Imperial  programme  of 
conquests  and  settlements  in  Italy.  France,  on 
the  other  hand,  who  may  sometimes  have  con- 
sidered that  the  existence  of  a  robust  Italian 
State  at  her  gates  was  an  inconvenience,  and  even, 
at  certain  moments,  a  danger,  will  want  Italy 
to  constitute  a  south-eastern  rampart  against  the 
Germanic  world.  Consequently,  though  a  fresh 
raffrochement  between  Italy  and  Germany  may 
not,  in  certain  contingencies,  appear  totally 
impossible,  the  general  trend  of  things  and  the 
logic  of  events  make  it  a  matter  of  only  the 
faintest  probability. 

However,  the  Germans  flatter  themselves  that 
they  can  always  get  hold  of  Italy  again.  With 
that  imperturbable  confidence  which  character- 
ises them,  and  which  the  consciousness  of  their 
strength  and  the  habit  of  success  have  developed 
of  late  years  to  such  an  outrageous  pitch.  Prince 
von  Billow  wrote,  in  the  chapter  of  his  German 
Politics  devoted  to  the  Italian  alliance  : 

"  Germany  and  Italy  cannot  dispense  with 
one  another.  They  will  always  come  together 
again,  thanks  to  a  host  of  important  factors, 
to  the  absence  of  any  rivalry  between  the  two 
nations,  or  any  disturbing  recollections — the 
memories  of  the  struggle  in  the  Forest  of  Teuto- 
burg  and  the  battle  of  Legnano  are  disappearing 
in  the  night  of  time  ;  — thanks  also  to  the  analogy 
of  their  historical  development,  and  the  common 


252  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

dangers    which    might    constitute    an    identical 
menace  for  each." 

Bismarck,  who  had  more  experience  than 
Prince  von  Biilow,  and  experience  of  more  diffi- 
cult and  more  extensive  affairs,  was  more  reserved 
and  less  trusting.  It  was  in  reference  to  Italy 
that  he  described  international  politics  as  a 
fluid  element  which,  from  time  to  time,  becomes 
solidified  hy  force  of  circumstances,  but  which 
returns  to  its  original  state  upon  the  least  atmo- 
spheric variation.  This  is  why,  he  used  to  say, 
when  one  State  allies  itself  to  another  State, 
the  clause  rebus  sic  stantibus  should  always  be 
understood.  In  his  calculations  and  his  assurance 
Prince  von  Biilow  forgot  to  reckon  with  this 
clause  in  his  dealings  with  Italy. 


"  The  Empire  of  1871  is  in  process  of  becoming 
an  historic  Empire.  In  its  place  we  shall  see  the 
formation  of  a  vast  Germanic  Empire  which  will 
be  merely  the  resurrection  of  the  Germanic  Holy 
Roman  Empire  ...  as  it  was  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
when  it  ruled  over  the  half  of  Europe." 

So  said  the  Pangermanist  historian,  Karl  Lam- 
precht,  who,  as  he  died  in  191 5,  may  have  believed 
that  his  ideal  was  about  to  be  realised.  Before 
him  Constantin  Franz  had  already  stated  that 
nothing  was  ''  more  essential  to  Germany  than 
to  gain  the  mouths  of  our  two  provincial  rivers, 
the  Rhine  and  the  Danube."  Paul  de  Lagarde 
again  used  to  say  that  no  people  was  better  quali- 
fied than  the  German  people  "  to  exercise  a 
decisive  influence  on  the  remodelling  of  the 
countries  of  the  Lower  Danube,  formerly  subject 


THE   FUTURE  233 

to  Turkish  domination,  and  even  the  whole 
Balkan  Peninsula." 

The  invasion  of  Serbia  by  the  German  armies, 
the  march  upon  Constantinople,  and  perhaps, 
before  long,  upon  Salonika,  will  have  sufficiently 
demonstrated  that  Germany  does  actually  proceed 
to  the  execution  of  the  ambitious  projects  con- 
ceived by  her  intellectuals  in  her  Universities. 
Moreover,  was  it  not  in  the  East  that  the  war 
began  ?  Was  it  not  the  realisation  of  the  Dra?ig 
nach  Osten  ?  Here  again  all  Italy's  views  and 
ideals  and  her  whole  position  would  be  unsettled 
were  the  plans  of  Germany  to  succeed,  and  were 
Germany  to  reduce  the  Balkan  States  to  a  state 
of  dependency,  to  the  condition,  according  to 
the  phrase  of  a  Pangermanist  writer,  of  a  "  sub- 
Germanic  Europe." 

Italy's  policy  in  the  Balkan  countries  has  princi- 
pally consisted,  hitherto,  of  rivalry  as  regards 
Austria  and  of  distrust  as  regards  the  Serbs  and 
the  Greeks.  To  revive  the  ancient  empire  of 
Venice  over  the  isles  and  shores  of  the  Eastern 
Adriatic,  to  rule  from  Trieste  to  Albania,  Italy 
had  not  merely  to  expropriate  the  Habsburgs. 
She  gradually  discovered  other  competitors. 
The  Slavs  of  Austro-Hungary,  descending  sea- 
wards, becoming  more  conscious  of  their  person- 
ality and  their  language,  realised  that  they  were 
not  only  different  from  their  masters  in  Buda- 
pest and  Vienna,  but  also  different  from  the 
Italian  populations  which  they  encountered  in 
Trieste,  Fiume,  and  Ragusa,  and  which  they  are 
tending  to  submerge.  In  this  direction  Italian 
politics  has  become  singularly  complicated,  since 
the  moment  when  Italy  was  forced  to  perceive 


254  ITALY   AND   THE    WAR 

that  the  problem,  far  from  being  reducible  to  two 
terms,  involved  three  or  four,  and  that  the 
principle  of  nationalities,  instead  of  helping  to 
resolve  it,  merely  served  to  render  it  more  in- 
soluble, the  national  entities  in  contact  being 
irreducible,  and  their  respective  elements  geo- 
graphically intermingled  in  an  inextricable 
fashion,  likely  to  engender  as  many  quarrels  as 
exist  among  the  populations  of  the  too  notorious 
Macedonia. 

In  a  speech  delivered  before  a  deputation  of 
Dalmatian  exiles,  who  desired  to  honour  him  by 
the  gift  of  a  book  devoted  to  the  glory  of  their 
country,  Gabriele  d'  Annunzio,  in  the  spring  of 
1 91 5,  while  forcibly  expressing  his  opinion  that 
Dalmatia  must  become  an  Italian  territory,  made 
no  secret  of  the  competition  of  which  it  was  the 
object. 

''  This  book  which  you  have  placed  in  my 
hands,"  he  said,  "  is  a  title  of  possession.  It  is 
brief,  yet  it  is  of  great  import.  It  tells  us, 
clearly  and  concisely,  in  the  style  of  Rome,  that 
Dalmatia  belongs  to  Italy  by  human  law  and 
divine.  Under  the  Latin  rule  of  Rome,  of  the 
Popes,  and  of  Venice,  as  under  the  barbarian 
rule  of  the  Goths,  the  Lombards,  the  Franks, 
the  Germanic  Othos,  the  Byzantines,  the  Hun- 
garians, the  Austrians,  the  civil  life  of  yonder 
shores,  like  the  civil  life  of  our  own,  has  always 
been  Italian  in  essence  and  origin.  It  has 
been ;  it  is ;  it  will  be.  Neither  the  German, 
coming  from  the  Alps,  nor  the  Slovenian  of  the 
Carso,  nor  the  Magyar  of  La  Putza,  nor  the  Croat, 
who  ignores  or  falsifies  history,  nor  the  Turk, 
who  disguises  himself  as  an  Albanian — no  one,  I 


THE    FUTURE  255 

say,  will  succeed  in  arresting  the  inevitable 
rhythm  of  accomplishment,  the  Roman  rhythm. 
I  tell  you  this,  brothers,  but  you  know  it.  On 
this  Dalmatian  gospel  we  may  swear  an  oath 
upon  it." 

Germans,  Slovenians,  Croats,  Magyars — these 
are  the  composite  elements  which  Italy  must 
confront  with  her  claims,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
Greeks,  who,  by  way  of  the  Epirus,  are  reaching 
out  toward  Albania.  So  we  may  imagine  that 
the  Italians  have  always  kept  a  close  watch  on 
the  progress  of  Greece,  and  that  they  have  been 
disquieted  by  the  development  of  Serbia,  regard- 
ing her  as  a  sort  of  Balkan  Piedmont,  the  nucleus 
of  a  future  State,  and  a  State  possessed  of  the 
power  of  expansion.  However — and  this  is 
greatly  to  their  honour — the  Italians  have  not 
allowed  themselves  to  be  drawn  into  regrettable 
jealousies.  Germany  and  Austria,  in  their  spirit 
of  division,  would  have  liked  to  see  them  take 
umbrage  at  the  Serbs  and  their  ^'  Greater  Serbia." 

They  have  sought  to  create  misunderstandings 
between  the  peoples,  to  evoke  "  incidents  "  on  the 
Albanian  stage.  It  was  trouble  wasted.  The 
Italian  Government  and  the  Italian  newspapers 
met  these  attempts  at  provocation  with  absolute 
tranquillity.  The  Italians  did  not  intend  to 
delight  their  enemies  in  Berlin  and  Vienna  by 
embroiling  themselves  with  the  Serbians  for  the 
sake  of  a  few  police  operations  in  Albania,  nor 
with  the  Montenegrins  for  the  sake  of  Scutari. 

However,  at  the  moment  of  writing  nothing 
is  more  uncertain  than  the  destiny  of  the  Serbian 
nation.  It  is  in  danger  of  a  lasting  reduction  to 
servitude.     It  may,  no  doubt,  rise  up  again  from 


2s6  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

its  ruins  and  take  its  revenge  ;  for  a  nation  does 
not  disappear  when  it  is  so  rich  in  life  as  the 
Serbian  nation.  But  in  any  case  it  does  not 
seem  as  though  the  "  Panserbian  "  idea  can  enjoy 
the  immediate  future  which  has  been  attributed 
to  it.  The  spontaneous  decomposition  of  Austria, 
which  used  to  be  a  sort  of  dogma,  and  which  was 
announced  as  an  inevitable  event,  especially 
inevitable  in  the  case  of  a  European  war,  a  great 
conflict  between  Teutons  and  Slavs — this  decom- 
position has  not  come  about.  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  monarchy,  above  all  with  the  support 
which  Germany  has  lent  it,  seems  to  have  greater 
powers  of  resistance  than  have  commonly  been 
attributed  to  it,  and  hitherto,  amid  the  turmoil, 
it  has  justified  Bismarck's  verdict :  "  I  believe 
in  the  vitality  of  Austria." 

A  Serbian  State  mangled  and  bled  white  is 
hardly  likely,  for  the  time  being,  to  act  as  a 
magnetic  centre  capable  of  detaching  from  the 
Habsburg  Empire  the  Serbo-Croat  populations 
which  it  contains.  This  portion  of  Europe  seems 
to  be  still  fated  to  lengthy  conflicts,  to  repeated 
convulsions,  before  chaos  becomes  simplified. 
Those  who  beheld  the  near  future  under  the 
aspect  of  an  Italo-Serbian  rivalry,  those  who 
even  asserted  that  one  of  the  first  wars  to  follow 
the  present  one  would  be  a  war  between  Italy 
and  a  Greater  Serbia  for  the  possession  of  the 
Adriatic,  are  probably  mistaken,  or  have  at  least 
very  considerably  anticipated  events. 

By  its  very  stupendousness  the  present  war 
gives  rise  to  uncertainty.  It  gives  rise  to  so 
many  questions  that  it  cannot  resolve  them  all. 
Of  those  which  interest  Italy  in  particular,  a 


THE    FUTURE  257 

certain  number,  it  would  seem,  must  remain  in 
suspense.  The  Italian  Government,  it  appears, 
has  foreseen  this  future  state  of  indecision,  and 
this  perhaps  is  one  of  the  reasons  which  cause  it 
to  hesitate  as  to  the  best  means  of  intervening 
with  the  Allies  on  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  For 
Italy,  situated  upon  the  very  brink  of  that  huge 
vat  of  fermenting  nationalities,  any  decision  is 
serious,  and  any  error  might  involve  incalculable 
consequences.  The  obscurity  and  confusion  and 
disorder  are  such  that  Italy,  we  may  imagine, 
has  need  to  reflect  before  engaging  in  one  path 
rather  than  in  another.  However,  if  Bulgaria 
were  to  advance  across  Macedonia  to  the  Adriatic, 
threatening  Albania — if  the  ambition  attributed 
to  Ferdinand  (who  has  not  had  Prince  Boris 
taught  Albanian  for  nothing) — if  this  ambition, 
encouraged  by  the  Court  of  Vienna,  were  to 
approach  realisation,  it  is  probable  that  Italy 
would  no  longer  hesitate  ;  that  she  would  refuse 
to  allow  a  new  competitor,  a  new  enemy,  to  appear 
on  that  sea  which,  more  than  any  other,  is  "  her 


sea." 


According  to  all  appearances,  Italy  has  still 
difficult  and  lengthy  tasks  before  her  in  the 
direction  which  she  has  chosen  for  the  extension 
of  her  activities.  When  she  entered  the  European 
conflict  to  realise  her  Nationalist  and  Imperialist 
programme,  it  was  not  repose  that  she  chose. 
But  she  knew  this  ;  and  it  was  not  repose  that 
she  desired,  but  power  and  greatness.  That  is 
what  she  looks  to  obtain  by  this  war.  Of  the 
conflicts  which  the  sixteenth  century  witnessed 
between  France  and  Spain  the  British  power 
was  born.     The  conflicts  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 

17 


2S8  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

tury  between  France  and  Austria  engendered 
the  might  of  Prussia  and  of  Russia.  For  manj 
Italians,  it  is  the  power  of  Italy  which  should 
emerge  from  the  war  of  domination  which  Ger- 
many and  England  are  waging  in  the  twentieth 
century. 

One  last  point  is  yet  to  be  examined  ;  one  of 
the  most  absorbing,  one  of  the  most  important. 
What,  in  the  future,  will  be  the  relations  between 
Italy  and  France  ?  Here  I  beg  Frenchmen  of 
whatever  party  and  whatever  opinions  who  may 
have  read  this  book  not  to  be  surprised  if  the 
reply  appears  to  us  to  depend  upon  the  lines 
followed  by  Italian  politics. 

^  After  thirty-three  years  of  alliance  with  Ger- 
many Italy  has  come  over  to  the  French  side 
and  is  fighting  on  this  side.  We  have  already 
explained  the  reason  for  this  development.  The 
faults  of  our  enemies  have  had  a  certain  share 
in  this  result.  Italy's  definite  idea  of  her  own 
interests  was  the  determining  factor.  The  tact" 
and  perseverance  of  French  diplomacy  facilitated 
the  rapfrochement.  And  racial  sympathies  and 
intellectual  affinities  were  far  from  devoid  of 
influence.  It  is  important,  however,  to  remem- 
ber that  sentiment  has  played  a  secondary  part 
in  the  formation  of  the  new  alliance.  The 
Quadruple  Entente  is  before  all  a  coalition  based 
upon  a  community  of  political  interests,  and 
united  by  a  common  peril.  Let  us  admit  that 
a  friendship  in  which  idealism  has  played  only 
an  auxiliary  part  will  not  endure  by  reason  of 
idealism. 

Here  I  address  myself  to  those  of  my  com- 


THE    FUTURE  259 

patriots  who  may  cherish  a  certain  antipathy  for 
Italy,  created  in  the  nineteenth  century  by  the 
rupture  of  ancient  pacts.  I  address  myself  also 
to  those  who  see  in  this  Italy  the  child  of  another 
law,  the  law  of  revolution,  the  law  of  nation- 
alities, the  law  of  nations.  Conservatives  and 
Liberals  alike  must  realise  that  they  are  living 
outside  their  age,  by  traditions  which  to  the 
Italians  themselves  are  becoming  increasingly 
obscured  and  forgotten.  Theirs  is  an  obsolete 
point  of  view,  which  no  longer  corresponds  with 
the  progress  of  the  world  and  of  events.  In 
Italy  a  new  legitimacy  is  establishing  itself.  The 
years,  as  they  have  lapsed,  have  reconciled  many 
conflicting  elements.  For  the  Catholics  them- 
selves unity  is  an  accomplished  fact  which  no 
one  dreams  of  rejecting  ;  a  precious  conquest 
which  no  one  would  think  of  renouncing.  For 
the  democrats  the  Italian  monarchical  State  has 
revealed  itself,  upon  trial,  as  the  most  habitable 
of  structures  ;  Liberal  aspirations  and  Nationalist 
aspirations  find  it  equally  to  their  liking.  We 
should  run  the  risk  of  speaking  a  language  foreign 
to  all  Italians,  and  even  of  shocking  our  hearers  ; 
we  should  be  unable  to  make  ourselves  under- 
stood, did  we  still  believe  in  their  former  state  of 
mind,  that  which  belonged  to  their  origins,  their 
remote  past. 

In  France,  it  is  hoped  that  the  Franco-Italian 
friendship  will  survive  the  war,  and  will  not 
disappear  with  the  circumstances  which  have 
revived  it.  If  this  is  to  be  so  we  must  not  lose 
sight  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  alliance 
was  formed.  Above  all,  let  us  not  imagine  that 
sentiment,  which  did  not  suffice  to  bring  it  about, 


26o  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

will  suffice  to  preserve  it.  It  will  not  resolve 
the  Franco-Italian  problems,  any  more  than  it 
will  resolve  those  which  will  arise  in  Europe  after 
the  conflict. 

The  European  war  has  resulted  from  the 
radical  impotence  of  Governments  to  satisfy, 
pacifically,  the  needs,  or  rather  the  demands,  of 
the  peoples.  Toward  the  end  of  his  days,  speak- 
ing before  Eckermann  of  the  convulsions  which 
he  had  witnessed  during  his  long  life,  from  the 
Seven  Years'  War  to  the  wars  of  the  Revolution 
and  the  Empire,  Goethe  expressed  the  appre- 
hension that  Europe  would  again  see  days  as 
troublous. 

"  What  the  future  reserves  for  us,"  he  said, 
**  it  is  impossible  to  prophesy.  However,  I  fear 
that  we  shall  not  attain  tranquillity  for  some 
time  to  come.  It  is  not  given  to  the  world  to 
be  moderate,  to  the  great  to  permit  themselves 
no  abuse  of  power,  to  the  masses  to  content  them- 
selves with  a  mediocre  position  while  awaiting 
successive  ameliorations." 

One  may  ask  to-day,  with  Goethe,  and  by  the 
light  of  the  successive  events  of  the  last  century, 
whether  the  causes  which  engender  revolutions 
are  not  the  same  as  those  which  engender  great 
wars.  Both,  perhaps,  are  only  forms  of  the 
struggle  for  life.  Who  knows  whether  the  desire 
for  improved  circumstances,  so  natural  to  man, 
has  not  been  the  spur  which,  from  one  day  to 
another,  has  turned  an  almost  Socialistic  Ger- 
many into  a  bellicose  and  conquering  Germany  ? 
This  war,  to  which  France  has  been  constrained 
in  order  to  defend  her  life  and  her  goods,  has 
been  undertaken  by  other  peoples  to  ensure  their 


THE    FUTURE  261 

*'  place  in  the  sun."  Unhappily  we  can  hardly 
doubt  that  this  law  of  competition  will  survive 
the  vast  conflict  which  it  has  caused,  and  that 
even  in  time  of  peace  there  will  still  be  harsh 
conflicts  to  sustain. 

After  the  war  Italy  will  be  preoccupied  in 
securing  the  advantages  which  she  has  obtained, 
increasing  her  resources,  and  extending  her 
activities.  To  come  to  an  understanding  with 
her,  to  avoid  disagreements,  we  must  thoroughly 
understand  her  programme,  must  realise,  for 
instance,  that  she  hopes  to  exert  an  influence 
in  the  East  similar  to  that  which  France  has 
always  exerted.  We  must  also  realise  that  she 
wishes  "  to  become  a  great  industrial  country," 
as  the  deputy  Nitti  recently  wrote.  He  already 
sees  Italy  "  excellently  organised  technically," 
replacing  Germany  in  many  domains,  and 
succeeding  her  in  the  world's  markets. 

No  doubt  the  community  of  arms  will  tighten 
the  bonds  between  France  and  Italy.  This  war, 
waged  against  the  same  enemy,  will  bear  lasting 
memories.  But  the  nations  do  not  live  on 
memories.  Neither  do  they  live  on  sentiment. 
There  is  in  Italy  a  very  sincere  desire  to  continue, 
after  the  war,  the  cordial  relations  which  the 
war  has  established.  However,  if  one  questions 
the  Italians,  if  one  asks  them  how  they  envisage 
the  future  of  their  relations  with  France,  they 
generally  exhibit  some  reserve,  because  the  bases 
of  a  future  collaboration  are  not  as  yet  very  clear 
to  them.  But  this  state  of  mind  is  far  more 
pleasing  to  us,  and  offers  far  more  security,  than 
the  fragile  enthusiasm  and  uncritical  idealism 
which  imperfectly  conceal  divergencies  or  con- 


262  ITALY   AND   THE   WAR 

flicting  interests,  and  which,  as  a  rule,  nourish 
nothing  but  a  dangerous  hypocrisy.  The 
positive  fact,  the  great  advantage  obtained,  is 
that  the  struggle  against  the  Germanic  domina- 
tion has  created  a  necessity  common  to  France 
and  Italy,  and  has  opened  between  them  a 
new  current  of  sympathy.  These  are  the  con- 
ditions most  favourable  to  an  enduring  under- 
standing ;  the  clairvoyance,  realism,  and  political 
sense  of  our  Governments  will  do  the  rest. 


THE    END 


INDEX 


Abbazia,  conference  at,  178-9, 

182 
Abdul  Hamid,   173 
Abruzzi,  Duke  of  the,  185 
Adriatic,  problem  of  the,   36, 

174.  235 

Aegean,  Italy  in  the,  170,  176, 

235 
Africa,  North,   Italy  in,    174  ; 

see  Tripoli 
Aigues  Mortes,  incident  of,  27, 

167 
Albania,  Bulgarian  designs  on, 

257 

Albert  I  of  Belgium,  127 

Alfieri,  86-7 

Alge9iras  Conference,  Italy 
at  the,  165-89 

Alliances,  penetration  of,  166  ; 
breaking  up  of,  167 

Amadeo,  King  of  Spain,  104-5 

Annunzio,  Gabriele  d',  28,  34, 
40,  86  ;  prophesies  war,  96- 
7,  114,  128,  186;  arrives  in 
Rome,  207 ;  leads  Inter- 
ventionists, 208  ;  compared 
with  Lamartine,  209 ;  his 
speeches,  209,  211-12,  216- 
19,  254 

Army,  masonic  elements  in 
the,  143 

Austria,  Italy's  relations  with, 

175,  17^,  193  ;  wished  to 
attack  Serbia  in  1913,  198; 
further  agreement  with  Italy 
impossible,  200 ;  Italy  de- 
clares war  on,  235  ;  does  not 
wish  for  collapse  of  Empire, 
245 ;     regarded     as     buffer 


State,    245,    250 ;     resisting 

power  of,  256 
Austrian     diplomacy     at     the 

Vatican,  198 
Azeglio,  Massimo  d',  19,  57-8, 

187 

Balkan  nations,  133,  255 
Barrdre,  M.  Camille,  179,  222 
Barzilai,  Signor,  40,  69,  135-6 
Belgian  Catholics,  the,  152 
Belgiojoso,  Princess,  75-8 
Benedict  XV,  147 
Berchtold,  Count,  171,  178-9, 

182,  199-200 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  179,  182 
Beyle,  29-30 
Bismarck,  44  ;    his  distrust  of 

France,  107-8,  136,  161,  163, 

172,  1 80-1  ;  Pan-Germanist 

schemes  of,  248 
Bismarck,  Count  Hubert  von, 

150 
Brescia,    the    Hunchback    of, 

82-3 

Billow,  Prince  von,  28,  30 ; 
offers  Italy  bribes  for  neu- 
trality, 38,  128,  161,  180-1, 
189,  192-3  ;  his  mission  to 
Rome,  196-7,  200-1  ;  loses 
hope,  203-9,  220,  222-5, 
251-2 

Burian,  Baron,  199-200 


Cadorna,  General,  185 
Carducci,  29,  35-6,  87-95 
Carlo  Alberto,  the  tragedy  of, 
49-56 


263 


264 


INDEX 


Carthage,  incident  of   the,  27, 

163,  167 
Catholicism,  German,  15 1-2 
Cavour,  51,  62,  78,  108,  227 
Centre,  the  German,  151-2 
Charette,  General  de,  29-30 
Clothilde,  Princess,  61-5 
Colonna,  Prince,  229 
Constantine  I,  King  of  Greece, 

133 

Corriere  della  Sera,  press  cam- 
paign of,  32 

Crisis,  the,  201-34 

Crispi,  66,  162-3 

Croce,  Benedetto,  quoted,  123- 

5 
"  Crocism,     125 

Democracy,  and  the  House  of 
Savoy,  46-7,  58  ;  its  part  m 
forming  the  State,  65  ;  in 
France,  73 

Dollinger,  Dr.,  193 

Drang  nach  Osten,  253 

Edward  VII,  164 
"  Egoism,  sacred,"  237-8 
Elections  of  191 3,  141 
Elena,    Queen,    130-1  ;     influ- 
ence of,  132 
Entente  Cordiale,  the,  164 
Erzberger,  Herr,  152 
Eugenie,  Empress,  64,  80-1 

Ferdinand,  Tsar  of  Bulgaria, 
153,  257 

Finances,  Italy's,  wonderful 
recovery  of,  138-9 

France,  in  arms,  20  ;  expects 
gratitude  from  Italy,  158- 
9 ;  misunderstanding  with 
Italy,  167 ;  breaks  with 
Papacy,  168  ;  future  of  re- 
lations with  Italy,  255-62 

Francis  Joseph,  185 

Freemasonry,  31-2,  142  ;  de- 
cadence of,  143-4 

French,  the,  their  ignorance  of 
Italy,  71-2,  99,  102  ;  of  the 
outside  world,  139-40  I  must 
learn  more  of  neighbours, 
169 


French  Empire,  fall  of  the,  44 
French   Revolution,   effect  of, 

on  Italy  and  Germany,  53 
Futurism,  in  Italy,  loi,  1 13-16 

Garibaldi,  50,  55-6,  82  ;   f6tes 

in  commemoration  of,  201-4 

Garibaldeans  in  French  Army, 

239 

Genoa,  celebrations  at,  201-4 

Genoa,  Duke  of,  129 

German  diplomacy,  at  the 
Vatican,  148-9 ;  seeks  to 
win  Catholic  elements  in 
Europe,  149-50 ;  and  to 
avoid  war  with  Italy,  240-2 

German  Press,  the,  31 

German  Unity,  established, 
44,  60 ;  compared  with 
Italian,  106-7 

Germany,  hypocrisy  of,  31  ;  a 
youthful  Power,  108  ;  her 
disgrace,  109  ;  rival  of  Italy, 
240-2  ;  peaceful  conquest 
of,  243  ;  ambitions  of,  246- 
50  ;    in  the  East,  253 

Giolitti,  Signor,  downfall  of, 
78-9;  112,  137-8,  142,  185, 
197  ;  falls  from  power,  204-8  ; 
forced  to  leave  Rome,  214 

Great  Britain,  prestige  dimin- 
ished, 177 
Grey,  Sir  Edward,  170,  176-7 

Harden,  Maximilian,  241 
History,    a    factor    of    ItaUan 

action,  26-8 
HohenzoUerns,  the,  44 
Honour,    Italy's   sense   of   na- 
tional, 30 
Hugo,   Victor,  influences  Car- 

ducci,  90-1,  96 
Humbert  I,  69,  133 

Imperialism  in  Italy,  equiva- 
lent to  Nationalism,  no 

Ingratitude,  France  complains 
of  Italy's,  158 

Irredentism,  35 

Italians,  in  Paris,  1914.  21  ; 
long  memory  of,  26-7 


INDEX 


265 


Italy,  declares  herself  neutral, 
22  :  enters  war,  23  ;  the  his- 
torical sense  in,  25  ;  her 
conception  of  the  war,  28  ; 
her  motives,  34-5 ;  the 
"  Fourth  Italy,"  35  ;  unity 
of,  44-5  ;  sudden  revival  of, 
103  ;  compared  with  Ger- 
many, 106-7  '>  her  "  will  to 
power,"  109 ;  finances  of, 
138-9 ;  cultivates  friend- 
ship with  Great  Britain,  164  ; 
makes  war  upon  Turkey, 
169  ;  Oriental  ambitions  of, 
170 ;  Mediterranean  inter- 
ests of,  174,  176-7  ;  declares 
herself  neutral,  190  ;  breaks 
with  Austria  and  the  Triple 
Alliance,  200 ;  decides  on 
intervention,  232-4  ;  her 
motives,  235-6  ;  her  ambi- 
tion to  become  a  Great 
Power,  236 ;  is  fighting  a 
war  of  conquest,  237  ;  future 
of,  261-2 

King,    the,     see    Victor    Em- 
manuel III 
KuUurkampf,  the,  31,  148-9 

La  Marmora,  82 
Lamartine,  23,  34,  40,  209 
Lamprecht,    on    the    German 

Empire,  252 
Latapie,  M.,  147 
Leo  XIII  and  Wilhelm  II,  150 
Leopardi,  87 
Liberty,    French    and    Italian 

ideals  of,  71-2 
Lombard    aristocracy,    in    the 

war,  32-3 
Loubet,  President,  108 

Magenta,  battle  of,  77 

Maistre,  J.  de,  advises  King 
of  Sardinia  to  lead  the  Ita- 
lians, 48-9,  56 

Manin,  54,  56 

Manouba,  incident  of  the,  27, 
163.  167 

Margherita,  Queen,  92,  126- 
30 ;  her  influence,  132 


Maria  Pia,  Queen  of  Portugal, 

105 
Marinetti,  F.  T.,  114 
May    191 5,    the    crisis    of,    in 

Rome,  39,  (183-234) 
Mazzini,  54,  163 
Mediterranean,     Italy's    place 

in  the,  104,  174,  176-7 
Messina,  earthquake  of,  131 
Mettemich,  24,  51,  54,  81 
Michelet,  44,  91 
Milan,  under  Austrian  rule,  84 
Mistral,  86 
Moltke,  44 

Napoleon  I,  53-4 

Napoleon  III,  23,  27,  63-4, 
79-80,  106 

Napoleon,  Prince,  62-3 

Nationalism,  Italian,  33,  61  ; 
in  poetry,  86,  1 10  ;  a  pas- 
sion, 1 40-1 

Nationalist  movement,  the, 
46-7  ;  nationalist  tradition, 
the,  71-98 ;  Nationalist 
Party,  the,  119,  143,  215 

"  Neutralists,"  the,  accelerate 
crisis,  210 

Nicholas   II,   Tsar  of   Russia, 

131 
Nietzsche,  116 
Nigra,  Chevalier,  78-81 
Novaro,  battle  of,  51,  78 

Oberdank,  84-5 
Orsini,  74,  84 

Pan-Germanism,  and  Catho- 
licism, 152-3  ;  ideal  of,  240- 

50 

Papacy,  refuses  to  recognise 
the  accomplished  fact,  144-5 

Parecchio,  the,  38,    185,  205-6 

Patriots,  Italian,  74-5 

Piedmont,  46-8 

Pius  IX,  144,  148 

Poets,  Italian,  read  by  popu- 
lace, 29 

Poetry,  importance  of,  in  Italy, 
28-9.  85 

Popes,  the,  attitude  to  throne, 
146 


266 


INDEX 


Potsdam  interview,  the,  166 

Precursors  of  the  Risorgt- 
mento,  see  Belgiojoso,  Cavour, 
Garibaldi,  Nigra,  La  Mar- 
mora 

Proudhon,  59  ;  on  Italy's  fu- 
ture, 102-3  '>  on  her  ambi- 
tions, 155-6,  181 

Prussia,  compared  with  Pied- 
mont, 106 

Quadruple  Entente,  the,  189 
Quarto,    celebrations    on    the 

Rock  of,  202-4 
Quirinal     and     Vatican,     the 

(126-57);    110    contact    and 

therefore   no   conflict,    145  ; 

possibility  of  reconciliation, 

154 

Reventlow,  states  that  San 
Giuliano  was  poisoned,   185 

Revolution,  supposed  immin- 
ence of,  in  1915,  231-2 

Revolution,  the  French,  effect 
of,  on  Italy  and  Germany,  53 

Revolution   of    1848,   the,   44, 

76t7 
Revolutionary  spirit  in  Italy, 

the,  40-1,  43 
Risorgimento,    the,    24-6,    46, 

82,  227 
Risorgimento,  the  new,  24,  50 
Romagna,  insurrection  in  the, 

156-7 
Rome,   war  decided   upon  in, 

33  ;   the  events  of  May  191 5 

in,  40  (183-234)  ;    danger  of 

insurrection  in,  213 
Rudini,  the  Marquis  di,  65-7 

Salandra,    Signor,    25-6 ;     re- 

^  called  to  power,  40  ;  69,  142, 
155,  185,  188,  191  ;  resigns, 
192  ;  forms  fresh  Cabinet, 
192,  194-5,  197-9 ;  appeals 
to  public,  211  ;  resigns,  213  ; 
returns  to  power,  230-1 

San  Giuliano,  Marquis  di,  173- 
5,   177-9,   188-90,  226 

Sand,  George,  43-4,  59 


Sardinia,  King  of,  48 

Savoy,  House  of,  the,  (42-70) ; 
early  history  of,  45  ;  leads 
nationalist  movement,  46 ; 
opposes  Papacy,  51  ;  demo- 
cracy rallies  to,  57-60,  67- 
9  ;   policy  of,  160,  227-8 

Serbia,  threatened  by  Austria 
in  1913,  198,  256 

Serbs,  destiny  of,  253  ;  pos- 
sible rivals  to  the  Italians 
256 

Solferino,  battle  of,  27,  77 

Sonnino,  Baron,  142,  185,  188, 
191,  193-4.  227 

Spanish  throne,  aspirants  to 
the,  105 

Stael,  Mme  de,  100 

Stendhal,  see  Beyle 

Suffrage,  universal,  introduced 
into  Italy,  112,  136-7,  143 

Switzerland,  mobilisation  in , 
20-1 

Tardieu,  M.  Andre,  168-9 

Terre  irredente,  the,  35,  235 

Thiers,  158 

Trentino,  the,  36-7 

Triple  Alliance,  rupture  of,  30 
37 ;  irritation  caused  in 
France  by,  73,  107 ;  (158- 
182)  ;  Italy's  motives  in 
joining,  160-1  ;  renewal  of, 
169 ;  apparent  solidity  of, 
179-80;  renewal  of,  189; 
the  cancelling  clause  in, 
193-4  »    rupture  of,  200 

Tripoli,  the  expedition  to,  26, 
104,  169,  180 

Turco-Italian  war,  the,   173 

Turin,  triumphal  entry  of 
French  troops  into,   19-20 

Two-Power  Standard,  the,  177 

Unity,  Italian,  compared  with 

German,  44,  106-7 
Utilitarianism  of  the  Italians, 

123 

Victor  Emmanuel  II,  49,  59  ; 
his  great  task,  60-1,  68,  103- 


INDEX 


267 


4  ;  foresees  the  role  of  Italy 
in  the  Mediterranean,  104  ; 
his  ambitions  of  empire,  105 
Victor  Emmanuel  III,  ap- 
pealed to  by  nation,  40,  59  ; 
d'Annunzio  on,  96-7,  129, 
131 ;  his  life  attempted,  133  ; 
his  character,  134-6;  grants 
universal  suffrage,  137  ;  187, 
is  appealed  to  by  the  people, 
188  ;  sends  telegrams  to  the 
Quarto  celebrations,  203  ; 
appealed  to,  226-7  ;    grasps 


his  opportunity,  228-9  ;    re- 
calls Salandra,  230 
Villafranca,  battle  of,  27 
Vinci,  Leonardo  da,  73 

Wilhelm  I,  53 

Wilhelm  II,  150  ;  his  religious 
ambitions,  150-1,  179,  185, 
196 ;  autograph  letter  to 
Victor  Emmanuel  III,  203 

Yougoslav  State,  Italy's  fear 
of  a,  245 


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